AKOKHIA v. THE STATE

A summary of the facts of the case as presented by the Respondent is that on the 28/9/2011 at about 7pm, the Appellant with one Abubakar Kareem (aka Super) and three other persons now at large went to the house of one Barrister Maxwell Igbadiumhe (PW2) while armed with cut to size barrel guns and they kidnapped him, put him inside his own black BMW 3 Series car, after tying him up and took him to an unknown destination inside a forest. He was only released after three days in their custody and upon payment of N1million ransom which was brought to them in the bush by the victims wife (PW1) at location designated by the kidnappers. The Appellant as 2nd accused denied any involvement in the alleged kidnapping saga.
At the trial, prosecution called three witnesses and tendered five exhibits which were marked as Exhibits A, B, B1, C, and C1 respectively.
The 1st accused person testified for himself and tendered one document admitted as Exhibit D. The Appellant as the 2nd accused person also testified in his own defence and called no other witness.
The parties thereafter filed and exchanged written addresses which they subsequently adopted and relied on at the lower Court.
In a judgment delivered on 31/10/2014, the two accused persons were found guilty as charged for the offence of kidnapping and were each accordingly convicted and sentenced to twenty-one years in imprisonment.
The Appellant herein as the 2nd accused person was not satisfied with the said judgment and consequently filed a notice of appeal on 22/12/2014.
An amended notice of appeal containing seven grounds of appeal was subsequently filed on 31/3/2016 but deemed properly filed on 3/4/2017. The Appellants brief of argument settled by Paul Osarenkhoe Esq., was filed on 5/4/2017 while the Appellants reply brief was filed on 12/5/2017. The Respondents brief of argument settled by Lotanna Chuka Okoli Esq., was filed on 24/4/2017.
The parties adopted and relied on their respective briefs of argument at the hearing of the appeal on the 6/12/2017.
From the seven grounds in the amended notice of appeal, the Appellant formulated the following two issues for determination:
(1) Did the learned trial Judge properly evaluate the evidence led by both the prosecution and defence and was there any basis for the findings of facts made against the Appellant in the judgment to warrant the conviction of the Appellant. (Grounds 1 6).
(2) Having regard to the totality of the evidence led at the trial, was there any circumstantial evidence leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt of the Appellant? (Ground 7).
The Respondent on the other hand formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:
Whether from the surrounding circumstances and the evidence adduced by the prosecution it proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as to justify the conviction of the Appellant.
The sole

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issue as raised in the Respondents brief encapsulates the two issues as raised by the Appellant. I will therefore resolve this appeal on the basis of the said sole issue.
Dwelling on their issue 1, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence led by both the prosecution and the defence that the evidence of the victim of the alleged crime who testified as PW2 clearly exonerated the Appellant as shown in page 36 of the record particularly lines 23 and 37 as well as page 41 line 15.
He added that the PW1 and PW2 did not identify the Appellant either in their statement to the police or their evidence in Court.
On the relevance of identification and recognition in criminal proceedings he relied on the following cases: WORU VS. STATE (2011) All FWLR (PT. 602) 1644 at 1646 and OLAGESIN VS. STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 670) 1357 at 1366.
It was then contended that the Appellant was not identified as one of the persons who kidnapped the PW2 in which case the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the learned trial Judge engaged in speculation of evidence not adduced before the Court in reaching the decision that the Appellant was guilty as charged.
On the negative effect of speculation, he cited the case of AYO VS. STATE (2010) All FWLR (PT. 530) 1377; OLAGESIN VS. STATE supra and THE STATE VS. AIBANGBEE (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 84) 548.
Learned counsel further submitted that it is not the duty of an accused person to prove his innocence by virtue of Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution and as held in ALATISE VS. STATE (2013) All FWLR (PT. 686) 552.
On the Respondents reliance on Exhibit C, the extra judicial statement of the co-accused to justify the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt, it was submitted that the statement of a co-accused is not binding on the Appellant unless he adopts it. He referred to Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act as well as the case of MBANG VS. STATE (2010) All FWLR (PT. 508) 379 at 383.
According to learned counsel, if the evidence adduced was properly and correctly evaluated, the learned trial Judge would have come to a different conclusion.
On issue 2, it was submitted that having regard to the totality of the evidence led at the trial, there was no circumstantial evidence leading to the conviction of the Appellant. Therefore the learned trial Judge was wrong to have relied on the circumstantial evidence on the basis that:
(a) The failure of the appellant to state where he was at the time the PW2 was kidnapped.
(b) That it took 5 days before the Appellant made himself available after he had been called by his elder brother that he was wanted by the vigilante people.”
He added that circumstantial evidence is only necessary where there is no direct eye witness evidence linking the accused with the commission of a crime as held in AGBOOLA VS. THE STATE supra, but that in the instant case, the PW2 in his evidence exonerated the Appellant. Alternatively, he argued that the evidence relied upon as circumstantial by the learned trial Judge does not qualify as such because the law requires that a circumstantial evidence must be such that leads to the inevitable conclusion of the guilt of the accused and no other probable conclusion as held in THE STATE VS. OKPALA (2012) All FWLR (PT. 617) 670 at 674 and MOHAMMED VS. STATE(2012) All FWLR (PT. 621) 1564

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at 1569.
This Court was then urged to resolve the issues in favour of the Appellant and allow the appeal.
Dwelling on the sole issue for determination in reply to the Appellants brief, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant was rightly convicted by the trial Court after a proper evaluation of the evidence placed before the Court. He added that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every shadow of doubt but implies that the prosecution should establish the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence and the learned trial Judge having evaluated the evidence adduced, concluded that the prosecution discharged the duty imposed on it.
After a review of the evidence adduced in Court by the parties, learned counsel submitted that the attack by the Appellants counsel on the manner of evaluation of evidence by the learned trial Judge is not borne out of the justice of the case. This is with emphasis on the finding of the learned trial Judge that the Appellant did not state where he was at the time of the kidnap of PW2 and what he had been doing. He argued, that the point being made by the learned trial Judge is that upon arrest by the vigilante, the Appellant did not proffer any defence that could absolve him from the commission of the crime at least by way of an alibi in his statement to the police and having not done so the lower Court had no choice than to believe the evidence of the prosecution.
On the Appellant complaint that the learned trial Judge did not consider the defence put up by the Appellant, it was submitted that the defence put forward by the Appellant was an outright denial that he does not know the 1st accused, PW1, PW2 or PW3 whom he met for the first time in the course of the case. This denial was not believed by the learned trial Judge.
On the Appellants contention that there was no evidence of his identification as one of the kidnappers, it was submitted that there is abundant evidence which identified the Appellant as one of the kidnappers. Particularly with regard to Exhibit C, the confessional statement of the 1st accused person wherein it was stated that the motorcycle of the Appellant was used to pick him up after the PW2 was kidnapped and brought to the bush and the Appellant in his extra-judicial statement did confirm that he has a motorcycle. He added that the case of MBANG VS. STATE (2010) All FWLR (PT. 508) 378 relied on by the Appellant does not apply in this case and besides that, the law is that a properly admitted extra-judicial confessional statement forms part of the prosecutions case as held in EGBOGHONOME VS. THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 383) 428, therefore the Court is obliged to consider it in determining whether or not the prosecution proved its case.
Learned counsel also referred to page 46 of the record to contend that the PW3 did give evidence to the effect that when the 1st accused person was contacted on the phone, he stated that the Appellant was also one of the kidnappers and this led to the arrest of the Appellant and the Simba motorcycle recovered from his house corroborated the evidence of PW3 and Exhibit C. It was then urged on this Court to dismiss the appeal.
The Appellants reply brief was filed on 12/5/2017. But reading through it reveals that it is more of an amplification of the submissions already made in the main Appellants brief. However for what it is worth the arguments contained therein will be addressed as the need arises in the course of this judgment. Now the charge against the Appellant and others reads thus:
That you Abubakar Kareem, Suleman Akokhia and others now at large on or about the 28th day

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of September, 2011, at Uwanya Street, Auchi in the Auchi Judicial Division did kidnap one Maxwell Igbadumhe M and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 2(1) and punishable under Section 3(2) of the Kidnapping (Prohibition) Law of Edo State, 2009.”
Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides that:
If the commission of a crime by a Party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceedings civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This burden is said to remain on the prosecution throughout the case and never shifts. See OKORO VS. STATE(1988) 12 SC (PT. 11) 88; USUFU VS. STATE (2007) 1 NWLR (PT. 1020) 94; AKPAN VS. THE STATE (1990) 7 NWLR (PT. 160) 101; ALABI VS THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 307) 511; SOLOLA VS. THE STATE (2005) 11 NWLR (PT. 937) 460; EKPE VS. STATE (1994) 9 NWLR (PT. 368) 263.
It follows therefore that if on the entire evidence adduced before a trial Court, the Court is left with no doubt that the offence was committed by the accused person, that burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is discharged and the conviction of the accused person will be upheld. Where on the other hand, the Court considers the totality of the evidence and a reasonable doubt is created, the prosecution would have in the circumstance failed in its duty to discharge the burden of proof as imposed on it by law and this will entitle the accused person to the benefit of the doubt and a resultant discharge and acquittal. See AFOLALU VS. STATE (2010) All FWLR (PT. 1538) 812 and POSU & ANOR VS. THE STATE (2011) 3 NWLR (PT. 1234) 393; JOSEPH VS. STATE (2011) 16 NWLR (PT. 1273) 226; STATE VS. SALAWU (2011) 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) 580.
Also DANLADI MUSA VS. THE STATE (2013) LPELR (21866) CA where this Court per Ige JCA held inter alia at pages 69 to 70 of the report that:
The law needs no restatement that before an accused person can be convicted of any offence the ingredients of the offence must be proved against the accused and shown to have fallen within the four walls of such ingredients of offence charged. In the case of SEBASTIAN S. YONGO & ANOR VS. C.O.P. (1992) 8 NWLR (PT. 257) 36 at 50, Kutigi JSC (later Chief Justice of Nigeria Rtd) said: In criminal proceedings the onus is always on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution will readily achieve this result by answering that all the necessary and vital ingredients of the charge or charges are proved by evidence.
The same emphasis was made by this Court per Abiru JCA in AMINA MUSA VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR 22912 (CA) wherein at pages 51 to 52 it was held that:
Where the commission of crime by a party is in issue in any proceedings be it civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging the burden, all the essential ingredients of the crime alleged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden never shifts. Therefore if in a criminal trial, on the whole of the evidence before it, the Court is left in doubt, the prosecution would have failed to discharge the burden of proof which the law lays upon it and the defendant will be entitled to an acquittal. It must however be stated that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to the hilt and is thus not synonymous with proof beyond all iota of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the defendant with compelling and conclusive evidence to a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability.
With the above principle of criminal jurisprudence in mind, I have carefully read through the record of appeal with particular reference to the judgment appealed against. I note that the conviction of the Appellant is premised in the main, on the fact that the learned trial Judge relied heavily on circumstantial evidence. Thus at pages 92 to 94 of the record, the following finding of fact and conclusion was made:
Although there was no identification parade conducted which may not be necessary where the identity of the accused as in this case appears well known from the PWs description and the search

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for him was on going. The 2nd accused person confirmed this in Exhibit B when he stated inter alia: Five days ago my elder brother named Shaka Akokhia called me on phone that, the vigilante are searching for me. I called the chairman of the vigilante and asked him of what is happening? He told me that the Barrister that was kidnapped want to identify me if I was one of the person that kidnapped him. He made this statement on 8/10/2011 and apparently five days before then would be 3/10/11 when PW2 would have in his statement indicted him as stated by PW3 and the search was on for him. It is interesting and noteworthy that the 2nd accused did not state where he was at the time of the Kidnap of PW2 and what he had been doing before his brothers phone call. It is evident that he took to flight while the search was on going for him. Even after his brothers phone call it still took five days for him to show up and rather than go to the vigilant he waited to be arrested. This conduct is circumstantial evidence which lends credence to the PW2s case that the 2nd accused was one of those recognised by him as among the kidnappers though he did not know his name. This evidence is sufficient to prove the complicity of the 2nd accused person in this case in that circumstantial evidence, may sometimes be the best evidence.
Now in relying on circumstantial evidence to determine the guilt of the accused, the evidence relied upon must if accepted, make a complete and unbroken chain so as to constitute sufficient proof that the accused person committed the offence with which he is charged. See THE STATE VS. JOHN OGBUBUNJO (2001) 3 SCM 119. In CHIMA IJIOFFOR VS. THE STATE (2001) 5 SCM 107 the Supreme Court held inter alia that circumstantial evidence is very often the best evidence. It is the evidence of surrounding circumstances which, by undersigned coincidence, is capable of proving a proposition with the accuracy of mathematics. See also LGCI VS THE STATE (1980) 8 11 SC page 52.
In ADESINA VS. STATE (2012) 14 NWLR (PT. 1321) 429 at 448 to 449 the Supreme Court elucidated on the concept of circumstantial evidence as follows:
Under the criminal legal system, circumstantial evidence is defined as the evidence of surrounding circumstances which by undersigned co-incidence is capable of proving a proposition with the accuracy of mathematics. Circumstantial evidence means that there are a number of circumstances which make a complete unbroken chain of evidence, if that is established to the satisfaction of the Court, it may well and properly act upon such evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to ground a conviction only where the inferences drawn from the whole story of the case points strongly to the commission of the crime by the accused. Mohammed vs. State (2007) 13 NWLR (pt. 1050) pg. 186; Nwaeze vs. State (1996) 2 NWLR (pt. 428) pg. 1; Akinmoju vs. State (2000) 4 SC (pt. 1) pg. 64; (2000) 6 NWLR (pt. 691) 608.; Durwode Vs. State (2000) 12 Sc (pt. 1) p. 1. or (2000) 15 NWLR (pt. 691) 467. In other words, for circumstantial evidence to ground a conviction, it must lead to one conclusion, namely the guilt of the accused person. Where there are other possibilities that others other than the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence with which the accused was charged, such an accused cannot be convicted of the offence. Ubani Vs. State (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 851) 224.
In the instant case, and as can be gleaned from the findings of the learned trial Judge as above set out and particularly at page 93 of the record, the findings therein as asserted by learned counsel for the Appellant are mostly speculative and conjectural. For instance at the said page 93, the learned trial Judge held thus:
There is no evidence as to how PW2 eventually directly identified 2nd accused. It appears that the police relied on the statement of PW2 in that PW3 stated in his evidence in chief that PW2

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indicted the 2nd accused in his statement along with 1st accused and one at large and they started looking for them using the vigilant in Iyankpi.
To my mind, the learned trial Judge no doubt seemed to have made a supposition as to how the police ended up arresting the 2nd accused person without it coming out by way of evidence from the prosecution.
It is not the duty of a Judge to speculate upon what might have happened and substitute its own supposition for the evidence available before the Court. In other words, a Court should not decide a case on mere conjecture of speculation because Courts of law are Courts of facts and law. They decide issues based on facts established before them and applied relevant laws and they must avoid speculations. See ANI VS. STATE (2009) 6 7 SC (PT. III) page 1; AGIP (NIG) LTD. VS. EZENDU (2010) 1 SC (PT. II) 124; ECOBANK NIGERIA LIMITED VS. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LIMITED & ORS. (2016) LPELR 40219 (CA); ADELENWA VS. THE STATE (1972) 10 SC 13; OKPERE VS. THE STATE (1971) ALL NLR page 1.
Furthermore, the evidence of the PW2, the victim of the crime unfortunately created room for doubting the culpability of the Appellant.
For instance, while testifying during the trial he gave a detailed picture of what transpired from the very night that the kidnapping took place, the various movements, and his interlocution with the kidnappers as well as various opportunities he had to look at the kidnappers when the blindfold used on him weakened or fell off. At page 36 of the record he testified thus:
I heard a commotion in my sitting room. I thought my children were fighting as I came out, I saw three men with cut to size double barrel gun. My family were being rounded up. At this time, I was looking at the men but they did not see me. Two of the men were black in complexion, tall and they had on face caps. The third one was a young, fair complexioned man not the 2nd accused and he was the one with my wife and children.
(underlining mine for emphasis)
It is noteworthy, that from the narrative above the PW2 clearly saw and fully noted the features of the three persons who came to the house that night and after describing the three person he emphatically stated that it was not the 2nd accused (now Appellant). Added to this he further stated at page 37 of the record as follows:
……I then help to switch on the head light. In doing so, had the opportunity to see the leader who was driving and the yellow boy who was holding me behind. They are people I know but I do not know them by name.
With regard to the recognition of the 1st accused, he did not mince words during his testimony wherein he stated thus at page 39 of the record.
It was at this point I recognised the 1st accused. He is always in the bush near my house hunting for animals. At times I buy from him along the expressway. He was very nice to me……………………
……… I did not know 1st accused by name but himself and the leader were facing me asking me questions while the third man was behind me. First accused had a fresh cut on his right big toes, he was wearing a knee length big knicker and a jacket that has a front zipper. He had on rubber slippers. The third person was far from me but I know he was fair complexioned.

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While the PW2 fully recognised and described the 1st accused as someone well known to him and even the fact that he had a wound on his big toe and was wearing a rubber slippers. He also had a clear picture of the leader of the gang as well as the fair complexion man including another strange man who came briefly and left, he never alluded to any fact that the appellant was one of the persons involved in the kidnap saga despite the fact that he is very well known to him as stated in his evidence at page 41 of the record as follows:
Before now I had known the 2nd accused through a friend called Akim. The 2nd accused had been to my office on two occasions to draw up agreements for land he was buying for somebody as an agent he came to my house on two occasions to pick them up, though he did not enter into the house.
What is more, while the PW2 described the 1st accused to the police which led to his eventual arrest, he never mentioned anything about the Appellant. He however testified to the effect that before the 1st accused was arrested, the 2nd accused came with his mother to his house and the mother asked if it is true that her son (Appellant) is a suspect in the kidnap case as alleged by the vigilante. But he asked them to leave his house as he was not in the mood and that they are embarrassing him.
It follows that even after his release, and eventual encounter with the Appellant and his mother, the PW2, never showed any sign of suspecting the Appellant as one of the kidnappers. To make matters worse, when the Appellant was arrested by the police, there is no record of the Appellant being invited to the station for an identification parade to enable either him or the PW1, his wife identify the Appellant. On this issue of identification the learned trial Judge had this to say at page 93 of the record.
Although there was no identification parade conducted which may not be necessary where the identity of the accused as in this case appears well known from the PWs description and the search for him was on going.
This to my mind is begging the question and raises the risk of a Court doing a case for the prosecution. If the identity of the Appellant was well known to the prosecution witnesses, why was this information not given to the police even when the Appellant came to the house of the PW2 with his mother and why should his arrest be at the prompting of the vigilante who were not eye witnesses to the incident? Moreso neither the PW1 nor the PW2 raised any issue with regard to the involvement of the Appellant in the kidnap in their statement to the police either before or after his arrest.
In the case of NDIDI VS THE STATE (2007) 5 SCNJ 274, it was held that identification evidence is that evidence which tends to show that the person charged is the same as the person who was seen committing the offence. Thus where a trial Court is faced with the issue of identification, it should be satisfied that the evidence of identification establishes the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. See IHEAONUNEKWU NDUKWE VS. THE STATE (2009) 2 3 SC (PT. 11) 35. Also in ANI VS. THE STATE (2009) 6 7 SC (PT. III) page 1,the Supreme Court held inter alia that identification of an accused person in the commission of crime is the most serious exercise in the administration of justice as it creates the link between the accused person and the offence.
Thus given that the issue of identification was not properly addressed by the trial Court moreso that it was evident that no identification exercise was carried out with regard to the participation of the Appellant in the alleged crime, I hold that it is a fundamental snag in the prosecutions case.
The learned counsel for the Respondent had also contended that a properly admitted extra-judicial confessional statement forms part of the case for the prosecution and as such should be considered by

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the Court in determining whether or not the prosecution proved its case. This is correct to the extent that it concerns the maker of the confessional statement. It does not apply where there are other accused persons charged along with the maker of the confessional statement unless they unequivocally adopt the said confessional statement.
In other words, when an accused person makes a confessional statement as to his participation in a crime, he is not confessing for his accomplices. An accused persons confession is only evidence against him and not against co-accused persons except where such confessional statement is voluntarily adopted by the co-accused persons. See OZAKI VS. STATE (1990) 1 NWLR (PT. 124) 92; JIMOH VS. THE STATE (2014) LPELR (22464) SC; WAKALA VS. THE STATE (1991) 8 NWLR (PT. 211) 552; EMEKA VS. STATE (2001) 6 SCNJ 257; IGAGO VS. STATE (1999) 11 12 SCNJ 140; SOLOLA VS. THE STATE (2005) 11 NWLR (PT. 937) 460. See also Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act 2011.
The Respondents reliance on Exhibit C is therefore faulty and misguided notwithstanding whether the confessional statement of the 1st accused implicated the Appellant with respect to the alleged crime, wherein he alleged that the red tank simba motorcycle used to come and pick him to go and buy drugs at a chemist belongs to the Appellant and that later the Appellant went with him and other persons to the house of the PW2 that night. Such statement implicating the Appellant is borne out of the confessional statement of a co-accused which is inadmissible in law, and as such cannot be used against the Appellant unless he adopts the said confessional statement. Another important exception is where the co-accused in his evidence on oath in Court implicates a co-accused in which case such evidence will support the prosecutions case. It is not so in the instant case as the 1st accused even put up a strong denial about the commission of the offence charged.
The Appellant in his extra-judicial statements Exhibits B and B1 as well as in his evidence in Court wholly denied any involvement in the offence charged and that leaves the prosecution with the responsibility to discharge the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In AGBOOLA VS THE STATE (2013) All FWLR (PT. 704) 139, it was held by the Supreme Court that there are three ways in which the guilt of an accused can be proved. They are:
(1) By direct evidence of an eye witness.
(2) By circumstantial evidence.
(3) By confessional statement of an accused person.
See also MOSES VS. THE STATE (2003) FWLR (PT. 141) 1969 and GIRA VS. THE STATE (1996) 4 SCNJ 95.
The Respondent herein from the available evidence on record and as appraised by this Court, did not succeed in proving the guilt of the Appellant either by direct evidence which is totally lacking or by circumstantial evidence which also does not avail it. The issue of confessional statement of an accused does not even arise given the content of Exhibits B and 1, the extra-judicial statements of the Appellant wherein he denied any involvement in the offence charged.
This brings me to the complaint by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the learned trial Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence led by both the prosecution and the defence and this affected the findings of fact made against the Appellant.
It is settled law that the duty of appraising evidence given at a trial is pre-eminently that of the Court that saw and heard the witnesses. It is also the right of that Court to ascribe probative values to such evidence and an appellate Court may not disturb a judgment simply on the ground that it would have come to a different conclusion on the facts as long as the judgment of the trial Court is

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supported by the evidence rightly accepted by that Court. The Court of Appeal is however entitled to interfere when it is satisfied that the trial Judge failed to properly advert his mind to the evidence on record. See ONYIA VS. ONIAH (1989) 2 SC (PT. II) 69; OGUNDULU VS. PHILLIPS (1973) 2 SC 55; EBOADE VS. ATOMESIN (1997) 5 SCNJ 13.
In the instant case this Court is satisfied that there was a failure on the part of the learned trial Judge to advert his mind to the evidence on record, hence inherent in the judgment are perverse finding of facts. Interference with such findings by this Court therefore becomes justifiable and the result of such interference as earlier detailed in this judgment is that based on the evidence on record the prosecution failed to prove the case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In the final result this appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The judgment of the High Court of Edo State delivered on the 31st day of October, 2014 is hereby set aside.
The Appellant is accordingly discharged and acquitted.
JIMI OLUKAYODE BADA, J.C.A.: I read now the lead judgment of my learned brother SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, JCA just delivered.
My Lord has dealt with the sole issue in this appeal adequately and I agree with the reasons given therein as well as the conclusion reached.
Having also read the record of appeal and the briefs of argument filed and exchanged by the parties, I am also of the view that this appeal is meritorious. I also allow the appeal. I abide by the consequential order made in the said lead judgment.
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the draft judgment delivered by my learned brother S.C OSEJI JCA. My Lord has dealt with all the issues canvassed by the Appellant and the sole issue formulated by the Respondent. I align myself with his reasoning and conclusions reached therein. It is also my view that the learned trial Judge averted his mind to the evidence on record, hence inherent in the judgment are perverse findings of fact and the prosecution also failed to prove the case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In a nut shell this appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The judgment of the High Court of Edo State delivered on the 31st day of October, 2014 is hereby set aside.
The Appellant is accordingly discharged and acquitted.