Conversion

Shorn of details, the facts were that the appellant and others were arraigned on sundry counts of conspiracy, stealing and conversion of funds/shares said to belong to Afribank Plc and her subscribers. The respondent closed her case after calling four witnesses and tendering in evidence avalanche of documents. The appellant made a no case submission which was overruled.
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court below, the appellant filed a notice of appeal with 4 grounds of appeal. The respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection to the appeal. It was argued in the respondent’s amended brief of argument filed on 13.12.17 to the effect that ground 1 of the notice of appeal is vague and general in terms and offends Order 7 Rule 3 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016 (Rules of the Court) read with the cases of Osasona v. Ajayi (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 527 at 544-545, Professor Abe v. University of Ilorin and Ors. (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1379) 183, Nwosu v. Udeaja (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 188 at 217, Abdullahi v. Oba (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 554) 420 at 428, Adesola v. Abidoye (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt.637) 28 at 56, consequently it was urged that ground 1 of the notice of appeal and issue 1 of the appellant’s issues for determination built on it should be struck out.
The respondent argued on the second leg of the preliminary objection that ground 2 of the notice of appeal is incompetent being a complaint against a decision that the Court below did not make as the Court below did not pronounce on the competence of the action and as a ground of appeal is expected to be precise, unequivocal and must directly attack the validity of the ratio decidendi of the case, otherwise the ground of appeal will be held incompetent, therefore ground 2 of the notice of appeal is incompetent more so it is repetition of ground 1 of the notice of appeal and should be struck out videOloruntoba-Oju and Ors. v. Abdul-Raheem and Ors. (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83 at 121, Archianga v. A G, Akwa Ibom State (2015) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1454) 1 at 36 – 37, Egbe v. Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 546, M.C.S. (Nig.) Ltd/Gte v. Adeokin Records (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 391) 1624 at 1635, Mark v. Abubakar (2009) 2 NWLR (Pt.1124) 79 at 134.
The respondent argued on the third leg of the preliminary objection that grounds 3 and 4 are on the evaluation of facts and evidence to arrive at a decision whether the appellant had a case to answer and are thus grounds of mixed law and fact requiring the leave of the Court first sought and had and not having obtained the requisite leave grounds 3 and 4 of the notice of appeal are incompetent and should be struck out vide Akinyemi v. Odu’a Investment Co. Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209 at 230, Amuda v. Adelodun (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.360) 23 at 30, Odunukwe v. Ofomata (supra) at 426 and Section 242(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999(1999 Constitution); upon which the respondent urged that the appeal should be struck out on ground of incompetence.
The reply brief of the appellant filed on 03-01-18 contended that the substance of ground 1 of the notice of appeal gave the 1st respondent sufficient information about the complaint of the appellant and cannot be described as vague and general in terms vide CBN v. Okojie (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt.768) 48 at 61, Eleburuike v. Tawa (2010) LPELR – 4099, Animashaun and Anor. v. Onyekwulujuje (2003) LPELR-7242.

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The reply brief also contended that in light of the fact that ground 2 of the notice of appeal complained against the failure of the Court below to consider and make pronouncement on the fundamental point of law canvassed by the parties that the proceedings were a nullity in that they were conducted in the absence of the 3rd defendant, ground 2 of the notice of appeal is competent vide Okwara v. Okwara (1997) LPELR – 6291, Akpan v. Bob and Ors. (2010) LPELR – 376; and that grounds 3 and 4 having not been grounds contesting findings of fact by the Court below but purely grounds of law which seek to challenge the failure of the Court below to apply the law to established facts, grounds 3 and 4 are not grounds of mixed law and fact and did not require the leave of the Court to file and argue them in the appeal vide Obatoyinbo and Anor. v. Oshatoba and Anor. (1996) LPELR – 2156,Abubakar v. Dankwambo (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt.1491) 213 at 228, therefore it was urged that the notice of preliminary objection should not be countenanced for lacking in merit.
Pages 1312A 1312C of the record of appeal (the record) contain the motion on notice for the no case submission. The substantive prayer is in pages 1312A 1312B of the record. It is for the striking out of all 35 counts of the charge sheet on the basis that the respondent did not adduce sufficient evidence in support of the counts in question and for consequential order discharging and acquitting the appellant. There is no substantive prayer for the proceedings of the Court below to be quashed on the premise that they were conducted in the absence of one of the defendants. The parties and the Court are bound by the prayers in the motion paper. They cannot stray outside it vide Okoya v. Santilli (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.131) 172, Commissioner for Works Benue State v. Devcon Ltd. (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.83) 407.
A party seeking to quash proceedings of a Court cannot pursue the remedy under a prayer for a no case submission. Both are mutually exclusive. The success of a prayer for a no case submission is a consequential order discharging the defendant. While the success of a request to quash the proceedings of a Court for being a nullity attracts the consequential order of a proper or fresh trial of the defendant vide the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Hassan v. F.R.N. (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt.1560) 64 at 82 per the lead judgment prepared by the eminent jurist Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C., which I came across while preparing this judgment.
It follows that nullity of proceedings cannot be argued under a prayer for no case submission. It requires its own substantive prayer. Such a prayer is normally brought under the inherent powers of the Court. Being a special remedy, the proper procedure should have been followed in raising and urging it in this case vide Oko v. The State (2017) NWLR (Pt.1593) 24 at 47 – 48 following Adejobi v. State (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt.1261) 347 at 366 – 367 and Jov v. Dom (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt.620) 438 at 541.
True, the Court below should have considered the submission on the nullity of the proceedings and ruled one way or the other on it. Not having considered it, the appellants complaints in grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal are properly laid vide Akpan v. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt.1223) 421. But I do not, with respect, see actual miscarriage of justice in the failure of the Court below to consider the submission on nullity of the proceedings when the issue was not covered by any substantive prayer in the motion paper as should be the case showing the submission had no rampart to secure/support it. I invoke the proviso to Section 19(4) of the Court of Appeal Act to most respectfully hold that there is no actual miscarriage of justice as the submission on nullity of the proceedings was not based on any substantive prayer and thus made in a vacuum.
Assuming without agreeing the point is well taken, the success of it would have led to a consequential order for the proper or fresh trial of the appellant, not a discharge of the appellant.
I have seen the grounds of appeal in pages 3552 – 3554 of the record. Ground 1 thereof is with respect not vague and general in terms. Taken together with the particulars thereof ground 1 of the

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notice of appeal gives the respondent sufficient notice of the complaint it shall meet at the appeal. It is a good ground of appeal, in my modest view; as the essence of a ground of appeal is to let the other party know precisely what is in contest on appeal thus leaving no room for doubt on the substance of the dispute vide Ameen v. Amao (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1358) 159, Best (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (Nigeria) Ltd. and Ors. (2011) 5 NWLR (Pt.1239) 95 at 115 on clear and succinct ground of appeal wearing the toga of efficacy. Even where grounds of appeal are inelegantly drafted they can still be accommodated once the sting of the complaint is clear as in this case vide KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Aloma (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt.1601) 473 (on inelegantly drafted Court process). See also Ngere & Anor. v. Okuruket XIV and Anor. (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt.1559) 440 following Nnanna v. Onyenakuchi (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt.689) 92, Obijiaku v. N.D.I.C. (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.774) 201, Apapa v. INEC (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt.1303) 409, Mba v. Agu (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt.629) 1, Hambe v. Hueze (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.703) 372, Agbi v. Ogbeh (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt.926) 40.
Ground 2 of the notice of appeal does show at close range that it is dissimilar to ground 1 thereof and cannot be duplication of ground 1 of the notice of appeal. Nor does ground 2 overlap ground 1 of the notice of appeal. But both grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal stand on nothing having regard to the fact that there is no specific prayer in the motion paper for the Court below to adjudicate on them, therefore grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal do not avail the appellant. Assuming without agreeing that grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal avail the appellant, their success should lead to the consequential order for the proper/fresh trial of the appellant.
Grounds 3 – 4 of the notice of appeal are on the overruling of the no case submission. These are grounds of mixed law and fact requiring the leave of the Court first sought and had; and having not sought and obtained the leave of the Court before filing grounds 3 – 4 of the notice of appeal, the said grounds of appeal are incompetent vide Metuh v. F.R.N. (2017) 4 NWLR (pt.1554) 108 at 119 – 120 followed by the Court (Lagos Division) in Emmanuel Morah v. F.R.N. in yet unreported appeal No. CA/L/809CB/2016 decided on 24-11-17 (coram: Garba, Nimpar and Obaseki-Adejumo, JJ.C.A.) per the lead judgment of Nimpar, J,C.A. See also Section 242(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the cases of Shaka v. Salisu (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.248) 22, Oshatoba v. Olujitan (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt.655) 159, Nigerian Air Force v. Shekete(2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) 129, Otti and Anor. v. Ogah and Ors. (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt.1563) 1.
Accordingly, I uphold the preliminary objection and for the reasons given (supra) hereby strike out the appeal on ground of incompetence.
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, JCA. just delivered with which I agree and adopt as mine. I have nothing more to add.
JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: I read before today the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother JOSEPH SHAOBAOR IKYEGH JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived of in the judgment, adopt it as mine with nothing further to add.

EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): At the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory the appellant and one other are defending a 6-count charge alleging conspiracy to criminally convert public funds and criminal conversion of public funds totalling N16,412,315.00 being interests generated from two fixed deposit accounts.
The Bayelsa State Government made a donation of N557,995,065.00 to the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), at the time the appellant was the Inspector General of Police, to enable the NPF purchase equipment for proper policing of Bayelsa State. It appears from the summary of the statement of Olayinka Ayegbayo, an investigator with the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Offences Commission (ICPC), that the appellant and the 2nd Accused had agreed to place and did place N300,000,000.00 and N200,000,000.00 into fixed deposits respectively at Wema Bank Plc and Intercontinental Bank Plc. The two fixed deposits allegedly netted a total of N16,412,315.56 as interests. Mr. Ayegbayo, listed as a witness in the proofs of evidence, would, at the trial, testify inter alia that: when the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria directed the appellant to transfer the money donated by the Bayelsa State to the Federal Ministry of Police Affairs to make the necessary purchases for the Police, the appellant delayed his compliance with the presidential directive until after the maturity of the fixed deposits. When in November 2006, the appellant caused the principal sum donated by the Bayelsa State Government to be transferred to the Ministry of Police Affairs the interests earned from the fixed deposits were not transferred with the principal sum. It is alleged that the appellant and his co-accused conspired and criminally converted the said interests totalling N16,412,315.56 to their personal use. The conversion of this sum forms the crux of the 6 charges the appellant and the co-accused are defending at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.
The prosecution has listed Mr. Ayegbayo and three bank managers to testify at the trial. The summary of the proposed evidence is attached to the proofs of evidence. The list of Exhibits to be tendered together with the extra judicial statements of the accused persons, the appellant’s inclusive, are also included in the proofs of evidence.
On 6th June, 2012, the appellant filed a motion on notice, by way of preliminary objection, wherein he prayed the trial Court for the following orders-
1. AN ORDER of this Court dismissing and/or striking out the amended charge for want of jurisdiction.
2. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court quashing the amended charge against the Accused/applicant for want of competency.
3. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court debarring Mr. Paul Ahmed Bassi or any official of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission from prosecuting the 1st Accused/Applicant, they having no constitutional power to do so,
OR
4. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside its order of 31st May, 2012 granting leave to the complainant/Respondent to prefer charge No. FCT/HC/CR/92/12 against the Accused/Applicant.
The application was predicated on the following 12 grounds.
1. It is the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to entertain the amended charge preferred against the 1st Accused/Applicant. Section 251(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution as altered gives the Federal High Court Jurisdiction over civil matters relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party, or is interested.

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2. The Respondent having shown by the wide publicity given to the case of the 1st Accused/Applicant in the world media and on internet even before obtaining the leave of Court to prefer the amended charge and before the 1st Accused/Applicant’s arraignment has demonstrated that it can only be a persecutor and not an unbiased, uninvolved prosecutor.
3. Section 251(3) of the 1999 Constitution, as altered, provides that the Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by, Subsection (1) thereof.
4. The criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court derives from its civil jurisdiction as contained in Section 251(1)(a).
5. The parties and subject matter in this amended charge fall squarely under the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court not the FCT High Court.
6. The Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000 under which the amended charge is brought is unconstitutional as same was abrogated by the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2003 and is still an issue for judicial determination, having been referred back to the Court by the Apex Court of Nigeria.
7. The proof of evidence discloses no prima facie evidence against the Accused/applicant.
8. The Court wrongly exercised its discretion by granting leave to the prosecution to prefer the amended charge against the Accused/Applicant.
9. The offence alleged is not disclosed by the statement of witnesses or proof of evidence and there is nothing linking the Accused person whatsoever with the amended charge upon which he can be called upon to explain his own position.
10. The amended charge is a complete abuse of Court process as the Court apparently granted consent to prefer the amended charge in the absence of information linking the Accused with the amended charge. There is no nexus whatsoever between the 1st Accused and the amended charge or any of the offences mention therein.
11. The accounts in the amended charge are not tied to the offending section of the act such as to enable the Court deal with specific criminal conduct.
12. The offences are not known to law.
The trial FCT High Court (Coram: M.N. Oniyangi, J) heard the application on 21st September, 2012. In the reserved ruling delivered on 21st September, 2012, the learned trial judge dismissed the application in its entirety. The appellant’s appeal against the decision of the trial Court was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal sitting at Abuja on 14th January, 2014. The lead judgment of A. A. Adumein, JCA was unanimously concurred by A.D. Yahaya and T. Akomolafe-Wilson, JJCA. This further appeal is against the order of the lower Court dismissing the appeal No.CA/A/S51C/2012.
This appeal was argued on three (3) issues. I have decided to condense the issues from the 3 issues submitted by the appellant and the 1st respondent. The 2nd respondent did not file any brief. His counsel, at the hearing of the appeal on 4th October, 2017, conceded that they filed no brief. The 3 issues are:
1. Whether the High Court of the FCT has the requisite jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences created by the Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Act, 2000.
2. Whether the charges and the Proofs of Evidence before the trial Court disclose any prima facie case against the appellant to warrant the leave granted and the arraignment of the appellant for the offences charged.
3. Having regards to the provisions of Section 6(a), 26(2) and 61(1) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related

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Offences Act, 2000, whether the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and its officers can initiate and prosecute the appellant for offences under the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000.
The gravamen of the appellant’s case on issue 1 is that the interests accruing from fixed deposits totalling N16,412,315.56, allegedly, criminally converted by the appellant and the co-accused constitute an item of revenue accruable to the Federal Government of Nigeria. The appellant therefore contended that as such only the Federal High Court, by dint of Section 251(1)(a) and (3) of the Constitution, as amended, to the exclusion of the High Court of the FCT, has jurisdiction. In other words, that by the extant provisions of Section 251(1)(a) and (3) of the Constitution, as amended, the Federal High Court is the appropriate Court to hear and determine criminal causes and matters arising from the issues that relate to the revenue of the Federal government of Nigeria. The two Courts below had expressed contrary opinion in their dismissal of this contention. The lower Court held the opinion that reading Sections 251(1)(a)-(s) and 257(1) of the Constitution together with Sections 61(3) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000 (Anti Corruption Act, 2000) clearly shows that the Federal High Court and the High Court of the FCT have concurrent jurisdiction.
The additional jurisdiction vested on the Federal High Court by Subsection (3) of Section 251 of the Constitution is not synonymous with the exclusive jurisdiction vested on it by Section 251(1)(a) of the same Constitution. This is clear from the two provisions which are herein below reproduced.
251. (1) Notwithstanding anything, to the contrary in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters–
(a) relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Sub-section (1) of this Section.
The word “also” as used in Subsection (3) of Section 251 of the Constitution connotes or means “in addition; too, or as well”. According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 7th ed.; Burton’s Legal Thesaurus 3.d ed, page 27 and Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd Ed, page 46. According to Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, the word also is an adverb, not used with negative verbs and it is more formal than “as well” or “too”. Much as I agree with the appellant that the word also, as an adverb, means “in addition”; I do not go any further to agree with him to conclude that the additional jurisdiction vested in the Federal High Court by Section 251(3) of the Constitution “in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which” jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of the Constitution is co-terminus with the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Federal High Court in respect of “civil causes and matters”. The appellant has, in my view, read and interpreted Section 251(3) of the Constitution with a gloss thereon against all known or acclaimed canons of interpretation.
The function of the Judex is simply jus dicere, and not jus dare. Accordingly this Court, in D. E. OKUMAGBA v. EGBE (1965) 1 ALL NLR 62, had condemned any attempt by a Court of law embarking on judicial legislation by reading into the provision of a statute words that are not there, or which words are not contemplated by the law maker. Thus, as the Court of Appeal had rightly stated in EDOZIE v. EDOZIE & ORS (1998) 12 NWLR (pt.580) at 152.
“Courts should not read into an enactment words which are not to be found there and which will alter its operative effect.”

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It is an established cardinal principle of interpretation that the words of the statute which are unambiguous, must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning. It is therefore, no function of the Court to import words into the statute which do violence to the intent and meaning of the statutory provision. See EGBE v. ALHAJI & ORS (1990) 21 NSCC (pt.1) 306 at 325; (1990) 1 NWLR (pt. 128) 546 at 581.
The clear intent and purpose of Section 251(1)(a) of the Constitution, as amended, are to vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, as the successor of the defunct Federal Revenue Court, only in respect of “civil causes and matters relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party”. The jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by Section 251(3) of the Constitution “in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred” by Section 251(1) is not a jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court. If it were intended to be so it would have been so stated expressly in the Constitution.
I completely agree with the lower Court when they stated the law correctly thus –
“The provisions of Section 251(3) of the Constitution – 1999 are clear, plain and unambiguous and effect must be given to the ordinary meaning of this constitutional provision. See the case of CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI v. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE & 2 ORS (2002) 5 SC (PT. 1) 63 at 80; (2007) 7 NWLR (pt. 767) 60 at 680 where Uwaifo JSC held, on the proper approach to interpretation of Constitutional provisions, that: When the terms are plain and involve no ambiguity there must be given their meaning upon the ordinary and surrounding circumstances.”
My interpretation of Section 251(1)(a) & (3) of the Constitution, as amended, is; that the two provisions do not vest exclusive jurisdiction in respect of criminal causes or matters as they relate to, or are in respect of all those civil causes or matters in Section 251(1) of Constitution over which the Constitution has conferred or vested in the Federal High Court, as a civil Court, “jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in CIVIL CAUSES AND MATTERS”. The emphasis placed on “civil causes and matters” in Section 251(1) of the Constitution is intentional or purposive. The exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Federal High Court has emphatically been qualified by the words “in civil causes or matters”. The appellant, clearly, is in error and misconception when he criticized the lower Court for falling “into grave error when it held that no such word as “exclusive jurisdiction appeared in Section 251(3) of the Constitution”. The lower Court was right. The appellant is wrong on this.
The lower Court had further alluded to the general jurisdiction vested in the High Court of the FCT by Section 257(1) of the Constitution “to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person”. Section 251(1) of Constitution which limits the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to “civil causes and matters” is not relevant for the purpose of Section 257(1). On the other hand, both Sections 251(3) and 257(1) of the Constitution, speak to the criminal jurisdiction of the High Court of the FCT. When the two provisions are read together, it makes some point in the sense that the Constitution does not intend to vest or confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to entertain criminal causes or matters in respect of those matters mentioned in Section 251(1) Constitution as they pertain to the civil jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In respect of those criminal causes or matters, the Constitution itself has deliberately or intentionally permitted other High Courts, including the Federal High Court, to exercise

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jurisdiction. For emphasis Sections 251(3) and 257(1) of the Constitution are herein below reproduced.
Section 251 (3). The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this Section.
Section 257 (1). Subject to the provisions of Section 257 and any other provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court Territory, of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, shall have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.
Sub-Section (3) of Section 251 of the Constitution is the provision that statutorily empowers or enables the Federal High Court to exercise Criminal Jurisdiction in respect of the causes and matters that Subsection (1) of Section 251 of the Constitution has vested exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to deal with as a civil Court. The provisions of Section 251 (3) are very clear and unambiguous. If the Constitution intends that the Federal High Court shall be imbued with criminal jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in respect of all the matters and causes in Subsection (1) of Section 251 thereof it should have stated so clearly, as it did when it vested “Jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in CIVIL CAUSES AND MATTERS” in Section 251(1). To me, it is idle to argue, as the appellant did, that simply because Section 257(1) of the Constitution operates subject to Section 251 the jurisdiction the High Court of the FCT has by virtue of Section 257 of the Constitution has been excluded. That cannot be the proper construction of these provisions we are discussing. Section 251(3) of the Constitution that specifically confers on the Federal High Court its criminal jurisdiction must be given its natural and grammatical meaning. While Section 251(1) of the Constitution vests in the Federal High Court “jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other in civil causes and matters” in respect of the listed matters therein; Subsection (3) of the same Section 251 merely enables the Federal High Court to have and exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of the causes and matters in sub-Section (1) thereof. The Criminal Jurisdiction is clearly not intended to be exclusive to the Federal High Court.
It has become necessary now for me to recall the statement made by this Court, in UNIPETROL v. E.S.B.I.R. (2006) All FWLR (pt.317) 413 at 423, on what we should always bear in mind when we are called upon to interpret a provision of statute. That is: that the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning, and that the cardinal principle of law on interpretation is that a Court, when interpreting a provision of a statute, must give the words and the language used their simple and ordinary meaning. It is not permissible, therefore, to go outside the words of the provision to introduce extraneous matters that may lead to circumventing or giving the provision an entirely different meaning from what the lawmaker intended it to be. In other words, nothing must be added to, and nothing must be taken from the statute. By this, we shall not interpret the provision to mean what it does not mean, or to interpret it not to mean what it means in actuality. That should be the golden rule.
The words “subject to” which, in Section 257(1) of the Constitution, usher in “the provisions of Section 251 and any other provisions of this Constitution” are deliberately there to introduce a condition, a restriction, a limitation or proviso to intentionally subordinate the provisions of Section 257(1) to those other provisions of the Constitution. See OKE v. OKE (1994) 1 ALL NLR (pt. 1) 443 at 450; NDIC V. OKEM ENTERPRISE LTD & ANOR (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 880) 107; FRN v. OSAHON(2006) S NWLR (pt. 973) 261; OLORUNTOBA-OJU v. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (pt. 1157) 83. This however, does not mean the supritendency of the exclusive civil

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jurisdiction of the Federal High Court vested by Section 251(1) of the Constitution over other provisions. The clear intent or purpose to limit the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to Civil causes or matters mentioned in Section 251(1) of the Constitution becomes more manifest and poignant with the introductory words of the sub-section “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution”, which words qualify the words “shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters, in respect of the jurisdiction the Constitution in Sub-section (1) of Section 251 vests in the Federal High Court. The word “notwithstanding” that heralds the provisions of Section 251(1) merely removes any doubt, or impinging and impeding effect of any other provision of the Constitution, in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in relation to those matters or causes specifically mentioned therein.
There is also, or in addition to Sections 251(3) and 257(1), Section 286(1)(b) of the Constitution that provides, inter alia, that “where by the Law of a State jurisdiction is conferred upon any Court for the investigation, inquiry into, or trial of persons accused of offences against the Laws of the State – the Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to the investigation, inquiry into, or trial of persons for Federal Offences-” Section 299 of the Constitution provides that “the provisions of this Constitution shall apply to Federal Capital Territory, Abuja as if it were on of the States of the Federation”. Accordingly, reference in Section 286(1)(b) of Constitution to either the Law or Court of a State is also reference to the Law or Court, including the High Court, of the Federation Capital Territory, Abuja.
There is no substance in issue 1 canvassed and argued by the appellant. I hereby resolve it against the appellant.
Issue 3 is closely related to issue 1. The question posed in issue 3, formulated from the appellant’s complaint in ground 4 of his Grounds of Appeal, is: whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) can initiate a charge under its enabling Act, having regards to the combined provisions of Sections 6(a); 26(2) and 61(1) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000, as amended? The grouse of the appellant, as it appears, is directed against the opinion expressed by the lower Court at pages 392-393 of the record before resolving the issue against the appellant. The lower Court has held thus:
When Sections 6(a), 26(2) and 61(1) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000 are read together and the words used in the said Sections are given their ordinary grammatical meanings, since the words are plain and simple, it is clear that by Section 61(1) of the Act, the prosecution being undertaken by the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in this case is “deemed” to have been commenced with the consent or under the delegated authority of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation. This is so because the word “prosecution” used in both Sections 26(2) and 61(1) of the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000 is the noun of the word “prosecute” which means To institute and pursue a criminal action against a person.
Black’s Law Dictionary. Eighth edition, page 1258.
The provisions of Section 6(a) and 61(1) of the – Act, 2000 seem to validate a criminal prosecution under the Act where the prosecution was not initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation himself….. The lower Court was right in this view, and I endorse it.

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It is unfortunate that the appellant persisted in his erroneous view that the ICPC cannot, under Section 26(2) of its enabling Act, initiate and maintain criminal proceedings against any person, including the appellant herein, for an offence under the said Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000 (i.e. the ICPC Act), inspite of the loud allusions by the 1st respondent and the learned trial judge to the undoubted and authoritative pronouncement on it by this Court in A. G, ONDO STATE v. A. G. FEDERATION & ORS (2002) 6 SC. (pt. 1) 1. All the senior counsel to the appellant needed to do, as an officer in the temple of justice, is simply picking the decision of the Full Panel of this Court in A. G, ONDO STATE v. A. G, FEDERATION & ORS (supra), read it and advise his client accordingly.
Be that as it may, the Full Court of this Court had cause to consider the constitutional validity of several provisions of the ICPC Act in 2002 in the A. G, ONDO STATE v. A. G, FEDERATION & ORS (supra). Sections 26(3) and 35 of the ICPC Act were struck down as being unconstitutional. The validity of the other provisions, including Section 26 (2) of the ICPC Act was affirmed. At page 139 of the report, the opinion of Uwaifo, JSC which says it all is inter alia thus:
”Section 286(1)(b) of the Constitution makes it clear that any Court of a State (including the FCT) which is by the law of that State given jurisdiction to try persons accused of offences against the Laws of the State, shall have like jurisdiction with respect to Federal offences”.
Specifically, on the prosecutoral powers of the ICPC viz-a-viz the power of the Attorney-General of the Federation under Section 174 of the Constitution his Lordship had put it viz-
”Section 6 of the Act says inter alia that it shall be the duty of the ICPC to prosecute offenders. However, Section 26(2) of the Act provides inter alia that every prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney -General of the Federation.
It is no longer in doubt that the High Court of the FCT, like any State High Court, can be used as a venue for the prosecution of the offences under the ICPC Act. The informed opinion of Ejiwunmi JSC at page 190 of A.G, ONDO STATE v. A. G, FEDERATION & ORS (supra) is very clear on this. It is similarly beyond doubt that Sections 6(a), 26(2) and 61(1) of the ICPC Act are constitutionally valid. That was the loud and clear decision of this Court in A.G. ONDO STATE v. A. G. FEDERATION (supra). Curiously, the senior counsel for the appellant, very cognisant and seised of this fact, is not asking us, my Lords, to depart from it.
In what appears to me to be mere gymnastics of quibbles, the learned senior counsel for the appellant had taken strenuous pains to distinguish between the words initiate and Prosecution” as they appear in Sections 6(a), 26(2)and 61(1) of the ICPC Act to found his solace in the submissions, that the provisions-
did not say Commission have been given authority. Therefore if the Act had contemplated a direct power to initiate from the Attorney-General of the Federation to ICPC it should have stated so clearly. It is not so stated. Any person or authority used here means there must be express delegated authority to do so initiate not “implied authority or decision as the Court below held.
The senior counsel further submitted that it must be established that the express authority, or fiat, of the Attorney-General of the Federation was donated to the ICPC or Paul Ahmed Bassi to enable either or both of them initiate the criminal proceedings against the appellant. It is, however, not in dispute that Paul Ahmed Bassi, Principal Legal officer, ICPC who signed the process initiating the prosecution of the appellant is an officer of the ICPC. To that extent, he is an agent of the ICPC in the said initiation of the prosecution of the appellant. By this indubitable fact, the prosecution of the appellant for corrupt practices under the ICPC Act was initiated by the ICPC. The grouse of the appellant, as I understand it, is directed against the holding of the lower Court, at page 393 of the record, that it is clear by Section 61(1) of the Act, the prosecution being undertaken by the Independent

…………………….I…………………….

Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), in this case, is “deemed” to have been commenced with the consent or under the delegated authority of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation.
After consulting dictionaries, particularly Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (Revised Edition), the learned senior counsel submits on behalf of the appellant, thus:
5.30.- from these Lexicographers, it is clear initiate is distinct from prosecute or prosecution. To initiate is to set in motion.
I am afraid, I cannot see the distinction between the terms to prosecute, and to initiate prosecution, as they appear in Sections 6(a), 26(2) and 61(1) of the ICPC Act. The learned senior counsel himself concedes, upon his consulting Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, that “to initiate” means to cause something to begin. Accordingly, to initiate prosecution means, in my view, to cause prosecution to begin. The verb: prosecute, in BLACK’S LAW Dictionary 9th ed. at p. 134 means, inter alia, to commence and carry out legal action; to institute and pursue criminal action against a person including the appellant herein. There is nothing ambiguous in those provisions, particularly of Section 26(2) of the ICPC Act, to warrant the rigmarole, or the circulocutous argument, about the clause: every prosecution for an offence under this Act – shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation”. This is more so that this Court in A.G. ONDO STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION & ORS. (Supra) has resolved the matter and held that the powers exercised by the ICPC pursuant to Sections 6(a), 26(2)and 61(1) of the ICPC Act, to prosecute offenders under the ICPC Act, are deemed to have been exercised by the Attorney-General of the Federation pursuant to Section 174 of the Constitution.
In enacting Sections 6(a), 26(2), 61(1) of the ICPC Act, the National Assembly was conscious that, by dint of Section 174 of the Constitution, the Attorney- General of the Federation remains the repository of the prosecutoral powers of the Federation and that the ICPC is statutorily presumed and deemed to be prosecuting the offenders under the ICPC Act as an, or the, agent of the Attorney-General of the Federation. The lower Court has not gone outside the box to do and say anything to the contrary. In the circumstances, I hereby resolve Issue 3 against the appellant.
In paragraph 4.55 of the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, it is acknowledged that “the appellant is standing trial on a six count charge before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory – with the 2nd Respondent and that Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 relate to the Appellant. Counts 1 and 3, dealing with the offence of conspiracy, are brought under Section 26(1) (c) of the ICPC Act. Count 4, dealing with the offence of using the office to confer corrupt advantage, is brought under Section 19 of the ICPC Act. While count 5, dealing with knowingly making false statements to officers of ICPC, is an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 25(1) (a) of the ICPC Act. The pith and gist of all the allegations are the conspiracy to illegally convert, and the criminal conversion of, the sum of N16,412,315.06, being the interest generated from placing N300.000.00 and N200.000.00 on fixed deposits respectively at Wema Bank PLC and Intercontinental Bank PLC.
For the appellant, it is submitted that the proofs of evidence and the charges disclose no prima facie facts on the elements of the 3 offences under Sections 19, 25(a) & (b) and, 26(1) (c) of the ICPC Act. The questions to ask are: what are the elements of these offences, and whether the facts disclosed by the proofs of evidence sustain any prima facie case of the commission of the alleged offences?

…………………….J…………………….

A prima facie case means no more than that “on face of it” the facts supporting the charge disclose ground(s) for proceeding in the prosecution. See ONAGORUWA v. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 303) 49 at 82 – 83. It also means that the facts, as they stand, if they are not controverted and they are believed, are sufficient proof of the allegations. Of course Prima facie case and proof beyond reasonable doubt, which comes later, do not stand on the same footing or pedestal. See IKOMI v. THE STATE (1986) 3 NWLR (pt.28) 240 at 355; EGBE v. THE STATE (1980) I NCR 341; ABACHA v. THE STATE (2002) 11 NWLR (pt.779) 437 at 486. To constitute a prima facie case, it is trite that the proofs of evidence must link the accused to the offence he is alleged to have committed. See OHWOVORIOLE v. FRN (2003) 2 NWLR (pt.803) 176 at 190 – 191. In otherwords, that the case against him not is not one borne of mere suspicion. See IKOMI v. STATE (supra).
I will need to reproduce the provisions of Sections 19, 25(1)(a) and 26(1)(c) of the ICPC Act. They are:
19. Any public officer who uses his office to gratify or confer corrupt unfair advantage upon himself or any relation or associate of public officer or any other public officer shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for five (5) years without option of fine.
25.(1) Any person who makes or causes any other to make to an officer of the Commission or to any other public officer, in the course of the exercise by such public officer of the duties of his office, any statement which to his knowledge of the person making the statement, or causing the statement to be made-
(a) is false, or intended to mislead or untrue in any material particular:
or
(b) is not consistent with any other statement previously made by such person to any other having authority or power under any law to receive, or require to be made such other statement notwithstanding that the person making the statement is not under any legal or other obligation to tell the truth, shall be guilty of an offence and shall or conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Naira or to imprisonment not exceeding two (2) years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
26(1) Any person who-
(c) abets or is engaged in a criminal conspiracy to commit any offence under this Act.
Shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to the punishment provided for such offence.
The elements constituting each offence are very well stated in the provisions which, in my opinion, are unambiguous. Each charge is also clear as to what it alleges and the offence charged. The proofs of evidence and the charges, if juxtaposed against the provisions of ICPC Act, under which the charges have been laid, clearly disclose a prima facie case to warrant the trial to proceed.
This is an interlocutory appeal. It is not permissible in law at this stage that any comments be made on the merits of the substantive case that is yet to be heard. See IWEKA v. SCOA (2000) 3 SC 21 at 24 – 25; FSB INT’L BANK LTD. v. IMANO NIG. LTD. (2000) 11 NWLR (pt.679) 620 at 639. Conscious of this injunction, I shall not undertake any comment on the merits of the case.
Mr. Ayegbayo, an investigating officer of the ICPC, is apparently the star witness the ICPC intends to call at the trial of the appellant. The other 3 witnesses are drawn from the various banks. Their evidence in essence are
…………………….K…………………….
intended merely to corroborate one or two facts. There are also documents to be produced at the trial. These following facts, among others, appear to stand out in the synopsis of the proposed evidence of the said ICPC investigator, Mr. Ayegbayo. That is:-
The President directed the 1st accused to handover the money (i.e. N557,995.065.00 donated by Bayelsa State Government) received from Bayelsa State Government to the Ministry of Police Affairs to carry out the necessary purchases. That the accused persons failed to comply with the directives of the President to remit the money to the Ministry of Police Affairs to make the purchases until November, 2006 when the deposit (in the interest yielding accounts) had reached maturity and the sum of N16,412,315.56 was the interest generated on the principal amount.
That the accused persons then released the (principal) sum of N557,995.065 to the Ministry of Police Affairs-minus the interest generated. The accused persons deliberately withheld from the Ministry of Police Affairs the fact that the amount donated had been placed in an interest yielding accounts and that it had generated a substantial amount of interest.
(And) that the accused persons collected the N16,412, 315.56 as interest from the 2 fixed deposit accounts and converted same to their personal use.
On these facts and others in the proofs of evidence, the appellant has failed to carry me along with him that the facts and the charges do not disclose any prima facie case. The facts speak for themselves and to the allegations against the appellant. I think, and so hold, that on these facts a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant requiring the trial to proceed on the charges in the information sheet. A prima facie case, as this Court held in DABOH ANOR. v. THE STATE (1977) 11 NSCC 309; (1977) 5 SC 222, is made out by the prosecution if it is sufficient for the accused to be called upon to make some explanations.
The appellant has not satisfactorily made out his complaint as argued under Issue 2. Accordingly, I resolve the Issue against him, and in favour of the 1st respondent.
On the whole, I find no substance in this appeal. It is unfortunate that, inspite of the decision of this Court in A.G. ONDO STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION (supra) on facts almost on all fours with the facts of the instant appeal, this interlocutory appeal was fought doggedly from the High Court of the FCT to this Court. In the end, notwithstanding the huge resources, time, money and energy inclusive, wasted this case has to go back to the zero or starting point at the High Court of the FCT for the appellant, as the accused person to face his trial.
It is hereby ordered that the case against the appellant at the trial Court shall forthwith resume or continue, and shall be given accelerated hearing and the attention it deserves.
IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading before now; the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Eko, JSC in which he dismissed the appeal. I am in entire agreement with my lord that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. I, too, dismiss the appeal. I abide by consequential orders made in the leading judgment.
OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Ejembi Eko, JSC. His Lordship dealt with the issues involved exhaustively and I have nothing new to add. I agree entirely with the reasoning that led to the final conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. I shall also dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

…………………….L…………………….

I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.: I was obliged in advance a copy of the judgment of my learned brother Ejembi Eko, JSC just delivered with which I am in agreement that this appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. My learned brother has admirably resolved the three issues distilled for the determination of this appeal. I adopt both the reasons marshaled and the conclusion therein as mine. I have nothing new to add. I abide by all the consequential
orders made in the lead judgment. Appeal Dismissed.
AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the lead Judgment delivered by my learned brother, Eko, JSC, and I am in agreement with him that in the circumstances of this case, a prima facie case has been made out against the Appellant.
A prima facie case in a criminal trial simply means that there is ground for proceeding. It is not the same as proof, which comes later, when the Court has to find whether the Accused is guilty or not guilty- Ajidagba V. I.G.P. (1958) SCNLR 60. In this case, there is ground for proceeding with the trial against the Appellant, his argument to the contrary is not borne out by the facts. Thus, I also dismiss this Appeal. Appearances

The Appellant was accused of several offences of conspiracy, conversion and inducement of the Federal Government, a charge denied by the Appellant. The Respondent called several witnesses and tendered a host of documents in proof of the charge. The Appellant after the case for the Prosecution made an application contending that no case was made out against the Appellant. The Court below found otherwise thus this appeal.
The Appellants brief dated 13th December, 2017 filed on the same date but deemed on 20/3/18 distilled 2 issues for determination as follows:
i. Whether the totality of evidence adduced at the trial, a prima facie case could be said to have been established against the Appellant, with respect to the allegations contained in the charge before the Court, to warrant calling upon him to enter a defence to the allegations?
ii. Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses was not so severely discredited in relation to the allegations against the appellant, such that the decision of the trial Court calling upon the Appellant to enter his defence did not constitute a violation of his right to presumption of innocence?
The Appellant filed a reply brief (Amended) dated 22/2/18 filed same day.
The Respondent on its part formulated a sole issue as follows:
Whether the lower Court was wrong in holding that the Respondent (Prosecution) has made out a prima facie case against the Appellant to warrant its being called upon to enter his defence.
I have considered the Notice of appeal, the record of appeal and the briefs of the respective counsel in this appeal and I am inclined to adopt the sole issue presented by the Respondent for determination here.
The sole question is whether there was a prima facie case to warrant calling on the Appellant to put in his defence or whether there was none, in which case the no case submission should succeed. The two issues donated by the Appellant herein are all encapsulated in the single issue formulated by the Respondent. In a No case submission, the primary issue is narrow and it is simply to determine whether there was a prima facie case made out against the Appellant to warrant his being asked to enter his defence. The Court cannot determine credibility of the witnesses nor evaluated the quality of evidence at this stage. Consequently, all other issues outside this narrow view shall be discountenanced by the Court.
SOLE ISSUE
Whether the lower Court was wrong in holding that the Respondent (Prosecution) has made out a prima facie case against the Appellant to warrant its being called upon to enter his defence.
The Appellant under issue one stated the position of the law with respect to a no case submission, submitted that once the evidence of the prosecution cannot sustain conviction, then no prima facie case has been established and

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it will be wrong to call upon the accused to enter his defence, referred to AGBO V STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT 689) 1094, UKET V FRN (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 411) 923, TONGO V COP (2007) 12 NWLR (PT 1049) 525, AJIDAGBA V IGP (1958) 3 FSC 5. In this case, the Appellant submitted that a prima facie case had not been made out against the Appellant, particularly in relation to the elements of the offences for which the Appellant was tried at the lower Court. He further submitted that in a criminal trial, the decision of the Court has to be firm, definite and certain but the decision of the trial judge in this case is shrouded in uncertainty, referred to ABU V STATE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT 447) 126, SUBERU V STATE (2010) ALL FWLR (PT 520) 1263. The Appellant further submitted that a consideration of the evidence along with the ingredients of the offences as stated in S. 15 (1) (2) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act brought against him, shows clearly that there was no basis for the lower Court to overrule the No case submission, he referred to THOMAS ISEGHOHI V FRN (Unreported) in Appeal No. CA/A/742C/2014, ONAGORUWA V STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 303) 49 @ 95.
According to him, the testimonies of the witnesses shows that they are not properly abreast of the facts upon which they came to testify nor was it proved that the funds paid to third party companies was of unlawful origin or was used for the benefit of the Appellant. The Appellant also contended that the offence of conversion is not provided for in the Money Laundering Act, same being a form of the offence of stealing which is outside the jurisdictional competence of the Federal High Court. The Appellant submitted that the testimonies of the witnesses could at best be said to have established reasonable suspicion but does not establish the commission of the offence, referred to ODIDO V STATE (1995) 1 NWLR (PT 369) 88. Finally, the Appellant submitted the decision to overrule the No case submission without the prosecution establishing the allegations made against him, amounted to a breach of the Appellants right of presumption of innocence, cited SUBERU V STATE(supra), OKORO V STATE (1988) 3 NSCC 275. He further relied on the following cases in proof of his submissions; IMOH V ONANUGA & ORS (2013) LPELR 20682 (CA), IKE & ANOR V INEC (2010) LPELR 4293 (CA).

Continuing submission as issue two the Appellant summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and submitted that their testimonies were severely discredited that it will be impossible for any Court to safely rely on those testimonies to convict the Appellant. He argued that from the responses of the questions put to the witnesses during cross examination, it is clear that none of the witnesses could substantiate the allegations brought against the Appellant. Furthermore that the alleged purchase of US Dollars using the funds belonging to the ISPS Committee does not in itself constitute credible evidence of money laundering. Finally, Appellant argued that suspicion no matter how strong does not take the place of legal proof, citedABIEKE V STATE (1975) 9 11 SC 61 and urged the Court to uphold the appeal.
The Respondents Counsel in submission on its sole issue contended that Section 357 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 confers the right on the Appellant to raise a no case submission at the close of the examination of witnesses for the prosecution. He contended further that Section 358(1) of the Act requires that the prosecution must have sufficiently made out a prima facie case against the Appellant before he can enter a defence. Counsel cited the cases of AJIDAGBA v IGP (1958) SCNLR 60 at 62; EKWENUGO v FRN (2008) 15 NWLR (PT 1111) at 638 639; In DABOH v STATE (1977) 5 SC 197 at 315; OLANIYAN v STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (PT 48) 156; STATE v EMEDO (2001) 12 NWLR (PT 726) 131; ADEYEMI v STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 195) 1 at 35 SC; AGBO & ORS v STATE (2013) LPELR 20388 SC on what is meant by a prima facie case. Respondent Counsel then contended that considering the testimony of PW1-PW12 and exhibits P1-P77, a prima facie case has been made out which should require the Appellant to make some explanation in his defence in line with S. 358 of the ACJA 2015. He also noted that the evidence of PW1-P12 was never discredited or contradicted by the Appellant during cross examination neither was the credibility of the witnesses shaken.

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On the meaning of conspiracy, the Respondent Counsel referred to the cases of OKEKE v STATE (1999) 2 NWLR (PT 590) 265; NWOSU v STATE (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 877) 466; YAKUBU v STATE (2011) LPELR 19749 (CA); GBADAMOSI v STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (PT 196) 182; NWANKWO v FRN (2003) 4 NWLR (PT 809) 1 at 37 and submitted that the prosecution has established the essential ingredients of the offence of conspiracy against the Appellant and others and therefore urged this Court to uphold the findings of the lower Court.
Respondents Counsel further submitted that the evidence established a prima facie case that the Defendants converted proceeds of unlawful act to wit: stealing, that the offences alleged against the Appellant are offences contrary to the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 2012 and that the ruling of the trial judge dismissing the no case submission is in the interest of justice and not perverse. He argued that there is evidence showing that the Defendant participated fully in the commission of the alleged offence and all persons who are participes criminis whether principal or accessories are guilty of the offence, referred to UKPE V THE STATE (2001) WRN 84 @ 113, AGWUNA V AG FEDERATION (1995) 5 NWLR (PT 396) 418. He further argued that money laundering can take different forms and the facts reveal that the Appellant and his cronies used various companies as a conduit pipe to launder funds out of NIMASA. He argued that the predicate offences as regards the funds laundered are the offences of criminal conversion or stealing as prescribed under Sections 383 390 of the Criminal Code Act, NDUKWE V LPDC (2007)5 NWLR (PT 1023) 81, KALU V FRN (supra). He argued that from the evidence of PW1-12 and the exhibits tendered, the prosecution has proved the offence of conversion of proceeds of unlawful act to warrant an explanation from him.
On the count of obtaining by false pretence, Respondent Counsel while stating the position of the law submitted that the evidence on record shows that the Appellant and his cronies knew of the falsity of the pretence to the President by their active participation in the fraudulent conversion of the funds initially approved by the President for the implementation of the ISPS code in Nigeria. He submitted that the contention of the Appellant that the ruling of the lower Court is shrouded in uncertainty is misconceived because the trial judge cannot at this stage venture into the realm of evaluating evidence and ascribing probative value, referred to ADAMA V STATE (2017) LPELR 42266 (SC). He therefore urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and call on the Appellant to enter his defence.
In reply, the Appellant submitted that the Respondent failed to respond to its contentions that the Prosecution failed to adduce any evidence in support of the elements of the offence. He further submitted that the Appellant was not charged with the offence of stealing, an offence under the criminal code which the Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain, referred to WAGBATSOMA V FRN (2015) LPELR 24649 (CA).
RESOLUTION
The crux of this appeal is simply whether the Respondent made out a prima facie case against the Appellant to warrant asking him to enter his defence. The Appellant made a no case submission application before the trial Court which was dismissed thus this appeal. What is a no case submission under our criminal jurisprudence? The phrase No case submission was defined by the Supreme Court in several cases. One of such cases is AJIBOYE V THE STATE (1995) 9 SCNJ 242 also reported in (1998) 1 All Criminal Law Reports 355 at 363.

…………………….D…………………….

The apex Court defined it as follows:-
The meaning of No case submission is that there is no case for an accused person to answer is that there is no evidence on which, even if the Court believes it, it could convict. The question whether or not the Court does believe the evidence does not arise, nor is the credibility for the witnesses in issue at this stage.
The Court went further to set the circumstances under which a no case submission can be made.The Court gave 2 circumstances and they are:-
1. When there has been no evidence to prove an essential element in the alleged offence;
2. When the evidence adduced by the prosecution has been so discredited as a result of cross examination or is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable tribunal could safely convict on it.
The Court of Appeal in the old case of ONAGORUWA VS THE STATE (1988) 1 ALL CRIMINAL LAW REPORTS 435 at 441 described what the term connotes and what it also calls into question or determination. It held thus:
No case submission means what it says but it is that from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the accused has no case to answer and should not therefore be called to defend himself. By a no case submission the accused submits that the prosecution has not made a prima facie case against him that he should not be made to face the ordeal of defending himself.
The term prima facie was also considered in the case of UBANATU V C. O. P (2001) 2 ALL CLR 312 at 317 and the Court held thus:
The evidence establishing a prima facie case is not to be such as would justify a conviction. It only means that the evidence has covered the essential elements of the alleged offence and if it remains uncontradicted (and is not thoroughly discredited in cross examination) a reasonable tribunal may justifiably convict on it; and therefore some explanation is required from the accused person.
The term also attracted judicial attention in the case of ABACHA VS THE STATE (2002) 11 NWLR (PT 779) 439 at 486 as follows:
When there is ground for proceeding and evidence discloses a prima facie case when it is such that if uncontradicted and if believed it will be sufficient to prove the case against the accused. But prima facie case is not the same as proof which comes later when the Court has to find whether the accused person is guilty or not guilty. Thus if the facts in a deposition whether an oath in preliminary investigation or not an oath in mere statement attached to an information do not disclose a prima facie case the indictment must be quashed.
A prima facie case is therefore an allegation supported by evidence which has taken it outside the realm of suspicion, speculation and such evidence must cover all the elements of the offence and not just a few of them. The quality of evidence required at this level is not the type that is strong enough to convict but legal evidence. It is that evidence slight enough to support and cover all elements of the charge. What it presupposes is that there is evidence to support not necessarily to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offence. It is the evidence on all elements that gives the Court the power to go deeper into the determination of guilt of the accused in the criminal allegation. Such evidence might fail to prove the offence after it goes through evaluation and when the credibility of the witnesses is later assessed by the Court.
The Supreme Court in the case of EMEDO V THE STATE (2002) 7 SCNJ 221 at 225 held that the Court at the stage of a No case Submission like this in hand is not to evaluate the evidence as what is required is minimal evidence to establish a prima facie case against the accused. The Court at this stage is not expected to consider the credibility of the witnesses nor evaluate the evidence. The Court is expected to look at the evidence as a single flowing story. The Court cannot consider the evidence in bits and pieces in order to ascribe probative value to it because this stage is not to find the accused guilty or not guilty.

…………………….E…………………….

Superior Courts just as trial Courts like the one below have to give a brief ruling because its duty is simply to consider whether the evidence before the Court has established a prima facie case to warrant calling on the accused person to enter his defence. What the Court should look out for is the necessary minimum evidence establishing all the ingredients of the offence not evidence to convict.
I have taken the pains to lay this broad foundation before delving into the application proper so that the focus would/should be directed to what the Court below was expected to do and the limits allowed by law. Therefore, any submission that would take the Court outside the realm of what Superior Courts should have done shall be discountenanced.
The contention of the Appellant is simply that there is no evidence implicating the Appellant in the commission of the offences alleged in the charge sheet with 22 counts. The offences alleged can be classified into these 3 types and as follows:
i. Conspiracy to convert various sums belonging to NIMASA
(counts 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, 19 and 21)
ii. Conversion of the various sums
(Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20)
iii. Inducement count 22.
It must be made clear that a no case submission should succeed where there is no evidence in support of one ingredient or element of the offence to be proved and not necessarily when all the ingredients are not made out, see the case of UBANATU V COP (2000) LPELR-3280 (SC).
It is therefore necessary to identify the ingredients of each of the categories of offences listed above before we make progress in this judgment.
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must present evidence in respect of every essential element needed to establish the offence. The apex court pronounced on the ingredient of conspiracy in the case of OKOH V STATE (2014) LPELR-22589 thus:
“It is also well settled that the essential ingredient of the offence of conspiracy lies in the bare agreement and association to do an unlawful thing, which is contrary to or forbidden by law, whether that thing be criminal or not and whether or not the accused persons had knowledge of its unlawfulness. Evidence of conspiracy is usually a matter of inference from surrounding facts and circumstances. The trial Court may infer conspiracy from the fact of doing things towards a common purpose. See: Clark V. The State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 35) 381; Gbadamosi V. The State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 182; Aje V. The State (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 982) 345 at 363 A – C; Kaza v. The State (2008) 7 NWLR (pt. 1085) 125 @ 175 – 176 F – B.” Per KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.
NIKI TOBI, J.S.C (of blessed memory) also talked about conspiracy in the case of KAZA V STATE (2008) LPELR- 1683(SC) thus:
“From the above, I sift the following ingredients of the offence of conspiracy: (i) There must be an agreement of two or more persons. In other words, there must be a meeting of two or more minds. (ii) The persons must plan to carry out an unlawful or illegal act, which is an offence. (iii) Bare agreement to commit an offence is sufficient. (iv) An agreement to commit a civil wrong does not give rise to the offence, as Section 97(1) of the Penal Code provides only for criminal conspiracy. (v) One person cannot commit the offence of conspiracy because he cannot be convicted as a conspirator. (vi) A conspiracy is complete if there

…………………….F…………………….

are acts on the part of an accused person which lead the trial Court to the conclusion that he and others were engaged in accomplishing a common object or objective.” Per TOBI, J.S.C.
Conspiracy is therefore grounded in agreement of the accused persons and an agreement is the state of being in accord or unanimity of opinion or an arrangement that is accepted by all parties. So the prosecution must present evidence of agreement, which may not be direct but can be by inference.
The next offence is conversion. Conversion is an act of willful interference, without lawful justification with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and possession of that chattel.
In the case of BUA V. DAUDA (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 657 UWAIFO JSC, describes the term undue influence in the following language;
“Undue influence is no doubt elusive of satisfactory definition but it may be regarded as a state of mind of a person who has been subdued to any improper persuasion or machination in such a way that he is overpowered and consequently induced to do or forbear an act which he would otherwise do or not do of his free will. It is a product of the abuse or misuse of the confidence reposed in someone who is able to put some pressure on or take unfair advantage of another: or who takes an oppressive and unfair advantage of another necessities or distress.” Per PATS-ACHOLONU, J.S.C.
Being a criminal offence, the criminal intent or false pretense is important and must be supported by evidence. False pretense was described in the case of ABATAN OLUWASHEUN V THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2016) LPELR-40768 thus:
The term false pretences denotes the offence of knowingly obtaining someones property by misrepresenting a fact with the intent to defraud that person. In Blacks Law Dictionary, tenth edition it is also termed; the crime of knowingly obtaining title to another persons property by misrepresenting a fact with the intent to defraud. The offence has also been fittingly defined in Section 20 Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, 2006, in this way: 20. In this Act- false pretence means a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or conduct, of a matter of fact or law, either past or present which representation is false in fact or law, and which the person, making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true. Per Sankey, J.C.A.
To prove obtaining by false pretense, my learned brother OGAKWU, JCA in the case of REV VICTOR MUKORO V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2015) LPELR-24439 (CA) said:
Now, for the offence of obtaining by false pretences to be committed it must be proved that the accused person had an intention to defraud and that the thing is capable of being stolen. An inducement on the part of the accused person to make his victim part with the thing capable of being stolen or make his victim deliver a thing capable of being stolen will expose the accused person to imprisonment for the offence.
In the same vein, JUSTICE ADEJUMO, JCA in the case of ADOHA UGO-NGADI V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA(2015) LPELR- 24824(CA) on the ingredients said as follows:
In AGUBA V FRN (2014) LPELR-23211, this Court held that the offence of obtaining property by false pretences could be committed in writing or even by mere oral communication of the accused person. See AMADI V FRN(2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 259; ONWUDIWE V FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt.988) 382; OSHIN V IGP (1961) I SCNLR 40 where the Court listed the ingredients of obtaining by false pretence thus: (a) that there was a pretence; (b) that the pretence emanated from the Defendants (c) that it was false; (d) that the Defendants knew of the falsity or did not believe in its truth; (e) that there was an intention to defraud; (f) that the thing is capable of being stolen and (g) that the Defendants induced the owner to transfer the property.

…………………….G…………………….

The memo requesting for funds should have been dishonestly or fraudulently represented to the National Security Adviser or the Presidency. No such evidence. Going by the charge before the Court below, the Federal Government was the party induced to release what was approve in a budget for the ISPS code program. The fact that the project of ISPS is genuine and true and the money was budgeted for it defeats the allegation of inducement in the charge. The prosecution did not present any evidence to back the allegation of inducement and conspiracy to induce the release of the money. Furthermore, the Respondent did not extend its investigations to the office of National Security Adviser who forwarded the Memo to the Presidency nor the Presidency (President) who approved to confirm that there was inducement. Meanwhile, PW12 also admitted under cross examination that the subject matter exist; the money was budgeted for and there was a previous committee. Exhibits tendered clearly depict an official request duly approved. It was not established by slight evidence that the Appellant induced anybody outside official actions duly taken. No evidence of deceit against the appellant was presented by the prosecution. In any case, it was the 1st accused who wrote the memorandum for money to fund the ISPS project and not he appellant herein. So if there was any fraudulent deceit, it couldnt have come from the Appellant herein. I agree with the Appellant that there is no evidence of inducement. The prosecution has failed to make out a prima facie case against the Appellant on inducement. The no case submission application should succeed on all the counts of conspiracy to induce and that on inducement. They are hereby struck out from the charge.
I agree with the Respondent that Section 357 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act is at play here and it states thus:
Where at the close of the evidence in support of the charge, it appears to the Court that a case is not made out against the defendant sufficiently to require him to make a defence, the Court shall, as to that particular charge, discharge him being guided by the provision of Section 302 of this Act. Also Section 302 provides as follows:
The Court may, on its own motion or on application by the defendant after hearing the evidence for the prosecution, where it considers, that the evidence against the defendant or any of several defendants is not sufficient to justify the continuation of the trial, record a finding of not guilty in respect of the defendant without calling on him or enter his or their defence and the Court shall then call on the remaining defendant, if any, to enter his defence.
The simple act of calling on the Appellant to enter his defence to a criminal charge is only when a prima facie case has been made out and not otherwise. When either of the two conditions on which a No case submission application succeeds is made out then the application succeeds and not otherwise. The contention of the Appellant from the onset of its brief is that the burden is on the prosecution to prove elements of the offence and referred to the Ruling of the trial Court where it said: To this Court the charge is before the Court, the ingredients of the offences alleged are not difficult to discern. The Court cannot see the woods from the trees in the arguments that the evidence has not established a prima facie case. This the Appellant submitted is uncertain and a mere conjecture. I also find it unsettling that a trial Court will resolve a No case submission application without placing the evidence against the elements of the offence. In fact, the Court merely said the elements of the offence are not difficult to discern without identifying what they are and whose evidence established the elements of the offence to ground a prima facie case. I am not saying the Court below should evaluate the evidence, it has a duty to state the basis of its decision. The

…………………….H…………………….

Court in the case of TOM ISEGHOHI V FRN(unreported) judgment in appeal No: CA/A/742C/2014 delivered on the 16th day of May 2017 held that at the stage of considering a No case submission, the Court below is only to consider whether there is evidence before the Court legally admissible evidence linking the accused with the commission of the offence with which he is charged. Even though a trial Court is not expected to write a lengthy ruling on a no case submission and it is not expected to make findings on the credibility of the witnesses that testified for the prosecution. It is my strong view that the Court ought to clearly consider the evidence adduced by the prosecution, review same as to determine whether or not proved the essential ingredients of the offences charged. This exercise does not amount to evaluation of evidence. Rather, it is tantamount to consideration of evidence. The Court failed to show how it arrived at its conclusion that the Appellant had a case to answer.
The case against the Appellant was that he along others conspired to induce the release of funds and as chairman of the ISPS Code Implementation Committee, whose funds constituted the funds said to have been laundered by the Appellant through the award of contracts by the ISPS committee to various companies and the sums were later converted to dollars and handed over to the Appellant and who also alleged that it was handed over to the 1st defendant at the trial Court and therefore committed an offence and is guilty of Money Laundering.
Let me at this stage dispose off the aspect of the charge alleging inducement, the Respondent contended that the Appellant induced the approval of money meant for the ISPS. The application was made by the 1st accused person through the office of the National Security Adviser and to the President who approved.
The 12th prosecution witness who was the investigating officer admitted that the money was budgeted for the ISPS project and he did go not go to the National Security Adviser nor the Presidency to verify that the project existed and whether approvals followed due process. He also admitted under cross examination that the committee had existed before it was reconstituted by the 1st accused.
The evidence before the Court is that the Appellant, 1st accused at the trial Court, by way of memo got approval for the release of funds for a project ISPS (International Ship and Ports Security Code) and then set up an independent committee chaired by the Appellant; a separate account was created for the committee and funds for the project moved into it. The funds moved was the exact amount approved by the President that was transferred into the said account. The Appellant is a signatory to the account and cheques were issued by the Appellant. There is legally acceptable evidence linking the Appellant to the purposes the money was put to. Having issued cheques the value for which were converted to dollars and given to the Appellant, he needs to explain what he did with the money. There is no evidence that the memo to the President was fraudulent nor was it established that the ISPS project was a fraud; which presupposes that the funds were duly approved and authorized after due process in securing the funds. PW12 admitted that his investigations did not get to the office of the National Security Adviser nor the Presidency. Consequently, the offence of inducement out rightly cannot hold as the facts are clearly contrary to the allegation of inducement because due process was followed. No evidence of fraudulent intent was presented.
Any allegation that the Appellant acted contrary to law, thus committing any offence can only start from the withdrawal of the money and not from the memo and release of funds to NIMASA for the existing project. The existence of the committee was not illegal as PW12 admitted there was a committee previously in existence. Even learned counsel for the Respondent admitted in his brief that the money was duly released for the purposes of the ISPS project.

…………………….I…………………….

Inducement has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary 8th Edition at page 790, as follows: “The act or process of enticing or persuading another person to take a course of action.” See also NGORKA V A.G IMO STATE (2014) LPELR- 22532(CA). For this class of offences, a person accused must have intentionally enticed or persuaded another to take the course of action which he would not have taken but for the process of persuasion by the accused. I will also add that the inducement must be by way of falsehood or deceit. It can be likened to undue influence which the apex Court described it in the case of BUA V DAUDA (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 657 following words:
“Undue influence is no doubt elusive of satisfactory definition but it may be regarded as a state of mind of a person who has been subdued to any improper persuasion or machination in such a way that he is overpowered and consequently induced to do or forbear an act which he would otherwise do or not do of his free will. It is a product of the abuse or misuse of the confidence reposed in someone who is able to put some pressure on or take unfair advantage of another: or who takes an oppressive and unfair advantage of another necessities or distress.” Per PATS-ACHOLONU, J.S.C.
The Appellant was the chairman of the committee that handled the ISPS project and the account was under his control. It was established that money was taken from the account and witnesses testified that payments were made to them. Furthermore, there was evidence that part of the money was converted to dollars and handed over to the Appellant by 3rd and 4th accused persons. The Appellant therefore has a duty to explain how those various sums were expended, whether it spent for the project or not. There is need for explanation from him. On the allegation of conversion, the no case submission application must fail. And also since there are counts alleging conspiracy to convert fund meant for ISPS project, those counts too would stand. There is evidence to defeat the no case submission here, documentary evidence also links the Appellant to the issuance of the cheques and as chairman of the committee all issues relating to the ISPS revolved around him. The strength of the evidence at this stage should not be the required for a conviction but that it links, connects and mentions the appellant.
On the whole therefore, the no case submission succeeds in respect of counts 21 and 22 which are the counts of conspiracy to induce and inducement and fails in respect of counts 1 20 which are counts in respect of conspiracy and conversion of various sums of the ISPS fund in the committee account under the control of the Appellant. This appeal partially succeeds.
The Appellant is to return to the trial Court for continuation of hearing in respect of counts 1 20 while counts 21 and 22 are hereby struck out of the charge.
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: The Appellant was one of six defendants charged before the Federal High Court on twenty-two sundry counts of conspiracy, conversion and inducement. At the close of the case for the Prosecution, the Appellant made a no case submission which was overruled by the lower Court. The instant appeal was brought against the refusal of the no case submission.
My learned brother, Yargata Byenchit Nimpar, JCA, obliged me with an advance copy of the leading judgment which has just been delivered. I agree with the reasoning and the manner the issue thrust up for determination was resolved in the leading judgment.

…………………….J…………………….

By the provisions of Sections 302 and 357 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act a no case submission can be made and upheld where at the close of the case for the Prosecution it appears that a case has not been made out against the defendant sufficiently to require him to enter a defence to the charge. In other words, that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution did not disclose a prima facie case against the defendant. The rationale behind this is that the Prosecution having failed to make out a prima facie case against the defendant; asking the defendant to enter upon his defence would be requiring him to prove his innocence, which will be contrary to the presumption of innocence guaranteed in Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution.The expression prima facie case has been defined as meaning that there is a ground for proceeding. Put differently, that something has been produced which makes it worthwhile to continue with the proceeding. On the face of it, it suggests that the evidence produced so far indicates that there is something worth looking at. See DURU vs. NWOSU (1989)1 NWLR (PT 113) 24 at 43 and UBANATU vs. COP (2000)1 SC 31 at 36-37.
Simply put, a Court can uphold a no case submission and discharge a defendant without requiring him to enter upon his defence where the evidence adduced by the Prosecution is not sufficient to justify the continuation of the trial and or that a case is not made out against the defendant sufficiently to require him to make a defence.
Section 303 (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act provides for what a Court has to take into consideration in exercising discretion on a no case submission. See KALU vs. IGP (2017) LPELR (42857) 1 at 40 and FRN vs. SARAKI (2017) LPELR (43392) 1 at 40. The said Section 303 (3) provides as follows:
(3) In considering the application of the defendant under Section 303, the Court shall, in exercise of its discretion, have regard to whether:
(a) an essential element of the offence has been proved;
(b) there is evidence linking the defendant with the commission of the offence with which he is charged;
(c) the evidence so far led is such that no reasonable Court or tribunal would convict on it; and
(d) any other ground on which the Court may find that a prima facie case has not been made out against the defendant for him to be called upon to answer.”
Having read the Records of Appeal and briefs of argument filed and exchanged by the parties, I agree with the analysis and summation in the leading judgment that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution in respect of Counts 21 and 22 of the Charge is not sufficient to justify the continuation of the trial on those Counts, as a prima facie case was not made out against the Appellant sufficient enough to require him to enter upon his defence in respect of those Counts of the Charge.
Conversely, the evidence adduced in respect of Counts 1 to 20 of the Charge sufficiently links the Appellant to the commission of the offences charged on those Counts, such that the Appellant must enter upon his defence in respect of the said counts of the Charge. See Section 358 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act.
I am therefore allegiant to the conclusion in the leading judgment that the no case submission succeeds in respect of Counts 21 and 22 of the Charge only. The Appellant is discharged on the said Counts, while he is to enter upon his defence in respect of Counts 1 to 20 of the Charge.
Consequently, I also join in allowing the appeal in part.
ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege to preview the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, JCA and I agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
My learned brother has adequately considered all the issues raised in this appeal, as such, I have nothing useful to add. I abide by the consequential orders made in the leading judgment.