CHROME AIR SERVICES LIMITED & ORS v. FIDELITY BANK

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EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellants were the plaintiffs at the trial Court. They were also the appellants at the Lower Court. The Respondent was the defendant and respondent respectively at those Courts.
By a Writ of Summons and Statement of claim filed on the 24th day of November, 2009 the Plaintiffs(now Appellants) claimed against the Defendant (now Respondent) as follows:-
I. A declaration that the Plaintiffs are not indebted to the Defendant in any sum of money whatsoever whether in local or foreign currency.
II. The sum of N100, 000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) in favour of the 1st plaintiff being general damages for detinue.
III. An order of Court mandating the Defendant to return to the 1st Plaintiff Certificate of Occupancy Nos. FCT/ABU/CR.296 in respect of Plot No. 756 Maitama A5 District, measuring approximately 2189.30 square meters and FCT/ABU/NG488 in respect of plot No. 71A3, Garki II District, measuring approximately 1195.06 square meters which the 1st plaintiff deposited with the Defendant in respect of overdraft which his been fully liquidated.
IV. An order of Court mandating the Defendant to return to the 1st plaintiff Recertification Acknowledgement letters it received from the Abuja Geographical Information System in respect of recertification of the title documents prayed in (3) above.
V. Interest at the rate of 10% per annum on judgment sum from the date of judgment until judgment sum is fully liquidated by the defendant.

Upon been served with the plaintiffs claim, the Defendant filed their statement of Defence and also Counter Claimed against the Plaintiffs and Sir Emeka Offor KSM (who was joined by leave of Court) as follows;
a. The sum of N17,099,169.99 (Seventeen Million and Ninety Nine Thousand, One Hundred and Sixty Nine Naira Ninety Nine Kobo only) being the outstanding due to the Defendant/Counter Claimant from the 1st and 3rd Defendants.
b. Interest at the rate of 38% per annum from the 17th June, 1999 till date of judgment and 10% thereafter until full payment.
c. An order of Specific Performance by the payment of the sum of $1,000.000 (One Million US Dollars) by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to Defendant/Counter Claimant.
d. Interest at the rate of 38% per annum from the 17th June, 1999 till date of judgment and 10% thereafter until full payment.
e. An order of foreclosure and sale of all that property located at Plot 755 Maitama A5, District measuring about 2189.30 square meters covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. FCT/ABU/CR.296 in liquidation of the debts owed by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.
f. An order foreclosure and sale of all that property located at Plot 71 A3, Garki II District measuring about 1195.06 square meters covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. FCT/ABU/NG498 in liquidation of the debts owed by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants.
g. An order of foreclosure and sale of all that property located at Plot No. 505 Cadastral Zone A0 in Abuja measuring about 3940.85 square meters covered by Certificate of Occupancy No. FCT/ABU/MISC-5178 in liquidation of the debts owed by 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.
h. Cost of this action.

Both sides called oral evidence, one witness each, at the trial Court. At the close of their respective cases and final addresses the trial Court delivered a reserved judgment. In the judgment the trial Court held as a fact that the appellants, as plaintiffs, were no longer indebted to the defendant/respondent in any sum in Naira denomination, and that in US Dollar Denomination, however, the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs/appellants were still liable in the sum of $1,000,000.00 USD to the defendant/respondent. The appellants unsuccessfully appealed that finding. This further appeal is against the decision of the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division (the Lower Court), that affirmed the decision of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the appellants before it.
Aggrieved by the decision of the lower Court in the appeal No. CA/A/203/2012 the appellants herein have further appealed to this Court. They filed their
Notice of Appeal on 27th November, 2014. It has two grounds, to wit
GROUND ONE
ERROR IN LAW
The Honourable Lower Court erred in law when it held as follows:
Exhibit O and Q as found by the trial Court are clear admissions of indebtedness to the respondent by the 2nd and 3rd Appellants, in addition to the Oruruo Eloka, Dw. 1, at page 111 of the record, especially paragraphs 10 – 15.
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Contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellants, this Court holds the view that the respondent have discharged the onus of proof of a counter claimant, by the evidence of Dw.1 and Exhibits O and Q; and thus having acknowledged their liability the onus is on the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to the counter claim, herein appellants to show that they paid, or are not indebted; this is more so especially in view of the appellants’ eagerness, portrayed particularly in Exhibit O to pay.
GROUND TWO
ERROR IN LAW
The Honourable Lower Court erred in law when it held as follows:
The abandonment of the 3rd Defendant/Appellant’s case is total, by reason of the fact that no sufficient evidence was elicited in contradiction from the testimony of Dw.1, contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellant; it is just not enough in the circumstances to refuse or fail to lead evidence in support of your pleadings, only to cross-examine the witness for the counter claimant, and assume that there cross examination is enough. The evidence elicited from such cross examination must not only be pleaded, relevant but also substantially support the claim of the appellant. I did not see such thing in this case. The circumstances of this case are clearly in contradistinction to the position of the law in OFEM & ANOR v. EWA & ANOR (2012) LPELR – 7852 – CA.
The appellants also formulated two (2) issues from the two (2) grounds of appeal, viz:
1. Whether the Court below was right when it held that the Respondent discharged the onus of proof of the counter-claim and that the Appellants failed to show that they paid or are not indebted to the Respondent. (Ground 1)
2. Whether the Court below was right in its position that the failure of the 3rd Appellant to testify at the High Court left the evidence of Dw.1 uncontradicted as it pertains to the counter-claim ( Ground 2 )
In the Respondent’s Brief, filed on 30th January, 2015, the Respondent raised preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal on the grounds that:
a. The grounds of appeal herein are grounds of fact and or mixed law and fact.
b. No leave was obtained before the filing of the appeal.
c. the mere labelling of a ground of appeal as “error in law” does not translate the ground into a ground of law.
d. this Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal based on facts or mixed law and fact without leave.

The issue raised by the Preliminary Objection is simply: whether the Appellant’s appeal is competent? It is true, as submitted by the Respondent on the authority of TILBURY CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD v. SUNDAY OGUNNIYI (1988) 2 NWLR. (pt. 74) 64, that the mere labelling of a ground of appeal as a ground of law, or error in law; does not ipso facto make or transform the complaint in the ground of appeal to one of complaint of error of law. The ground of appeal’to be one of error or law must in actuality or substance, be a complaint that the Court below had committed error of law in its judgment, the subject of the appeal. The ground of appeal read together the particulars of error must unequivocally point at error in law.
The Notice of Appeal is an originating process. To determine whether or not it has properly initiated an appeal before this Court under Section 233 (3) of the 1999 Constitution, the Notice of Appeal shall be submitted to scrutiny in order to determine whether or not it has strictly complied with the relevant enabling provisions of the law. See ABBAS v. TERRA (2013) 3 NWLR (pt. 1334) 284 at 286. The enabling provisions of Section 233 (2) & (3) of the Constitution are clear:
(2) An appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court as of right in following cases-
a). where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeal;
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
(3) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (2) of this Section, an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court with leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.
In other words, a ground of appeal other than one complaining or raising issue of law alone is not filed as of right. The appellant shall, for a ground involving question of mixed law and fact or of fact alone, seek and obtain leave of Court before filing or bringing appeal on that ground.
The appellants posit that their appeal comes under Section 233(2) of the Constitution, and therefore as of right, since the two grounds of appeal “involve questions of law alone”. The Respondent, on the
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contrary, maintains that the two grounds of appeal are grounds of mixed law and fact, or of fact, and therefore the appeal on them could not been brought as of right. The Respondent on this stance submits that the Appellants needed to have first sought and obtained leave of Court under Section 233 (3) of the Constitution before filing the Notice of Appeal, and having brought their appeal without satisfying the pre-condition, the appeal therefore is incompetent.
My Lords, I had earlier set out the grounds of appeal and the issues formulated therefrom by the Appellants for the determination of their appeal. The perusal of the grounds of appeal together with their particulars of error, when read together with the issues for the determination, leaves no doubt that the two grounds of appeal are purely on facts. Dr. Ameh, SAN for the Respondent puts it succinctly thus: “the issues framed from the grounds (of appeal) have put the argument to rest that the grounds are grounds of facts only.”
The complaint in Ground one is merely that the lower Court did not properly evaluate the facts before it. The totality of the ground and its particulars comes down to this: that the lower Court did not appreciate or apprehend the facts on which it held that the evidence of the Dw.1 viz-a-viz Exhibits O and Q, as found by the trial Court, are clear admissions of their indebtedness to the Respondent. Indebtedness of one party to other is one of facts. It calls for the estimation or valuation of one set of facts against the other in order that the judge would appreciate, realize or see that one party is or is not indebted to the other. Where the ground of appeal is couched in a way, as the instant ground one, that reveals or questions the evaluation of facts by the lower Tribunal before the Tribunal would come to its finding of fact such a ground is one of facts, or at best one of mixed law and facts. As Onu, JSC, stated in MEDICAL AND DENTAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL v. DR. JOHN EMEWULU NICHOLA OKONKWO (2001) 3 SC 76; (2001) 6 NWLR (pt. 710) – where the error complained of is one predicated on disputed facts calling into question the correctness of the facts determined, it is invariably a question of mixed law and facts. A. C. B. PLC v. OBMIAMI BRICK & STONE (1993) 6 SCNJ 98; (1993) 5 NWLR (pt. 274) 399.
I have read the opinion of Adekeye, JSC in B. A. S. F (NIG.) LTD v. FAITH ENTERPRISES LTD. (2010) 4 NWLR (pt. 1183) 104 at 132 cited by the Appellant’s counsel. It also accords with the earlier dicta of this Court in M. D. P. D. T. v. OKONKWO (supra) AND A. C. B PLC v. OBMIAMI (supra) that where admissible evidence has been led, the assessment of that evidence is entirely for the Court. If the complaint, as in the instant case, is about the assessment of the admissible evidence, the ground is that of fact. Adekeye JSC also stated in B. A. S. F (NIG) LTD v. FAITH ENT. LTD (supra) that where the ground questions the evaluation of the facts before the application of the law, it is ground of mixed law and facts.
The complaint in Ground two of the grounds of appeal is that the lower Court was in error in its findings as of the fact that the 3rd defendant had abandoned his case at the trial Court, having failed to adduce evidence or elicit evidence from the opponents witness (Dw.1) to support his case as pleaded. The issue formulated from this ground of appeal is: whether the Lower Court was right that the failure of the 3rd appellant to testify at the trial Court left the evidence of Dw.1 uncontradicted as it pertains to the Counter-Claim. The verb contradict, in its ordinary grammatical meaning, also means to assail, controvert, deny, dispute or traverse. One fact or set of facts is required to contradict, controvert, or traverse another fact or set of facts. That is why in Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, it is provided that facts not disputed or which are taken as admitted need no further proof. See also DIN v. AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS OF NIGERIA LTD. (1990) 21 NSCC (pt. 2) 313 at 320.
Clearly from the earlier templates set by this Court in M. D. P. D. T v. DR. OKONKWO (supra),A. C. B PLC v. OBMIAMI BRICKS & STONE (supra) and B. A. S. F (NIG) v. FAITH ENTERPRISES LTD (supra); it becomes very hard for me to agree with the Appellants counsel that the two grounds of appeal on which the Appellants appeal is predicated “involve questions of law”. I agree with the senior counsel for the Respondent that the two grounds of appeal are grounds of mixed law and facts, or of facts. They accordingly require leave of the Court of Appeal or of this Court first sought and obtained
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before this appeal on them could be brought in accordance with Section 233 (3) of the Constitution. The failure of the Appellant to first seek and obtain the leave before bringing this appeal has rendered this appeal incompetent.
The preliminary objection is on terra firma and it is accordingly sustained. Consequently, the appeal being incompetent is hereby struck out.
The Respondent is entitled to costs, which I assess at N500, 000.00. The said amount shall be paid to the Respondent by the Appellants, jointly and or severally as costs.
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: My learned brother EJEMBI EKO JSC did oblige me the draft of his lead judgment just delivered. I agree with him that an appeal founded on grounds of mixed law and fact and in respect of which the leave of Court has not been sought and obtained is incompetent. In the instant case with all the grounds of appeal being of mixed law and fact and leave of neither the lower Court nor this Court not having been sought and obtained the respondent/objector is right to insist that we decline jurisdiction. Section 233(3) of the 1999 Constitution as amended supports their contention. See also Ugboaja V. Akintoye – Sowemimo (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt 1113) 278 and Jimoh V. Akande (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt 1135) 549.
It is for the foregoing and more so for the fuller reasons contained in the lead judgment that I also strike out the incompetent appeal and abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN. J.S.C.: My learned brother, Ejembi Eko, JSC obliged me with a draft of the judgment just delivered. I agree with him that there is merit in the preliminary objected raised by the respondent.
The appellants’ appeal against the judgment of the lower Court is on two grounds. They are reproduced hereunder:
GROUND 1
The Honourable Lower Court erred in law when it held as follows:
Exhibits O and Q as found by the trial Court are clear admissions of indebtedness to the respondent by the 2nd and 3rd appellants, in addition to the Oruruo Eloka, DW1, at page 111 of the record especially paragraphs 10-15. Contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellants, this Court holds the view that the respondent have discharged the onus of proof of a counter claimant, by the evidence of DWI and Exhibits O and Q; and thus having acknowledged their liability the onus is on the 2nd and 3rd defendant to the counter claim, herein appellant to show that they paid, or are not indebted; this is more so especially in view of the appellants’ eagerness, portrayed particularly in Exhibit O to Pay,
PARTICULARS
1. Exhibit O was clear on its surface that the one Million US Dollars was to substantially reduce an already outstanding indebtedness with the bank.
2. Evidence on records shows that the appellants totally liquidated their outstanding indebtedness with the bank.
3. The respondents DW1 admitted on record that there is no contract between the appellants and the respondent wherein the respondent paid the appellants N99 Million Naira in exchange for $1 Million Dollars.
GROUND 2
The Honourable Lower Court erred in law when it held as follows:
The abandonment of the 3rd defendant/appellant’s case is total, by reason of the fact that no sufficient evidence was elicited in contradiction from the testimony of DW1, contrary to the contention of learned counsel to the appellant; it is just not enough in the circumstances to refuse or fail to lead evidence in support of your pleadings, only to cross-examine the witness for the counter claimant and assume that mere cross examination is enough. The evidence elicited from such cross examination must not only be pleaded relevant but also substantially support the claim of the appellant. I did not see such thing in this case. The circumstances of this case are clearly in contradistinction to the position of the law in OFEM & ANOR. V EWA & ANOR (2012) LPELR-7852-CA.
PARTICULARS:
1. A counter claim is an independent action that must succeed on the strength of the counter claim and not on the weakness of defence to the counter claim.
2. The decision of the trial High Court that the respondent did not prove the claim of $1 Million Dollars apart from reliance on Exhibits O and Q was not appealed and stands.
3. Exhibits O and a do not constitute admission of indebtedness of $t Million Dollars by the appellants.
4. In the 1st and 2nd appellants defence to counter claim dated 22nd January, 2010 and filed on 2nd February, 2010 the 1st and 2nd appellants adopted paragraphs 1-19 of the Statement of Claim in answer to the counter claim.
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5. PW1 led evidence in support of paragraphs 1-19 of the Statement of Claim, thereby defending the counter claim.
6. The admission of DW1 under cross examination supports the pleadings in paragraphs 119 of the Statement of Claim and substantially destroyed the counter claim.
The objection of Dr. S.S. Ameh, SAN, learned counsel for the respondent is on the following grounds:
1. The grounds of appeal herein are grounds of fact or of mixed law and fact.
2. No leave was obtained before filing this appeal.
3. The mere labeling of a ground of appeal as “error in law” does not translate the ground into a ground of law.
4. This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal based on facts or on mixed law and fact without leave.
It is learned senior counsel’s contention that the appeal is incompetent for failure of the appellants to obtain leave to appeal either from this Court or from the Court below. It is settled law that failure to obtain leave to appeal where leave is required is fatal to the appeal. The leave of Court is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the appellate Court to entertain the appeal. Failure to obtain leave where necessary renders the grounds of appeal requiring such leave and any issues formulated therefrom incompetent. See: Oshatoba Vs Olujitan (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 655) 159; Metal Construction Vs Migliore (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 99; Ikweki Vs Ebele (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 936) 397; Tilbury Construction Ltd. Vs Ogunniyi (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 74) 64.
By virtue of Section 233(2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, an appellant can appeal as of right from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court where the ground of appeal is a ground of law alone in respect of decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeal. By virtue of Section 233(3) of the 1999 Constitution, on the other hand, an appeal to this Court on facts alone or on mixed law and facts can only be by leave of this Court or the Court below. See: KTP Ltd. Vs G & H (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 680; Maigoro Vs Garba (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 624) 555 @ 568; CBN Vs Okojie(2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 768) 48; Abubakar Vs Dankwambo (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 213 @ 234-235.
It has been held that the mere description of a ground of appeal as an error of law is not sufficient to make it so. See: Yaro Vs Arewa Construction Ltd. (2007) 6 SC (Pt. II) 149; Ojemen & Ors. Vs Momodu II (1983) SC 173.

However, a single ground of appeal in law alone is capable of sustaining an appeal.
It is recognised that it is often difficult to distinguish between a ground of law and a ground which is of mixed law and facts. Over time, a general rule of thumb employed by Courts to determine the nature of a ground of appeal has evolved. Where the complaint is that the trial or appellate Court misunderstood the law or misapplied the law to the proved or admitted facts, it is a ground of law. Where the ground of appeal questions the evaluation of evidence before the application of the law, it is a ground of mixed law and fact. There is generally no difficulty in determining whether a ground of appeal is a question of fact. See: Odunukwe vs Ofomata (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 125) 404; Metal Construction (W.A.) Ltd. vs Migliore (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 299; Ogbechie vs Onochie (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 484; Anukam vs Anukam (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1081) 455.

I have carefully examined the two grounds of appeal reproduced above. I agree with learned senior counsel for the respondent that the two grounds raise issues of fact or at best mixed law and facts. There is no evidence in the record before us that leave to appeal was sought and obtained either from the Court below or from this Court. The two grounds of appeal are therefore incompetent. In the absence of any ground of law to sustain the appeal, the failure to obtain leave before filing this appeal is fatal. I agree with my learned brother in the lead judgment that the appeal is incompetent. It is accordingly struck out. I abide by the order for costs as contained in the lead judgment.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.: My learned brother Ejembi Eko, JSC obliged me in draft form a copy of the judgment he has just delivered which I read in advance. I agree with him that the five grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal are of mixed law and facts and the leave of this Court not having been sought and obtained before filing same, makes the said grounds incompetent and cannot sustain this appeal.
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Admittedly, the difficulty in recognizing and/or distinguishing a ground of law from a ground of fact or mixed law and fact has always been recognized by the Courts. The position as enunciated by this Court in several authorities on this issue is for the Court to examine the grounds of appeal involved to see whether the grounds reveal a misunderstanding by the lower Court of the law or a misapplication of the law to the facts already proved or not in dispute in which case the question in the ground is one of law. Where the grounds would require questioning the evaluation of facts by the lower Court before the application of the law, then the question in the involved grounds would be of mixed law and fact. See Ogbechie V. Onochie (1986) 2 NWLR (pt. 23) 484, Orakosim V. Menkiti (2001) 5 SC (pt. 1) 72, Osasona V. Ajayi (2004) 5 SC, (pt. 1) 88, Global West Vessel Specialist Nig. Ltd. V. Nigeria LNG Ltd & Anor. (2017) LPELR – 41967 (SC).

The two grounds of appeal in the instant appeal have been set out in the lead judgment and I find it unnecessary repeating the exercise here. A close look at the two grounds as was evaluated by my learned brother, Eko, JSC, they are of mixed law and facts. There is no evidence that the leave of this Court or the Court of Appeal was sought and obtained before filing the Notice of Appeal. This is as provided for under Section 233 (2) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). By this provision, only grounds complaining of or raising issue of law alone can be filed as of right. Any ground of appeal raising or complaining about issue of mixed law and fact or facts alone cannot be raised in this Court except leave of this Court or the Court of Appeal has previously been sought and obtained. Failure to seek and obtain the requisite leave renders the said ground of appeal incompetent and deserves to be struck out.
As it stands in this appeal, the only two grounds of appeal contained in the notice of appeal are adjudged incompetent. What this means is that the preliminary objection of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Dr. S. Ameh, SAN is hereby sustained. In consequence, as there is no competent ground to sustain the appeal, it is hereby struck out. I abide by the order as to costs.
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.: I had the advantage of reading before now the draft judgement which my Lord, Ejembi Eko, JSC, just delivered now. I agree with His Lordship’s view that the ground of appeal is incompetent, being a ground of mixed law and fact, which cannot be raised without leave of either the Court below or this Court, Section 233 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
When the facts are disputed as between the parties, the conclusions which follow from the application of the law to such disputed facts are characterized as those of mixed law and facts. Hence grounds of appeal challenging such conclusions are grounds of mixed law and fact. Ajayi and Anor v Omorogbe (1993) LPELR – 290 (SC) 23; F-G; MDPDT v Okonkwo [2001] 3 SC 76; ACB Plc v Obmiami Brick and Stone Nigeria Ltd [1993] 6 SCNJ 98.
As thus court held in ACB Plc v Obmiami Brick and Stone Nigeria Ltd. (1993) LPELR -206 (SC) 27; E-F:
It is now generally accepted that where the ground of appeal is based on an allegation of error deduced from conclusion on undisputed facts, it is a ground of law. Where on the other hand, the error of law is founded on disputed facts calling into question the correctness of the facts determined, it is invariably a question of mixed law and fact. This is because in this latter case, it is a conclusion of law coupled with the exercise of discretion.
It is for these, and the more elaborate reasons in the leading judgement that I too shall dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.