ABUBAKAR V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
On Wednesday, the 12th day of July, 2017
CA/J/18C/2013Before Their Lordships
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
Before Their Lordships
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
GAMBO ABUBAKAR –Appellant
AND
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA –Respondent
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UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal is against the judgment of the Federal High Court, Jos division delivered on the 14th of February, 2011 by A.L. Allagoa, J. in Charge No. FHC/J/14C/2010. The said judgment is found at pages 95-110 of the record of appeal.
The Appellant was arraigned on 29th July, 2011 along with one Dauda Abubarkar on a three count charge of offences contrary to and punishable under Section 518 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap. C38 Laws of the Federation 2004 and Section 15(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004 in charge No. FHC/1/14C/2010. The Appellant who is the 2nd accused on the charge sheet pleaded not guilty and the trial commenced.
The facts of the case is that on 7th March, 2010 at a time when mayhem was being unleashed on Dogo N’ahauwa and other villages of Jos South and Barkin Ladi Local Government Areas of Plateau State; the accused persons were apprehended at different locations in circumstances that suggested they were criminals. They were taken to the State Criminal Investigation Department of the Nigeria Police in Jos, where they made voluntary confessional statements. They were subsequently arraigned before the Federal High Court, Jos division on a three count charge. At the end of the trial, the Appellant was found guilty in counts one and three of the charge and sentenced to 2 years and 21 years respectively.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the Appellant filed a Notice and Grounds of Appeal on 23rd March, 2011 which was later amended and filed on 21st November, 2013 but deemed properly filed and served on 21st February, 2014. Parties duly filed and exchanged their briefs whereupon the appeal was heard on 1st of June, 2017 after the Court was satisfied that the Appellant was served with hearing Notice for the day through his counsel Mr. A. S. Garba. Mr. Ihua – Maduenyi identified the Appellant’s brief filed on 15th February, 2011 but deemed properly filed and served on 2nd March, 2017; and urged the Court to deem the same adopted and argued under Order 19 Rule 9 (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016. Mr. Ihua Maduenyi the learned counsel for the Respondent thereafter adopted and relied on the Respondent’s brief of argument in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal.
For the purpose of this appeal, the Appellant submitted a sole issue for determination, which is:
“Whether from the record of proceedings, there was a proper arraignment of the Appellant before his trial, conviction and sentence by the trial Court.”
The Respondent’s counsel in the brief prepared by Mr. Charles Ihua – Maduenyi adopted the sole issue raised by Mr. A.S. Garba the Appellant’s counsel for determination. Since the Appellant’s counsel abandoned the other Grounds of appeal he did not raise issues from, I shall determine this appeal on the sole issue distilled by the parties as I deem the same appropriate for the determination of the appeal.
ARGUMENTS ON THE SOLE ISSUE
Mr. Garba in the Appellant’s brief submitted that, there was no proper arraignment of the Appellant at the Trial Court before his trial, conviction and sentence. He contended that, even though the Appellant appeared in Court on 1st April, 2010, 29th April, 2010 and on 10th June, 2010 to answer allegations against him, the record did not show that the charge was sufficiently read and explained to him in the language he understands to the satisfaction of
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the Court. He added that the Appellant’s plea to the charge read to him on 10th June, 2010 at the Trial Court was not recorded by the Court as provided for by law. He invited the Court to page 79 of the record.
The learned counsel further submitted that the Trial Court did not follow the correct procedure in arraigning the Appellant as provided for by Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. He noted what an arraignment must consist of to be adjudged valid.
He equally submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the requirements to read and explain charge to an accused person in the language he understands is based on the provisions of Section 36 (6) and (4) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended for the purpose of ensuring fairness to the accused person. The learned counsel contended that in a criminal trial where more than one accused person is charged as in the instant case, that the count must be read separately to each of the accused person and they must plead separately to the charge. Also that the record of proceedings must show that the count was read separately to each of the accused and that each pleads to them. See: YERIMA V. STATE (2010) 14 NWLR (PT. 1213) 25 at 41; OKOLI V. STATE (2012) 1 NWLR (PT 1281) 385 AT 400; YUSUFU V. STATE (2011) 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) 553 AT 879; BASSEY V. STATE (2012) 12 NWLR (PT. 1314) 209.
In conclusion, the learned counsel submitted that what the trial Court recorded at page 79 of the record on the plea of the Appellant, fell short of compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Section 36(6) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. He urged the Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the Appellant.
In response, Mr. Ihua Maduenyi for the Respondent agreed with the Appellant’s counsel that there must be valid arraignment of an accused person otherwise, any ensuing trial, conviction and sentence will be null and void. He referred to: LUFADEJU V. JOHNSON (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 371) 1532; TIMOTHY V. FRN (2012) 6 SC (pt. III) 159; MADU V. STATE (2012) 6 SC (pt. i) 80; KAJUBO V. STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 73) 721; EREKANURE v. STATE (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 385; KALU v. STATE (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 5S3) 537; OKORO V. STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 181 and OGUNYE V. STATE (1999) 5 NWLR (pt. 604) 548.
The learned counsel submitted that there was arraignment of the Appellant at the Court below before his trial and eventual conviction and sentence. He invited the Court to carefully scrutinize pages 75- 80 of the record where the arraignment of the Appellant was carried out on three occasions, to submit that in this case, the trial Court followed the requirement of the law. Mr. Ihua-Maduenyi recounted the proceedings of the Court on 10th June 2010 on how the Appellant took his plea to submit that the arraignment of the Appellant was in strict compliance with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Section 36 (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.
In any case, he argued that both the Appellant and his counsel has not shown in their brief what exactly is their complaint with regard to the arraignment as contained at pages 75-90 of the record of Appeal apart from restating the basic principles of law on arraignment under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. He added that it is not the law that unless the Court so expressly
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records every detail of how it took the accused person’s plea, such an arraignment automatically becomes invalid and null and void. That the law, which enjoins a trial Court to be satisfied with the explanation of the charge to the accused person before he pleads thereto, is subjective and not objective. In this case he argued that there is nothing on record to suggest that the trial Court was not satisfied with the explanation of the charge to the Appellant. He relied on: OGUNYE V. STATE (1999) 5 NWLR (pt.604) 548 at 553.
The Respondent’s counsel urged the Court to hold that Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act was substantially complied with by the learned trial Judge. That this issue is an after-thought and the same is raised in bad faith emphasizing that the learned counsel for the Appellant was present on the three occasions when the charge was read to the Appellant and when he took his plea. He did not raise any objection as to the purported non-compliance with the mandatory Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
He therefore prayed the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Respondent.
RESOLUTION OF SOLE ISSUE
By the sole issue and submissions thereon, it is obvious that the Appellant is satisfied with the decision of the trial Court delivered on the 14th February, 2011. The Appellant’s only complaint is that his arraignment in the trial Court was fundamentally flawed, thereby rendering the whole trial a nullity and so entitling him to an acquittal.
It is indeed the law that once an arraignment of an accused person fails to comply with Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; equivalent of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act; the trial, which follows, no matter how well conducted and decided, will be a nullity. Accordingly to ensure a valid trial and decision, a trial Court must comply substantially with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act when an accused person is arraigned before it. Equally the judge must make accurate recordings to show there was due compliance.
The validity of the trial, conviction and sentence of an accused person stemmed on his competent arraignment is as a result of the provisions of Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law, (applicable in the Northern part of Nigeria); and its counterpart Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act (applicable in the Southern part of Nigeria); alongside with Section 36 (6) and (a) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria; which ensures the accused’s fundamental right to fair hearing is maintained. The referred Laws provide thus:
Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law;
“When the High Court is ready to commence the trial the accused shall appear or be brought before it and the charge shall be read out in Court and explained to him and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or not guilty of the offence or offences charged.”
Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act:
“The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served.”
Section 36 (6) and (a) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999;
“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to
(a) Be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in details of the nature of the offence.”
For there to be a valid arraignment of an accused person: the procedure as provided for under Section 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which proper import is x-rayed by the provisions of its rival Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act on pleading to a charge; must be followed, as failure amounts to breach of the accused person’s fundamental right to fair hearing, under Section 36 (6) (a) of the Constitution. The under listed have been adjudged by judicial authorities as the conditions for a valid arraignment in accordance with the above reproduced provisions of the law.
(a) The accused shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court is satisfied that for safety concerns he should be fettered;
(b) The charge shall be read and explained to the accused person in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar
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or any other officer of Court;
(c) The accused person shall then be called upon to plead to each charge;
(d) The plea of the accused person shall be instantly recorded.
Both parties are ad idem and rightly too, that the above-stated requirements of the law are mandatory and not directory and must be significantly complied with in all criminal trials. lt is worthy of note that these requirements have been specifically provided to guarantee the fair trial of an accused person and to safeguard his interest at such a trial. Little wonder that, failure to satisfy any of them will render the whole trial incurably defective and null and void.
The crucial question itching for an answer is whether the trial Court complied with the requirement for the valid arraignment of the Appellant before his trial, conviction and sentence subject of this appeal. I feel the good stand point to approach the answer to this all important question in this appeal is reference to the proceedings of the trial Court on arraignment of the Appellant. The Appellant’s grouse is at page 79 of the record. I shall therefore reproduce the relevant part of the proceedings.
“Court: Read the charge
Charge is read to the accused persons in English Language and interpreted from English to Hausa and the Accused persons acknowledge they understand the charge.
To Count 1, 1st and 2nd Accused persons plead not guilty as charged. To Count II, 1st and 2nd Accused persons plead not guilty as charged To Count III, 1st and 2nd Accused persons plead not guilty as charged.”
The Appellant’s counsel submitted that by the recording shown above, the trial Court did not follow the correct procedure in arraigning the Appellant. From pages 75 to 79 of the record referred to by the Respondent’s counsel, I see that the Appellant took plea three times, to wit: on 1st of April 2010 at pages 75 to 76 of the record; on 29th April, 2010 at pages 77 to 78 of the record; and then again on 10th June, 2010 at pages 79 of the record. Let me also reproduce the plea taken on 1st April, 2010:
COURT: Count 1 of the charge has been read and explained to the two accused persons.
COURT to 1st Accused: Do you understand the count of the charge? lf you do are you guilty or not guilty
1st Accused: I understand the 1st count of the charge, I am not guilty.
2nd Accused: I understand the 1st count of the charge. I am not guilty
COURT: The 2nd count of the charge has been read and explained to the two accused persons
COURT to the accused persons: Do you understand the 2nd count of the charge? If you do are you guilty or not guilty?
1st Accused: I understand the 2nd count of the charge. I am not guilty.
2nd Accused: I understand the 2nd count. I am not guilty.
COURT: The 3rd count has been read and explained to the two accused persons
COURT to the Accused person: Do you understand the 3rd count of the charge? lf you do are you guilty or not guilty?
1st Accused: I understand the 3rd count. I am not guilty.
2nd Accused: I understand the 3rd count. I am not guilty.”
It is important to note that the Appellant’s counsel did not go beyond stating that the trial Court failed to follow the right procedure for arraignment as per Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. He did not show in the brief their exact complaint with regard to the arraignment as contained at pages 75-79 of the record of Appeal. The Appellant’s counsel in my view should have been specific as to which of the requirements was not followed. That it is, whether: (a) the charge was not read to the Appellant and his plea not taken? or; (b) the trial judge did not state that he was satisfied that the Appellant understood the charge since he is an illiterate? or; (c) the Appellant did not have a fair hearing in view of the fact that the charge was not read or explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court? or; (d) the plea was not recorded or was recorded together? or; (e) the charge was not read separately to the Appellant since they were two accused persons at the trial Court. However, reading in between the lines of paragraph 4.5 at page 6 of the Appellant’s brief, I can garner the complaint of the Appellant to be that the trial Court failed to have the counts of the charge read separately to each of the two accused persons at the trial Court and have their individual plea recorded separately. Examining the plea(s) of the Appellant at pages 75 to 79 of the record, it is correct that the counts of the charge were not read separately to the Appellant and the other accused person. Also their plea at page 79 of the record was
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recorded for the Appellant and his co accused together. Does this procedure and recording satisfy the requirements of the arraignment law or does it amount to a breach of the right to fair hearing of the Appellant.
A careful consideration of Section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution (As amended); depicts that once a charge is read and explained to an accused person in the language he speaks and or understands before he takes his plea; his right under that section of the Constitution would be deemed complied with. ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED v. THE STATE (2015) LPELR – 24397 (SC). In my own understanding therefore the combined purport of Section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution (As amended); and Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law or the like Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act; is the reading of the charge and explaining each of the counts fully and carefully in the language the accused person speaks or understands and ensuring that the accused person has understood the offence he is alleged to have committed before taking his plea. Appropriately, plea should be taken on each of the counts. Where you have more than one accused person,each accused person shall separately plea to each of the several counts. Again where there are many accused persons, it is still substantial compliance of the arraignment procedure law for the counts to be read jointly for the accused persons to take their individual plea. There is no doubt that it is always more elegant to record accused persons’ plea separately; in which case the Court will record the plea thus:
“1st accused person pleads not guilty to count 1 of the charge
2nd accused person pleads not guilty to count 1 of the charge
3rd accused person pleads not guilty to count 1 of the charge
4th accused person pleads not guilty to count 1 of the charge.”
However, it will not vitiate the trial, conviction and sentence of an accused where the Court records the accused person’s individual plea jointly, for example a recording that reads thus. “1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th accused persons each plead not guilty to count 1 of the charge”.
Furthermore, where the learned trial Judge had each count read jointly to the accused persons and records the separate plea of several accused persons together; but had satisfied himself that each of the accused persons understands the offence he is charged in that count; the fact that he did not record his satisfaction will not be offensive to the arraignment procedure law so as to render an accused person’s trial, conviction and sentence a nullity. ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED V. THE STATE (2015) LPELR – 24397 (SC); UDEH v. STATE (1999) 7 NWLR (pt. 609) 1; JOSEPH DANIEL V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2015) LPELR 24733; EREKANURE V. THE STATE (1993) 5 NWLR (pt. 294) 385; KAJUBO V. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 721, EFFIOM V. THE STATE (1995) 1. NWLR (Pt. 373) 507; TIMOTHY v. FRN (2012) 7 SCM 274. Commonsensically, when a Judge calls for the reading of a charge to an accused person and he takes his plea and the Court records his plea and thereafter proceeds to trial, the presumption of the law is that the Court is satisfied that the charge was explained to the accused to its satisfaction. See: OKORO V. THE STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.594) 181; where the Supreme Court per Wali, JSC put the matter succinctly as follows:- “The provision of the law should not be stretched to a point of absurdity by reading into it that the Judge must record that the charge was explained to the accused to his satisfaction before taking his plea. It will be impeaching the integrity of the Judge to do that, as no Judge will take the plea of an accused if he is not satisfied that the charge was read and explained to the accused to his satisfaction.”
I must emphasize though, that in all that I have laboured to state above, the accused person or persons must be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court is satisfied that for safety reasons he (they) should be fettered.
The apex Court in ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED v. THE STATE (supra) while referring to UDEH v. STATE (1999) 7 NWLR (pt. 609) 1; explicitly stated, “where the Appellant who stood trial with another accused and was convicted of murder and complained on appeal that the block reading of the charge to joint accused persons vitiated the criminal trial, this Court by a majority of 4 to 1 dismissed the appeal. The majority view was that a block reading of the charge to joint accused persons does not vitiate a criminal trial. Ayoola, JSC who delivered the lead judgment stated at page 18 as follows:- “It is difficult to fathom the logic in the argument which, in effect is that the
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trial Judge should have stated that the charge had been read to each of the accused persons, or, that only separate reading of the charge meets with the requirements of Section 333. It would be manifestly absurd to suggest that if there were twenty or more jointly accused person, the charge should be read twenty times, notwithstanding that the charge may have mentioned each of the accused as joint participant in the crime charged. The provisions of Section 333 cannot be interpreted to lead to such absurdity. When, therefore, Section 333 provides that the charge shall be read over and explained over to the person to be tried, it does not mean that it is to be read to each of them separately, so that the charge shall be read as many times as there are persons to be tried. The reasonable view to my opinion, is that when persons to be jointly tried on a charge or information are placed before the Court, the requirement of Section 333 is complied with by reading and explaining it to the group. What the law requires and what satisfies the purpose of the law is that each of them should plead separately to it” in his concurring judgment, Belgore, JSC (as he then was) said: “The fact that more accused persons than one are arraigned is not vitiated by the charge being read and explained jointly to them. The fact of joint reading and explanation of the charge to the accused persons will not vitiate a trial once it is clear the accused in the dock understood the offence he is accused of committing and has pleaded to the same (SUNDAY KAJUBO V. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 721, EREKANURE v. THE STATE (1993) 5 NWLR (pt. 254) 385; ONUOHA KALU v. THE STATE (1998) 13 NWLR (pt. 583) 53). By parity of reasoning since the charge contains 6 counts, it is not necessary to read out and explain each count to the accused before taking his plea. It will be sufficient if all the counts in the charge are read and explained to the accused and he is asked to plead to the charge as was done in this case. There is no complaint by the Appellant that he did not understand the charge against him; but rather that he should have been asked to plead to each count. The intention and purpose of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Ogun State as well as Section 36 (6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution (As amended) were fully complied with in the arraignment of the Appellant and the taking of his plea. This issue is resolved against the Appellant.” per AKA’AHS, JSC. (pp. 37 – 39, paras. A – G).
It is important to note at this point that the object of the requirement in Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law or Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act is to ensure that justice is not only claimed to have been done but must be seen to have been done to the accused by ensuring that he understands the charge against him and so as to be able to make his defence to the charge. See: SOLOLA & ANOR. V. THE STATE (2005) 6 SCM 137; ADENIJI v. THE STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (pt. 730) 375; (2001) 7 SCM 1; JOSEPH DANIEL v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (supra).
InJOSEPH DANIEL v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (supra), the apex Court noted that as in the case of ADENIJI v. THE STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (PT. 730) 375; (2001) 7 SCM 1, on the plea of the Appellant, the Court recorded the pleas as follows:- “Accused pleads not guilty to the charge” Counsel contended that the plea was not properly recorded in the trial Court. The Supreme Court held that since the accused person understood the English language, which is the language of the Court, there was no need to record that the charge was read to the accused in the language that he understands. Also in OKEKE V. THE STATE (2003) 5 SCM 131; on the plea of the accused, the trial Court recorded it as follows: “The charge is read to the accused who pleads not guilty to the charge.” The Court opined that two events took place in the above sentence. The first one is that the charge was read to the Appellant. The second one is that the Appellant pleaded not guilty. The apex Court held thus “I do not think the recording of a charge can be defeated merely because the trial Judge did not record that the charge was read in a particular language which is understood by the accused person, particularly in a situation such as this, where the Appellant was represented by counsel… taking a plea by an accused person presupposes that he understands the charge.”
So the absence of the details of how the charge was read and explained to the accused person, does not under the arraignment procedure law vitiate a trial. OKEKE v. THE STATE (supra). Once an accused person pleads to a charge before the Court without any
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objection, it presupposes that he understands the charge preferred against him. OKEWU V. FRN (supra). This is moreso, where as in the case the accused person is represented by a counsel.
With the referred decisions of the Supreme Court, the position of the law is unequivocally clear. In the present appeal where the Appellant was represented by counsel at the trial Court where he took his plea of “Not Guilty” and; there is nothing on record to impugn the fact that he perfectly understood the charge read and explained to him in Hausa language which he speaks and understands. Although the counts of the charge were read in block to Appellant and his co accused; their individual pleas on 10th June, 2010 recorded jointly; and the learned trial Judge did not categorically record that he was satisfied that the Appellant understood the nature of his plea; the arraignment procedure did not in anywhere contravene the requirements of Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code Law nor Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Rather I hold the view that the manner in which the learned trial Judge recorded his plea though could have been more elegantly recorded, yet substantially complied with the law. Accordingly, I hold that there was a competent arraignment of the Appellant and his trial, conviction and sentence valid.
The sole issue is therefore resolved in favour of the Respondent. Appeal therefore lacks merit and fails. The same is dismissed. I affirm the decision of the Federal High Court in suit No: FHC/J/14C/2010 delivered on 14th February 2011 as the same is valid.
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Uchechukwu Onyemenam, JCA. His Lordship considered and resolved the issues in contention in this appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide the conclusions. I wish to make some comments for emphasis.The sole complaint of the Appellant in this appeal is that the lower Court failed to comply with the provisions ofSection 187(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The section provides:
“When the High Court is ready to commence trial, the accused shall appear or brought before it and the charges shall be read out in Court and explained to him and he shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged or offences charged.”
This complaint of the Appellant questioned whether or not there was a valid arraignment before he was tried by the lower Court. An arraignment involves the taking of the plea of an accused defendant. The plea is an accused defendant’s formal response of guilty or not guilty or no contest to a criminal charge. It is the means by which an Accused defendant joins issues with the State on a criminal charge. It is trite that one of the fundamental requirements of a valid trial in a criminal matter is a valid arraignment. In Idemudia vs State (1999) 7 NWLR (pt 610) 202 at 219 B-C, Karibi-Whvte, JSC stated that:
“A valid trial is posited on the fact of a valid arraignment. An arraignment as rationem ponere, that is calling on the accused to reckoning for the allegations of the offences against him. The laws of this country have made adequate provisions for the protection of the interest of the accused and the citizens in the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, the Court before whom an accused person is required to appear for reckoning in respect of allegations of offences, is required to observe certain constitutional requirements in Section 36(6)(a) and the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law.”
Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that ‘every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence.’ The Courts have, in the interpretation of the laws of criminal prosecution, laid down some essential requirements that must be satisfied for there to be a valid arraignment and these are (a) the defendant must be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order; (b) the charge or information must be read over and explained to the accused to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court; (c) it must be read and explained to him in the language he understands; (d) the accused must be called upon to plead thereto unless there exists any valid reason to do otherwise such as objection to want of service where the defendant is entitled by law to service of a copy of the information the Court is
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satisfied that he has in fact not been duly served – Kajubo Vs State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt 73) 721, Olabode Vs State (2009) 11 NWLR (pt 1152) 254, Temitope Vs State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt 1 243) 289 and Olowoyo Vs State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1329) 346.
These requirements are to ensure that an accused person gets a fair trial and he is not railroaded into jail. They are not merely cosmetic or mere semantics. They are provisions considered necessary to ensure that the accused defendant understands and appreciates what is being alleged against him, to which he is required to make a plea. The requirements cannot be waived, ignored or presumed. They are very important and mandatory and there must be clear evidence on the records that they were fully or substantially complied with. Arraignment is not a matter of technicality and it is a very important initial step in the trial of a person on a criminal charge. It is very critical and foundational to the successful prosecution and possible conviction of an accused defendant. A criminal trial anchored on a faulty arraignment process is tantamount to erecting a house on a faulty and sandy foundation and it will invariably collapse no matter how well the trial was conducted. Thus, the Courts have held that failure to comply with the conditions for a valid arraignment renders the whole trial a nullity- Kajubo vs State supra, Yahaya vs State (2002) 3 NWLR (pt 754) 289, Okeke vs State (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 842) 25. Amala Vs State (2004) 12 NWLR (pt 888) 30, Solola Vs State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt 937) 460, Lufadeju Vs Johnson (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt 1037) 535 and Dada vs State(2013) 2 NWLR (pt 1337) 59.
It was not the case of the Appellant that he was not arraigned before the lower Court. The records of appeal show that the plea of the appellant was taken on three different dates. The grouse of the Appellant is that the lower Court did not record that the charge was sufficiently read and explained to the Appellant in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court and that the charge was not read to the Appellant and his co-accused separately, but together. It is correct that it is good practice for trial Courts to specifically record that “the charge was read and fully, explained to the accused defendant to the satisfaction of the Court” before then recording his plea thereto – Kajubo Vs State supra. However, the law is that where there is no such recording but there is evidence on the record of the trial Court that the charge was read over to the accused person in the language he understands and he makes his plea and the Court records the plea and thereafter proceeds to trial, the presumption of the law is that the Court was satisfied that the charge was explained to the accused and the fact that the record of the trial Court does not include details of how the charge was read and explained to the accused and that it was done to its satisfaction will not vitiate or nullity the arraignment- Okoro Vs The State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 181, Adeniji Vs The State (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt 730) 375, Okeke Vs The State (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 842) 25, Daniel Vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt 1475) 119.
Similarly, it is desirable that where there are more than one accused defendant, they should be arraigned separately as there is no provision for block pleas under the law-Dike Vs State (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt 450) 553. The law, however, is that the fact that more accused persons than one are arraigned is not vitiated by the charge being read and explained to them jointly. The fact of joint reading and explanation of the charge to the accused persons will not vitiate a trial once it is clear that the accused person in the block understood the offence he is accused of committing and has pleaded to the same – Kalu Vs The State (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt 583) 53, Udeh Vs State (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt 609) 1 and Mohammed Vs State (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt 1468) 496.
The records of the Court show that on each of the dates that the plea of the Appellant was taken, he was represented by Counsel and on none of those dates did the Appellant complain that he did not understand the offence or the language it was being read to him. The records show that the offences in the charge were read over to the Appellant and he pleaded to each one. The records show that neither the Appellant nor his Counsel made any complaint about any lapse or flaw in the procedure adopted in his arraignment before the lower Court either before or after he gave his plea. The arraignment was proper and the complaints of the Appellant in this appeal are baseless.
It is for these reasons and the fuller exposition of the law in the lead
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judgment that I agree that there is no merit in the appeal. I too hereby dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Federal High Court sitting in Jos Judicial Division in Charge No FHC/J/14C/2010 delivered by Honorable Justice A. L. Allagoa on the 14th of February, 2011 convicting the Appellant and sentencing him accordingly.
ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege and opportunity to preview the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions therein.
The appeal lacks merit and it is hereby disallowed. I therefore affirm the judgment of the Court below. I make no order as to costs.
Appearances
Absent –For Appellant
AND
Charles Ihua-Maduenyi Esq. –For Respondent
Appearances
DAUDA v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
On Friday, the 10th day of March, 2017
SC.442/2014Before Their Lordships
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
Before Their Lordships
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
ADAMU DAUDA –Appellant
AND
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA- Respondent
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OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal from the Court of Appeal, Jos Division delivered on 23rd May, 2014 which affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant by a Jos Federal High Court.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeal, Jos Division. That Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court.
Still not satisfied with the conviction by the trial Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, the appellant has appealed to this Court on one ground of appeal from which he formulated a sole issue for determination of this appeal. The sole issue reads:
Whether from the records of proceedings, there was a proper arraignment of the appellant before his trial, conviction and sentence by the trial Court.
Learned counsel for the respondents adopted the sole issue formulated by the appellant.
The sole issue formulated by the appellant’s learned counsel shall be considered in resolving this appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal on 15th December, 2016 learned counsel for the appellant, R.George Esq adopted the appellant’s brief filed on 25/8/14 and urged the Court to allow the appeal, while learned counsel for the respondent C. Ihua-Maduenyi Esq, adopted the respondent’s brief filed on 8/9/14 and urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm concurrent findings.
Learned counsel for the appellant observed that the appellant as one of the accused persons was not properly arraigned before the trial Court, contending that the charge was not sufficiently read and explained to him in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court. He further observed that the appellant’s plea to the charge was not recorded as provided by law. He submitted that where there is non-compliance with requirements for valid arraignment, the trial is a nullity. Reliance was placed on Yerima v. State (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1231) p.25; Okoli v. State (2012) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1281) p.385; Kayode v. State (2008) 1 NWLR (PT. 1068) P. 281.
Concluding he submitted that the effect of failing to comply with Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act renders the entire proceedings a nullity. He urged this Court to allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant.
On his part, learned counsel for the respondent observed that there was compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act when the appellant was arraigned and took his plea on 15 June, 2010. Reference was made to pages 67-68 of the Record of Appeal. Reliance was placed on Lufadeju v. Johnson (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 371) p. 1332; Erekanure v. State (1993) 5 NWLR (pt. 294) p. 385.
Concluding, he submitted that the appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed.
In this appeal the appellant is satisfied with the judgment of the trial Court delivered on 16th December, 2010 and affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 23 May, 2014. The ONLY complaint of the appellant is that his arraignment in the trial Court was fundamentally flawed, thereby rendering the whole trial a nullity and so entitling him to an acquittal.
Indeed once an arraignment of an accused person fails to comply with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the trial which follows no matter how well conducted and decided is a nullity.
It is therefore fundamental that the trial judge ensures that he complies strictly with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act when an accused person is arraigned before him to take his plea and the judge must make correct recordings to show that there was compliance.
Section 36(6) of the Constitution states that:
“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to-
(a) be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in details of the nature of the offence.”
Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that:
…………………….B…………………….
“The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explain to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officers of the Court and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served therewith.”
For there to be a valid arraignment of the accused person, the following conditions, contained in Section 215(supra) must be satisfied:
1. The accused person shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court is satisfied that for safety concerns he should be fettered.
2. The charge shall be read and explained to the accused person in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or any other officer of Court;
3. The accused person shall then be called upon to plead to each charge;
4. The plea of the accused person shall be instantly recorded.
Failure to comply with any of the above renders the whole trial a nullity. See Lufadeju v. Johnson (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.371) p.1532; Timothy v. FRN (2012) 6 SC (Pt. III) p.159; Madu v. State (2012) 6 SC (Pt. 1) p. 80.
I shall now reproduce relevant extracts from the record of appeal to see if there was compliance with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, when the appellant was arraigned before a Jos Federal High Court on 15th June, 2010. The record of proceedings for 15 June 2010 runs as follows:
“All the accused person are present.
Ihua – Maduenyi. C.U.
A.S. Garba- appearing with A. Aminu for all the accused persons.
Ihua – Maduenyi – This matter is coming up for the 1st time; we humbly apply that the accused be allowed to take their plea.
All the accused persons indicate that they do not understand English.
Mr. Peter Sani is called interpreter on Oath.
Plea – Charge is read to all the accused persons in English language and translated by the interpreter from English to Hausa language.
To Count 1 all the accused persons acknowledge that they understand the charge and plead not guilty to the charge.
To Count II the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 11th, 13th, and 14th accused acknowledge that they understand the charge and plead not guilty as charged.
To Count III – All the accused persons acknowledge that they understand the charge and plead not guilty.
Ihua – Maduenyi: May we apply to come back on the 1st and 2nd to come back to take the trial-”
This is what the Court of Appeal had to say on the arraignment.
“The appellant has not proved any irregularity in his arraignment before the lower Court. He has also not shown how a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned to his disadvantage in the proceedings of the lower Court on 15th June, 2010 when he was arraigned before that Court. On the whole I hold that the lower Court complied with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act when the appellant was arraigned before it and his plea to the (3) counts charge was taken. In the result, I resolve the lone issue against the appellant.”
There were fifteen accused persons arraigned before the Federal High Court Jos on 15th June, 2010. The appellant was one of them. He was accused person number 3. All of them were charged on three counts as stated earlier in this judgment.
There is an irrebutable presumption after examining proceedings before the Court on 15th June 2010 that the appellant was placed before the Court unfettered. The charge was read and explained to him in Hausa language, the language he understands, to the satisfaction of the Court, more so as neither he or his counsel at that time complained of not understanding the charge.
The appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the three counts charge and his plea was recorded as not guilty. I am in the circumstances satisfied that the learned trial judge complied with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal
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Procedure Act. By complying with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the learned trial judge ensured that the appellant was given a fair hearing as provided by Section 36(6) of the Constitution. There is no merit in this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: On reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother Rhodes-Vivour JSC just delivered. I share his lordship’s reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and that it has to be dismissed.
Appellant’s complaint in the appeal is that his arraignment which is in breach of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act renders the entire proceeding leading to his conviction and sentence, under Section 518(5) of the Criminal Code, Section 5(1) and 27(1) of the Firearms Actand Section 15(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004, a nullity. Appellant contends that the head of charge were neither read and explained to him nor were his plea thereto recorded by the Court as required by law.
Learned respondent counsel dutifully opposed the submission and maintains that the record of appeal clearly belies appellant’s contention. I agree.
My examination of the record shows clearly that the trial Court, as required by law, had read, explained the various heads of charge to all those arraigned before it and recorded their respective pleas. The lower Court could not have held otherwise.
This is an appeal against the concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts. Having failed to establish that these findings are in any way perverse and occasioning miscarriage of justice, the appellant’s must fail. See Ibhafidon v. Igbinosu (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 716) 653 and Jackie Phillips v. Eba Odan Commercial & Industrial Company Ltd (2012) LPELR-9718 (SC). I so hold.
It is for the foregoing purely made by way of emphasis and more so the fuller reasons in the lead judgment that I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the concurrent decisions of the two Courts below.
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI, J.S.C.: I read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. I agree that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
My brother has outlined the background facts leading to the conviction and sentence of the appellant which was concurrently affirmed by the two lower Courts.
The appellant was certainly unhappy with the outcome of the judgment and hence the appeal now before us on the sole issue and posing the question:-
Whether from the records of proceedings, there was a proper arraignment of the appellant before the trial, conviction and sentence by the trial Court.
It would appear from the foregoing issue that the appellant’s bone of contention is against the procedure adopted in respect of the appellant’s arraignment. Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act is very specific and well spelt out on the subject of what should constitute a valid arraignment as follows:-
“The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court and such person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served therewith.”
On the question of a valid arraignment, this Court per Kutigi, CJN in the case of Lufadeju v. Johnson (2007) All FWLR (PT. 371) 1532 at 1537 had the following to say:-
“Arraignment involves two things. One, the reading of the charge or information to the accused. Two, the response to the charge or information by a plea from the accused. The plea can either be guilty or not guilty. It is only when the above procedure is followed that a Court of law will be said to have taken arraignment proceedings.”
In other words, there cannot be a valid arraignment without the accused being in Court because he must plead to the charge personally. The Court must also be satisfied that the accused person was not before it in a representative capacity.
…………………….D…………………….
It is also mandatory that the accused should be told and understands the nature of the charge brought against him. The explanation is only discharged if the Court is fully satisfied that the accused is in fact well acquainted of the reason why he is brought to Court.
The final stage is where the accused must plead to the charge. The plea must be voluntary and free from all forms of inhibitions or external detractions. The reason for the requirements and the strict compliance are to ensure a fair trial of an accused person and also to safeguard his interest at such trial of an accused person and also to safeguard his interest at such a trial. The failure to satisfy any of the essential criteria will render the whole trial incurably defective and null and void. See the cases of Kajubo v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 73) 721; Erekanure v. State (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 294) 385 AND KALU V. STATE (1998) 13 NWLR (pt. 583)
With reference to pages 67-68 of the record of appeal, the arraignment of the appellant was carried out in the trial Court. I agree with the submission by the learned counsel for the respondent that the requirement of the law was followed at the trial Court. The procedure followed was indeed in strict accordance with the provision of Section 215 of the Act and Section 36(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)
In this case, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the trial Court was not satisfied with the explanation of the charge to the appellant. See the case of Ogunye v. State (1999) 5 NWLR (pt. 604) 548 at 553.
In summary, I agree with the learned respondent’s counsel that Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act was substantially complied with the learned trial judge.
My learned brother Rhodes-Vivour, JSC has dealt with the issue adequately. With the few words of mine and relying further on the comprehensive reasoning in the lead judgment, I also endorse the concurrent judgment by the two lower Courts and dismiss the appeal which has no merit.
Appeal dismissed.
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.: My lord, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, obliged me with the draft of the leading judgment just delivered now. I endorsed the conclusion that, as this appeal is unmeritorious, it ought to be dismissed
The question here involves around the issue of proper arraignment which this Court has dealt with ad nauseam,Josiah v. State [1985] 1 NWLR (pt.1) 125; [1985] 1 SC 406; Kajubo v. State [1988] 1 NWLR (PT 73) 721, 731; [1988] 3 SCNJ (PT. 1) 1179; EBEM V. STATE [1990] 7 NWLR (PT. 160) 113; Idemudia v. State [1999] 5 SCNJ 47; Onuoha Kalu v. The State [1993] 5 NWLR (PT. 583) 531; Erekanure v. The State [1993] 5 NWLR (PT. 294) 385; OMOKUWAJO V. FRN(2013) LPELR – 20184 (SC); Sharfal v. The State (1992) LPELR-3038 (SC) 11.
Others include: Ogunye v. The State [1999] 5 NWLR (PT 604) 548, 567; Ewe v. The State (1992) LPELR-1179 (SC); Debie v. The State [2007] 9 NWLR (PT.1038); Lufadeju and Anor v. The State (2007) LPELR-1795 (SC); Olabode v. The State (2009) LPELR-2542 (SC); Amako v. The State (1995) LPELR-451 (SC); Josiah v. The State [1985] 1 SC 400, 416; Eyorokoomo v. The State [1979] 8-9 SC 3; Dibie v. The State [2007] 9 NWLR (PT. 1038) 30, 61-62; Edibo v. The State (2007) LPELR- 1012 (SC); Adeniji v. The State (2001) LPELR -126 (SC); Madu v. The State (2012) LPELR-7867 (SC); Ogunye v. The State [1999] 5 NWLR (PT. 604) 548, 555; Rufai v. The State (2001) LPELR-2963 (SC); Effiom v. The State [1995] 1 NWLR (pt. 373) 507; Adeniji v. The State [2001] FWLR (PT 57) 809; Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) LPELR-20184 (SC); Ogunye v. The State [1999] 5 NWLR (pt 604) 548, 567.
From my perusal of the record of the trial Court for June 15, 2010. I am satisfied that the lower Court, rightly, affirmed the trial Court’s approach to the arraignment of the appellant.
It is for these and the more detailed reasons in the leading judgment that I too, shall dismiss this appeal as lacking in merit. Appeal dismissed.
AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.: I read in draft form, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Olabode
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Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. I agree with the reason and conclusion he arrived at that appeal lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. For purposes of emphasis and support. I will offer few comments of mine below.
His lordship had ably summarized the facts giving rise to this appeal and the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, hence I do not see any need to repeat them here.
The grouse of the appellant’s learned counsel is that the appellant was not properly arraigned before the trial Court because according to him the charge was not sufficiently read and explained to the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court adding that the appellant’s plea to the counts was not recorded as required by law. Learned counsel for the appellant opined that where there is non-compliance with the requirement of Sections 215 and 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the proceedings is a nullity. Reliance was placed on the anthenties of Yerima vs. The State (2010) 14 NWLR (pt. 1231) 25; Kayode v. The State (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1068) 281.
In his reaction, the respondent’s learned counsel argued that the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Codewas duly complied with when the appellant was arraigned before the trial Court and his pleas were taken as borne out by the record of appeal.
It was apposite to refer to the record of proceedings of the trial Court to see what had really transpired on the 15th June 2010 when the appellant and other co-accused persons were arraigned before the trial Court. The proceedings of the trial Court went as below:-
“A.S.Garba appearing with A. Aminu for all the accused person.
Ihua-Maduenyi- This matter is coming up for the first time, we humbly apply that the accused be allowed to take their plea.
Court – All the accused persons indicate that they do not understand English.
Mr Peter is called interpreter on oath. English language and translated by the interpreter English to Hausa language.
Court – Count I all the accused persons acknowledge that they understand the charge and plead not guilty to the charge.
To Count II the 1st, 3rd, 8th accused acknowledge that they understand that charge and plead not guilty.
To Count III All the accused persons acknowledge that they understand the charge and plead not guilty to the charge.
Ihua-Maumyi – May we apply to come back on the 1st and 2nd to come back to take the trial.
My lords, permit me now to considered the requirement of a valid arrangement under our laws. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 by its provision of Section 36 (6) provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed instantly in the language he understands the nature of the offence he was accused of committing. What is required of a trial Court is to cause the charge to be read and explained to the accused person in the language he understand and if he understands it, then his plaa will be taken. See Darwoda vs The State (2000) 12 SCNJ 9.
By the combined effect of the constitutional provisions mentioned supra and the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Code Act, there can be said to have been a valid arraignment only if the following requirements are satisfied, namely:-
(a) The accused is placed before the Court unfettered unless the trial Court shall see cause to the contrary or otherwise order.
(b) The charge or information shall be read over and explained to him in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court by the Court registrar, clerk or officer and
(c) The accused shall then be called upon to plead instantly thereto.
In multiplicity of decided authorities of this Court, it has been held that these requirements must be satisfied and the record of the trial must clearly show that the conditions listed above are complied with in order to safeguard the constitutional requirement of fair trial of those arraigned before a trial Court. See Adeniji v. State (2001) 5 SCNJ 379 at 350; Kajubo v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (PT 721); Rufai v. The State (2001) 7 SCNJ 127 at 128. The above requirement of the law is therefore mandatory.
In this instant case, the appellant was among the fifteen accused persons arraigned before the Federal High Court Jos (trial Court). When arraigned before trial Court as shown by the record of proceedings reproduced supra, the charges were read and explained to him in Hausa language, the language he understood and after that his plea of “not guilty” was taken on each of the three counts he stood trial on.
To my mind therefore, there had been strict compliance with all the conditions or requirements of the law as required by Section 36(6) of 1999 Constitution and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It needs to be noted also that the appellant as one of the accused persons arraigned before at the trial Court was represented by a counsel. The learned counsel did not at any time, object or complain about the procedure adopted by the trial Court on 15th June, 2010, the date of arrangement of the appellant. Also as rightly found by the Court below. The learned counsel failed to show that miscarriage of Justice was occasioned to him on the date of the arraignment and I therefore do not see any irregularity with the said arraignment of the appellant and therefore hold that there was proper arrangement as rightly found by the Court below.
Thus, for these few comments advanced by me in support of lead judgment and for the fuller and more detailed reasons in the lead judgment of Rhodes-Vivour JSC. I also dismiss this appeal for want of merit. I affirm the concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances
R. George with him, B. Damilare –For Appellant
AND
C.U. Ihua-Maduenyi with him, C. Ihua- Maduenyi –For Respondent
Appearances
MBATSADUE v. C.O.P
On Friday, December 09, 2022
CA/ABJ/CR/85/2021Before Their Lordships
Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal
Peter Oyinkenimiemi Affen Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
Judgment
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant was arraigned and convicted of Criminal Force and Assault contrary to Section 267 of the Penal Code Law and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with a fine of N 10,000 (Ten Thousand Naira), by a Senior Magistrate Court of the FCT, His Worship Hauwa Aliyu Shehu, on the 2nd of November, 2011. At the trial before the Senior Magistrate, the Prosecution called three witnesses and tendered two exhibits and closed its case, while the appellant called two witnesses in his defence.
At the close of the case, the learned trial Senior Magistrate found the appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six months in prison with a fine of N10,000.00. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant appealed against that decision to the High Court of FCT Appellate Division. The appeal was heard and in a considered judgment delivered on the 28th of November, 2013, the FCT High Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant of the Offence of Criminal Force and Assault to deter a Public Servant from the performance of his duty contrary to Section 267 of the Penal Code Law.
The FCT High Court however reduced the sentence from six months’ imprisonment with N10,000.00 fine to a fine of N20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Naira). Dissatisfied with the judgment of FCT High Court, Appellate Division, presided over by U.A. Ogakwu J., (as he then was and A.I. Kutigi, delivered on the 28th of November, 2013, the appellant has appealed to this Court on four grounds of appeal filed on the 21st of January, 2021. Learned counsel for the appellant Tsafa Barnabas Esq., distilled four issues for determination as follows: “1.
Whether the trial Magistrate’s holding that the matter was not heard in Chambers but only the FIR was mentioned in chamber was not unconstitutional. 2. Whether the learned Justices of the High Court were right when they held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 3.
Whether the learned Justices of the High Court were right when they held that the extra-judicial statement of the appellant was not a confessional statement but refused to acquit and discharge the appellant when his conviction was based solely on the extra-judicial statement as it was held to be a confessional statement.
4. Whether the learned Justices were right in hiking the fine imposed by the trial Magistrate when there was no appeal on the fine.”
Learned counsel for the respondent Simon Lough, SAN, adopted the issues as distilled by learned for the appellant. In his brief of argument, learned counsel for the appellant submitted in summary that since the judgment of the trial Court was a nullity for failure to comply with the mandatory constitutional requirement with regards to the taking of plea of the appellant, this Court is urged to discharge and acquit the appellant. He argued that the prosecution failed to prove the offence under Section 267 of the Penal Code beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.
Counsel contended that the extra-judicial statement of the appellant which the trial Court declared to be a confessional statement and consequent upon which he was convicted but which the High Court declared not to be a confessional statement, stands to reason that the conviction of the appellant was not based on evidence. Reacting to the foregoing, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the issue of taking the FIR (First Information Report) in chambers was not unconstitutional and that this issue never arose at the FCT High Court.
That to raise the issue in this Court, the appellant ought to seek and obtain the Leave of this Court. He reproduced the provisions of Section 267 of the Penal Code upon which the appellant was charged and convicted and contended that the FCT High Court was well within the law to have held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Referring to pages 155 to 173 of the Record of Appeal, counsel posited that the FCT High Court did not in their judgment hold that the extra-judicial statement of the appellant was not a confessional statement.
That the FCT High Court stated that the said statement was not the sole basis for the conviction of the appellant at the trial Magistrate Court. In the determination of this appeal, issue no. 1 appears most crucial in the sense that it bothers on the provisions of Sections 360(1) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
The appellant in the course of his trial filed a Preliminary Objection challenging the jurisdiction of the trial Magistrate Court on the ground that the plea of the accused (now appellant) was taken in chambers rather than in an open Court as provided for under the said Constitution. The respondent has however, argued that what took place in chamber was only the First Information Report (FIR) and therefore, did not occasion any miscarriage of justice.
The said Section 36(1) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution provides: 36(1) “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality”. 36(3) “The proceedings of a Court or the proceedings of any Tribunal relating to the matters mentioned in Subsection (1) of this Section including the announcement of the decision of the Court or Tribunal shall be held in public.” (Underlining mine for emphasis).
The question then is; is First Information Report (FIR) part of proceedings? The trial Magistrate had argued that the matter was not heard in Chambers but only the First Information Report was mentioned in Chambers and therefore, there was no miscarriage of justice. Counsel for the appellant disagreed with the above view but rather looked at it in a different perspective. In Nigeria – Arab Bank Ltd v. Barri Engineering Nig.
Ltd (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 413) Pg. 257, the Supreme Court held that delivery of the judgment in Chambers occasioned an irregularity which touched on the legality of the whole proceedings. The Court held as follows: “…It is my respectful view that sitting in Chambers to deliver judgment is not one of the facts before us, sitting in public or open Court is.
A judge’s Chambers is not one of the regular Courtrooms nor is it a public place to which the public have the right to ingress and egress as of right except on invitation by or with permission of the judge… There is in this case a clear breach of the mandatory provisions of Section 33(3) and (13) of the 1979 Constitution and Order 36 Rule 1 of the High Court Rules of Lagos State… The delivery of judgment is in my respectful view part of the hearing of a case or matter. A breach of a mandatory constitutional provision is more than a mere technicality. It is fundamental.
The breach vitiates the entire proceedings before him.” Peter-Odili, JSC, captured the controversy as to whether conducting part of the Court’s proceedings in Chambers renders the entire proceedings null and void in the case of Misiri Alimi v. Asani Kosebinu (2016) All FWLR (Pt. 859) at pg. 944. “…A part of the Court’s proceedings which ought to be public is and is conducted in the confines of the judge’s chambers is clearly one done in secrecy and detracts from the impartiality, independence, publicity and unqualified respect which enshrouds justice given openly without fear or favour.
Its acceptance by the public at large and the confidence it demands depends on these qualities which must be strictly adhered to… what occurred in the trial High Court was a clear aberration, an irregular so profound as to be incurable…” Even in civil matters which we do not view as serious as the criminal matters since civil matters do not attract jail term, the Supreme Court was still of the firm view that it must be conducted in open Court. The decision of the trial judge on his own to hear the matter in chambers occasioned a fundamental irregularity.
The Supreme Court stated as follows: “The hearing of this matrimonial case took place in judge’s chambers. Neither the counsel nor the parties requested for the hearing of the divorce proceedings in camera. A judge’s chambers is not a Court Hall to which the public will normally have any right to access. The petition and answers did not contain such matters, which by law, ought to be heard in camera in a Courtroom.” Again in Edibo v.
The State (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) at 306, Tabai JSC, captured it succinctly, thus: “The arraignment and taking of plea of an accused person is the very commencement of a criminal trial. It is the stage when the accused person appears in Court, the charge explained to his understanding and pleads thereto in person and not even through his counsel. It is a very fundamental aspect of any criminal proceedings and that underscores the need for the strict and mandatory compliance in matters relating thereto.
Thus, any criminal trial no matter how well conducted, without the plea of the accused first and properly taken is a nullity. In the instant case, the proceedings of the 19th January, 1998 wherein the plea of the appellant and others were taken in the judge’s chambers was not only irregular, it was fundamentally defective and rendered the entire proceedings null and void.” The above case decided by the apex Court in 2007 is in all fours with the present appeal.
It is trite that the taking of the plea of an accused person not only kick-starts the criminal trial, it is the nucleus of the entire trial. It is one of the stages where the accused person must plead personally and not even through his counsel, therefore, compliance must be strictly, compulsorily and obligatorily adhered to. It does not give room for discretion or evasion. In the instant case, the trial Magistrate admitted taking the First Information Report (FIR) which is the plea of the accused person in chambers.
It is a constitutional requirement and Section 36(3) of the said 1999 Constitution gives no room for waiver. The act of conducting the (FIR) in chambers rather than in open Court, has resulted in fatal consequences. It is not a mere irregularity but quite fundamental which has rendered the taking of the plea (FIR) and indeed the entire proceedings a judicial waste of time, unconstitutional and a complete nullity. The whole trial and conviction of the appellant crumbled with this fundamental blunder.
As I pointed out earlier, issue one is the most crucial in the sense that a determination of that issue will establish the need or otherwise to go into the other issues. The apex Court in Edibo v. The State, cited earlier was of the view that in order to justify an order of retrial, an appellate Court must satisfy itself of the existence of a number of factors. Each case must however, be determined by its peculiar facts and circumstances. Those factors as enumerated by the apex Court are as follows: “a.
That there has been an error in law (including the observance of the law of evidence) or an irregularity in the procedure of such a character that the appellate Court is unable to say that there has been no miscarriage of justice. b. That besides the error or irregularity, the totality of evidence discloses a substantial case against the appellant. c. That there are no special circumstances that would render it oppressive to put the appellant on trial a second time.
d. That the offence or offences with which the appellant is convicted or the consequences to the appellant or any other person of the conviction or acquittal of the appellant are not merely trial; and
e. That to refuse an order for retrial would occasion a greater miscarriage of justice than to grant it.” Considering the circumstances of this case, particularly, the nature of the offence, the factors enumerated above are not applicable in this case. It is on record that the appellant is a legal practitioner, he was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment out of which he spent about one month before he was granted bail pending appeal.
Since the trial of the appellant has been adjudged to be unconstitutional, and a nullity, quite apart from the irregularity which clearly bothers on unconstitutionality, the evidence in my view did not disclose a substantial case against the appellant to justify a second trial. In the premise, there is merit in this appeal and it is hereby allowed. Issue no. one is resolved against the respondent and in favour of the appellant. A determination of this first issue has rendered a consideration of the other issues unnecessary and academic.
Consequently, the judgment, conviction and sentence of the lower Court i.e. FCT High Cout Appellate Division on the 28th of November, 2013, is hereby set aside. The appellant is accordingly discharged and acquitted.
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my Lord, CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, (PHD), JCA and I am in total agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the leading judgment. Indeed, it is a constitutional requirement that trials must be held in the public, which is one of the attribute of fair hearing. In a criminal trial, arraignment is a very important and fundamental aspect. Once arraignment is defective, being a foundation, the trial must collapse. My Lord, MOHAMMED, J.C.A in AKIODE V.
FRN (2022) LPELR-58266 (CA) held thusly; “A criminal trial starts with the arraignment of an accused person before the trial Court. Arraignment is therefore the foundation of a criminal trial. The arraignment essentially consists of reading the charge or information to the accused person, or stating to him the substance of the charge or information and calling on him to plead thereto.” The fundamental nature of arraignment has a jurisdictional consequence, if improperly done, it will divest the Court of jurisdiction, see the case of IBRAHIM V.
STATE (2013) LPELR-21883 (SC) where the apex Court held as follows: “The arraignment of an accused person touches on the jurisdiction of the Court and any improper arraignment of the accused is a breach of a fundamental requirement in criminal proceedings which is capable of rendering the totality of the proceedings null and void See Section 36(6)(a) of 1999 Constitution, also S.242 CPC. It was held in State v.
Oladimeji (2003) FWLR (Pt175) 395 at 406 that: “Issue of arraignment is fundamental in a criminal trial because if not properly conducted it may vitiate the proceedings.” Per AKA’AHS, J.S.C I therefore adopt the fuller reasoning in the leading judgment and also allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the appellate Court below.
PETER OYINKENIMIEMI AFFEN, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading, in draft, the leading judgment of my Noble Lord, CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME (Ph.D), JCA which has just been delivered. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (“CFRN”) provides in S. 36 (1) for the plenitude of the right to fair hearing in civil and criminal matters within a reasonable time by a Court or other Tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.
Sub-sections (3) and (4) CFRN specifically provide that: “(3) The proceedings of a Court or the proceedings of any Tribunal relating to the matters mentioned in Subsection (1) of this Section (including the announcement of the decisions of the Court or Tribunal) shall be held in public. (4) Whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence, he shall, unless the charge is withdrawn, be entitled to a fair hearing in public within a reasonable time by a Court or Tribunal: Provided that – (a) a Court or such a Tribunal may exclude from its proceedings persons other than the parties thereto or their legal practitioners in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, the welfare of persons who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the protection of the private lives of the parties or to such extent as it may consider necessary by reason of special circumstances in which publicity would be contrary to the interests of justice. (b) if in any proceedings before a Court or such a Tribunal, a Minister of the Government of the Federation or a Commissioner of the Government of a State satisfies the Court or Tribunal that it would not be in the public interest for any matter to be publicly disclosed, the Court or Tribunal shall make arrangements for evidence relating to that matter to be heard in private and shall take such other action as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the disclosure of the matter.” The conduct of legal proceedings “in public” is therefore a constitutional imperative that can only be ignored to the detriment of the proceedings, whether civil or criminal.
“Public” means “for the use of everyone without discrimination; anything, gathering or audience which is not private is public”. Not a few cases have been nullified on the basis that Court proceedings conducted, or judgment delivered, in a Judge’s Chambers does not satisfy the requirement of “a fair hearing in public”, and breach of such a constitutional provision is fundamental and not a mere technicality. Notable cases include EDIBO v STATE [2007] 13 NWLR (PT. 1051) 306 which involved a scenario in which the plea of an accused person was taken in Chambers (as in the instant case).
MENAKAYA v MENAKAYA [2001] 16 NWLR (PT. 738) 203 and OVIASU v OVIASU (1973) 11 SC 315 where matrimonial proceedings for dissolution of marriage were heard in Chambers contrary to the dictates of S. 103 (1) and (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1970 which provide for hearing “in open Court”; as well as NIGERIA – ARAB BANK LTD v BARRI ENGINEERING NIG. LTD [1995] 8 NWLR (PT 413) 247 and ALIMI & ORS v KOSEBINU & ORS (2016) ALL FWLR (PT. 859) 944, (2016) LPELR-42557(SC) where hearing was conducted in open Court but judgment was delivered in Chambers.
The rationale, as Ogbuagu JSC put it in EDIBO v STATE supra at 335, is that: “Surely and certainly, a Judge’s Chambers is not and cannot be equated to a hall in a public building that is used for formal meetings. As a matter of fact, a Chambers can also be defined as or equated with a private bedroom or private room. Even in Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition at page 224, a Judge’s Chambers as defined as the private room or office of a Judge.” See also NIGERIA – ARAB BANK v BARRI ENGINEERING NIG.
LTD supra at 273 – 274 where Ogundare JSC held that the Chambers of a Judge “is not one of the regular Courtrooms nor is it a place in which the public have right to ingress and egress as of right except on invitation by or with permission of the Judge.” There is no gainsaying in the case at hand that the arraignment of the Appellant and/or taking of his plea in the Chambers of the Learned Senior Magistrate on 2/11/11 constitutes an egregious violation of constitutional provisions that enjoin the conduct of legal proceedings in public.
A criminal trial commences upon arraignment and ends with a sentence. Where the commencement (which is to the foundation) of the trial is fundamentally flawed, the subsequent proceedings and eventual sentence founded upon it can scarcely be sustained. I accordingly join forces with my learned brother in setting aside the judgment of the Appellate Division of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory delivered on 28/11/13 (embodying the affirmation of the Appellant’s conviction and sentence), and record a verdict of discharge and acquittal in its stead.