Being joint tortfeasors, the person injured is at liberty to sue any one of them separately or may sue both jointly, their liability being joint and several.
IFEANYICHUKWU (OSONDU) CO LTD v. SOLEH BONEH (NIGERIA) LTD LGC(10/3/2000) F
The law regards both master and servant as joint tortfeasors
IFEANYICHUKWU (OSONDU) CO LTD v. SOLEH BONEH (NIGERIA) LTD LGC(10/3/2000) F
The next point I need make is that the master is answerable for every wrong of the servant as is committed in the course of his employment.
IFEANYICHUKWU (OSONDU) CO LTD v. SOLEH BONEH (NIGERIA) LTD LGC(10/3/2000) F
In summary, to succeed against a master the plaintiff must:-
1. establish the liability of the wrongdoer, and prove:-
2. that the wrongdoer is a servant of the master and
3. that the wrongdoer acted in the course of his employment with the master.
IFEANYICHUKWU (OSONDU) CO LTD v. SOLEH BONEH (NIGERIA) LTD LGC(10/3/2000) E
The general principle of law which has its roots in the earliest years of the common law is that a master is liable for any wrong even if it is a criminal offence or a tortious act committed by his servant while acting in the course of his employment.
IFEANYICHUKWU (OSONDU) CO LTD v. SOLEH BONEH (NIGERIA) LTD LGC(10/3/2000) D
Where a company is said to have done an act, by the very fact of a company not being a human being, it can only do the act through its human agents or servants. Where the said agent or servant has committed an act the company may rightly be said to have committed the act since in law, by the principle of vicarious responsibility, the act of the agent or servant is the act of the company. The evidence by which the act is to be proved against the company will be the conduct of the agent or servant.
JAMES V. MID-MOTORS NIGERIA CO. LTD LGC(17/11/1978) N
Where a company is said to have done an act, by the very fact of a company not being a human being, it can only do the act through its human agents or servants. Where the said agent or servant has committed an act the company may rightly be said to have committed the act since in law, by the principle of vicarious responsibility, the act of the agent or servant is the act of the company. The evidence by which the act is to be proved against the company will be the conduct of the agent or servant.
JAMES V. MID-MOTORS NIGERIA CO. LTD LGC(17/11/1978) N
We think it is necessary in this connection to explain the term agency. That term has "in popular use a number of different meanings, but in law the word agency is used to connote the relation which exists where one person has an authority or capacity to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal and third parties"; and the relation (i.e. of agency) also arises "whenever one person called, the agent has authority to act on behalf of another called the principal and consents (expressly or by implication)
JAMES V. MID-MOTORS NIGERIA CO. LTD LGC(17/11/1978) M
In the case of ENE & ORS. V. BASSEY & ORS (2014) LPELR–23524 (CA), this Court held that: “The trial Judge failed to advert his mind to the fact that the 1st Respondent was offered bail and that he could not find a suitable surety to take him on bail. There is no agency relationship between a private citizen and a police officer in the performance of his police duties, under Section 4 of the Police Act or any other enabling law to the same effect.” See Ezeadukwa v. Maduka (supra).
The Police are statutorily empowered by Section 35(c) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and Section 24 of the Police Act to arrest and detain persons upon reasonable suspicion let alone upon receipt of a criminal complaint made officially as in the instant case.
Until and unless a substantial surety for the bail of the applicant or detainee is provided as per Section 27 of the Police Act, there exist no breach of fundamental right of the applicants or detainee.., In this case, since the respondents offered bail to the applicants on April 10th, 1994, then their continued detention after that date cannot be said to be unlawful.” Per NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A (Pp. 26-27 paras. A) (Underlining mine for emphasis).
My Lords, CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, JCA (as he then was) and ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, JCA, concurred with the position taken by NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A in ENE & ORS. V. BASSEY & ORS (supra). This Court shared similar views in the case of EFCC & ORS V.
CHUKWURAH (2018) LPELR–43972 (CA) wherein my learned brother, OWOADE, JCA, held that: “It seems to me that the learned Counsel for the Appellants was right in relation to Issue Three that the Appellants could not have been held to violate the Respondent’s right to liberty, when the Respondent was in fact granted administrative bail by the Appellants 1st December, 2015 when he was first invited by the Appellants but failed to meet the bail conditions until 3rd day of December, 2015.” PER UMAR, JCA.
In law, ‘agency’ is a comprehensive word that is used to describe the relationship that arises where one person called the agent is appointed or authorized either expressly or impliedly to act as the representative of another person, called the principal. Such authorized acts that an agent may do on behalf of the principal may include entering into a contract with a third party for and on behalf of the principal.
In this regard, the agent creates a privity of contract between the principal and a third party that is enforceable against the principal (by the third party) so long as the contract was entered in the exercise of the authority of the agent.
An agency relationship can be created or formed mainly in five ways, namely, (1) by express appointment, (2) by virtue of doctrine of estoppel, (3) by the subsequent ratification by the principal of a contract made on his behalf without authorization from him, (4) by implication of law where it is urgently necessary that one man should act on behalf of another and (5) by presumption of law in the case of co-habitation. See MABEL AYANKOYA & ORS. VS. OLUKOYA & ANOR. (1996) 4 NWLR (PT. 440) 1 at 27 and IRONBAR VS. C. R. B. R. D. A (2004) 2 NWLR (PT. 857) 411 at 431-431. PER ALIYU, J.C.A.
The claim of denial of fair hearing does not arise; the Appellant appears to be clutching at straws. The judgment is against the Appellant and Appellant alone; the Appellant is responsible for whatever is done in its name by its agents. It is settled principle of law that an agent acting on behalf of a disclosed and known principal, as in the instant appeal, is not liable for his acts of agency. Only the principal should be liable. The act of an agent, for a particular purpose, is the act of the principal.
In law, it is the principal that did what the agent did or omitted to do; SEE VASSILE VS. PASS INDUSTRIES LTD. (2000) 12 NWLR (PT. 681) 347 AT 357; LEVENTIS TECH. LTD. VS. PETROJESSICA ENT. LTD. (1992) 2 NWLR (PT. 224) 459 AND QUA STEEL PRODUCTS LTD. VS. BASSEY (1992) 5 NWLR (PT. 230) 67; AND ALSO UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR VS. EPHRAIM (1993) 1 NWLR (PT. 271) 551; OYENUGA VS. I.C.L. LTD. (1991) 1 N.W.L.R. (PT. 168) 415 AND OLUFOSOYE VS. FAKOREDE (1993) 1 NWLR (PT. 272). PER MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON WHETHER OR NOT A COMPANY IS A JURISTIC PERSON On the issue of jurisdiction, especially in regard to whether the failure to add the word ‘limited’ to the name of the appellant robs the tribunal of jurisdiction, it is important to state from the onset that, generally speaking, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff being a corporation or a defendant for that matter to establish its juristic personality by merely stating its name with the addition of “Ltd. or “Plc.”.
That status, whether a company is a juristic person or not has to be proved, except of course where it is admitted by the opposing party, as in this case; admission, for the avoidance of doubt could be express or implied. This is not to suggest by any means that jurisdiction can be conferred by concession; SEE BANK OF BARODA V IYALABANI CO LTD (2002) LPELR- 743-SC. Juristic personality is a well established principle of law, a ‘person’ has it or doesn’t.
The mere fact that the words ‘Public Liability Company (PLC)’ or ‘Limited liability (LTD)’ were not added to the name per se, will not diminish its status as a Public Liability Company or a limited liability company, and as a juristic Personality; see ADEJOBI & ANR V STATE (2011) LPELR-97-SC. In a similar situation to the one at hand, the Supreme Court held in WAHAB ADEJOBI V.
THE STATE (2011) LPELR-97 (SC) that the fact that ‘PLC was not added to Trans International Bank on the charge sheet was immaterial as it does not diminish its status as a Public Liability Company and as a juristic person. The name used in all the processes in this suit, by both parties is Lead securities and investment; the fact that all the processes served on the Appellant bore the same name right from the beginning of this case indicates that a business or a contractual, relationship existed between the 1st Respondent and the Appellant; Exhibit B4 and C1-13 attest to that.
The fact that the word “Ltd” was omitted in the name of the Appellant is not prejudicial to it, as long as the company is registered and incorporated according to law. In ADEJOBI & ANOR v. THE STATE (2011) LPELR 97, SC. It was held to the effect that the mere fact that the words “PLC” were not added to the name on the charge sheet would not diminish its status as a public liability company and as a juristic personality. PER MUSTAPHA, J.C.A.