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Before Their Lordships
OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CLARA BATA OGUNBIYI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
AMIRU SANUSI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
SERAH EKUNDAYO EZEKIEL –Appellant
AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION –Respondent
…………………….A…………………….
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant in this appeal and others were arraigned before the Federal High Court, Ikeja Judicial Division, on November 18, 2011, on a Charge which alleged the offence of trafficking in persons contrary to Sections 15 (a); 15 (c ); 16; 19 (1) (b); 19 (1) (d) and 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 (as amended).
Miss Nneka Adaora Ajie, a Law Officer of NAPTIP, signed the Charge dated November 18, 2011, woven around eighteen Counts, for the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation.
A year later, precisely, on November 18, 2012, the said Miss Nneka Adaora Ajie, on behalf of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, amended and signed the Charge, again, anchored on eighteen counts against the appellant only.
She was alleged to have committed offences of trafficking in persons contrary to Sections 15 (a); 15 (c ); 16; 19 (1) (b); 19 (1) (d) and 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 (as amended).
Upon her arraignment on the amended charge on February 24, 2012, the appellant, who was unrepresented, pleaded guilty to all the counts. The Court, (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”), in consequence, finding her guilty as charged, convicted her on the eighteen Counts or the Charge and sentenced her to various degrees of sentences: all sentences to run concurrently.
Aggrieved by her conviction and sentence, she appealed unsuccessfully, to the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division (throughout this judgment, simply referred to as “the lower Court’), which Court affirmed the Trial Court’s verdict.
This further appeal is the appellant’s expression of her disgust against the lower Court’s affirmation of the trial Court’s decision. She framed two issues for the determination of her appeal: issues which were endorsed by the respondent. They were couched thus:
1. Whether Law Officers of the National Agency For the Prohibition of Traffic (sic) in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIT) (sic) are officers in the Department of the Attorney General of the Federation and can sign Charge or Processes initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation for and on behalf of the Attorney General of the Federation?
2. Whether if the lower Court had considered the submission of the appellant’s counsel that the appellant was a victim of the offences she was charged (sic) and first offender, the lower Court would not have come to the conclusion that the learned trial judge has (sic) eminently exercise (sic) his discretion judiciously and judicially thereby reduce (sic) the sentences passed on the appellant?
ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUES
ISSUE ONE
Whether Law Officers of the National Agency For the Prohibition of Traffic (sic) in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIT) (sic) are officers in the Department of the Attorney General of the Federation and can sign Charge or Processes initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation for and on behalf of the Attorney General of the Federation?
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
At the hearing of this appeal on December 15, 2016, E. A Oyebanji, learned counsel for the appellant, adopted the brief filed on August 5, 2014 and the Reply brief filed on March 3, 2015, although deemed, properly filed on June 4, 2015 as representing his arguments in this appeal.
The crux of his arguments was that although by the. provisions of Section 174 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Attorney General’s powers to initiate and undertake criminal proceedings may be exercised by him in person or through the officers of his department, the officers of the Agency under his control and supervision cannot do so, citing Obi v INEC(2007) 7 SC 268, 315.
In his submission therefore, the exercise of that power by the officers of NAPTIP was a gross violation of Section 174 (1) (b) (supra). He contended that the lower Courts were wrong in resorting to Section 4 (c), 60 and 64 of the NAPTIP Act (supra), citing pages 155 -156 of the record because the said Act did not make the Agency a department in the office of the Attorney General. He maintained that Section 174 (2) (supra) provides for “a department of the Attorney General of the Federation” and not “departments of the Attorney General.” As such, NAPTIP, in his submission, does not qualify as a department within the meaning of Section 174 (2) (supra).
A year later, precisely, on November 18, 2012, the said Miss Nneka Adaora Ajie, on behalf of the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, amended and signed the Charge, again, anchored on eighteen counts against the appellant only.
She was alleged to have committed offences of trafficking in persons contrary to Sections 15 (a); 15 (c ); 16; 19 (1) (b); 19 (1) (d) and 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 (as amended).
Upon her arraignment on the amended charge on February 24, 2012, the appellant, who was unrepresented, pleaded guilty to all the counts. The Court, (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”), in consequence, finding her guilty as charged, convicted her on the eighteen Counts or the Charge and sentenced her to various degrees of sentences: all sentences to run concurrently.
Aggrieved by her conviction and sentence, she appealed unsuccessfully, to the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division (throughout this judgment, simply referred to as “the lower Court’), which Court affirmed the Trial Court’s verdict.
This further appeal is the appellant’s expression of her disgust against the lower Court’s affirmation of the trial Court’s decision. She framed two issues for the determination of her appeal: issues which were endorsed by the respondent. They were couched thus:
1. Whether Law Officers of the National Agency For the Prohibition of Traffic (sic) in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIT) (sic) are officers in the Department of the Attorney General of the Federation and can sign Charge or Processes initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation for and on behalf of the Attorney General of the Federation?
2. Whether if the lower Court had considered the submission of the appellant’s counsel that the appellant was a victim of the offences she was charged (sic) and first offender, the lower Court would not have come to the conclusion that the learned trial judge has (sic) eminently exercise (sic) his discretion judiciously and judicially thereby reduce (sic) the sentences passed on the appellant?
ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUES
ISSUE ONE
Whether Law Officers of the National Agency For the Prohibition of Traffic (sic) in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIT) (sic) are officers in the Department of the Attorney General of the Federation and can sign Charge or Processes initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation for and on behalf of the Attorney General of the Federation?
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
At the hearing of this appeal on December 15, 2016, E. A Oyebanji, learned counsel for the appellant, adopted the brief filed on August 5, 2014 and the Reply brief filed on March 3, 2015, although deemed, properly filed on June 4, 2015 as representing his arguments in this appeal.
The crux of his arguments was that although by the. provisions of Section 174 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Attorney General’s powers to initiate and undertake criminal proceedings may be exercised by him in person or through the officers of his department, the officers of the Agency under his control and supervision cannot do so, citing Obi v INEC(2007) 7 SC 268, 315.
In his submission therefore, the exercise of that power by the officers of NAPTIP was a gross violation of Section 174 (1) (b) (supra). He contended that the lower Courts were wrong in resorting to Section 4 (c), 60 and 64 of the NAPTIP Act (supra), citing pages 155 -156 of the record because the said Act did not make the Agency a department in the office of the Attorney General. He maintained that Section 174 (2) (supra) provides for “a department of the Attorney General of the Federation” and not “departments of the Attorney General.” As such, NAPTIP, in his submission, does not qualify as a department within the meaning of Section 174 (2) (supra).
…………………….B…………………….
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