I must remind counsel that the main purpose for address is simply to assist the Court.Cases are decided not on address or alluring closing speeches but on credible evidence. So no amount of brilliant address can make up for lack of evidence to resolve any issue before the Court. See Niger Construction Ltd v. Okugbemi (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) p. 787;
N.E.W. Ltd v. Denap Ltd (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 525) p. 481 Okuleye v Adesanya (2014) 6-7 SC (Pt. 1) p.1.
Now, it is undeniable that Section 294 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria consecrates the right to final addresses. Sodipo v Lemminkainen Oy [1985] 2 NWLR (pt 8) 547; Mustapha v Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (pt 58) 539; Ijebu Ode v. Balogun and Company Ltd. (1991) LPELR 1463 (SC) 31-32; F-A; Okeke v State (2003) LPELR – 2436 (SC) 19-20; F-A.
The said expression "final addresses" means the last or ultimate speech or submission made to the Court in respect of the matter before it, before the delivery of the judgment. Put simply, it is the last address before the delivery of the judgment. Sodipo v Leminkainen Oy (supra); Mustapha v Governor of Lagos State (supra); Ijebu Ode v Balogun and Company Ltd (supra); Okeke v State (supra). It [final address] is the penultimate part of the three most important portions of the trial period; the first, being the hearing of the evidence; while the last is the judgment, Okeke v State (2003) LPELR -2436 (SC) 19 -20; F-A.
Such is its pedestal in the administration of justice that when counsel or a party is denied this right [that is, of address], the trial Court is equally deprived of its enormous benefits. Its inevitable consequence is that a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Okafor and Ors v A.G., Anambra and Ors (1991) LPELR-2414 (SC) 28; A-C; Obodo v. Olomu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 111; Adigun v A-G of Oyo State (supra). This explains why a party must have the same right as given to his adversary to offer, by his counsel, the final address on the law in support of his case. Ndukauba v Kolomo and Anor (2005) LPELR -1976 (SC) 12; A-D.
It is trite law that cases are tried on credible evidence adduced by the parties not on addresses of Counsel. See NKORO V. AZURU (Supra). I have carefully perused the Records of Appeal and found that the Appellant (Plaintiff) in his amended writ of summons at the lower Court sued Hon. Shu’aibu Audu, Bilfa Nig. Ltd and Saico Commercial & Const. Co. Ltd and the subject matter is contract of sale and defamation of character of the Plaintiff. See pages 85 and 86 of record of Appeal. This clearly shows that the lower Court has jurisdiction over the matter.
The only thing is that the Respondents’ Counsel in his final written address filed at the lower Court omitted to include the name of Saico Commercial & Const. CO. Ltd as the 3rd Respondent even though the names of the 1st and 2nd Respondents are clearly written. The learned trial Judge realised the mistake and in its judgment at page 172 of the record of appeal held as follows:- “I wish to state that the mistakes therein e.g wrong heading, omission of name of parties does not render a document incompetent as amended will suffice. See the case of SETRACO (NIG.) LTD V.
JOSEPH KPAJI (2017) 1 SCNJ Page 169. The error does not affect the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to hear and make pronouncement. I hold that the omission of the name of the 3rd Defendant can be made even viva-voce and also this Court has the power to amend to reflect the parties. Accordingly, the name of the 3rd Defendant omitted on the Defendant is ordered to be reflected on the Defendant’s written address that is Saico Commercial & Const. Ltd. ….” PER ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.
In law, the failure of the 1st Respondent to make any counter submission to the challenge to the competence of the 1st Respondent’s Suit before the lower Court simply amounts, in my view, to a concession by the 1st Respondent that it is indeed true that his Suit before the lower Court was incompetent as urged upon us by the Appellant.
This is so because in law, where one party is duly served with the arguments of the other party and he fails or neglects or refuses to respond to the said arguments as proffered by the other party, it would be taken that he has conceded to the arguments of the other party. See Dr. Arthur Nwankwo & Ors V.
Alhaji Uniaru Yar’Adua & Ors (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518, where the Supreme Court per Onnoghen JSC, (as he then was but later CJN) had held inter alia thus: “It is settled law that where an opponent fails or neglects to counter any argument or issue validly raised in the brief of argument or during oral presentation, the issue is not so contested and is deemed conceded by the defaulting party.” See Elephant Group Plc V. National Security Adviser & Anor (2018) LPELR-45528(CA) AT pp. 99 – 102, per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Ahmed V. Ahmed (2013) 41 WRN 1, Dairo V.
Aderinoye (2013) 50 WRN 111. Be that as it may, I am aware that in law where an issue raised by one party is not countered by the other party, it does not automatically follow that such arguments, though conceded, are to be taken hook, line and sinker by the Court. Thus, the failure of one party to counter the arguments of the other party alone does not ipso facto, and without more, confer merit on the arguments of the party as the Court is still under a duty to consider the arguments on their own merit. See Adah V. NYSC (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639. See also Elephant Group Plc V.
National Security Adviser & Anor (2018) LPELR-45528(CA) AT pp. 99 -102, per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Tanko V. UBA Plc. (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 80, Obiuweubi V. CBN (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 80, Stowe V. Benstowe (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 450, Elelu Habeeb V. AG. Fed. (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423, Agi V. Access Bank Plc (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1411) 121.
It is therefore, only in deference to the above position of the law and the overriding need to do substantial justice that I intend to proceed to consider and resolve the challenge to the competence of the 1st Respondent’s Suit as canvassed under issue one for determination in the Appellant’s brief. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.
In a nutshell and without much ado, the submissions of learned senior Counsel is not supported by the Appellant’s pleadings or evidence. Thus, Address of Counsel, no matter how eloquent and sound it might be, cannot take the place of pleaded facts and evidence. In the case of NEKA B.B.B. MANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD V.
AFRICAN CONTINENTAL BANK, (2004) LPELR 1982, the Supreme Court per PATS-ACHOLONU, JSC (of blessed memory) held as follows: “It cannot be overemphasized that neither the pleadings nor the most forensic eloquence of any brilliant lawyer can be a substitute for evidence that was given. Evidence whether oral or documentary consists of facts, and facts are the fountain head of law.” PER SENCHI, J.C.A.
For the trial Court to lighten the importance of the presence of the accused person (the Respondent) throughout his trial including address stage is lamentable and must be discouraged. “The addresses, I hold, are not directed at the Court alone. The purport of the address by a party is to let the Court and his adversary know what his summing up is on the facts and the law as revealed by the evidence before the Court.
Therefore it is a wrong supposition for a trial Court to believe that an address at the close of a party’s case is meant for it alone; the other side, throughout the trial of a case must not be blinded from what his adversary relies upon”. See Per SALIHU MODIBBO ALFA BELGORE, JSC in FORCABOS OVO OBODO V. STAFFORD OLOMU & ANOR (1987) LPELR-2189 (SC) (P.12, PARAS. B-D). PER AJI, J.S.C.