Before Our Lordships
Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu - Justice of the Court of Appeal
Balkisu Bello Aliyu - Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ademola Samuel Bola - Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF THE CROSS AND STAR
2. LEADER OLUMBAR OLUMBA OBU - APPELANTS
And
1. GOVERNMENT OF CROSS RIVER STATE
2. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CROSS RIVER STATE
3. CROSS RIVER GARMENT & TEXTILE FACTORY LTD - RESPONDENTS
MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the ruling of the High Court of Cross River State delivered by Hon. Justice F. Nnang Isoni on 2nd July, 2018 upholding the 1st and 2nd defendants' preliminary objection and striking out the suit for want of jurisdiction.
The appellants as claimants before the lower Court took out a writ of summons and statement of claim led on 26th May, 2017 and claimed jointly and severally against the respondents herein as follows:-
"1. As against 1st defendant, a declaration that 1st defendant's entitlement to the property situate at No. 1 Big Quo Street, Calabar (also known as Plots 67 and 68 Old Ikang Layout, Calabar) with certificate of occupancy no CA/560/80 variously registered as No. 35 at Page 35 in Volume 186 and No. 55 at Page 55 in Volume 31 in the Lands Registry, Calabar ("the property") is derived not under powers of acquisition conferred on 1st defendant by any enactment but upon 1st defendant's fulfillment of her obligations in the consent judgment in Suit No: HC/97/2014 founded on terms of settlement between parties therein.
2. As against 1st and 2nd defendants, a declaration that the property situate at Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (or Airport) By-Pass in Atimbo, Calabar Municipality and more particularly described and delineated in Plan No. CR/C.1164 ("the alternative property") was by the agreement between claimants and 1st and 2nd defendants the specific and distinct alternative property and no other granted to claimants by 1st defendant and sanctioned by the consent judgment in Suit No: HC/97/2014 based upon terms of settlement executed by the parties therein.
3. As against 1st and 2nd defendants, a declaration that 1st and 2nd defendants having not honoured both or either obligations voluntarily assumed by them in the consent judgment in Suit No: HC/97/2014 made pursuant to the terms of settlement voluntarily executed by them or having bound thereby by forcefully taking over the alternative property are not entitled to take the bene t of the said consent judgment.
4. As against 1st and 2nd defendants, a declaration that 1st and 2nd defendants having not met, fulfilled or satisfied both or either conditions contained in the consent judgment in Suit No: HC/97/2014 given pursuant to the terms of settlement between the parties in that suit for the legality, constitutionality, validity, propriety and efficacy of the revocation or claimants' right of occupancy in and over the property, the said revocation remains illegal, unconstitutional, improper, ineffective, wrongful and unlawful and the property remains the bona de property of claimants and 1st and 2nd defendants are not entitled to exercise any acts of ownership in and over the property.
5. A declaration that the invasion by defendants between 28/1/2016 and 31/1/2016 of the alternative property granted to claimants by 1st defendant in exchange of the property as part of the terms of settlement in Suit No: HC/97/2014 which terms of settlement was made the consent judgment of the parties in the said suit and thereafter proceeding to erect a garment factory thereon was mala des, presumptuous, malevolent, highhanded, unconscionable, presumptuous and trespassory.
6. A declaration that the actions of defendants in invading and taking over the alternative property and proceeding to build thereon permanent structures for 3rd defendant without giving claimant any other suitable plot notwithstanding claimants letters to 1st and 2nd defendants dated 1/2/2016 and 21/06/2016 were injurious and prejudicial to claimants right to own immoveable property and their said actions amounts to acts of highhanded executive recklessness, blatant and brazen display of impunity and disdain and contempt for the property rights of claimants.
7. Special damages in the sum of N733,000 being monies expended by claimants for purposes connected with the alternative property including but not limited to fees for perimeter survey of the alternative property, uprooting palm trees therefrom and clearing same of shrubs and trees, etc.
8. The sum of N250,000,000 general damages for trespass into the alternative property including the several inconveniences suffered, energy and time expended and unrecorded and unaccountable monies spent in pursuing matters related to the said alternative property.
9. The sum of N500,000,000 exemplary or aggravated damages for the highhanded, presumptuous, vindictive, malevolent, malicious, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional actions of defendants and or their servants or agents.
10. An order of perpetual injunction restraining defendants whether by themselves, servants, agents or privies from entering into No. 1 Big Quo Street, Calabar also known as Plots 67 and 68 Old Ikang Layout, Calabar with certificate of occupancy No. CA/560/80 variously registered as 35/35/186 and 55/55/31 in the Lands Registry, Calabar for any purpose whatsoever, or erecting any structures or carrying out any manner of improvements, works or activities thereon or acting in any manner in relation to the property inconsistent with claimants' possession and ownership thereof or in any way interfering with claimants interest in and over the said property.
Upon being served with the originating processes, the 1st and 2nd defendants (now respondents) led a preliminary objection urging the lower Court to strike out the suit on the following grounds:-
1. This suit constitutes an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court.
2. There are features in the case which prevent this Court from exercising its jurisdiction over this matter.3. This Court is invited to sit as an appellate Court over its own judgment (consent judgment) in Suit No. HC/97/14, and the reliefs sought by the claimants herein are tied to the said consent judgment.
Argument was taken on the said preliminary objection based on written addresses of the respective counsel and in a considered ruling delivered on 2nd July, 2017, learned trial held on pages 156-157 of the record thus:-
"In the light of the foregoing, I hold that proceeding to hear this suit is clearly at invitation to this Court to sit as an appellate Court over its own judgment as the reliefs sought by the claimants are tied to the consent judgment one way or another. This issue is accordingly resolved in favour of the 1st and 2nd defendants. From the resolution of issue 3, it is clear that this Honourable Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter. It would therefore amount to academic exercise for the Court to continue further to resolve issues 1 and 2.
In the final analysis, for reason set out above, the preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd defendants is hereby upheld and this suit is accordingly struck out for want of jurisdiction."
Dissatisfied, appellants approached this Court through a notice of appeal led on 18/7/2018. The notice of appeal contains four (4) grounds of appeal at pages 158 - 160 of the record. From the said notice of appeal, appellants distilled three issues for the determination of this appeal as follows:-
1. Whether the adjudication and determination of the claims in suit no. HC/213/2017 i.e. the present suit required the trial Court to review or sit on appeal over its consent judgment in suit no. HC/97/2014 or to interpret the said consent judgment so as to render the present action incompetent and unmaintainable?
2. Whether having regards to the terms of the said consent judgment and the entire circumstances of this case, appellants' remedy was limited or confined to setting aside the consent judgment by a fresh suit and/or enforcing some of the terms thereof and not initiating the present suit based in part on the said consent judgment thereby divesting the trial Court of jurisdiction to entertain this present suit? 3. Whether the form in which the claims relating to the invasion of the alternative laid given to appellants by 1st respondent (in replacement of that belonging to appellants conditionally given to 1st respondent) were couched or expressed were such as rendered them unmaintainable so that the trial Court was thereby incapacitated to adjudicate and determine them?
The respondents on their part also formulated three issues for the determination of this appeal.
These are:-
1. Whether the trial Court was correct when it held that granting the reliefs sought by the claimants (appellants) will amount to sitting on appeal over the consent judgment as the reliefs sought in the instant case (HC/213/2017) are tied to the consent judgment in suit no. HC/97/2014 one way or another.
2. Whether the trial Court was correct when it stated that it would have been different if the claimant were seeking for setting aside of the consent judgment for any of reasons as listed in the case of AMORI V IYANDA (supra) in that, a fresh action like the instant one would have been the appropriate thing to do.
3. Whether the trial Court was correct when it stated that a separate suit on the alternative plot of land granted the claimants can also be instituted against the defendants but not in the form in which the claims herein are couched and led and that it cannot even be called upon to interpret a consent judgment.
In addition, the respondents relied on the notice of preliminary objection to contend that all the grounds of appeal contained in the notice of appeal are grounds of mixed law and facts wherein prior leave of Court must be sought and obtained. Furthermore, grounds 2, 3, and 4 of the notice of appeal according to the learned counsel for the respondents are not against the ratio but against the obiter of the trial Court.
Upon careful perusal of the record vis-a-viz the respective formulations, the appeal in my view can conveniently be determined on the appellants' issue no.1 which is also similar to the respondents' issue no. 1. I shall in the circumstance determine this appeal on the bases of the appellants' issue no.1.
Proffering argument on issue no.1, learned counsel for the appellants, Dafe Diegbe, Esq., referred copiously to the first four reliefs sought in Suit No. HC/213/2017 and the terms of settlement in the consent judgment in suit no. HC/97/2014 to contend that it is only where the grant of the first four reliefs in suit no. HC/213/2017 or any of them by the trial Court would reverse, annul or derogate from the terms of the consent judgment, can it then be said that their grant would amount to sitting on appeal over consent judgment. He submitted that rather than reverse or nullify any of the terms of consent judgment, the first relief would simply place the consent judgment as far as the acquisition of No. 1 Big Quo Street, Calabar by the 1st and 2nd respondents on a higher pedestal because the first relief was merely seeking for Court's alternative declaration in terms of the consent judgment that the 1st respondent's power to take over the property at No. 1 Big Quo Street, Calabar was circumscribed by the consent judgment alone.
On the second relief, counsel submitted that the grant of a declaration that the alternative plot given to the appellants and forming part of the consent judgment would merely affirm the fact as contained in the consent judgment and not to contradict it. And on the third and fourth reliefs, counsel argued that since the appellants under the consent judgment have accepted the takeover by the 1st respondent of their property at No.1 Big Quo Street, Calabar or the revocation of their right of occupancy of the 1st and 2nd respondents fulfilled the two conditions in the consent judgment, the grant of these reliefs would simply be a judicial re-affirmation of the said conditions as contained in the consent judgment. In aid, counsel referred to DANTATA & ORS V MOHAMMED (2000) FWLR (prt. 21) 889 at 925 and EMEZIE & ORS V LINUS & ANOR (2016) LPELR - 40514 to the effect that none of the reliefs sought would derogate from the terms of settlement and that all the declaratory reliefs sought were intended to declare existing state of affairs or facts as contemplated by the consent judgment.
Learned Attorney-General and commissioner for justice, Mr. Tanko Ashang also relied on both the reliefs sought by the appellants at the lower Court and the consent judgment in contending that there was no way the trial Court could grant the said reliefs without reviewing the content of the consent judgment. He thus submitted that although the trial Court has the inherent jurisdiction to set aside its earlier judgment on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation and or mistake but such features are absent in the earlier consent judgment. He referred to the cases of AMORI V IYANDA also reported in (2008) ALL FWLR (prt. 416) 1864 at 1893, DANA IMPEX LTD V ADEROTOYE (2006)3 NWLR (prt. 966) 78 at 93 - 74 and TALABI V ADESEYE (1972) 8-9 SC 2020 to the effect that consent judgment cannot be unilaterally rescinded or repudiated. Counsel submitted further that a consent judgment cannot be dislodged by implication and that it can only be set aside by fresh action specifically for that purpose.
It is pertinent at this juncture to restate the facts of the case leading to this appeal, albeit brie y. The property known as No.1 Big Quo Street, Calabar was previously owned by Uwa Printers (Nig) Ltd who later assigned its interest to Leader Olumba Olumba Obu in 1995. He in turn leased same to Zenith International Bank. In January, 2002, the Cross River State Government revoked the right of occupancy over the said land. The said revocation was however challenged in Suit No. HC/97/2014 and subsequent of which, parties settled the matter amicably wherein the terms of settlement formed the basis of the consent judgment.
By the consent judgment, appellants accepted as valid the revocation of their right of occupancy upon the 1st and 2nd respondents paying them the sum of N15,000,000 for their unexhausted improvements and also giving them an alternative land. Consequent to the alleged failure on the part of the 1st and 2nd respondents to honour the terms of the consent judgment that the appellants as claimants instituted suit no. HC/213/2017 seeking for declaratory and injunctive reliefs which are reproduced earlier in this judgment.
Before considering the merit of this appeal, it is prudent to first of all consider the preliminary objection raised in this appeal by the 1st and 2nd respondents. A preliminary objection is the procedure adopted where a respondent object to the hearing of an appeal. Its purpose is to terminate the appeal in limine. In the instant case, the 1st and 2nd respondents raised a preliminary objection that all the grounds of appeal are of mixed law and facts and that the prior leave of Court was not sought and obtained and that grounds 2, 3, and 4 are predicated not against the ratio of the judgment but against an obiter.
Arguing the preliminary objection, counsel for the respondents submitted that from the grounds of appeal and the issues distilled therefrom, requires critical analysis and examination of the terms contained in the consent judgment in suit no: HC/97/2014 and appellants' reliefs in suit no: HC/213/2017 which are matters of fact to be ascertained and hence, leave of Court ought to have been sought and obtained.
Continuing, counsel submitted that grounds nos. 1 and 4 as well as the lone issue couched therefrom are clear invitation for the trial Court to sit as an appellate Court over its own judgment and therefore, the leave of either the trial Court or this Court is imperative. He relied on the case ofABUBAKAR V WAZIRI (2008) 35 NSCQR 333 at 336 to submit that where grounds of appeal are of mixed law and facts alone, it is imperative that the leave of Court must first be sought and obtained otherwise the notice of appeal carrying such grounds is incompetent. Furthermore, issues raised from those incompetent grounds of appeal are equally incompetent.
Counsel finally submitted that apart from the fact that grounds nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the notice of appeal are a mixture of law and fact, they are also an attack on obiter rather than on the ratio decidendi and therefore incompetent. He placed reliance on the cases of ABACHA V FAWEHINMI (2000)6 NWLR (prt. 660) 228 at 251, ILOABACHIE V ILOABACHIE (2000)5 NWLR (prt.656) 178 and ERIVO V OBI (1993) 9 NWLR (prt 315) 60.
In response, counsel to the appellants submitted that appeals which are as of right do not require the leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal to be competent. He referred to Section 241 (1) (a) to contend that once the appeal is a final decision of the High Court, sitting at first instance, whether the ground of appeal is of pure facts or mixed law and facts, an aggrieved party is at liberty to appeal as of right.
On the second arm of the objection, counsel submitted that the said grounds challenge the decision of the trial Court for declining jurisdiction to entertain the appellants' suits and that same constitute ratio decidendi and not an obiter dictum.
In further argument, counsel submitted that where parties joined issues on any material point and the Court resolves such point one way or the other, such resolution amounts to an appealable decision under Section 318 (1) of the Constitution. Counsel also referred to DEDUWA & ORS V OKORODUDU & ORS (1976)10 NSCC 499 at 505 and OMISORE & ANOR V AREGBESOLA & ORS (2015) ALL FWLR (prt. 813) 1673 at 1719.
RESOLUTION
A notice of appeal is the originating process in an appeal. Once it is incompetent, it remains so, and the Court no longer has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Thus, the appeal would be struck out for being incompetent. And any process attendant to incompetent notice of appeal including the brief of argument is equally incompetent.
See ADERIBIGBE V ABIDOYE (2009) 10 NWLR (prt. 1150) 592 and ONWUZULIKE V STATE (2020)10 NWLR (prt. 1731) 91 at 104.
The first arm of the respondents' objection relates to the requirement of leave to appeal because the grounds of appeal are of mixed law and facts. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) however creates two rights of appeal namely. (1) the right of an aggrieved party to appeal as of right and (2) the right of appeal with leave. Section 241 (1) (a) of the aforesaid Constitution aforesaid emphatically provides that:-
"241 (1) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases -
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal pleadings before the Federal High Court or a High Court sitting at first instance."
From the notice of appeal, the decision appealed against finally disposed the right of the parties and hence a final decision within the contemplation of Section 241 (1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. As rightly posited by the learned counsel for the appellants that once the appeal is against a final decision to the High Court, sitting at first instance, appeal is as of right irrespective of the nature of the grounds of appeal.
As regards the second arm of the objection, the main contention is whether grounds nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the notice of appeal constitutes a challenge to the ratio of the decision. The ratio decidendi of a case is the principle or rule of law upon which a Court's decision is founded.
It is thus the reason for the decision or the reasons, principle, or ground upon which a case is decided. An obiter dicta or obiter dictum on the other hand means something said in passing a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion but one that does not embody the decision of the Court. See OLEKSANDR V LONESTAR DRILLING COMPANY LTD (2015)9 NWLR (prt. 1464) 337, AWOKUNLE V NEPA (2007) LPELR - 8766 (CA) and ANYANWU v. PDP (2020) 3 NWLR (prt. 1710) 134 at 160. To ascertain whether or not grounds nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the notice of appeal constitutes a challenge to the ratio of the decision of the lower Court, the said grounds are reproduced hereunder as follows:-
GROUND 2
The learned trial judge erred in law in holding as follows:
"…It would have been different if the claimants were seeking for a setting aside of the consent judgment for any of the reasons as listed out in the case of AMORI V IYANDA (Supra). In that case, a fresh action like the instant one would have been the appropriate thing to do while the sum of N15,000,000 (Fifteen Million Naira) granted the claimants in the consent judgment can be enforced by means of all the execution processes provided for the enforcement of judgments ……
The reliefs sought by the claimant in this suit are without doubt so closely tied to the consent judgment that it will practically be impossible to enter judgment in this suit without touching the consent judgment…" thereby arriving at a wholly wrong verdict, whereas:
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1. Appellants' remedies in the light of the invasion of the alternative land granted to them after they had expended monies on same went beyond the reliefs provided by the consent judgment of 23/9/2014;
2. A consent judgment based on terms of settlement creates a new agreement and where the "…terms of such agreement… are breached or not complied with,the injured or aggrieved party must seek his remedy based on the agreement. In other words, his cause of action is founded on that agreement…" vide Abe y & Ors v Alex & Ors (1999) 12 SC (Pt. II) 71 at 78; Woluchem v Wokoma (1974) NSCC 151 at 189;
3. A consent judgment constitutes a fresh contract between parties and a cause of action can therefore be founded on such consent judgment in certain circumstances such as those in the instant case. See Race Auto Supply Compan y Ltd & Ors v Akib (2006) All FWLR (pt. 327) 486 at 511C.
4. Actions which can be taken on a consent judgment are not limited to merely taking steps to set aside such consent judgment (especially where no grounds to do so exist), but such actions include bringing a fresh action on the consent judgment.
5. It is settled that a party (such as 1st respondent) entitled to a conditional judgment cannot be compelled to perform the conditions, his only penalty being the loss of the bene t of the judgment. See Talbot v Blindedll (1908)2 KB 14.
6. The fact that the reliefs sought in the present suit were so closely tied to the consent judgment did not render them bad in so far as they were not re-litigating matters already dealt with by the suit leading to the consent judgment.
7. The claims in the present suit were unrelated with matters dealt with in Suit No: HC/97/2014 giving rise to the consent judgment in that suit.
GROUND 3
The learned trial judge erred in law in holding as follows:-
"…A separate suit on the alternate plot of land granted the claimants can also be instituted against the defendants but certainly not in the form in which the claims herein are couched…" thereby arriving at a wholly perverse conclusion, when:
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1. The learned trial judge did not point out the defect or error "… in the form in which the claims…" in the present suit were couched.
2. Order 17 Rule 14 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules does not permit the objections raised by the learned trial judge against the claims of claimant.
3. Respondents did not raise any objections to the form of the said claims, and the trial Court suo motu raised same in breach of the principles of fair hearing.
4. Reliefs 5 - 9 of the particulars of claim in the present suit dealt with the takeover of the alternative land by respondents.
5. The said claims 5 - 9 were declaratory and monetary in form and capable of sustaining the suit irrespective of other claims.
6. The claims were clear and were properly commenced by writ of summons.
7. The claims raised distinct causes of actions arising from the invasion of the alternative land by 1st defendant.
8. The learned trial judge did not state how the claims as couched made them defective or the form they were led which rendered them incompetent.
9. Order 17 Rule 17 (3) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules allows appellants to initiate action in which only declarations of rights are sought.
GROUND 4
The learned trial judge erred in law in holding as follows:
"…It is pertinent to state here that this honourable Court cannot even be called upon to interpret a consent judgment…" PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1. The learned trial judge thus held in the alternative that appellants present suit called for the interpretation of the consent judgment in the previous suit.
2. Appellants did not commence the present suit by originating summons and none of appellants' claims in the present suit required the Court to interpret the consent judgment.
3. The consent judgment was clear and unambiguous, and required respondents to perform two conditions before they could validly take over appellants' land at No. 1 Big Quo Street, Calabar.
4. Where the question is the effect or legal consequences of a document including a judgment, it is a misconception to approach such question as one of interpretation. See Bi yo v Aku (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 422)1 at 38 E - F.
5. Respondents acknowledged the two conditions to be fulfilled by them and insist they fulfilled one but not the other.
6. The reliefs touching the consent judgment raised the question whether without fulfilling the two conditions respondents could take the bene t of the consent judgment.
7. The resolution of those questions did not require any interpretation of the consent judgment."
The above no doubt formed the nucleus of the decision being appealed against as same formed the basis upon which the lower Court upheld the preliminary objection and declined jurisdiction. It is not a mere passing comment which has no affirmity to the issue submitted for adjudication. Therefore, grounds nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the appellant' notice of appeal contains the reasons for the lower Court's decision and hence the ratio decidendi of the case.
On the whole, the respondents' preliminary objection is devoid of any merit and it is hereby overruled.
Having overruled the preliminary objection, I will proceed to determine the merit of the substantive appeal. The bone of contention relates to the consequence of granting the appellants' reliefs in suit no: HC/213/2017 on the consent judgment as embodied in suit no HC/97/2014.
I have earlier reproduced the reliefs sought by the appellants in suit no HC/213/2017 and the essence of which was to give effect to the consent judgment hitherto entered by the parties, particularly the appellants and the 1st and 2nd respondents herein. A consent judgment or order is said to have at least two broad meanings. In the first sense, it occurs when parties in litigation agree to strike a compromise which they embodied in the agreement signed by them or their counsel which they led in the registry and is subsequently made an order of Court. In the second sense is, where a party submits himself because he cannot resist it mainly due to the fact that he has nothing to offer against it. SeeFESTUS V AFRICAN ACTION CONGRESS (AAC) (2020) 4 NWLR (prt. 1714) 276 at 296 - 297.
In order to have a consent judgment therefore, the parties must reach a complete and final agreement on the vital issue in their terms of settlement. They must be ad idem as far as the terms of their compromise agreement are concerned and their consent must be free and voluntary. The consent judgment emerges the moment the Court on the application of the parties enters such compromise agreement as a judgment of the Court. As Lindley, L. J. put it in HUDDERSFIELD BANKING COMPANY LTD V HENRY LISTER & SONS LTD (1895-99) ALL EXR. 868 at 871:
"A consent order, I agree is an order and so long as it stands, it must be treated as such, and so long as it stands I think it is good an estoppel as any other order. But that a consent order can be impeached not only on the ground of fraud but upon any grounds which invalidate the agreement it expresses in more formal way than usual, I also have not the slightest doubt."
It is instructive to stress here that the appellants were not seeking for an order to invalidate and/or impeach the consent judgment on grounds of fraud, mistake, misconception or by any other vice which would afford a ground for setting aside the compromise agreement on which the order was made. Indeed, they were not as well seeking to set aside the consent judgment but rather sought to affirm the facts as contained in the consent judgment. In other words, they sought to reinforce the terms of the consent judgment through the instrumentality of suit no. HC/213/2017.
Parties in the present case were ad idem as regard the terms of their compromise agreement and it cannot also be disputed that their consent was free and voluntary. The consent judgment being a judgment of Court of competent jurisdiction remains valid and binding even where the person affected by it believes that it is void until it is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The procedure for setting it aside is simple. The party affected must appeal against the judgment. SeeBABATUNDE V OLATUNJI (2000) 2 SC 9 at 16.
The pertinent question here is whether the lower Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the reliefs sought in suit no: HC/213/2017? I have critically examined the reliefs vis-a-viz the terms of the consent judgment and I am of the view that granting the said reliefs will undoubtedly have the effect of interpreting the consent judgment. The trial judges of the same Court must stand shoulder to shoulder by complementing each other in their adjudicatory duties and not to re-open or review earlier decision of their learned brothers.
Furthermore, a consent judgment being a final judgment means that a Court cannot sit as an appellate Court over its own decision. Once the Court decided a matter, it ceases to be seised of it and cannot reopen it for any purpose whatsoever, save for the correction of clerical mistake only. The appellants can only apply for setting aside the consent judgment when same is vitiated by fraud, mistake, misconception or by any other vice but not to seek for reaffirmation of it. In the instant case, the learned trial judge was right to have declined jurisdiction.
In conclusion, I find no substance in this appeal and same is hereby dismissed. I therefore affirm the decision of the lower Court delivered on 2nd July, 2018 and struck out suit no HC/213/2017 for want of jurisdiction.
Parties shall bear their respective costs.
BALKISU BELLO ALIYU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu, JCA. I agree with him that the preliminary objection is devoid of any merit and I dismiss it.
With respect to the main appeal, I adopt the reasoning and conclusion reached in the lead judgment to also dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
I affirm the ruling of the High Court of Cross River State delivered on the 2nd July, 2018 in respect of suit no. HC/213/2017.
ADEMOLA SAMUEL BOLA, J.C.A.: I have read through the draft of the judgment delivered by noble Lord, MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, JCA. His reasons are lucid and convincing.
I adopt them as mine.
I abide by the conclusion and the consequential orders made.
Appearances:
Dafe Diegbe, Esq. - For Appellant
O. E. Asuquo, Asst. Dir. Civil Litigation, MOJ, CRS - For Respondent