Bribery & Corruption

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PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein and one Mrs. Ruth Adehwe Aweto were bursar and provost respectively of Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan. They were arraigned before the Oyo State High Court, Ibadan charged with offences bordering on contravention of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. During the trial the prosecution called five witnesses and tendered several documents in evidence. The Appellant and his co-accused testified in their defence and called additional four witnesses.
At the end of the trial and in a reserved and considered judgment, the Appellant and his co-accused were each convicted under counts 5, 6, 7 and 8 and sentenced to one year imprisonment on each count. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court. Being aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeal, Ibadan, where his appeal was dismissed. He has now brought this appeal. His Notice of Appeal dated 28th November, 2015 and filed on the 29th November, 2017 contains four grounds of appeal. Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The Appellant’s brief of argument, settled by Oluwasina Ogungbade Esq of counsel to the appellant was filed on the 19th December, 2017. Learned counsel submitted two issues for determination of this appeal. These two issue are hereunder reproduced as follows:-
1. Whether the High Court of Oyo State had the jurisdiction to try the Appellant for the offences charged particular regard being had to the combined effects of the provisions of Sections 251(1)(p) and 251(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended)?
2. Whether in the absence of proof of a corrupt intent in the preparation of the budget proposals, the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof required for the conviction of the Appellant under the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.
The Respondent’s brief of argument settled by Enosa Omoghibo Esq of counsel was filed on the 17th January, 2018. Learned counsel formulated two issues for determination of this appeal. They read thus:-
(a) Whether the High Court of Oyo State had the jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences charged under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 having regard to the provisions of Sections 251 (1)(p) and 251 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
(b) Whether the prosecution had not proved corrupt intent as an ingredient of the offence created under the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 to ground a conviction.
Appellant filed a reply brief on 18th January, 2018. Before I delve into the submissions of learned counsel, I wish to set out in brief the facts that gave rise to this appeal, which are in my view simple and straight forward. The Appellant herein was the bursar of the Federal Cooperative College Ibadan. Mrs Ruth Adehwe Aweto was the provost of the same college. The two of them prepared and submitted nominal rolls and Budget proposals for the staff of the college for 2006, wherewith they presented 41 casual staff as permanent staff. As a result of such presentation to the Federal Government, the sum of N7,041,861.15 was released every year as salaries and emoluments for the 41 casual staff, whereas the actual amount that was paid to the casual staff was N3,690,000.00 only.
In arguing the first issue, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that Section 251 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confers criminal jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 251 (1) of the same Constitution. According to the learned counsel, one of the areas over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction are matters involving the administration, management and control of the Federal Government and its agencies. It is the view of the learned counsel that the conduct forming the basis of the charge against the Appellant was in the performance of his duty as the bursar of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan, an agency of the Federal Government, as such only the Federal High Court could validly try the offences alleged to have been committed as reflected on the charge.
Section 251 (1)(a) and (p) of the 1999 Constitution provides as follows:-
251 (i) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary

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contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters –
(a) Relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(p) The administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any or its agencies.”
It is true that the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan is an agency of the Federal Government. The exclusive jurisdiction donated to the Federal High Court is in respect of civil causes and matters relating to those items set out in Subsection (1)(a-s) of Section 251 of the Constitution. Section 251(3) of the same Constitution is very clear. It provides as follows:-
251 (3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this section.
The word Exclusive is clearly absent in Section 251(3) of the 1999 Constitution and the word also” connotes “in addition, as well” or too. I therefore agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent where he stated in argument that if the framers of the Constitution had intended that the Federal High Court should have exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters relating to the revenue of the Federal Government of Nigeria, they would have said so in clear words.
In the case of Attorney General of Ondo State vs The Attorney General of the Federation, the Attorney General of Ondo State, by an originating summons filed at the Supreme Court, asked for among other reliefs the following:-
1. A determination of the question whether or not the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by him can lawfully initiate legal proceedings in any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of any of the criminal offences created by any of the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.
2. A declaration that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 is not inforce as law in Ondo State.
3. A determination that it is not lawful for the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by him to initiated legal proceedings in any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of the criminal offences purported to be created by the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offence Act, 2000.
The full Court of this Court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that, by virtue of Section 174 (1) and 286 (1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) can lawfully initiate or authorise the initiation of criminal proceedings in any Court other than a Court martial in any State of the Federation in respect of offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. At page 419 paragraphs A -B, their Lordships had this to say:-
“The Attorney-General of the Federation derives his powers under Section 174 of the Constitution as an agency of the Federal Government. The law is well established that the Court cannot control the manner he exercises his powers so conferred….nor can he be prevented from exercising his functions on the grounds that his jurisdiction does not extend to any particular state in Nigeria, Section 174 of the Constitution does not impose any such limitation.” See the State vs Ilorin(1983) 1 SCNLR 94.
Section 6 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences says among other things that it shall be the duty of the ICPC to prosecute offenders. However, Section 26 (2) of the same Act provides inter alia that every prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation. It follows therefore that any criminal case initiated by the ICPC, is infact initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation.
It will appear that the learned counsel for the Appellant has either failed to understand the decision in Attorney-General Ondo State vs Attorney-General Federation (supra) or he has deliberately brought this issue to test the patience of this Court. If learned counsel wants the Court to depart from its decision, he has not properly placed his

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wishes before this Court. For this Court has clearly stated that the State High Courts and the FCT High Court which are designated by the Chief Judges under Section 61 (3) of the Act for hearing of cases bordering on offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, have the requisite jurisdiction to hear such cases. In the instant case the High Court of Oyo State has jurisdiction to hear this case. The Lower Court was therefore right to so hold. Issue one is therefore resolved against the Appellant. The round of appeal upon which this issue was formulated is hereby dismissed.
The 2nd issue for determination, is whether in the absence of proof of a corrupt intent in the preparation of the budget proposals, the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof required for the conviction of the Appellant under the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices And other Related Offences Act 2000? The Appellant was accused of having made false representation in the budgetary proposals of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan for the year 2006 with the intention that her principal, the Federal Government of Nigeria would act on those false representations. Specifically the Appellant was accused of presenting 41 casual staff of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan as permanent staff as a result of which the Federal Government released the sum of N7,041,816.15 as the benefits and emoluments of the said staff, when in reality they were as casual staff entitled to N3,690,000.00 only.
The Appellant’s defences as reflected in the Appellant’s brief of argument are reproduced hereunder as follows:-
(i) That the 41 casual staff had already been interviewed by the Respondent preparatory to their conversion to permanent staff and that the decision to include them as permanent staff was based upon the recommendation of the interview panel.
(ii) That prior to her assumption of office as the provost of the college, the said 41 casual staff had already been represented via Exhibit 83 (the handover note of her predecessor in office) to the Respondent as permanent staff.
(iii) That the proposed conversion was delayed owing to policy of the government on employment.
(iv) There was a short fall of staff salary of over N9,000.00 million in 2004.

(v) That the difference between the amount released by the Federal Government as emolument of the casual staff and the amount actually paid to them was used to defray the shortfall in staff salary from 2004.
By the Appellant’s defence as reproduced above, the Appellant admitted that the 41 casual staff which she represented in the budget were yet to be converted to permanent staff as at the time the budget proposals were submitted to the Federal Government. She also admitted that she was aware that Exhibit 83, the handover note did not disclose the true status of the 41 casual workers, and that is why they were subjected to interview with a view to converting them to permanent staff. Finally she admitted that the difference between the actual money paid to the 41 casual staff and the money received from the Federal Government was used to offset outstanding salaries of other staff, which is not the purpose for which the money was requested for in the budget. All these admissions were not disclosed to the Federal Government when the budget proposals were submitted.
The facts admitted by the Appellant represent the allegation against her for which she was arraigned before the trial Court. The law is settled beyond any argument that admitted facts require no further proof. See NNPC vs Klifco (Nig) Ltd (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.125) 209: Ikare Community Bank vs Ademuwagun (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.924) 275; Ogolo v. Fubara (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.831) 231;Adeleke vs Aserifa (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt 30) 575: Nnonye vs. Anyichie (1989) 2 NLWR (Pt.101) 110.
Learned counsel for the Appellant argued forcefully that the learned trial Judge failed to advert to the fact that the defences so enumerated negated any corrupt intention on the part of the appellant. According to the learned counsel, the Court of Appeal incorrectly held that the prosecution established the required mens rea for a conviction on the offence charged. In a further argument, learned counsel submitted that the Lower Court was wrong to have affirmed the conviction of the Appellant when the evidence led before the trial Court negated any corrupt intention.
Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 provides as follows:-

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17 (i) any person who corruptly
(a)
(b) ……………………….
(c) knowingly gives to any agent, or being an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which to his knowledge is intended to mislead his principal or any other person, is guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to five years imprisonment.”
From the provision of Section 17(1)(c) which I have reproduced hereinabove, for the prosecution to succeed, it must prove that the accused knowingly deceived his principal or intended to deceive his principal by presenting a document in which the principal is interested in and that the document contains false material. A man’s intention can only be established by circumstances and facts leading to the commission of the crime for which he is charged. It is very difficult to know what a man intends without resorting to chains of events that culminated into the acts complained of. It is only God and perhaps the devil whose powers are beyond human comprehension that will know a man’s intention. Intent is defined in Wager vs Pro C.A 603 F.2d 1005 as a mental attitude which can seldom be proved by direct evidence, but must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. Also in State vs Gantt 26 NC, App. 554 intent is defined as a state of mind existing at the time a person commits an offence and may be shown by act, circumstances and inferences deducible therefrom. See State v. Evans 219 Kan 548 p.2d 772, 777. From the facts of this case the Appellant and the Provost of the college knew that the 41 casual staff were not permanent staff. This is clearly admitted by the Appellant who said because of that knowledge, they interviewed the 41 casual staff with a view to converting them to permanent staff.
I therefore do not see the rationale behind learned counsel’s argument that the prosecution failed to prove that the Appellant had the necessary intention to commit the offence for which he was charged. The Court of Appeal was right when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court. Section 17 (1)(c) of the Act does not suggest that money lost as a result of the receipt or misrepresentation must be recovered from an accused before he could be found guilty of the offence. Mere deception and presentation of false and erroneous or defective material by a person with intent to mislead his principal or any other person is enough. The omission of the word corruptly from the reproduction and consideration of the provision of Section 17 (1)(c) of the Act by the Court of Appeal has not affected the quality of its judgment. I have also read through the reply brief and I have found that it contains argument canvassed in the Appellant’s brief of argument. The essence of a reply brief is not to reopen argument already canvassed. It is to reply to new issues that have arisen in the Respondent’s brief of argument. Learned counsel for the Appellant has not convinced me to overturn the decision of the Lower Court on this issue, which I resolve against the Appellant.
Having resolved the two issues submitted for the determination of this appeal against the Appellant, this appeal shall be and it is hereby dismissed.
The decision of the Lower Court is accordingly affirmed.
IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division delivered on the 14th of July, 2015 in which that Court dismissed the appeal against appellant’s conviction and sentence by the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan for offences brought under the Independent Corrupt Practices And Other Offences Act, 2000. (ICPC Act).
I have had the privilege of reading the judgment of my learned brother, Galinje, JSC. I am also of the view that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. I too, dismiss same.
OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother Galinje, JSC just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is lacking in merit and should be dismissed. I too will dismiss the appeal. The decision of the Lower Court is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS J.S.C.: The leading judgment in this appeal was prepared by my learned brother, Galinje JSC. He considered all the issues raised in the appeal and found that the appeal lacks merit. I totally agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I however

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wish to say a few words regarding issue 1 if only for emphasis.
Issue 1 agitated by the appellant in this appeal is that by virtue of the combined effect of Section 251(1)(p) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and the facts of this case, the High Court of Oyo State lacked jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences charged.
Section 251(1)(P) and (3)states:-
“251(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes or matters –
(p) the administration or the management and control of the Federal government or any of its agencies;
(3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this section.”
Learned counsel for the appellant is contending that since Section 251(3) of the Constitution confers criminal jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of matters over which it has civil jurisdiction under Section 251(1) went further to argue that one of the areas over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction is in matters involving the administration, management and control of the Federal Government and its agencies and as the conduct forming the basis of the charge against the appellant was taken in his capacity as the Bursar of the Federal Co-operative College, Ibadan (a Federal Agency) only the Federal High Court could validly try the commission of the offences alleged to have been committed as stated on the charge. He further argued that to hold the view as decided by the Court of Appeal that the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 251(3) is not exclusive to the Federal High Court but should be exercised concurrently by the State High Court and of the Federal Capital Territory would run contrary to the principles underlying the establishment and continued existence of the Federal High Court which for all intents and purposes is intended to serve as a Court dealing exclusively with matters stipulated in Section 251(1)(p) of the Constitution
Learned counsel for the appellant anchored his submission that the Federal High Court should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case against the background facts that the appellant and one Mrs. Ruth Adehwe Aweto who were bursar and provost respectively of the Federal Co-operative College, Ibadan prepared and submitted rolls and budget proposals for the staff of the College for 2006 wherein they presented 41 casual staff as permanent staff. As a result of this presentation to the Federal Government, the sum of N7,041,801.15 was released every year as salaries and emoluments for the said staff but the amount that was paid to the casual staff was N3,690,000.00 only and when this came to light, they were arraigned before the High Court of Oyo State and charged with conspiracy to commit an offence and for using a document which is defective in material particular with intent to deceive and mislead the principal which are offences under the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 contrary toSection 26(1)(c) and punishable under Section 17(1)(c) of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) Act 2000. It is against this background that learned counsel argued that since the accused used the money to pay outstanding salaries of staff of the Co-operative College which touches on the administration or the management and control of a Federal Government Agency, the case should be heard exclusively by the Federal High Court.
Learned counsel for the respondent made reference to Section 251(p) (s) and (3) and after reproducing Section 251(1), went on to state that it is followed by a long list of civil causes and matters that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over and to demonstrate that this list is not exhaustive, he set Section 251(1)(s) and (3)which provides-
“such other jurisdiction civil or criminal to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by on Act of the National Assembly.
(3) …………..” (already reproduced in this judgment), and submitted that what is immediately evident in the provisions above is the absence of the word exclusive in Subsection (3) of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. He argued that if the framers of the Constitution had intended the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction in

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criminal matters relating to the revenue of the Federal Government of Nigeria, they would have said so and that the appellant is trying to read into the section what is not there and what was not intended by the framers of the Constitution. He then submitted that the Supreme Court noted the absence of the word exclusive in Section 251(3) and that made it to validate the provisions of the ICPC Act 2000 and pronounced the Act as constitutional in Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222. He argued that the word “also” in Section 251(3) has never meant “the same thing” or used interchangeably with the word “exclusive” in legal drafting. He said the Courts are bound to give the correct interpretation of the law and not one that could lead to ambiguity or absurdity and referred to Fawehinmi v. Inspector-General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.767) 606.
I agree with the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that if the framers of the Constitution intended to invest the Federal High Court with exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters relating to the revenue of the Federal Government, this would have been taken care of in Section 251(1) by stating that the exclusive jurisdiction to be exercised by the Federal High Court is in respect of both civil causes and criminal matters and the section will read as follows:-
25-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and criminal matters-“(underlining mine for emphasis)
If Section 251(1) had been framed as stated above, reading it with sub-paragraph (a) will fit into the interpretation that learned counsel for the appellant has advanced in his argument. In construing sub-paragraph(s) of Section 251(1) read along with Subsections (2) and (3), the Lower Court stated at pages 537-538 per Tsammani JCA as follows:-
“It appears therefore to me that, the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, by a combined reading of Section 251(1)(s), (2) and (3) of the Constitution is restricted to offences on treason, treasonable felony and other related offences, and criminal offences affecting any of the matters enumerated in Paragraph (a) – (r) of Subsection (1) of Section 251 of the Constitution. As stated earlier, the question that has arisen for determination is whether such criminal jurisdiction is exclusive to the Federal High Court or not. Paragraph (s) to Subsection 1 (supra) gives power to the National Assembly to donate such other civil or criminal jurisdiction on the Federal High Court; and the National Assembly in donating such jurisdiction shall indicate whether such jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of any other Court or not.
Now, the offences for which the appellant was charged, tried and convicted have been created under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offence Act (otherwise called Anti-Corruption Law 2000). By Section 26(2) of the I.C.P.C. Act (supra):-
“Prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation, or any person or authority to whom he shall delegate his authority, in any superior Court of record so designated by the Chief Judge of a State or the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja under Section 60(3) of this Act. Every prosecution for an offence under this Act, or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption, fraud or any other related offence shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation.
By the above stated provision all State High Courts, within the Federation and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory have been given jurisdiction to try all offences under the I.C.P.C Act. This is so because, it is inconceivable that the Chief Judge of a State will venture into the territory of the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court to designate Judges in the Federal High Court to try offences under the Act”
This is very sound reasoning.
The conclusion reached by the Lower Court is that the prosecution for offences under the I.C.P.C. Act is not within the exclusive preserve or jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The Lower Court was right in so deciding. It accords with the decision of the full Court in A.G Ondo v. Attorney-General of the Federation & 35 Ors (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222.
The guide to the interpretation of unambiguous statutory provisions including the Constitution is that they require no resort to any cannon of construction but they must be read in their plain and ordinary words which best give the meaning. The answer to the first issue therefore is that the High Court of Oyo State had jurisdiction to try the appellant under the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000.
With these few remarks, I agree entirely with the judgment of my learned brother, Galinje JSC that this appeal completely lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the lead Judgment delivered by my learned brother, Galinje, JSC, and I agree entirely with his reasoning and conclusion, which I hereby adopt, as I have nothing useful that I can add to it. Appeal is dismissed. The decision of the Lower Court is accordingly affirmed.

For clarity, the three counts charge under which the appellant was charged and convicted may be set out as follows:
COUNT 1
CORRUPT DEMAND BY PERSON CONTRARY TO SECTION 10(A)(II) OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT 2000.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
That you Temple Nwankwoala (DSP) of the Nigeria Police Force, at Benin City, Edo State on or about 18 of October, 2006, being a Police Officer in charge of the Homicide section attached to the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Zone 5, Benin City, did ask or demand for the sum of N1,000,000 (One Million Naira) from Elder Alexander Okiye being a person against whom criminal complaints were made on account of the said criminal complaints being investigated as an inducement to write, secure, procure and confer a favourable report of Elder Alexander Okiye in respect of the criminal complaints and thereby committed an offence punishable ”under” Section 10(a)(II) of the ICPC Act 2000.
COUNT 2
CORRUPT RECEIPT BY PERSON CONTRARY TO SECTION 10(A) (II) OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT 2000
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
That you, Temple Nwankwoala, (DSP) and an officer in charge of the Homicide Section attached to the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Zone 5, Benin City Edo State on or about 6th of November, 2006 did received the sum of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as gratification from Elder Alexander Okiye against whom criminal complaints were made and being investigated in order to write, secure, procure and confer a favourable report in favour of the suspect, Elder Alexander Okiye in respect of the Criminal complaints made against him, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 10(a)(II) of the ICPC Act 2000
COUNT 3
FAILURE TO REPORT OFFER OF GRATIFICATION CONTRARY TO SECTION 23(1) OF THE ICPC ACT 2000 PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
That you, Temple Nwankwoala, (DSP) of the Nigeria Police Force, being the officer in charge of the Homicide section in the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Zone 5, Benin on or about 26 October 2006 in the course of investigation of complaints of crimes against one Elder Alexander Okiye was offered gratification by the said Elder Alexander Okiye but refused and failed to report the offer of gratification to any officer of the Independent Corrupt Practices – Commission (ICPC) in Benin city or any Police Officer and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 23 (1) of the ICPC Act 2000.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the original two counts, subsequently amended by the addition of a third count. Trial eventually got underway.
The prosecution called four witnesses. Fifteen documents were admitted as exhibits A-P.
The appellant testified in his defence and called three witness. In a considered judgment delivered on 25 January, 2012 the learned trial Judge Ikponmwem J found the appellant guilty on counts 1 and 3. The appellant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment with hard labour on count 1 while he was cautioned and discharged on count 3.
Dissatisfied, the appellant filed an appeal. It was heard by the Court of Appeal,Benin Division.
That Court in a judgment delivered on 23 February, 2015 affirmed the judgment of the trial Court in these words:
“Having therefore determined the two issues canvassed by the appellant against him, the conclusive effect is that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed by me. The lucid and sound decision of Justice E.F. Ikponmwen of the Edo State High Court delivered on the 25th of January, 2013 is hereby affirmed. I also affirm the conviction and sentence of the lower Court.”
This appeal is against that judgment. Briefs were filed and exchanged by counsel.
The appellant’s brief was filed on 28th July 2016, while the respondent’s brief was filed on 1st February, 2017 but deemed properly filed and served on 1st November, 2017.
Mr. O. Ovrawah, learned counsel for the appellant formulated two issues for determination. They are:
ISSUE 1
Whether the learned Justices of the Court below were correct when they held that the trial, conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 was valid whereas the Corrupt Practices and Other Related, Offences Act 2003 had expressly repealed the 2000 Act?

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ISSUE 2
Whether the learned Justices of the Court below were right when they held that the respondent had proved the offences with which the appellant was charged?
And for the respondent, its learned counsel, Mr. G. Lawal also formulated two issues for determination.
ISSUE 1
Whether the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 under which the appellant was tried and convicted is a valid law.
ISSUE 2
Whether the respondent proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
After examining both sets of issues for determination I am satisfied that they ask the same question. The appellants issue 1 and the respondent’s issue 1 ask whether the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 is a valid law. While the appellant’s issue 2 and the respondent’s issue 2 ask whether the case against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since both sets of issues ask the same question and they address the real grievance of the appellant, i shall resolve this appeal on the issues formulated by the respondent. They are straightforward and more direct to the point.
At the hearing of the appeal on 29 November, 2017 learned counsel for the appellant O. Ovrawah Esq., adopted the appellant’s brief filed on 28 July 2016, and urged the Court to allow the appeal, while learned counsel for the respondent, G. Lawal Esq., adopted the respondent’s brief filed on 1st February, 2017 but deemed duly filed on 1st November, 2017. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
The appellant was a Deputy Superintendent of Police, attached to the office of the Assistant Inspector General of Police Zone 5 Benin City, Edo State. On or about 18 October, 2006 the appellant was involved in the investigation of one Elder Alexander Okiye, who had criminal complaints to answer. In order that the investigation turns out to be favourable to Elder Alexander Okiye the appellant demanded for the sum of N1m (One Million Naira) from him. The learned trial judge found that the act of demanding contravened the provisions of Section 10 (a) (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Offences Act 2000. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge.
ISSUE 1
Whether the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 under which the appellant was tried and convicted is a valid law.
Learned counsel for the appellant observed that the appellant was charged, tried and convicted under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, a repealed statute. Learned counsel for the appellant further observed that when the appellant was arraigned on 24 November 2006, the statute in force was the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003, and not the statute of 2000 which had been repealed. Reference was made to Section 3 of the Revised (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act, 2007. He submitted that the appellant can only be charged under an existing statute. Reliance was placed on Osadebay v. A.G. Bendel State (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.169) p.525.
Concluding, he submitted that the trial, conviction and sentence are unconstitutional, null and void. He urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.
Learned counsel for the respondent observed that in the year 2003 the National Assembly amended the 2000 ICPC Act in violation of a subsisting order of a Federal High Court which restrained all parties from taking action on the subject matter of the suit. He further observed that in Hon. Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors v The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors. Suit No.FHC/ABJ/CS/93/2003, Ruling delivered on 21 May 2003, the Federal High Court declared the ICPC Act of 2003 passed by the National Assembly in violation of the subsisting order of Court as null, void and of no effect, contending that the ICPC Act 2000 is in force. He made reference to AG Ondo State v AG Federation & Ors (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) p.222; Egharevba v F.R.N & 3 Ors (2016) 2 SC (Pt.ii) p.166; FRN v Wabara (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt.1347) p.331

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He urged this Court to resolve the issue in favour of the respondent by affirming the decisions of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal in that the appellant was charged, tried and convicted under a valid and subsisting law of the National Assembly.
An accused person charged for an offence can only be charged under the law that creates the offence. Such a law must be in force at the time the offence was committed.
There is no provision in our Constitution to charge an accused person under a law that was not in existence at the time the conduct complained of manifested, or to create an offence to crirnimalise a conduct after the act.
A trial conducted under a law that has been repealed, no matter how well conducted and decided is a nullity. See Ogbomor v. State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) p.223.
After the prosecution closed its case, the learned trial judge heard submission from counsel on whether the ICPC Act 2000 had been repealed. In a considered Ruling delivered on 27 January, 2012 the learned trial judge said:
“I am satisfied that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 commenced in June 2000 and the then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo signed it into law: I am satisfied that a similar Act passed in 2003 was incorporated in the Revised Edition of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 but I am not satisfied that the said Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act was signed by the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or given assent to by the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria before it was compiled in the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act 2007 to which he gave assent. It is my humble view that each Law must pass through the proper procedure for it to become a law and it does not become a law by compilation. The learned counsel for the accused has not proved that the President assented to the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act. Even if it is taken that by giving assent to the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Bill, 2007 on 25 May 2007, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2003 is deemed to have been assented to which is not my position, this law takes effect in my respectful view from 25 May 2007. It therefore means that the accused person in this case whose trial commenced under the 2000 Act cannot thereby be affected by this new Act.
However, I am bound by the decision in Wabara & Ors v Federal Republic of Nigeria cited by Mr. Erewa. I therefore hold that the Act under which this accused person stands trial is not repealed and remains valid.”
What did the Court of Appeal have to say on the above. That Court said:
“…It is not in contention that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 remained valid law unless amended or avoided by a law validly made by the National Assembly. The crucial question therefore is, whether from the provisions of the revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act, 2007 it can be read that the 2000 Act was repealed therein, and consequently that the appellant’s trial, was based upon a repealed Law?
A dispassionate look at the section above cited show that the Act repealed therein is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 1990. Even were it to be held that the 2007 Act gave life to the 2003 Act, same was assented to on 25 May 2007, months after the commencement of the present case before the trial Court. Furthermore, the 2013 Act having been declared null and void having no effect, and the 2000 Act remaining the extant law, unless amended or avoided by any subsequent valid law, it can safely be assumed that the 2000 Act still remains in force. This is even more so where Section 2 of the 2007 Act is taken into consideration, which reads:
S.2 Any inadvertent omission, alteration of any existing statute shall not affect the validity and applicability of the statute.
It is my candid view therefore that the 2000 Act solidly stands, and the appellant was duly and rightly tried under the 2000 Act, which was the law in force.”
I have read both views and relevant legislation on the matter. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning of both Courts. To my mind the issue appears straightforward.
There is in existence the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000. In 2003 the National Assembly promulgated the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act of 2003. It has as its commencement date 18 May 2003. In Section 55 supra the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 was repealed. See Laws of the Federation Vol.3 Chapter C31 – 1. Four days after 18 May 2003, that is on 21 May, 2003 a Federal High Court Abuja in Suit No.FHC/ABJ/CS/93/2003. Hon. Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors. v. The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors, declared the ICPC Act of 2003 passed by the National Assembly in violation of a subsisting Court

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order null, void and of no effect, and revalidated the ICPC Act of 2000.
In the absence of an appeal from the decision of the Federal High Court that Ruling remains inviolate until set aside. The law in force is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 and not the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2003. See FRN v. Wabara (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt.1347) p.331; AG Ondo v. AG Federation & 35 Ors (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) p.222; Egharevba v. FRN (2016) 2 SC (Pt.iii) p.166.
I must observe that since 2003, in the compilation of laws of the Federation the Corrupt Practices and Other Offences Act 2003 could be found. See Laws of the Federation, Vol.3 Chapter C 31 -1 (updated to the 31st Day of December, 2010). A law attains legitimacy and is valid only after it passes through the well laid down procedure. When a law is declared null and void by a Court of law, as is the case with the 2003 statute, it remains so in the absence of a contrary declaration from the Court. When legislation that should not be in the statute books finds its way there, it can only mean that those that did the compilation were not aware of the Court order.
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 was very much in force when the offences for which the appellant was charged and arraigned were committed.
We are satisfied that the Order of a Federal High Court in Hon. Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors v. The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors. Suit No.: FHC/ABJ/CS/93/2003 which declared the 2003 statute null and void revalidated the 2000 statute.
Consequently, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 is valid. The appellant was tried and convicted on a valid law.
To succeed under count 1 and 3 the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt.
(a) That the accused person is a public officer.
(b) That the accused person received or obtains any property or benefit of any kinds for himself or for any other person for anything already done or omitted to be done or for any favour or disfavor already shown to any person by himself in the discharge of his official duties, or in relation to any matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of a government department or corporate body or other organization or institution in which he is serving as an official.
(c) That he asked for the benefits in the course of his official duties.
(d) That the accused person failed to report the offer of gratification to any officer of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC).
Lord Denning explained proof beyond reasonable doubt in Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ALL ER p.372 and this explanation was adopted by this Court in Lori & Anor v State (1979-1981) 12 NSC p.269 and in innumerable decisions of this Court. His Lordship said:
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted of fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible but not in the least probable the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt but nothing short of that will suffice.”
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that evidence led by the respondent was riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions enough to raise reasonable doubt in the minds of the Courts below.
He further submitted that these doubts should have been resolved in the appellants favour. Learned counsel observed that in testimony in Court PW1 said:
“I and the team members sought and got the sum of N500,000 from the operations funds set aside for such operations in the ICPC. As was standard practice, we photocopied the whole N500,000 in N500 notes of ten bundles totaling 1000 pieces. I also recorded the serial numbers of N500,000 in my own handwriting in the exhibit register kept in my custody.
But in his statement he said:
“….On arrival, I took the lawyer before my head of Department – Bar Falade. We deliberated on the petition and Bar Iluobe arranged for the exhibit money. Suffice it to say that while arrangements were being made, the petitioner was asked to reach DSP Temple to accept N500,000 as part payment for the total sum of N1,000,000.”

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He observed that the only reasonable interpretation is that the complainant, PW2, lawyer Barrister IIuobe who testified as PW3 had provided the exhibit money, contending that this is contrary to the testimony of PW1. He submitted that PW1 is not a credible witness. Reliance was placed on Nwabueze & Ors v. State (1988) 7 SC (Pt.ii) p.157.
He further submitted that another piece of inconsistency was in respect of the date on which the demand was made contending that the respondent’s case did not clear the air around the date the demand for the bribe was made and the source of the money. He further submitted that PW1, PW2 and PW3 are tainted witnesses Reliance was placed on Ishola v. State (1978) 9-10 SC p.59.
Finally he submitted that count 3 lacked precision and is ambiguous contending that the conviction of the appellant on it occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice. He urged this Court to set aside the conviction.
Learned counsel for the respondent observed that the three ingredients for counts 1 and 3 to wit:
(a) the offender must be a public officer.
(b) that he asked for benefit of any kind for or for any other person in respect of something to be after words done.
(c) that he asked for the benefit in the course of the discharged of his official duties.
Were each proved beyond reasonable doubt, contending that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was uncontroverted and not contradicted. Reliance was placed on Ajibade v. State (2013) 8NCC p.221.
Concluding he observed that the appellant failed to provide compelling and convincing reason to overturn concurrent findings of the two Courts below.
A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what that other evidence has stated not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradicts one another when they are themselves inconsistent. A discrepancy may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of, or contains a little more than what the other evidence says or contains some minor difference in details. See Gabriel v State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) p.460.
If a witness makes a statement before trial which is inconsistent with the evidence he gives in Court and he does not explain the inconsistency to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court should regard his evidence as unreliable. See
Onubogu & Anor v State (1974) (NSCC) p.358.
I must say straightaway that it is only material contradictions that are to be considered. The issue is whether a demand was actually made.
A mix up as to the dates the demand was made in the testimony of PW1 and PW2 to my mind is a minor discrepancy. If these discrepancies do not prop up in testimony in Court it may lead to the suspicious that the witnesses were tutored.
I am satisfied that there are no material contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses especially on whether the appellant demanded for N1million from PW2.
I have examined the statement of PW1 and his testimony in Court on the issue of marked money and who provided it. I am satisfied that his testimony in Court did not contradict his statement, rather it contains a little more than what he said in his statement. This is a minor discrepancy and is in no way a material contradiction. I am satisfied that there is no material inconsistency in the testimony of PW1 and his statement.
Whether the prosecution witnesses are tainted witnesses.
A tainted witness is a witness who has some purpose of his own to serve. After examining the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, I am satisfied that they gave evidence on what they saw during the investigation of the case and came to Court to say exactly what transpired .It was not shown that by their testimony they had some purpose of their own to serve. They are indeed witnesses of truth and not tainted witnesses.
Whether there was miscarriage of justice.
Miscarriage of justice is a failure of justice. There is a miscarriage of justice where there are grave or serious errors in the proceedings as to make the proceedings fundamentally flawed. It means failure of the Court to do justice. See Enawakponmwhem Aigbobahi & Ors v. Edokpayi Aifuwa & Ors (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.976) p.270; Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) p.76;Kalu O. Irolo & Ors v. Ebe E. Uka & Anor (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.786) p.195. Nnajiofor

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v. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.36) p.505.
I fail to see any error in the proceedings which led to the conviction of the appellant by the learned trial judge. I find the handling of the trial by the learned trial judge commendable. That explains why the Court of Appeal had no hesitation affirming the judgment of the trial Court and describing it as a sound decision. I am satisfied that there was no miscarriage of justice.
To find out if this case was proved beyond reasonable it is important that the facts of the case are examined to see if there is sufficient evidence in proof of (a) to (d) earlier alluded to in this judgment.
(a) That the accused person is a public Officer.
It is not in doubt that at the time the offence was committed the appellant was a Deputy Superintendent of Police DSP. See page 113 of the Record of Appeal where the appellant said “I am a Police Officer, a Superintendent of Police. At the time I was arrested, I was a Deputy Superintendent of Police. I got my promotion while I was in the cell in Abuja.
A Deputy Superintendent of Police is a public officer. I am satisfied that by the appellant’s own admission he is a public officer. That the appellant is public officer has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) That the accused person received or obtains any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person for anything already done or omitted to be done or for any favour or disfavour already shown to any person by himself in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of a government department or corporate body or other organization or institution in which he is serving as an official.
Evidence led by the prosecution witnesses show that the appellant made a demand from PW2 for N1m. Relevant extracts from the testimony of PW2 highlights this fact. He said:
“The accused told me that I am a Petroleum products diverter, a pipeline vandal and that I owe the petitioner Monday Ebhohimen N2.7million. After about 9 hours I was granted bail. The accused person then called me aside and asked me to see him privately. I had been given a date to report back on 18/10/2006 but he asked me to see him the next day. The following day, I went to the accused who called me aside and said that he would need N1 million from me otherwise the way he would investigate the case would require him arresting my staff, senior NNPC staff and impounding my trucks, tankers and vehicles…That he prefers one giving him N1 million so that he would not destabilize my business and that he would give me a favourable report.”
Under cross-examination PW2 was emphatic when he said:-
I pleaded with accused that I did not have N1 million he demanded. I could only offer N300,000. He still refused….
PW3 gave evidence on this issue of the accused person demanding N1m. He said:
PW2 told me that after the general meeting the accused person called him and told him privately that the alternative to paying that N2 million to Monday is that PW2 would pay N1 million for a favourable report to be written by him and that he would write a favourable report stating that the matter is civil and there is no criminality in the case. I asked PW2 if he will allow me to confront the accused with the claim and he agreed…. I told him what PW2 told me and he confirmed it. That he demanded for N1 million to help PW2.”
My lords, I am satisfied on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, especially PW2 and PW3 which remained unshaken under cross examination that the appellant demanded/requested for gratification of N1 million from PW2. The whole purpose of the demand was for the appellant to write a favourable report for PW2 as regards the case being investigated by him. (b) was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(c). That he asked for the benefit in the course of his official duties.
The appellant, a senior police officer was detailed to investigate criminal allegations against PW2 which arose from a petition forwarded to him by his superiors.
It was in the course of his official duties (i.e. while investigating the contents of the petition against PW2) that he asked for the benefit. (i.e. the sum of N1 million). I am satisfied that he asked for benefit in the course of his official duties.
(d). That the accused person failed to report the offer of gratification.
Under Count 3, failure to report offer of gratification to an officer of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) offends Section 23 (1) of the ICPC Act 2000.
At no time did the appellant report to any officer of the ICPC or the Police any issue of gratification. Count 3 is thus proved beyond reasonable doubt, since the appellant failed to make a report.
In the end the appeal lacks merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

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Appeal dismissed.
MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I am at one with my learned brother, Olabode Rhodes Vivour JSC in the judgment and the reasonings from which he arrived at the decision just delivered. To register that support, I shall make some comments.
This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, Benin Division or Court below or Lower Court which upheld the judgment of High Court of Edo State holden at Benin delivered on the 25th January, 2012 wherein the appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven (7) years imprisonment with hard labour for violation of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000.
The appellant’s conviction was consequent upon a two count charge which was later amended with leave of Court to a three count charge bordering on the violations of the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 (hereinafter) referred to as “The ICPC ACT 2000”. The prosecution now respondent called four witnesses and tendered fifteen documents, EXHIBITS A-P. The appellant testified in his defence and called one witness and at the conclusion of the trial, E.- F., Ikponmwen J (as she then was) convicted the appellant on count 1 and sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment, discharged and acquitted him on count 2 and convicted, cautioned and discharged him on count 3.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court he appealed to the Court below which affirmed the decision of the trial Court, dismissing the appeal, hence the recourse to the Supreme Court on appeal.
The background facts leading to this appeal have been well set out in the lead judgment and no useful purpose will be achieved to repeat them except for when the occasion calls for a reference to any part thereof.
On the 29th November, 2017 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Ogaga Ovrawah Esq, adopted his brief of argument filed on 28th July, 2016 and in it framed two issues-for determination, viz:-
(i). Whether the learned Justices of the Court below were correct when they held that the trial, conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act,2000 was valid whereas the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003 had expressly repealed the 2000 Act? (Ground 1).
(ii). Whether the learned Justices of the Court below were right when they held that the respondent had proved the offences with which the appellant was charged.
Learned counsel for the respondent, George Lawal Esq. adopted the brief settled by Paul Ahmed Bassi Esq. (as he then was), filed on 1st February 2017 and deemed filed on the 1st November 2017. He equally adopted the issues as identified by the appellant.
I shall make use of the said issues as crafted for ease of reference.
ISSUES 1 & 2
i. Whether the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences ACT, 2000 under which the appellant was tried and convicted is a-valid law.
ii. Whether the respondent proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was charged, tried and convicted under a repealed statute, the ICPC Act of 2000 while the extant law is the ICPC Act of 2004 and the charge initiated in 2006. That by virtue of Section 36 (6) and (8) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the appellant was not charge under an existing law. He cited in aid the cases of Osadebay v. A.G Bendel State (1991) 1 NWLR (pt.169) 525 at 579; Obmiami Brick & Stone (Nig) Ltd v. A.C.B. LTD 1992 (Pt.229) 260 at 309; Akintokun v Legal Practitioners’ Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) (2014) 13 NWLR (PT.1413) 1 at 75 etc.
Mr. Ovrawah of counsel for the appellant contended further that the evidence led by the respondent in proof of the two counts 1 & 3 were full of inconsistencies and contradictions which raised reasonable doubt that ought to have been resolved in favour of the appellant. He referred to the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 which narrowed these contradictions to which the respondent offered no explanations. He cited Raphael Nwabueze & Ors v. The State (1988) 7 SC (Pt.11) 157; Sunday Onuoha & 3 Ors v. The State (1989) 2 SC (Pt.11) 115.

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That in the peculiar circumstances of this case the issue of the date when the demand for the bribe was made is critical and this was not established with certainty which goes to support the denial by the appellant that the demand for bribe did not happen and that he had a loan transaction with PW1 who was the debtor. That a reasonable doubt occurred thereby as PW1, PW2 and PW3 were tainted witnesses whose evidence the trial Court should have taken with circumspection. He relied on Jimoh Ishola v The State (1978) 9-10 SC 59; Oluwole Akindipe v The State (2012) 6 SC (Pt.11) 120; Fred Dapere Gira v The State (1996) 4SCNJ 94;Edoho v. The State (2010)14 NWLR (1214) 651 at 694-695 etc.
Learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the ICPC Act, 2000 under which the appellant was charged still remains a valid law of the National Assembly. That the 2003 ICPC Act was not a valid Act and this as stated in the case of Hon. Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors v. The National Assembly of the Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors in Suit No:FHC/ABJ/CS/93/2003 before the Federal High Court Abuja and on the 21st day of May, 2003, E.S. Egbo-Egbo J. Court declared the ICPC Act, 2003 as null and void and revalidated the ICPC Act, 2000 purportedly repealed by the National Assembly and the decision has not been set aside and so the 2000 Act remains extant. He referred to I.F.C. v DSNL Offshore Ltd (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1087) 592 at 604; Udeh v Okoli (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt.1141) 571 at 588; A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation & 36 Ors (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772).
That there are numerous decisions of the Supreme Court which utilized the ICPC Act of 2000.
For the respondent it was further submitted by learned counsel that the respondent proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in counts 1 & 3. That the ingredients of the offences charged and upon which the appellant was convicted were established as required by law through the uncontroverted evidence of the prosecution witnesses. He cited Ajibade v The State (2013) 8 NCC 221 at 245.
That the appellant admitted receipt of part of the money under cross-examination and so no further proof was necessary. He cited Section 29(1) Evidence Act, 2011; F.M.H. v. C.S.A. Ltd (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt.1145) 193 at 214; Akran v. IGP (1960) 1 NSCC 2 at 5; Onyenye v State (2012) 7 NCC 304 at 328-329.
The slant of the challenge by the appellant is that the appellant was tried, convicted and sentenced under the ICPC Act, 2000 which had been repealed by the ICPC Act, 2003 and assuming the Court rules there was a valid Act that the prosecution witnesses PW1, PW2 and PW3 lacked credibility.
Respondent’s counter is that the position of the appellant was from a misconception as to the extant law and that the prosecution effectively discharged the burden on it.
A foray into the historic journey of what really is the extant law, the original Act on the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act (ICPC) was promulgated in 2000 which incidentally is the Law under which appellant was charged, convicted and sentenced. Indeed there was an attempt in 2003 to repeal the 2000 Act and substitute it with an amended version in 2003 but before the process at the National Assembly could be concluded an order of the Federal High Court, Abuja restrained all parties from taking further action on the proposed amendment. Curiously the National Assembly proceeded and produced a Bill of 2003 which when sent for the presidential assent was returned, the President pointing out that there was a valid Court order of restraint. The National Refusal and some of their members approached the Court in the case of Hon. Bala Kaoje & 5 Ors v The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 13 Ors (suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/93/2003) before the Federal High Court Abuja.
In a ruling delivered on the 21st day of May, 2003, Egbo-Egbo J declared the said ICPC Act, 2003 passed by the National Assembly in violation of the subsisting order of Court as null, void and of no effect and revalidated the ICPC Act 2000.
I shall quote the salient part of that decision which is thus:-
“…but the Act passed by the National Assembly in violation of a valid order of this Court is hereby declared null and void and of no effect. Consequently the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 which came into effect on 13th June 2000 and was sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of Federation & Ors in a judgment dated 7th June 2002 shall continue to operate in this country until amended or voided by a valid law made through due process of law by the National Assembly.
That Ruling has not been appealed against and so remains valid and subsisting thereby re-enthroning the ICPC Act, 2000

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until such a time in future something is done repealing or amending it. This is so because decisions of Courts of law continue to operate until set aside or overruled on appeal and since that has not happened, the ICPC Act, 2000 remains the extant law. See I.F.C. v. DSNL Offshore Ltd (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1087) 592 at 604; Udeh v. Okoli (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt.1141) 571 at 588; A. G. Ondo State v A.G. Federation & 36 Ors (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772).
On whether or not the prosecution proved its case against the accused appellant beyond reasonable doubts, it has to be borne in mind that the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt. It is not tantamount to proof beyond all shadow of doubt; as all that is expected is that the evidence is strong enough against the accused to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can easily be dismissed with the fact that, “it is possible but not in the least probable”, then the burden of proof is discharged, I referred to Mukhtar JSC (as she then was) in the case of Jimoh Michael v. The State (2008) 3 NCC 660 at 690.
The appellant was charged in counts 1 and 3 of the ICPC Act 2000 and in respect to count 1, the ingredients required in the offence created by Section 10 (a) (ii) of the Act which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are thus:-
(a) The offender must be a public officer.
(b) That he asked for benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person in respect of something to be afterwards done.
(c) That he asked for the benefit in the course of discharge of his official duties.
In the case at hand the appellant was a serving Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) attached to the homicide section of the Assistant Inspector General of Police (AIG), Zone 5, Benin City, Edo State when the alleged offence took place. The prosecution brought PW1, PW2, PW3 and PW4 excerpts of whose testimonies would be stated hereunder, thus:-
PW2.
“I know the accused person. I knew him on the 11th of October, 2006. On that day at 8am, he came to my office with a team of policemen.
He was a Deputy Superintendant of Police (DSP). He came to arrest me upon a petition by one Monday Ebhohimen, an ex-employee of mine. Accused took me to his office at A.I.G Zone 5 and I made a statement. The accused told me that I am a petroleum products diverter, a pipeline vandal and that I owe the petitioner Monday Ebhohimen N2.7 million. After about 9 hours I was granted bail. The accused person then called me aside and asked me to see him privately. I had been given a date to report back on 18th October, 2006 but he asked me to see him the next day. The following day, I went to the accused who called me aside and said that he would need N1 million from me otherwise the way he would investigate the case would require him arresting my staff, senior NNPC staff and impounding my trucks, tankers and vehicles. That in the process of taking out bail all the persons he would arrest and releasing my vehicles, he would make at least N2 million. That he prefers me giving him N1 million so that he would not destabilize my business and that he would give me a favourable report”
Under cross-examination, PW2 on the same point stated categorically:
“…I went to the office of the ICPC in Abuja following my petition on 3rd November, 2006. I went alone . My lawyer went on another date. I see Exhibit ‘C’. I did not know when it was made. I was not present when it was made. The money N500,000 produced was not by me but by ICPC. It was after 11th October, 2006 that the accused person demanded a bribe from me. After I was arrested. I cannot remember the exact date. I cannot remember exactly if it was after the following day I was arrested that the accused demanded the bribe. After, on the 11th October, 2006, the accused person arranged with me that I should come the next day i.e. 12th October 2006, I cannot-remember Whether it was that day that he made a demand for bribe on me because I went on some occasions and did not meet him in the office..
…the only time the issue of N300,000 came up was when I pleaded with accused that I did not have N1 million he demanded. I could only offer N300,000. He still refused. I cannot remember the day I asked accused to come down to N300,000 but it was by telephone…”
In support of the Respondent case, PW3 stated thus: :
“PW2 told me that after the general meeting, the accused person called him and told him privately that the alternative to paying that N2 million to Monday is that PW2 would pay N1 million for a favourable report to be written by him and that he would write a favourable report stating that the matter is civil and there is no criminality in the case. I

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asked PW2 if he will allow me confront the accused with the claim and he agreed and I asked him to come the next day so we can go together.
The next day, we both went to the accused office where I met the accused sitting under a tree behind his office. They brought chairs for us to sit with the accused there as he said anywhere he was, was his office. I told him what PW2 told me and he confirmed it. That he demanded for N1 Million to help PW2, He said he is the O/c pipe line and he was investigating vandalization and diversion of fuel against PW2. That the One Million Naira is little compared with what he would make if he decided to arrest everyone involved in the matter. He told me that if he allowed (sic) to investigate the matter, PW2 would lose more than One Million Naira.”
The learned trial judge held thus:-
”The accused person was acting on his own as his team members were unaware of this payment to PW2 was to make on the day of accused arrest. I cannot find any doubt to puncture the case of the prosecution in this case the deposition of PW2 in EXHIBIT ‘G’ confirms the prosecutions case. More so when by the accused person’s showing in his statement and conduct in going outside the police Zone 5 premises personally to receive the money the allegation is shown to be true.”
The evidence of the prosecution witnesses were not controverted. The PW3 had stated further as follows:-
”…PW2 told me that the general meeting, the accused person called him and told him privately that the alternative to paying that N2Million to Monday is that PW2 would pay N1Million for a favourable report to be written by him and that he would write a favourable report stating that the matter is civil and there is no criminality in the case. I asked PW2 if he will allow me confront the accused with the claim and he agreed and I asked him to come the next day so we can go together. The next day, we both went to the accused office where I met the accused sitting under a tree behind his office. They brought chairs for us to sit with the accused there as he said anywhere he was, was his office. I told him what PW2 told me and he confirmed it. That he demanded for N1 million to help PW2. He said he is the O/c Pipeline and he was investigating vandalization and diversion of fuel against PW2. That the One Million Naira is little compared with what he would make if he decided to arrest everyone involved in the matter. He told me that if he is allowed to investigate the matter, PW2 would lose more than One Million Naira”.
The appellant in evidence admitted meeting PW2 in the course of his official duties thus:-
“..We then invited the suspect- Alexander Okiye (PW2), to react to the petition by Monday Ebhohimen. He made statement to the police.
In respect to count 3 of the charge which had to do with appellants failure to report the offer of gratification contrary to Section 23(1) of the ICPC Act 2000. The ingredients are,
a. The offender must be a public officer.
b. The public officer to whom the offer of gratification is made to must report same together with the name of the person who made the offer, if known to the nearest Officer of the ICPC or a Police Officer.
Section 2 of the Act defines Public Officer thus:-
“Public Officer means a person employed or engaged in any capacity in the public service of the Federation, State or Local Government, Public Corporation or Private Company…”
The appellants testimony under cross-examination helped the prosecution carry out its bouden duty of proof when he answered thus:-
“As O/c Homicide, I had superior officers to whom I report. They are CSP Rabiu Husseni and he reports to Deputy Commissioner of Police who in turn reports to the AIG Zone 5. On 6th November, 2006, Alex Okiye called me on my cell phone and asked me to give him my account number, I refused to do so. That he wanted to bring N500,000.00 to pay to Monday Ebhohimen, DW1 the IPO or any other member of the team i.e. Sgt. Iredia Samuel, Sgt. Emmanuel Ngwoke, CPL Francis Akor etc. I did not get to the officers that PW2 was bringing N500,000 because I did not get to the office to inform that my bosses in that I was arrested on the way… before 9am on 5th November 2006 and 9am on 6th November 2006, I did not tell any member of the investigating team of PW2’s phone call that he was bringing N500,000.00 because we do not live together”.
Clearly even from the testimony of the appellant is that there was an offer of N500,000, it is immaterial whether or not appellant received the money, what is important or crucial is that he failed to report to a police officer or to officer of the ICPC of the bribe to him in a matter relating to the duties and functions of his office, See Akran v IGP (1960)

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1 NSCC 2 at 5; Chiokwe v State (2013) 8 NCC 185 at 202-203; Onyenye v. State (2012) 7 NCC 304 at 328-329.
In the confessional statement of the appellant admitted as EXHIBIT B’ he stated as follows:-
“He has offered me money severally in the office in presence of some officers and his lawyer but I told him I do not take bribe.”
This piece of evidence by the appellant was also corroborated by PW3 when he stated thus:-
“At about six o’clock, John Okokhue and some others negotiated the bail running from the accused person to the other officers begging them to assist in begging the accused person to reduce the amount for PW2’s bail from N150,000. At about 7pm I was with John Okokhue when he was gathering money, he personally brought out N10,000 from his pocket, that the accused had agreed to take N50,000. They contributed N50,000. The accused person sent for a bail bond which he filed and PW2 was asked to sign in my presence and asked to go home.
Under cross-examination appellant stated thus:-
”PW2 attempted to bribe me in the presence of his lawyer B.A, Iluobe Esq. his in-law a taxi driver and one Sgt. Irabor through a hand shake with me. He attempted to bribe me twice. The second time was in my office when he bent over my desk to introduce money into my desk but I took him outside”.
Indeed what is at play is an open and shut case as even the evidence of PW3 corroborated the appellant’s extra-judicial statement and that PW3 evidence remained un-impeached. That together with even the testimony of the appellant under cross-examination provided the corroboration if that was asked for. Clearly the prosecution laid before the Court compelling evidence which can only admit remote and fanciful possibilities in the accused/appellant’s favour as to the commission of the offences for which he was charged and there is no fighting chance escaping from the conviction and sentence which the trial Court meted out to him and which the Court of Appeal easily acceded to and affirmed there being no way out of the same findings and conclusion of the trial High Court.
This Court I must say is in the same boat, having no material on which it can hang a reason for an interference with such well grounded concurrent findings.
From the foregoing and the well articulated lead judgment. I too see no merit in this appeal which I dismiss.
I abide by the consequential orders made.
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI, J.S.C.: I read in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. I agree that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
There is no gainsaying that I should over flog the issues raised in this appeal with my learned brother having considered same adequately in his lead judgment which I adopt as mine also and dismiss the appeal in like terms.
Appeal is therefore dismissed.
EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.: The Appellant, until his arrest and prosecution; was a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Nigeria Police Force. He was tried on a three count charge of demanding a bribe of N1,000,000.00 from one ELDER ALEXANDER OKIYE, a person being investigated for a criminal offence. He was also alleged to have received as gratification the sum of N500,000.00 from the same ELDER ALEXANDER OKIYE in order to write and confer a report in favour of the said ALEXANDER OKIYE. The two offences are punishable under Section 10(a)(ii) of the ICPC Act, 2000. He was also charged for refusing and or failing to report offer of gratification. The offence is punishable under Section 23(1) of the ICPC Act, 2000.
The Appellant was found guilty and convicted for the offences in count 1 and 3, and ordered to serve 7years in prison in respect of the offences in count 1.
His appeal challenging his conviction and sentence by the trial Court was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, Benin – City. The two issues argued at the Lower Court and this Court are that his conviction and sentence for the offences under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 (ICPC Act, 2000) cannot stand; the said ICPC Act 2000 having been repealed, and that the Respondent did not prove the allegations against him beyond reasonable doubt.

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My Learned brother, OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC, in the lead judgment just delivered has considered in extenso the two issues and found them unmeritorious. I am in complete concurrence.
It is correct, as submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant, that the Appellant can only be charged and prosecuted for an offence under an existing statute: OSADEBAY v. A.G. BENDEL STATE (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.169) 525. Section 36(8) of the 1999 Constitution reiterates that rule of law: that no person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence.
The peculiar circumstance of this case, however, does not support the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant. The ICPC Act 2003, that purportedly repealed the ICPC ACT 2000 under which the Appellant was tried, was declared a nullity by the Federal High Court on 21st May, 2003 in HON. BALA KAOJE & ORS v. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY & ORS. This decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction having not been appealed or set aside remains extant, persistent and binding. The effect is that the ICPC Act, 2000, and not the ICPC Act, 2003, remains a valid statute in the corpus juris of the Laws of the Federation. It is not in dispute, and it has to be pointed out, that Section 4(8) of the Constitution expressly subordinates “the exercise of the legislative power by the National Assembly to the jurisdiction of Courts of law” unless the Constitution otherwise provides. The Federal High Court exercising this undoubted superior jurisdiction nullified the ICPC Act. 2003.
Historically, the ICPC 2000 has survived several assaults on it. A.G. ONDO STATE V. A.G., FEDERATION & ORS (2002) 9 NWLR (PT.772) 222 affirmed the constitutional authority of the National Assembly to enact this same ICPC Act, 2000 in one of the earliest assaults on this ICPC Act 2000. This latest attack, on the grounds that the still born ICPC Act, 2003 had repealed the ICPC Act 2000 is a non starter.
The second issue argued in this appeal in a clear invitation to this Court to disturb the concurrent judgment of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal on facts. This Court has stated and re-stated for decades in several consistent judgments the policy that this Court, as the third tier appellate Court will not lightly interfere with concurrent findings of fact: OMETA v. NUNA (1934) 11 NLR 18 (PC). It will not, unless under special circumstances, hear arguments seeking to disturb concurrent judgments of the two Courts below on pure questions of fact: SERBEH v. KARIKARI (1939) 5 WACA 34. It has always remained the policy, since the days of the Privy Council, that the Apex Court will decline to review the evidence for the third time unless there are some special circumstances which justify the departure from that practice: NANKA-BRUCE V. GBEKE PC No. 56 of 1948 -OLISA CHUKURA: PRIVY COUNCIL DIGEST. The Appellant has not shown any good cause why this Court should depart this fossilised practice in this case. In any case, My Learned brother, OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC has taken time to painstakingly review the evidence the third time. He finds no substance in the complaint of the Appellant on this issue. I agree, having participated in the conference before the preparation of his Lordship’s opinion expressed in the judgment just delivered.
The appeal lacks substance. I dismiss it and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal, the subject of this further appeal. Appeal dismissed.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother Olabode Rhodes-Vivour, JSC., just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion reached. The appeal lacks merit, and it is accordingly dismissed by me.

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CHINWE EUGENIA IYIZOBA, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of Federal High Court No 1 Ibadan in Charge No. FHC/IB/26C/2017 delivered on the 9th day of May 2017 Coram Ayo-Emmanuel J. transferring a criminal charge brought against the Appellant and 2 others to Court 2 where the Appellant had a pending application for injunction restraining the filing of charges against the Appellant.
THE FACTS: During the 2015 general elections, the Appellant and two others were among the leaders of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Oyo State. They received the sum of N650, 000, 000.00 from a certain source for the 2015 election expenses. The Respondent claimed that investigation revealed that the N650, 000, 000.00 was proceeds of gratification received by the Former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke from various Oil Marketers. The Respondent through EFCC arrested the Appellant and the two others and insisted that they must refund the money to the Respondent. The Appellant refused to refund the money claiming the funds came from their party and had been lawfully expended on the elections. The Appellant claimed he was released from custody of EFCC after 40 days detention but that EFCC continued to harass and intimidate him and other leaders of the party, threatening further arrests and prosecution. They consequently instituted Suit No FHC/IB/CS/15/2017: PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY & 905 ORS V (1) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION, (2) EFCC, (3) IBRAHIM MAGU (AG. EFCC CHAIRMAN), and (4) MR. ROTIMI OYEDEPO claiming inter alia the following reliefs:
i. A DECLARATION that the order purportedly made by the President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the 2nd Defendant to use all means to force the members of the Plaintiff, a political party to pay back to the Federal Government all monies used for the 2015 presidential Election, is undemocratic, unconstitutional, an abuse of Presidential and official powers and therefore null, void and of no effect.
ii. A DECLARATION that the continuous harassment, intimidation, prosecution or threat of prosecution of the 1st Plaintiff’s members across the country and in particular its members in Oyo State comprising 2nd – 906 Plaintiffs over the presidential campaign funds given to them by the 1st Plaintiff without same treatment meted on members of the All Progressives Congress is discriminatory, and a breach of their fundamental human rights.
iii. A DECARATION that the demand and threat by the 2nd – 4th Defendants to refund all monies expended by the Plaintiffs in respect of the 2015 General Election and the threat of arrest and prosecution unless they leave the 1st Plaintiff and join the All Progressives Congress, is undemocratic, unconstitutional and an attempt to return Nigeria into a dictatorship.
iv. A DECLARATION that the receipt of money from Jonathan Campaign Organization which sum as conceded by the 2nd Defendant is said to have been donated by private oil companies and individuals does not constitute a criminal offence under any law in Nigeria for which the Plaintiffs can be arrested or prosecuted.
v. A DECLARATION that the demand by the Defendants that Plaintiffs should refund the sum of money received from Goodluck Jonathan Presidential Campaign Organization and spent for the purpose of the 2015 Presidential and National Assembly Election in all 33 Local Governments, 350 Wards and 5,620 Units of Oyo State is ultra vires.
vi. PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, their servants, agents or any person howsoever called from inviting, arresting, detaining or charging the Plaintiffs in a Court of law in respect of monies received from the People’s Democratic Party and Goodluck Jonathan Campaign Organization and other individual donors for the purpose of the 2015 Presidential Elections.
The Plaintiffs further filed a Motion on Notice dated 13th February 2017 seeking inter alia the following:
AN ORDER OF INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants by themselves, their servants, agents or any person howsoever called from inviting, arresting, detaining or charging the Plaintiffs in a Court of law in respect of monies received from Goodluck Jonathan Campaign Organization and other individual donors for the purpose of the 2015 Presidential Election pending the determination of the substantive suit.
While the above suit and motion for interlocutory injunction were pending in Federal High Court 2, the Respondent on the 20th

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day of March, 2017 preferred a criminal charge, Charge No FHC/IB/26C/2017 against the Appellant and 2 others in Court 1 before Ayo- Emmanuel J. (the lower Court). The Respondent???s case as set out in their brief is as follows:
My Lords, sometime in 2015, the Respondent received an intelligence report that the Appellant together with the duo of Oloye Jumoke Akinjide and Mr. Yinka Taiwo who at that time was the chairman People Democratic Party on the eve of Presidential Election received and possessed the sum of N650, 000,000.00 being proceeds of gratification received by the Former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs. Diezani Alison-Madueke from various Oil Marketers.
The said intelligence was received, analysed and investigated whereupon it was discovered that the Appellant and his cronies did receive the sum of N650, 000,000.00, being proceeds of gratification received by Mrs. Diezani Alison Madueke from oil marketers. It was also discovered by the Respondent that the Appellant and others did not only retain the funds but also made various cash payments in excess of amount authorized by law without going through a financial institution. (See pages 32-38 and pages 144-151 of records of appeal for the facts leading to the filing of the charge)
My Lords, upon the conclusion of the investigation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Respondent by an amended charge filed on the 20th day of March, 2017 preferred a criminal charge against the Appellant wherein it was alleged that the Appellant conspired with Oloye Jumoke Akinjide and Chief Olarenwaju Otiti to take possession of the sum of N650,000,000.00 which they reasonably ought to have known formed part of the proceeds of unlawful act contrary to Section 18 (a) and punishable under Section 15 (3) & (4) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act,2012.
It was also alleged that the Appellant directly took possession of the N650,000,000.00 which he reasonably ought to have known formed part of proceeds of unlawful act contrary to Section 15 (2) (d) Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act,2012.
My Lords, another category of offences alleged against the Appellant was conspiracy to make cash payment in excess of amount authorized by law and the substantive offence of making in excess of amount authorized by law contrary to Section 1 (a), 16 (d) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 2012 and punishable under Section 16 (2) (b) of the same Act.
The Appellant claimed that the Lower Court neither issued nor served him any hearing notice before commencing the proceedings as required by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act. The Appellant consequently filed two Motions in the lower Court seeking an Order to strike out the criminal charge on the ground that there was no service of hearing notice and that the charge was an abuse of the Court process; and an Order dispensing with the physical appearance of the 2nd Defendant for the purpose of arraignment pending the determination of the Motion praying for the striking out of the Charge. Counter affidavits were filed by the Respondent.
The learned Judge of Federal High Court No 2 where the civil matter was pending on being informed of the filing of the charge despite the pendency of the suit and the motion seeking to restrain the Respondent, on 28/4/17 made an order restraining the Defendants from taking any further steps that would prejudice the Motion for injunction. Ayo – Emmanuel J of Court No 1, the lower Court on being informed of the said order of High Court No 2 and after arguments back and forth on issues relating to the motions filed before him ruled thus:
Having considered the various submissions of counsel and more particularly as it relates to the interim injunctive order granted by my learned brother dated 28th day of April, 2017, this Court cannot pretend not to know the magnitude and weight of the said order neither can the Court cover its eye towards it. By the decision of A.G Anambra State vs. UBA & Ors (2005)15 NWLR (Pt 947) 44, this Court is bound to take cognizance of the said order. I cannot be seen to act as an appellate Court over the decision of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction.
In order to forestall an instance where the two Courts will be acting at variance and possibly making conflicting orders, it will be in the interest of justice and wisdom to have both the criminal and civil suits tried and determined by the same Court. Consequently, this suit is hereby transferred to Court two Coram, Hon. Justice J.O Abdulmalik for trial and determination. Fresh hearing notice shall be issued and served on all the parties.

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Dissatisfied with the Ruling; the Appellant appealed by a Notice of appeal which was subsequently amended. From the four grounds of appeal in the Amended Notice of appeal, the Appellant formulated the following four issues for determination:
i. Whether the learned Trial Judge could exercise his discretion and make an order that was not prayed for and when no argument was called for and none given. GROUND 1.
ii. Whether the learned Court has the jurisdiction to make an order that has the effect of deciding an application that has not been heard. GROUND 2.
iii. Whether the learned trial Court has the jurisdiction to direct another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter in which there is an objection as to competence. GROUND 3.
iv. Whether the whole proceedings is not a nullity in the absence of service of the Charge and notice of trial on the Appellant. GROUND 4.
Learned counsel for the Respondent in his brief of argument formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:
Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it can be said that the learned trial judge lacks the jurisdiction to make the order appealed against.
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL
APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS: Learned counsel for the Appellants on his issues i and ii submitted that the learned trial judge ignored the pending application challenging its jurisdiction to entertain the Charge in respect of which a Counter Affidavit and Written Address had been filed calling for a Further Affidavit and Reply Address from the applicant and went ahead to transfer the case when none of the parties prayed for the transfer of the criminal charge. Counsel submitted that the order had the effect of stifling the Appellant’s application. Counsel further submitted that the lower Court ignored the issue of non-service of Criminal Summons as required by Section 382(1) (2) (4) and (6) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. He argued that the transfer of the charge to Court Two coram Hon. Justice J.O.Abdulmalik for trial and determination. Fresh hearing notice shall be issued and served on all the parties was prejudicial to the Appellant’s case because if there was no service of the initial charge, thereby rendering the charge and anything based thereon null and void, how could there be a further hearing notice? Counsel argued that the order was aimed at curing the original defect in service which went to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the charge by making the order of transfer.
Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant had in the lower Court raised the issue that the Charge was an abuse of Court’s process in that there was pending before another Court of coordinate jurisdiction an action seeking to declare that the Plaintiffs including the Appellant herein committed no crime in relation to the campaign funds spent on the 2015 General Elections and that the parties in this charge and the civil suit are the same. The criminal Charge is claiming that they have committed an offence over the said campaign funds while the civil suit is claiming that they have committed no offence. Counsel argued that if the application succeeded, there would be no trial at all as the prayer in the application was to strike out the criminal charge. Counsel argued that by ordering the transfer of the suit to Court Two Coram Hon.
Justice J.O. Abdulmalik for trial and determination the learned Trial Judge had determined the application when the application has not been moved. Counsel based his contention on the fact that the order is to hear and determine the suit whereas the application is that the suit should not be heard at all. Learned counsel saw this as a serious breach of the Appellant’s right to fair hearing, and argued that it rendered the proceedings a nullity.
On issue iii, learned counsel submitted that the order by the Judge of Court 1 transferring the suit to Court 2, a Court of coordinate jurisdiction for trial and determination and for fresh hearing notice to be issued amounted to usurpation of the powers of the presiding judge in Court 2 and violated Section 382 of ACJA.
On issue iv, learned counsel submitted that the ACJA provided a step by step procedure beginning from investigation, to filing of Charge, to bringing an offender before the Court, to application for bail, to trial and to judgment. He examined the relevant provisions of Section 382 of ACJA and submitted that the lower Court violated all the provisions and more importantly that there was no

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service on the Appellant. He contended that the Court could not therefore assume jurisdiction to transfer the charge to another Court and that the entire proceeding was a nullity.
Learned counsel urged us to set aside the order transferring the suit to another Court for trial and determination and to dismiss the suit or in the alternative to send the case back to the lower Court Coram: Ayo-Emmanuel J or any other Court except Hon. Justice J.O. Abdulmalik for the hearing and determination of the Appellant’s preliminary objection.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
Learned counsel for the Respondent on his sole issue submitted that jurisdiction is a threshold issue and goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine a suit. He opined that where a Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a matter, the entire proceedings no matter how well conducted and decided would amount to a nullity. Counsel submitted relying on Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act that the Court below had the requisite jurisdiction to suo motu make an order of transfer of a cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings to another Court. Counsel quoted the provisions of the section and a number of decided authorities to conclude that a cumulative reading of Section 22(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Act show that a Federal High Court Judge, may at any time or at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter before final judgment, either with or without any application from any of the parties thereto, transfer such cause or matter before him to any other judge of the Court; that by Subsection (2) of Section 22, no cause or matter shall be struck out by the Court merely on the ground that such cause or matter was taken in the Court instead of the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, in which it ought to have been brought and by Subsection (3), notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, no cause or matter shall be struck out by the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was taken in the High Court instead of the Court, where he may also cause such transfer to the appropriate Judicial Division of the Court in accordance with the rules of Court. BySubsection (4) thereof, every order of transfer made pursuant to Subsection (2) or (3) of this section shall operate as a stay of proceedings before the Court before which such proceedings are brought or instituted and shall not be subject to appeal. Counsel submitted that on the above premise, the trial Court had the requisite power and jurisdiction to suo motu make an order of transfer of charge No FHC/IB/26C/2017 to Hon. Justice J.O Abdulmalik of the Federal High Court.
Learned counsel submitted that the contention of the Appellant that he was not served notice of the hearing when he was adequately represented in Court was a clear case of paying undue regard to technicalities when it had long been decided by a plethora of authorities that the Courts are not workshops of technical justice and must on the contrary do substantial justice. He urged us to dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit.
APPELLANT’S REPLY
Learned counsel submitted that the gravamen of the Respondent’s argument is that the learned Trial judge had jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act to transfer a matter before him to another judge of the same Court. Counsel submitted that none of the grounds of appeal challenged the power of the trial Judge under Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act. He argued that the submissions of learned counsel did not address the issues raised in the Appellant???s brief.
RESOLUTION:
Without much ado, it is my humble opinion that Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act has no relevance here. Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act provides:
“(1) A Judge of the Court may at any time or at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter before final judgment, either with or without application from any of the parties thereto, transfer such cause or matter before him to any other Judge of the Court.
(2) No cause or matter shall be struck out by the Court merely on the ground that such cause or matter was taken in the Court instead of the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in which it ought to have been brought, and the Judge of the Court before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in accordance with Rules of Court to be made under

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Section 44 of this Act.
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, no cause or matter shall be struck out by the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was taken in the High Court instead of the Court, and the Judge before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate Judicial Division of the Court in accordance with such rules of Court as may be in force in that High Court or made under any enactment or law empowering the making of rules of Court generally which enactment or law shall by virtue of this subsection be deemed also to include power to make rules of Court for the purposes of this subsection.
(4) Every order of transfer made pursuant to Subsection (2) or (3) of this Section shall operate as a stay of proceedings before the Court before which such proceedings are brought or instituted and shall not be subject to appeal.
(5) Where the Court to which any cause or matter has been transferred pursuant to Subsection (2) or (3) of this section is of opinion that the cause or matter ought in law to be dealt with by the Court which transferred the cause or matter, the Judge presiding in the first mentioned Court shall after hearing counsel on behalf of the parties state a case on a point of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal.
(6) Where any case on a point of law is stated for the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal shall, in accordance with rules applicable in that Court, give its decision upon the case and the Court which stated the case shall dispose of the cause or matter accordingly.
The above provisions have been the subject of many decisions of this and the apex Courts as quoted in the briefs. Learned counsel for the Appellant is right in his arguments in the Reply brief that Section 22 of the FHC Act was made to ameliorate the problem encountered by litigants who institute actions before the Federal High Court when the action ought to have been filed at the State High Court and vice versa. Secondly, where the Federal High Court has jurisdiction but the matter was brought in a division of the Court outside of where the subject matter arose the judge may under Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act transfer the case to the Federal High Court in which the cause of action arose. Previously, the Courts in such situations struck out such suits. The aim of the new provision is to save such suits from being struck out. None of the above scenarios exist in the present situation. The section is consequently inapplicable.
It is trite that jurisdiction is a threshold matter as it goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine the suit. See: BRONIK MOTORS LTD AND ANOTHER V WEMA BANK LTD. 1983 1 SCNLR P.296; OKOYA V. SANTILLI1990 2 NWLR PT.131 P. 172. In the case of MADUKOLU V NKEMDILIM 1962 1 ANLR PT.1 P.587 the Supreme Court held that a Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction where the Court is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualification of its members; the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents it from exercising jurisdiction and the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
The contention of the Appellant is that the learned trial judge assumed jurisdiction to transfer the case as he did when the condition precedent to his assumption of jurisdiction had not been fulfilled in that no charge or notice of trial had been served on the Appellant as required by law; and that there was an application pending seeking to dismiss the Charge as an abuse of Court’s process. Appellant’s contention further is that the learned trial judge suo motu transferred the charge without any application by any of the parties and in a manner that pre-determined all the pending applications.
A careful reading of the proceedings of the lower Court as appeared in the Record of appeal especially the proceedings of Tuesday 9th day of May 2017 at pages 163-168 of the printed record show that the facts are not quite as presented by the Appellant in his brief. The lower Court had pursuant to Section 382 (5) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act ordered that the Notice of trial and Information be served on the three defendants through their legal practitioners. Learned counsel for the 1st and 3rd Defendants admitted that they were served. Both counsel said they had been served and that there is no issue about that (1st Defendant page 164 first

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three lines. 3rd Defendant Page 166 3rd line.) Counsel for the 2nd Defendant who is the Appellant herein at the last three lines of page 164 stated that he had not been served with the summons. He stated that the learned trial judge had said the application challenging jurisdiction would be heard first. One wonders why if he had not been served with the summons, he would be applying for an Order dispensing with his physical appearance for the purpose of arraignment. Learned counsel for the Appellant further observed:
My learned brother appearing in Court this morning was in Court on that day when that order was made. (Order by Court 2 on 28/4/17 restraining the Defendants in Suit no FHC/1B/CS/15/2017 from taking any further steps that would prejudice the Motion for injunction). This is not a simple matter of civil matter and criminal matter going on at the same time but that no matter should go on since that case is going on. If my learned friend this morning is asking for an arraignment and asking your lordship to give a penal order against the 2nd Defendant who is a party in that suit, he is the one disrespecting the order of your learned brother. What I expected that he should do this morning is to come to Court and ask for an adjournment based on the order of your learned brother.
I align myself with the learned silk that we should stay proceedings till the ruling of your learned brother. I also need to file my response to the reply of the prosecution.
It is my view that non service of the summons on the Appellant was not made such an issue at the lower Court as would have deprived the court of jurisdiction to take any step in the matter. The Appellant who claimed not to have been served was duly represented by counsel. The concern of the Appellant as clearly made known by his Counsel above is that the criminal charge should not proceed in view of the order of Court 2. Claim of absence of fair hearing does not therefore arise at all. There were sufficient submissions by all the Counsel especially the Appellant’s Counsel as set out above to enable the learned trial Judge come to the conclusion that the proper step to take in the circumstances was to transfer the charge to Court 2. He could not be seen to be acting as an appellate Court over the decision of his brother judge of coordinate jurisdiction and also to avoid the possibility of their making conflicting orders. It could not consequently be said that the learned trial judge raised the issue suo motu and decided without hearing the parties. Considering the issues at stake in Court 2, I am not surprised the lower Court opted for the transfer to Court 2. He could not act as an Appeal Court over the decision of his brother Judge of coordinate jurisdiction and they should not be seen to be making conflicting orders. The learned trial Judge said it all and the Appellant should have read between the lines. Although the Appellant and his co-Applicants were asking for stay of proceedings; having heard their submissions, the learned trial judge rightly in my view decided that it was better to transfer the charge to Court 2 where all the issues can be dealt with. I am of the view that the transfer of the suit to Court 2 Coram, Hon. Justice J.O Abdulmalik for trial and determination does not preclude the Judge from hearing the pending applications if counsel desired to continue with the applications. Common sense however dictates that since there is already pending in that Court an order restraining the Defendants from taking any further steps that would prejudice the Motion for injunction, that the motion for injunction would be heard and determined one way or the other before any further steps can be taken on the criminal charge. However, Hon. Justice J.O Abdulmalik of Court 2 is master in his own Court. From the Record of Appeal, summons had already been ordered by the lower Court to be served on Counsel for the parties. Two of the Counsel admitted service. It follows that what ought to be ordered is fresh hearing notice on the parties. However, this does not preclude any party who claims not to have been served at all from raising the issue before Hon. Justice Abdulmalik.
I am at a loss as to why the Appellant found it necessary to appeal the Ruling of the lower Court to transfer the criminal charge to Court 2. If truly his reservation was the transfer for trial and determination and the order for fresh hearing notice; he would have confined his complaint to that aspect of the order. On the contrary, he is urging us to set aside the order transferring the suit and to dismiss the suit or in the alternative send it back to the

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lower court Coram: N. Ayo Emmanuel J or any other Court except Hon. Justice J.O. Abdulmalik for the hearing and determination of the Appellant’s preliminary objection. This, in my humble view shows lack of good faith and the intention to merely delay the hearing of the matters. Such conduct on the part of Counsel must be deprecated as it constitutes a clog in the speedy and due administration of justice to the detriment of the reputation of the Courts and the Judiciary. I am of the firm view that this appeal has no merit whatsoever. It is hereby dismissed.
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.:I read in advance the judgment delivered by my learned brother, C. E. Iyizoba, JCA.
The learned trial Judge transferred the case hitherto pending before him in the exercise of his discretion. Certainly, the learned trial Judge did so in the exercise of the inherent power granted all Courts in the exercise of adjudicatory functions by virtue of Section 6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). So long as the Court exercised that inherent power judicially and judiciously, the Appellate Court will not interfere. In the instant case, the decision of the learned trial Judge to transfer the case to his learned brother of the same jurisdiction, was for good reason. It was meant to avoid conflict in the decisions that may come out of the two Courts.
It is for the above reason that I agreed that this appeal has no merit. It is hereby dismissed by me.
NONYEREM OKORONKWO, J.C.A.: I agree with the lead Judgment in this appeal by my lord Chinwe Eugenia Iyizoba JCA dismissing this appeal as being misconceived.
I will proceed to add that Section 22 of the Federal High Court Act does not contain any factual conditions that must be met before a Judge will feel obliged to transfer a case before him to another Judge of the same Court. Numerous factual scenario may arise to justify such a cause of action including personal reasons.
Transfer of cases generally, is the preserve of the trial judge or administratively the function of the Chief Judge. The trial Court has given very good reasons why he could not proceed further with the case which reasons are unassailable. One wonders why the appellants are against a particular Judge. Perhaps appellant should apply to the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court who could administratively make such transfer.

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UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is predicated on the decision of the High Court of Plateau State in Charge No: PLD/J23C/2007 – FRN v. SGT. PETER ABBAH; delivered 10th October, 2016; wherein the Appellant was convicted on Counts 1, 2 and 3 but discharged and acquitted on Count 4 of the charge against him.
The Appellant was arraigned before the trial Court on a four count charge of offences contrary to and punishable under Sections 10 (a) (ii);17 (1) and 19 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. He was charged as follows:
COUNT 1
That you, Sgt. Abbah peter, M, in March, 2007 at Jos, Plateau State, being a public officer did ask for the sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty thousand naira only) for yourself from Mr. Gabriel Onwe on account of something to be afterward done, to wit – closing your investigation in the complaint of Criminal Breach of Trust pending against the said Gabriel Onwe and you thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 10(a) (ii) of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related offences Act 2000.
COUNT 2
That you, Sgt. Abbah peter ‘M’ in March 2007 at Shemshark Hotel Bauchi Road, Jos, Plateau State, being a public officer did corruptly accept the sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty thousand naira only) for yourself from Mr. Gabriel Onwe as an inducement for you to close your investigation in the complaint of criminal Breach of Trust pending against the said Gabriel Onwe and you thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 17 (1) of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.
COUNT 3
That you, Sgt. Abbah Peter M, in March 2007 at Jos, Plateau State being a Public Officer did use your office as a police officer to confer corrupt advantage upon yourself by collecting the sum of N50,000.00 (Fifty thousand naira only) from Mr. Gabriel Onwe for you to close your investigation in the complaint of criminal Breach of Trust pending against the said Gabriel Onwe and you thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 19 of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.
COUNT 4
That you, Sgt. Abbah peter, M, sometime in 2006 or thereabout at Abuja being a Public

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Officer did use your office as a police officer to confer corrupt advantage upon yourself by collecting the sum of N100,000,00 (one hundred thousand naira only) from Mr. Gabriel Onwe for closing your investigation in the complaint of Criminal Breach of Trust pending against the said Gabriel Onwe and you thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 19 of the ICPC Act 2000.Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court, the Appellant has filed this appeal. Upon filing of the relevant processes by counsel to both parties in line with the rules of this Court; the appeal was heard on 19th January, 2017; after Mr. E.O. Akhayere the learned counsel for the Appellant who appeared with Mrs. M. O. Alu had applied and was granted leave to withdraw the motion on notice filed on 26th October, 2016. Mr. Akhayere referred to adopted and relied on the Appellant’s brief of argument filed on 18th November, 2016 in urging the Court to allow the appeal. Thereafter, Mr. Kalu J. Ugbo who represented the Respondent adopted and relied on the Respondent’s brief of argument filed on 23rd December, 2016 in praying the Court to dismiss the appeal.In their respective briefs, their counsel distilled the same issues in different words. The issues raised by the parties are reproduced hereunder.
Appellant’s issues;
“1. Whether having regards to the evidence adduced by the parties in this case the learned trial Judge was right in his finding that all the ingredients of the offences in counts 1 to 3 have been approved.
2. Whether from the evidence before the Court the learned trial Judge was right in its finding that the Appellant took away the sum of N20,000.00 from the N10,000 given him by PW 2.”
Respondent’s issues are:
“1.Whether the Respondent proved the ingredients of the offences in counts 1, 2 and 3 of the charge against the Appellant.
2. Whether the Respondent was able to adduce evidence that the Appellant took away the sum of N20,000.00 from the N100,000.00 given by the PW 2.”

Being the same issues, I shall adopt the issues raised by the aggrieved party in determining this appeal.
ISSUE 1
“Whether having regards to the evidence adduced by the parties in this case, the learned trial Judge was right in his finding that all the ingredients of the offences in counts 1 to 3 have been approved.”

The Appellant’s counsel stated the well settled principle of law on who the onus of proof in criminal matters lie. He cited: OFORLETE V. STATE (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 415. He went on to summarize the evidence before the trial Court at pages 4 to 9 paragraphs 2.5 to 3.1 of the Appellant’s brief. He then submitted that from the evidence before the trial Court, the Prosecution did not succeed in proving mens rea of the offences. He argued that the offences created by Sections 10, 17 and 19 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act, 2000from their wordings are cases of strict liability in which case the Prosecution must first prove mens rea before the actusreus. He urged the Court to so hold citing: ABEKE v. STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1040) 411 SC; MUFUTAU OLANIYI ABIODUN V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2008) LPELR- 8574 CA; OJO V. F.R.N. (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1099).

Mr. Akhayere further submitted that the evidence of the Appellant as to the circumstances resulting in his receiving the money is consistent with his innocence. He noted the evidence that pw2 paid the sum of N80,000.00 which was receipted as

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admitted by PW4 and evidenced in Exhibit L. He thereafter submitted that these pieces of evidence have created doubt or left a hole in the evidence of the Prosecution as to whether indeed the Appellant received the money for himself and that being the case the Appellant ought to have been discharged and acquitted. He referred to: ALHAJI BABA GANA ABBAS DAWA & ANOR V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2011) LPELR- 9217 (CA); OKAFOR V. STATE (2006) 4 NWLR (PT. 969) 1.

The learned counsel finally urged the Court to hold that the prosecution did not establish the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt in which case the learned trial Judge was in error to have found the Appellant guilty. He prayed the Court to resolve issue 1 in favour of the Appellant.
In response, Mr. Kalu J. Ugbo for the Respondent referred to Section 135 and 139 of the Evidence Act, 2011 to concede that the onerous burden of proving the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt is on the Respondent. He however contended that the onus on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every iota of doubt. He relied on: LORI V. STATE(1980) 8-11 SC; DIBIE V. STATE (2007) 2 NCC 475.

The learned counsel went ahead to examine the prerequisite ingredients of the offences for which the Appellant was charged and the evidence in proof of the same as adduced by the Respondent in the course of trial at the lower Court through its five witnesses and documents admitted as Exhibits. See pages g – 17 paragraphs 5.0 to 6.9 of the Respondent’s brief. As for the urgency in the discharge of the duty that led to the arrest of the Appellant which the Appellant’s counsel submitted was impossible, Mr. Ugbo submitted that, that argument should be discountenanced as speed is part of the strategy of the commission in the discharge of its function as it concerns “sting operation” He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Respondent.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1
The standard of proof required of the prosecution in a criminal case is a heavy one. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof remains on the prosecution throughout and does not shift to the accused person, except in few limited circumstances, such as where an accused raises the defence of
insanity. There is no obligation on the accused to prove his innocence. In order to discharge the onus on it, the prosecution must establish all the ingredients of the offence charged. See: OKOH V. STATE (2014) 8 NWLR (PT 1410) 502 AT 522; SEE ALSO: STATE V. EMINE (1992) 7 NWLR (PT 256) 658; ALOR V. STATE (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 511.
The apex Court made the meaning of proof beyond reasonable doubt clear when in MUFUTAU BAKARE V. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 1 AT 32; (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 52) 579; (1987) LPELR- 714 (SC) PER OPUTA JSC (PP. 12-13) PARAS G-E); it held:
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt” stems out of a compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of any doubt, that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of cogency, consistent with an

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equally high degree of probability. As Denning, J. (as he then was) observed in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947 ) 2 ALL E.R. 373: – ” The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence – of course it is possible but not in the least probable the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.” See also: AIGBADION V. STATE (2000) 7 NWLR (PT 666) AGBO V STATE (2006) 6 NWLR (PT 977) 545; AKINYEMI V. STATE (1999) 6 NWLR (PT. 607) 499; ALONGE V IGP (1959) SCNLR 516; NWAEBONYI V. STATE(1994) 5 NWLR (PT 343) 138.
Thus, it is not the duty of an accused person to prove his innocence as a matter of law as there is always a presumption of innocence in his favour. As has been severally held by the Supreme Court, the standard of proof in a criminal charge is not proof beyond any shadow of doubt but proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, once the prosecution’s proof drowns the accused person’s presumption of innocence, the Court will be justified to convict. But it is not enough
for the prosecution to suspect, arrest and charge a citizen to Court, there must be cogent, credible and reliable evidence which would pin the person accused with the offence, See: OKOH V. STATE (SUPRA): GOLDEN DIBIE & ORS V. THE STATE (2007) 3 SC (PT 1) 176; (2007) LPELR- 941 (SC).

The relevant evidence before the trial Court that relates to the resolution of this issue is the fact that a petition by pw2 against the Appellant was referred to pw1 for investigation. PW1, Chukwurah Alexander Eze, a Principal Superintendent Investigator with Independent Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), identified the petition which was admitted !n evidence and marked Exhibit “A”. He said Exhibit A relates to demand of bribe by the Police of the Area command, Abuja. PW1 added that he assembled a team of investigators comprising Adira Akison and Joseph Daniel. Pw2 informed the investigators the reason for the demand for the bribe by the Appellant and the fact that the Appellant was in Jos waiting for him to bring the money. The pw1 went on this way in his evidence:
“He also came to the Commission with another petition against some officers in the Plateau State C. I. D. asking for the same sum of N50,000.00 in another matter involving his younger brother. Therefore, I applied and obtained the sum of N50,000.00 in N500.00 denomination. As a standard practice, I photocopied the entire pieces of N50,000.00 and recorded the serial numbers of the said amount in the Exhibit Register of the Special Duties Department of ICPC. Thereafter, we embarked on a working visit to Jos with 2 uniformed mobile policemen as back-up for the STING operation. On arrival at Jos, we went straight to the Command Headquarters of the Department of State Service to report our arrival and also to seek assistance should the need arise. At this point, I asked the petitioner to place a call through to the two sets of officers. The man in the State C. l. D. said he was not around Jos and we heard him because the phone’s speaker was on. Thereafter the Petitioner placed another call to the accused person and I heard the accused person said that he was at the Command Headquarters. At this point, I asked one of my team members, Mr. Adira Akison, to accompany the Petitioner to where the accused person was while pretending to be a

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colleague of the Petitioner. I did that in order to be able to identify the accused and also to confirm the alleged demand of bribe of N50,000.00. After the meeting, the duo came back to inform me that they have met with the accused person. They also confirmed the said demand by the accused person. Thereafter, we retired to our Hotel room to further strategise, because the Petitioner told me that he had informed the accused person to give them little time to go to the ATM to get the said money. While we were still together, the wife of the petitioner called him to inform him that there were two officers from Maitama, Abuja looking for him. We heard the discussion because the Petitioner left his phone on speaker. The wife of the Petitioner also informed the Petitioner that the officers have gone but left a mobile telephone number which was to be used by the Petitioner to call the accused person whom the petitioner’s wife had said that will leave for Abuja the next day at about 11.30AM. At this point, I asked the Petitioner to switch off his phone till the next day because it was late and we agreed to meet in our Hotel room early on 24/03/2007. At about 7.00AM
on 24/03/2007, while we were still discussing with the petitioner, the accused placed a call through to the petitioner and I asked him to put the phone on speaker to enable us listen to the conversation. During the conversation, I heard the accused person direct the petitioner to endeavour to meet him at a Hotel he called Semshak, opposite UNIJOS in room 193 before 9.00AM. At that point, I also heard the accused person direct the Petitioner to come with the said N50,000.00 bribe, his accommodation, the drinks he had taken and the money for the woman who had stayed with him for the night.Having heard this, I asked the petitioner to empty all his personal money that was in his possession. He complied and I brought out the same N50,000,00 in N500 denomination which I had earlier on obtained from the commission’s operational fund. I asked the petitioner to count the money. He counted and confirmed the amount to be N50,000.00. I also asked him to compare them with the photocopies I had made before and the serial numbers I recorded in the Exhibit Register and he confirmed them to be the same before we went to the target venue. When we were about getting into Semshak
Hotel, I asked my teammates to disembark while the Petitioner too was to come a few minutes after I had joined my teammates at the Hotel. I also asked the Petitioner to inform the accused person of his arrival immediately he gets to the gate of the Hotel. When I entered the Hotel premises with my teammates, we all took positions to enable us clearly see the turn of events. After a few minutes, the petitioner entered the premises of the Hotel and I saw him making a call. In a short while, I saw the accused person come out from the Hotel and met with the petitioner. Both of them sat in one mini garden close to the entrance of the Hotel building. After a few minutes of discussion between the accused person and Petitioner, I saw the petitioner bring out the same N50,000.00 which I handed over to him and handed same over to the accused person. After that, they had another brief discussion before the accused person started walking the Petitioner to the main gate of the Hotel. At this point, my teammates and I went to the accused person, introduced ourselves as officers from ICPC, Abuja, while I told him that the N50,000.00 which he had collected without receipt from
the petitioner was bribe money and from our commission and therefore he was under arrest. He resisted arrest until the two uniformed mobile policemen that acted as our back-up came in to assist us in effecting his arrest. Before then, the mobile policemen were in a Bus in the Hotel premises. After the arrest, the accused person with the money still in his possession was taken to Abuja for further questioning. At Abuja at the commission and in my office in the presence of my teammates and the two uniformed mobile policemen, I asked the accused person to bring out the N50,000’00 he collected from the Petitioner. He complied and counted it and confirmed it to be N50,000.00 in N500.00 denomination. Then I brought out the photocopies and the entry in the Exhibit Register. He compared them and confirmed them to be the same, though not without hesitation. He later endorsed the photocopy and also said that he was mindful of the gravity of the offence. I recovered the money from him, counted it with Mr. Adira Akison before putting it in a carton-coloured Envelope, which I labeled “Sgt” Abbah Exhibit for Jos” and dated it. At the top of the envelope, I also wrote

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“N50,000.00 (N500.00 denomination) “before I handed same over to the Exhibit keeper for safekeeping. I later recovered the money from the Exhibit keeper and handed same over to the prosecution.”
The envelope containing the N50,000.00 marked money, photocopies of the money and the certified true copy of the entries of the serial numbers of the marked money were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits “B”, “C” and “D” respectively. The first statement of the accused person dated 24/03/2007 was Exhibit “E”.
PW1 concluded his evidence thus: ”
“In the course of our investigation, we discovered that there was a pending matter in which the accused person was the I. P. O. that had to do with business transaction between one Abraham Ikeleji also known as Ibrahim Mohammad & Another and the former Employer of the petitioner. Consequently, we were able to recover from the Petitioner seven (7) receipts of payments made by the petitioner to his erstwhile Employer called Areva Air Services Ltd. located at Wadata, Makurdi, Benue State. The total sum of money paid through the petitioner to his former employer totaled N395,000.00 which the Petitioner remitted to the employer between June and August, 2005. The issue of asking the petitioner to come and give money for the case to be closed would not have arisen. I wrote my report to the Chairman of the Commission.”

The evidence of other prosecution witnesses is in line with the evidence of pw1. Also from the evidence of the Appellant and the submissions of his counsel, it is not in dispute that the Appellant is a person as defined and contemplated by the general definition found in Section 2 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. There is equally no contention that the sum of N50,000.00 was given to the Appellant by the PW2; The only disagreement is the purpose of parting and receiving the N50,000.00. For this reason, the Appellant’s counsel’s argument is that since there is no controversy that the pw2 was being investigated by the Appellant at his office in Abuja, and there is likewise evidence, oral and documentary that the PW2 had pleaded with the office of the Appellant to give him time to refund the money for which he was being investigated; and that he had as a matter of fact made some payment through the Appellant in the
past in his effort to refund the said money. He cognately noted the evidence of the Appellant that the N50,000.00 given to him by the pw2 was a further payment in settlement of the various sums of money that the pw2 undertook to pay back through the Appellant’s office. The learned counsel for the Appellant therefore submitted that the only logical conclusion that can be reached in the light of the evidence before the Court is that the pW2 on seeing the Appellant coupled with the fact that the officer at the State C.I.D., Jos he had come to arrest with the officers of the Commission was not on ground decided to use the instrumentality of the Commission to paint the Appellant in a bad light with a view of avoiding the case standing against him in the office of the Appellant. The learned counsel for the Appellant further argued that the failure of the officers of the commission to visit the office of the Appellant to investigate whether the Appellant was actually on official duty in Jos on that faithful date created doubt which should have weighed in the mind of the learned trial Judge positively in favour of the Appellant.
Again it was the contention of Mr.Akhayere for the Appellant that from the evidence before the Court and flowing from his analysis captured in the above paragraph, the Respondent did not succeed in proving the mens rea of the offence. He cited: ABEKE V. STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1040) 411; 2007 LPELR-31 (SC).

The latin word mens rea is the state of mind the prosecution must prove, that the accused person had when committing a crime in other to secure his conviction. It is the specific mental state; guilty mind; criminal intent; required: in conjunction with the actual criminal act (actus reus); for an accused person to be convicted of a crime other than strict liability offences. The argument of the learned counsel for the Appellant sums up that; although the Appellant collected N50,000.00 from the pw2; he did not have criminal intent when he collected the same. In other words, his mental state when he collected the N50,000,00 was devoid of guilty mind or intent to commit crime.
However, the learned counsel for the Appellant at page 9 paragraph 33 of the Appellant’s brief submitted wrongly on the meaning of strict liability offences. In the case of: ABEKE V. STATE (2007) LPELR- 31 (SC)

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relied on by the Appellant’s counsel; at page 21, paras. A – B per KEKERE- EKUN, J.S.C. HELD:
“The offences created by Sections 5 & 6 of the Federal Highways Act are strict liability offences. In other words, the crime does not require proof of mens rea. Proof of the actus reus is sufficient to ground a conviction…….”
Contrary to the submission of the Appellant’s counsel, strict liability offences do not require proof of mens rea. The offences created by Sections 10, 17 and 19 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related offences Act, 2000 are not strict liability offences and as such for the prosecution to succeed in proving the guilt of the Appellant he must proof both the actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus here is the demand and collection of the N50,000.00 by the Appellant. The mens rea is the guilty mind for the demand and acceptance of the money. Evidence from both sides abound that the Appellant collected the N50,000.00 from pw2; meaning the prosecution established the actus reus of the offence as charged. The dispute is on the proof of the mens rea.
Mr. Ugbo submitted that the Respondent led credible evidence to show that the
Appellant asked and received the sum of N50,000.00 from the Pw2 as gratification to enable the Appellant close the complaint of criminal breach of trust and cheating pending against him. The evidence of the Respondent on this is found in the evidence of PW1 reproduced earlier in this judgment. The defence of the Appellant is that he did not have criminal intent in receiving the money as pw2 gave him the money as part of the installments of the money pw2 undertook to refund to his employer.
The evidence of the Appellant on the face of it appears consistent with his innocence and would indeed tend to create doubt in the mind of any Court as contended by the Appellant’s counsel except for the fact that the Appellant’s conduct and the way and manner he collected the money was completely unprofessional and outside his scope of duty. From the evidence of the Appellant at pages 129 to 131, the pw2 was on police bail on self cognizance to enable him source for money to refund the complainants in a case of breach of trust reported against him at the Appellant’s office at Area command Abuja Metro, Maitama Abuja. The pw2 apparently jumped bail in that he refused to
show up either to make excuses why he would not continue to pay the money or to bring part of the money. He also changed his telephone numbers so that the Appellant who was the IPO in the said matter could no longer reach him nor know his whereabouts for two years until the Appellant ran into him when he came for another official duty in Jos. Then, the same Pw2 who had been avoiding the Appellant saw him at the Plateau State command and went to him instead of dodging him since the Appellant did not see him. The Appellant as a trained IPO who saw an accused person who had been sought for two years; did not arrange to detain him with the help of the office of the Plateau State command rather he entered into a friendship dialogue with him which led to his giving the Pw2 his phone number; going to visit him in his house and subsequently inviting him to his hotel room all in the name of trying to collect money for the complainant in the case for which the pw2 was an accused. All these from the evidence on record happened within 24hours. Eventually the money supposedly collected for and on behalf of a certain complainant who was not called to confirm the evidence
was not receipted for like that of Exhibit L. With all due respect to the submissions of the Appellant’s counsel, the picture I have painted from the Appellant’s evidence in my view is not consistent with the Appellant’s innocence nor does it extricate the Appellant of the mens rea of the offences as charged. Firmly stated, the evidence of the Appellant cannot in any way be said to cast doubt on the guilt of the Appellant.
This is more so for the fact that the Nigerian police is not a debt collector. It is therefore outside the scope of a police officer’s official duty to be running from pillar to post or even to a debtor’s house in order to collect debt on behalf of a complainant. This Court has stated severally, that the Nigerian police has no business helping parties to settle or recover debts. See OGBONNA V. OGBONNA (2014) LPELR – 22308 CA; (2014) 23 WRN 48; ANOGWIE & ORS V. ODOM & ORS. (2016) LPELR – 40214 (CA). It is correct that the case against the Pw2 was criminal breach of trust which is within the scope of duty of the police but when as testified by the Appellant the complainant in that case decided to settle with the PW2 by allowing him pay in installments; it ceased to be the duty of the police to go hand in glove with the PW2 to advance further part

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payment. This is so because such agreement now becomes civil agreement for which Section 4 of the Police Act, Cap 359 LFN; does not provide for the police to enforce. I am therefore of the view that the unofficial and unprofessional manner in which the Appellant went about in collecting the N50,000.00 from the pW2; goes further to strengthen the evidence of the prosecution that the Appellant had criminal intent in collecting the money to wit; as gratification to close the criminal complaint against the pW2.
Again, the fact that the investigators did not visit the office of the Appellant to inquire if actually he was in Jos for an official duty on that particular date in my view could not cast doubt in the mind of the Court on the guilt of the Appellant. This I say because the fact that the Appellant was on official duty in Jos on the fateful day does not negate the fact that he gave his phone number to a wanted accused person, visited him in his house, invited him to his hotel and collected N50,000.00 from him without issuing him a receipt, all acts which are unconnected to whatever official duty he was in Jos for. These unprofessional acts of the Appellant
only point to one logical fact which is that he collected the money as a bribe.
The Prosecution is held to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt when it has led strong, cogent, credible and convincing qualitative evidence in proof of the basic ingredients of the offences charged as specified in the legislation allegedly violated; and the proof irresistibly point to the accused’s guilt, though leaving only remote and unattractive possibility in his favour. By the evidence adduced at the trial Court, I agree with the learned trial Judge that the Prosecution firmly established the basic ingredients of the offences charged against the Appellant in counts 1, 2 and 3; leaving no reasonable doubt arising from the proof of guilt of the Appellant. Accordingly, I hold that the Prosecution proved the ingredients of the offences in counts 1, 2 and 3 of the charge against the Appellant. Issue 1 is resolved in favour of the Respondent.
ISSUE 2
Whether from the evidence before the Court, the learned trial Judge was right in its finding that the Appellant took away the sum of N20,000.00 from the N100,000 given him by pw2.
Mr. Akhayere referred to
the oral evidence of both pw2 and pw4 as it relates to Exhibit L to submit that; the learned trial Judge was wrong to have relied on the oral evidence of PW2 and PW4 to find that the Appellant took away the sum of N20,000.00 from the N100,000.00 given by pw2 for transmission to the complainant in the case of criminal breach of trust against him, when the Appellant by Exhibit L acknowledged receipt of N80,000.00. He relied on: BALIOLÂ LTD V. NAVCON LTD. (2010) VOL. 42 NSCQR 1067; OGUNDELE V. AGIRI (2009) VOL. 40 NSCQR 427.

The learned counsel urged the Court to answer issue 2 in favour of the Appellant and to allow the appeal.
Mr. Ugbo in the Respondent’s brief did not squarely address this issue. He reargued his issue 1 and re-emphasized the evidence of the pW2 and PW4 on how Pw2 gave the PW4 N100,000.00 for transmission through the Appellant to the complainant in the case of criminal breach of trust against him at the police station but that the Appellant collected the N100,000,00 but receipted for N80,000.00 as per Exhibit L.
The evidence of the PW2 and PW4 as to what was given and what was receipted for is clear from the record. However the
Appellant denied that he was given the sum of N100,000.00 by the pw4 rather he insisted that he was only given N80,000.00 by the PW4 for which he receipted via Exhibit L. The learned trial Judge found that the Appellant was actually given N100,000.00 by the pw4 but removed N20,000.00 and receipted for N80,000.00. The facts and circumstances of the case notwithstanding, it is settled by case law that where a document is clear and unambiguous, parole evidence cannot be led to contradict it. In other words, oral evidence cannot be used to state the contents of a document. See: A.G. BENDEL v. U.B.A. LTD. (1986) NWLR (PT. 37) 547; ANYANWU & ORS V. UZOWUAKA & ORS. (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1159) 445; OGUNDELE V. AGIRI (2009) VOL. 40 NSCQR 427.

Exhibit L in the instant case speaks for itself, it is clear and unambiguous that the PW4 handed N80,000.00 to the Appellant as money from the PW2 being part of the refund to the complainant of the case for criminal breach of trust against the PW2. The oral evidence of pW2 and pW4 was wrongly admitted by the trial Court to explain Exhibit L. The answer to issue 2 is therefore in the negative.
Issue 2 is resolved in favour of the Appellant.

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Let me state emphatically that the resolution of issue 2 does not in any way affect the decision of the trial Court wherein the Appellant was convicted for the offences as charged in counts 1, 2 and 3 of the charge. Accordingly the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I affirm the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the High Court of Plateau State in case No: PLD/J23C/07 delivered on 10th October, 2016.
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, JCA. I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein, to the effect that the appeal is grossly lacking in merit and ought to be dismissed.
I adopt the said judgment as mine in dismissing the appeal. The judgment and conviction made by the trial Court is hereby affirmed.
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Uchechukwu Onyemenam, JCA. His Lordship has considered and resolved the
issues in contention in this appeal. I agree with and abide the conclusion reached therein.
The Appellant was arraigned before the lower Court on a four charge contrary to and punishable under Sections 10(a)(ii), 17(1) and 19 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. The Appellant, being a public officer, was alleged to have asked for himself the sum of N50,000.00 for something to be afterwards done and to have corruptly accepted for himself the said sum of N50,000.00 from one Mr. Gabriel Onwe as an inducement for his closing his investigation into the complaint of criminal breach of trust pending against the said Gabriel Onwe. The Appellant was also alleged, being a public officer, to have used his office as a Police Officer to confer a corrupt advantage on himself by so collecting the said sum of N50,000.00 and by also, on another date, collecting a further sum of N100,000.00 for the same purpose of closing his investigation.
The Appellant pleaded Not Guilty and the matter proceeded to trial and in the course of which the Respondent called five witnesses and tendered exhibits in proof of its case against the Appellant and the Appellant testified in person and called one other witness and also tendered exhibits in proof of his
defence. At the conclusion of the trial and after final addresses by Counsel to the parties, the trial Court entered judgment wherein it found the Appellant guilty on the first three counts on the charge and sentenced him accordingly. This appeal is against the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.
It is axiomatic in our jurisprudence that the burden of proving that any person has committed a crime or wrongful act rests on the person who asserts it and this is more often than not, the prosecution. By virtue of Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act, where the commission of crime by a party is an issue in any proceedings be it civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging the burden, all the essential ingredients of the crime alleged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden never shifts. Therefore, if in a criminal trial on the whole of the evidence before it, the Court is left in a state of doubt, the prosecution would have failed to discharge the burden of proof which the law lays upon it and the defendant will be entitled to an acquittal.
It must however be pointed out that proof beyond reasonable doubt is
“not proof to the hilt” and is thus not synonymous with proof beyond all iota of doubt and this is because the law will fail to protect the community if it admits fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. Thus, if the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable”, the case will be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short will suffice. Reasonable doubt which will justify an acquittal is a doubt based on reason arising from evidence or lack of it. It is a doubt which a reasonable man or woman might entertain. It is not a fanciful doubt. It is not an imaginary doubt. It is a doubt as would cause prudent men to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to themselves – Uzoka vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt 1177) 118, Jua vs State (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt 1184) 217, Ike vs State (2010) 5 NWLR (pt 1186) 41 and Gabriel vs State (2010) 6 NWLR (pt 1190) 280.

The complaints of the Appellant in this appeal invite this Court to examine the evaluation of the evidence of the parties carried out by the

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lower Court. It is settled that a trial Court has two duties in respect of the evidence led by parties in a trial. The first is to receive into its records all the relevant evidence, and this is called perception. The second is to thereafter weigh the evidence in the context of the surrounding circumstances and this is evaluation. A finding of fact by a trial Court involves, both perception and evaluation – Guardian Newspaper Ltd. vs Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1256) 574. Nacenn Nigeria Ltd vs Bewac Automative Producers Ltd. (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt 1257) 193, Wachukwu vs Owunwanne (2011) 14 NWLR (pt 1266) 1.

It is the primary responsibility of a trial Court to evaluate the evidence presented by parties before it, ascribe probative value to the evidence and then come up with a decision. Evaluation of evidence entails the assessment of evidence so as to give value and quality to it. It involves a reasoned belief of the evidence of one of the contending parties and disbelief of the other or a reasoned preference of one version to the other. There must be on record how the Court arrived at its conclusion of preferring one piece of evidence to the other – Idakwo vs
Nigerian Army (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt 857) 249, Oyekola vs Ajibade (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt 902) 356, Imoh vs Onanuga (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt 1376) 139 and Al-Mustapha vs State (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt 1383) 350.

In evaluating the evidence led by the parties in this case, the lower Court stated thus:
“The prosecution’s evidence, which I have already recapped, is that upon the demand for N50,000.00 by the accused person from PW2 in order for the accused person to close a case of criminal breach of trust reported against PW2 at the Metro Police Station, Abuja, PW2 petitioned the ICPC whereupon a sting operation with marked notes of N50,000.00 in N500.00 denomination was arranged. The accused person arranged with PW2 to bring the money to his hotel Semshak Hotel, Jos, in the morning of 24/03/07 after his attempt to meet PW2 at his residence in Jos failed. This arrangement was made on phone in the presence of the ICPC Investigators who were listening to the conversation as the phone was on speaker. PW2 met the accused person as Semshak hotel was where he handed over the marked money to him, subsequent upon which the accused person was nabbed by the ICPC Investigators with
the money in his pocket and taken to ICPC Headquarters Abuja. There he was shown photocopies of the notes he obtained from PW2 together with the list of their serial numbers. The photocopies of N50,000.00 in N500 denomination together with the list of their serial numbers are Exhibits C and D before the Court. The accused person endorsed on these exhibits as copies and serial numbers of the N50,000.00 given to him by PW2- his endorsement is dated 24/03/2007.
In his defence, the accused person told the Court that the money given to him by PW2 was meant to be part payment for the amount owed the complainants by PW2 in the case of criminal breach of trust reported against the PW2 wherein PW2 made an undertaking to repay the money by N100,000.00 monthly installment. The accused stated that PW2 has paid through the Police the sum of N80,000.00 before he stopped further payment. It is the case of the accused person that when PW2 saw him at the Plateau State CID Office on 23/03/2007, he offered to give him the N50,000.00 part payment for onward transmission to the complainants in Abuja. According to the accused person, this was the reason why he went to the house of PW2 on the night of 23/03/07 and his failure to meet him led to their subsequent arrangement for PW2 to bring the money to him at Semshak Hotel, Jos.”
The lower Court continued thus:
“The questions that may be asked are:
a. If the N50,000.00 is meant to be part payment in pursuance of the undertaking made by PW2, is Semshak Hotel, Jos as opposed to Metro Police Station Abuja, the appropriate venue for such payment?
b. Has the mandate of the Nigerian Police extended to debt recoveries on behalf of complainants?
c. How about the money for Hotel accommodation, drinks and for the woman he slept with which PW2 and the accused person demanded from him, evidence that was not controverted?
It is settled law that the Nigerian Police is not a debt collector and therefore its officers cannot be running from pillar to post or even to debtors’ houses in order to collect debt on behalf of complainants. In the case Anogwie vs Odom…, the Court of Appeal held that the duties of the Police under Section 4 of the Police Act does not include settlement of civil disputes or the collection of debts or enforcement of civil agreements between parties. I did

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not believe the story given by the accused person that he went to the house of PW2 in Jos on the night of 23/03/2007 in order to collect debt owed to another person by PW2 concerning a pending matter at the Metro Police Station, Abuja. The house of PW2 and Semshak Hotel, both located in Jos, are not and can never be an extension of the Metro Police Station, Maitama, Abuja where the complaint was lodged and the undertaking made…”
The lower Court concluded thus:
“The accused person is indisputably a public officer, being a Sergeant in the Nigerian Police Force. From the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that the accused person:
a. Demanded for a bribe from PW2;
b. Received a bribe from PW2 in the sum of N50,000.00
c. For the purpose of closing a case of criminal breach of trust against PW2 by using his office as the IPO;
d. Has conferred upon himself a corrupt and unfair advantage by receiving the said sum of N50,000.00
All the purported defence put up by the accused person are nothing but fruitless antics and futile efforts of a corrupt Police Officer who was caught in the act to escape from the long arm of justice. I reject all the sham defences put forward by the accused person. It is my judgment that
all the ingredients of the offences charged on counts 1, 2 and 3 have been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, in the result therefore, I hereby convict the accused person as charged in these three counts.”
It is obvious from the above excerpts of the judgment that the lower Court did evaluate the evidence led by the parties. The law is that where the records of proceedings show that a trial Court assessed the evidence produced before it and accorded probative value to them and placed them side by side on an imaginary weighing scale before coming to a conclusion and making a finding of fact on side of the evidence that tilts the scale, such finding must be accorded due weight so long as it is not reasonable and not perverse. In other words, an appellate Court will not interfere with the evaluation of evidence carried out by a trial Court and will not substitute its own views for that of the trial Court unless the conclusion reached from the facts is perverse- Ajibulu vs Ajayi (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1392) 483, Ikumonihan vs. State (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1392) 564.
A decision of a Court is said to be perverse (a) when it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings; or (b) where it it has been shown that the trial Court took account of matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shut its eyes to the obvious; or (c) when such a decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; or (d) when the circumstance of the finding of facts in the decision are most unreasonable – Onu v. Idu(2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 657, Momoh Vs Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt 1270) 217.

The Appellant has urged this Court to find that the lower Court did not properly evaluate the evidence of the parties and to carry out a re-evaluation of the evidence. Now, it is trite law that the power of re-evaluation of evidence is not one that an appellate Court exercises just because an appellant has asked for it. The privilege of having an appellate Court exercise the power must be earned by an appellant showing a compelling and cogent reason for its exercise. An appellate Court will not embark on a re-evaluation of the evidence led by the parties in the trial Court simply because an appellant made an allegation of improper evaluation of evidence. An appellate Court will only do so where an appellant visibly demonstrates the perversity of the findings made by the lower Court by showing that the lower
Court (i) made improper use of the opportunity it had of seeing and hearing the witnesses; or (ii) did not appraise the evidence and ascribe probative value to it; or (iii) drew wrong conclusions from proved or accepted facts leading to a miscarriage of justice. Where an appellant fails to do so, an appellate Court has no business re-evaluating the evidence and interfering with the findings of the lower Court – Njoku vs Eme (1973) 5 SC 293 at 306, Kale vs Coker (1982) 12 SCÂ 252 at 371, Oke vs Mimiko (No 2) (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt 1338) 332 at 397-398, Gundiri Vs Nyako (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1391) 211, Busari Vs State (2015) 5 NWLR (Pt 1452) 343 at 373.
Reading through the entire arguments of the Counsel to the Appellant in his brief of arguments, all the Counsel did was to rehash the arguments presented by the Appellant in the lower Court. Counsel did not condescend on the findings of fact made by the lower Court and show why they should be upturned by this Court. It is settled law that it is not enough for an appellant to go before an appellate Court to repeat the case he presented before the lower Court with the hope that the appellate Court will come to
different decision; he must attack the findings of fact made by the trial Court from the evidence led – Uor vs Loko(1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 430 at 441, Onyejekwe Vs Onyejekwe (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt 596) 482 at 500-501, Jov Vs Dom(1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 620) 538 at 551, Awudu Vs Daniel (2005) 2 NWLR (pt 909) 199 at 231, Ojeleye Vs The Registered Trustees of Ona Iwa Mimo Cherubim & Seraphim Church of Nigeria (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt 1111) 520 at 543.

Counsel to the Appellant did not give this Court any reason to interfere with the findings and the decision of the lower Court. It is on this basis, and the fuller exposition of the law in the lead judgment, that I agree that there is no merit in the appeal. I too dismiss the appeal and hereby affirm the judgment of the High Court of Plateau State in Suit No PLD/J23C/2007 delivered by Honorable Justice M. I. Sirajo on the 10th of October, 2016 and the sentences passed thereon on the Appellant.