In the case at hand, Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) pursuant to which the plaintiff sues provides:- 232.(1) The Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other Court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute between the Federation and a State or between States if and in so far as that dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. In interpreting the foregoing, this Court in many of its decisions has specified the criteria that brings a plaintiff's claim within the purview of its original jurisdiction as constitutionally conferred. The emphasis in these decisions is that the dispute in respect of which the Court exercises its original jurisdiction must be one between the Federation and the State rather than one between the governments of both, States inter-se or their agencies. In AG, Lagos State v. AG Federation (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217 at 260-261, the Court held thus:- Plaintiff's grouse as captured inter-alia in the foregoing paragraphs is about a dispute between the Federal Government and the Government of the State rather than between the Federation and the various States. It is also a dispute pertaining to the operation of an agency of the Federal, Federal inland Revenue Service (FIRS) vis-a-vis an agency of the plaintiff. I do not have the slightest doubt that any dispute on all or any of these comes squarely within the purview of the jurisdiction the makers of the Constitution specifically provided the Federal High Court under Section 251(a)(b) and (q) of the Constitution which provision tampers and conditions the original jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 232(1) of the same Constitution. The plaintiff whose claim clearly relates to the revenue of the government of the Federation, consequent upon the taxes one of its agencies levies is at the wrong Court. This Court must decline jurisdiction. I so hold. See also AG, Kano State v. AG...
By virtue of Section 233(2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, an appellant can appeal as of right from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court where the ground of appeal is a ground of law alone in respect of decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeal. By virtue of Section 233(3) of the 1999 Constitution, on the other hand, an appeal to this Court on facts alone or on mixed law and facts can only be by leave of this Court or the Court below. See: KTP Ltd. Vs G & H (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 680; Maigoro Vs Garba (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 624) 555 @ 568; CBN Vs Okojie(2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 768) 48; Abubakar Vs Dankwambo (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 213 @ 234-235.
The age long principle of law, is that in criminal cases an accused person is constitutionally presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. The onus of proof in criminal cases does not shift as the burden throughout lies on the prosecution in criminal trial which must prove the guilt of the accused. See Bello v State (2007) 10 NWLR (pt.1043)364;Igabele v State (2006) 6 NWLR (pt. 975)100.
However, any doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favour of the accused person
On the part of this Court, Section 118(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, in my view makes the grant of bail to an accused person standing trial before a High Court, purely a discretionary matter in the hands of the trial judge. The trite position of the law is that in exercising the jurisdiction given to him by the law in the grant or refusal of bail, the trial judge is bound to consider the weight of facts pleaded to, in an affidavit evidence placed before him. The determination of the criteria is quite important because the liberty of the appellant stands or falls by the decision of the Court. In performing the judicial function, the Court wields a very extensive discretionary power, which must be exercised judicially and judiciously.
See BAMAIYI VS THE STATE (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 270 EKWENUGO vs F.R.N. (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 171 DANTATA VS POLICE (1958) NRNLR 3.
It is pertinent to state and emphasize that the jurisdiction of this Court is limited and circumscribed by the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Hence, the instant appeal as rightly submitted by the objectors, is unconstitutional and amounts to a gross abuse of Court process. It is not open to the Court to act without jurisdiction and in futility. Without mincing words, it should be emphasized in strong terms that neither the Court below nor this Court has jurisdiction to sit on appeal over the final decision of the Court of Appeal in respect of appeals arising from the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Petitions, as sought by the appellants' counsel in the instant appeal. Plethora of decisions of this Court are trite and have shown times without number that Section 246(3) of the Constitution 1999 confers finality of the lower Court in cases of this nature. The section reproduced hereunder:- "246.... (3) The decisions of the Court of Appeal in respect of appeals arising from the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Petitions shall be final." The preliminary objection in this matter is therefore very well taken. It is unfortunate I must say that despite the clear and unambiguous provision of the law, counsel have failed consistently to be guided therewith and rather seek their way around the provision. This to my mind is not only deliberate but also a surreptitious move to break in through a back wall into a building which does not entitle any entrance whatsoever. The Court of Appeal is specially designated as the lost port of call in cases of this nature. There can be no act of wisdom or ingenuity that can change this position without amending the Constitution. Counsel are to blame for the consistent refusal to adhere to what is well within their knowledge and should desist from ill-advising their clients by giving then a false hope. ABUBAKAR & ANOR V. USMAN & ORS: LGC(...
The objection is anchored on whether or not Section 246(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) applied to the effect that the determination at the Court of Appeal was with finality, the implication being that there cannot be a revisit to the matter by the Supreme Court on appeal, since it is a matter that has arisen from the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Petition. This Court in the case of Danoana v Usman (2013) 6 NWLR (pt.1349) 50 faced with a similar question had held thus per Adekeye JSC:- "It is apparent that the provisions of the 1999 Constitution as amended do not envisage an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal in National Assembly Election Petitions based on whether anybody has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly. The Court of Appeal shall be the final Court by virtue of Section 246(3) of 1999 Constitution. The provision of Section 246(3) affirms previous decisions of this Court." This Court had relied on the earlier decision in Onuaguluchi v Ndu (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 309 at 321 wherein it was held thus Per Uwaifo JSC, viz:- "The Court of Appeal throughout acted within its mandate of deciding an appeal arising from an election petition under Decree 5 of 1999. Whether it did so perfectly, rightly or was wrong in the decision, it arrived at cannot be taken on appeal to this Court for consideration. The reason for this can be founded on the provisions of Section 81(1) and (3) of Decree 5 of 1999." Adekeye JSC in the said Dangana v. Usman (supra) still utilizing in aid Onuaguluchi v Ndu stated further thus:- "Where an appeal is actually in respect of National Assembly election or other relevant election, whether error of a procedural nature or of a procedural vice as to jurisdiction or competence, cannot be corrected by this Court. They can only be corrected by the Court of Appeal itself or else they will remain uncorrected, unresolved as this Court cannot intervene since...
The stark position is as this Court put in Okadigbo v. Emeka and Ors (2012) LPELR-7839 (SC) that:
"The lower Court is the final Court in the appeals arising from the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Petition Tribunal. Therefore, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain such appeals vis-a-vis election petitions from the lower Court. It is the final Court in such matters whether rightly or wrongly decided."
[pages 15-16; D-A; italics supplied for emphasis)
To underscore the futility of the attempt in this appeal, I am constrained to set out the consistent views of this Court in previous decisions. In Madumere and Anor v. Okwara and Anor (2013) LPELR -20752 (SC) at 13 -14; E -C, the Court, pointed out that:
"The provisions of Section 246 (3) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended is (sic) very clear and unambiguous. It (sic) enacts as follows: '3. The decisions of the Court of Appeal in respect of appeal arising from the National and State Houses of Assembly Election petitions shall be final'. By numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, the above provision and similar ones to the like effect have been interpreted to mean that no further appeal can be filed against the decision of the Court of Appeal in appeals on National and State Houses of Assembly Election Petitions. See the case of Esewe v. Gbe [1988] 5 NWLR (pt. 93) 134 at 136-137; Onuagnwchi (Sic) v. Ndu [2001] 7 NWLR (pt. 712) 309 at 321; Dingyadi v. INEC (No.1) [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 1 at 98- 99; Ugwa v. Lekwauwa [2010] 19 NWLR (pt. 1226) 26 at 47 – 48; Sha'Aban v. Sambo [2010] 19 NWLR (pt. 1226) 353 at 360-361, etc."
[per Onnoghen, JSC, (as he then was); italics for emphasis]
In the same vein, M. D. Muhammad, JSC declared that:
"By the clear and unambiguous words of the provision of Section 246 (3) which makes the Court below the last port for any relief and its decision final as it were, there cannot be a further appeal against the lower Court's decision. This Court has stated this much in very many decisions and there is no feature in the present case which makes departure from that position legally permissible. See; Onuaguluchi v. Ndu [2001] 7 NWLR (part 712) 309 at 327; Dingyadi v. INEC (No.1) [2010] 18 NWLR (part 1224) 1 at 98 – 99; Ugwa v. Lekwauwa (2010) 19 NWLR (part 1226) 26 at 47 and Sha'aban v. Sambo [2010] 19 NWLR (part 1226) 353 at 360 – 361
".... Looking closely at the wording of Section 246 (3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended)... it is clear ...that the decision of the Court of Appeal is final. The decision therefore has no business climbing or driving to this Court for adjudication because this Court is certainly bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine any such appeal from the lower Court. This Court had also in numerous of its decided authority (sic) decided (sic) that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain and determine this and similar appeals..."
[per Sanusi, JSC, page 27 of the unreported judgment; italics supplied for emphasis]. On the same day, this Court maintained the same position in SC. 187/2016 – Okocha Samuel Osi v Accord and Ors and SC. 120/2016 – Hon Barambu Umaru and Anor v PDP and Ors.
Now, Section 246 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) confers finality on the judgments of the Court of Appeal in respect of appeals arising from election petitions in the above trenchant phraseology. Interestingly, this Court has dealt with the meaning and breadth this section on numerous occasions. Only a handful of these decisions would be cited in this judgment. Opara and Anor v Amadi [2013] 6- 7 SC (pt 2) 49; Madumere v Okwara[20l3] 6-7 SC (pt 2) 95; Okadigbo v Emeka and Ors (2012) LPELR -7839 (SC) 17; Emordi v Igbeke (2011) 4 SC (pt 11) 107, 145; Salik v Idris [2014] 15 NWLR (pt 1429) 36; Dangana v Usman (2012) LPELR-7827 (SC); Onuaguluchi v Ndu and Ors [2001] 7 NWLR (pt 712) 309; (2001) LPELR -2699 (SC); Salik v Idris [20I4] 15 NWLR (pt 1429) 36,60; Jegede v Akande (2014) 16 NWLR (pt 1432) 43, 72. Instructively, in Dangana and Anor v Usman and Ors (2012) LPELR-25012 (SC) where the first respondent in this appeal was also the first respondent, this Court dealt with this question. For their bearing on the self-same issue, I would take the liberty to set out this Court's view in extenso. Listen to this: "It is apparent that the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) do not envisage an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal in National Assembly Election Petitions based on whether anybody has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly. The Court of Appeal shall be the final Court by virtue of Section 246 (3) of the 1999 Constitution. The provision of Section 246 (3) affirms the previous decisions of this Court. In the case Onuaguluchi v. Ndu[2001] 7 NWLR (pt. 712) 309, this Court held at pages 321-322 Paragraphs H-D: 'Where an appeal is actively in respect of National Assembly election or other relevant election, whatever efforts of a procedural nature or of a procedural vice as to jurisdiction or competency, cannot be corrected by this Court. They can only be...
It is settled law, that the proof of service of processes on all parties to the suit before the Court is the factor which confers jurisdiction of the Court on the parties. In the absence of proof of service, the Court acts in vain, and the proceedings a nullity.
However, Section 36(2) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 provided that an opportunity should be provided for a person whose rights and obligation may be affected to make Representation to the administration of authority before that authority makes decision affecting that person.
This is because the Notice of Appeal is the substratum of the appeal. It is the foundation upon which every other process or proceeding in the appeal rests. Being an originating process, it is a fundamental requirement not only of the Rules of this Court but also of the constitutional right of fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that all parties to the appeal be duly served therewith. It is only when a party has notice of proceedings that he is in a position to read thereto and place his own side of the case before the Court. In an appeal, service of the notice of appeal on the respondent provides him with an opportunity to participate in the compilation of records and to file a cross-appeal, if necessary. On the mandatoriness of personal service of the Notice of Appeal, see Order 2 Rule 3 (1) (b) of the Rules of this Court.
Failure to serve an originating process on a party to the proceedings is a fundamental defect which goes to the root of the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate.
However, in JOV V. DOM (1999) NWLR (pt.620) 538 at 541, this Court held that a question of law and jurisdiction can be raised at any time in the proceedings, but it is not on a free for all procedure. Per BELGORE JSC at P. 547 para C. F. has this to say:-
"This is so in order to avail the other side every opportunity to advert to that issue.
But to contend that issue of law or the Constitution can be raised at anytime and do nothing more than to raised it in argument is like laying a disrupting ambush for the opponent. This is not the spirit of our practice of adjudication of holding the even balance. Proper application must be made so that the other side will know clearly what he has to meet.
Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (applicable in Northern Nigeria) and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act (applicable in Southern Nigeria) contain similar provisions relating to the procedure for the arraignment of an accused person. The requirements are as follows:
1. The accused person shall be brought before the Court unfettered (unless the trial Judge otherwise directs).
2. The charge shall be read and explained to the accused person to the satisfaction of the Court in the language he understands.
3. The accused person shall then be called upon to plead thereto instantly.
The requirements are mandatory, as they ensure that the accused person's right to fair hearing, as enshrined in Section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution, is protected. Failure to comply with these requirements would render the trial a nullity for lack of fair hearing. See: Kajubo v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 721 @ 732 E – F: Eyorokoromo v. The State (1979) 6 9 SC 3; Josiah v. The State (1985) 1 SC 406 @ 416; Torri v. National Park Service of Nigeria (2011) 6 – 7 SC (Pt.III) 171 @ 200 lines 4 – 31.
The law is also well settled that the best of adjudication which should earn the justice of a case is that which is decided on the participation by all parties in a proceeding.
The law is also well settled that the best of adjudication which should earn the justice of a case is that which is decided on the participation by all parties in a proceeding.
The basic fundamental principle in the Constitution as provided under Section 36(6) of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that, the person accused must be informed properly of the charge against him so that he will understand it. Should the accused not understand English language which is the language of the Court, the charge must be read and explained to him in that language he understands, presumable, through Court clerk. Section 33(6), (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is very clear on the requirement of affording a person accused of committing any criminal offence with an interpreter, if he does not understand the language of the trial Court before his plea can be taken. This is fundamental right which is inalienable and non-negotiable. Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law requires that the charge must be read over to the accused person in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court before he is called upon to plead to the charge. See the following cases:- OLABODE VS STATE (2009) 4 NCC 199 OGUNYE VS THE STATE (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt 604) 548 OKORO VS THE STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 18, EFFIOM VS THE STATE (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 502 MONSURU SOLOLA & ORS VS THE STATE, 22 NSCQR 254 at PP 289-290. However, in ANDREW IDEMUDIA VS THE STATE (1999) 5 SCNJ 47 at 62 per Karibi-Whyte, JSC (as he then was) held that: "The requirement that the charge must be read and explained to the accused in the language he understands, in my opinion, presupposes that the accused does not understand English which is the language of Court. If he does not, the Court has a duty to put on record the language spoken by the accused. However, if the accused understands English, then it is not necessary to record this fact." Where the accused understands the language of the Court, it is not necessary to record the fact. lt is however good practice to ask the accused the question whether he understood the charge as...
As regards the age of the 1st respondent, the onus was on the appellant to prove that as at the time he contested the election, the 1st respondent had not attained the age of 35 years as required by Section 177 (c) of the Constitution. If there is any discrepancy in the age of a candidate, it must have a bearing on the Constitutional requirement before it can have the effect of disqualifying him. See: Joe Odey Agi, SAN v. PDP & Ors. (2016) 12 SC (Pt.1) 74 @ 138 – 141. It was also held in this case that there must be evidence of an intention by the candidate to circumvent the provisions of the Constitution. There was none established in this case.
The salient issue here is whether Section 182 (1)(b) of the Constitution affects or impacts on when tenure is spent-out by operation of Section 191(1) of the same Constitution. The duty of Court, particularly ours as the Apex Court, is to interpret the statute in accordance with the intention of the law makers. In UGWU V. ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 367 at 498 this Court stated thus:- "A statute, it is always said, is "the will of the legislature" and any document which is presented to it as a statute is an authentic expression of the legislative will. The function of the Court is to interpret that document according to the intent of those who made it. Thus, the Court declares the intention of the legislature". The principles of interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution enjoin the Court to interpret the Constitution as a whole taking into consideration, related Sections. The lead judgment of this Court in BRIG. GEN. MOHAMMED BUBA MARWA & ORS. V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS (supra) is instructive Quoting the decision in A.T LTD V. A. D. H. LTD (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1056) 118 at 166 – 167, in the lead Judgment, Onnoghen JSC (as he then was; now CJN) stated thus: "The law is settled law that when a Court is faced with the interpretation of a Constitutional provision, the entire provision must be read together as a whole so as to determine the object of that provision. Secondly, it is settled principle of law that where a Court is faced with alternatives in the course of interpreting the Constitution or statute, the alternative construction that is consistent with smooth running of the system shall prevail as held inTukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517 al 579; I must remember that this Court has said it several times that the provisions of the Constitution ought to be read and interpreted as a whole in that related Sections must be construed together Finally, I must approach from the...
The issues being agitated in this appeal came up in Okoye v. C.O.P. (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1488) 274. In that case learned counsel for the appellant made an application to the Court to direct the prosecution to furnish the defence with all documents (including statements of witnesses, and police investigation report in the case) and he invoked the appellant's constitutional right to fair trial as provided in Section 36(6)(b) 1999 Constitution as amended. The question was then posed:- "When is an accused person entitled to facilities for the preparation of his defence as provided in Section 36(5)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and what are the facilities After adopting the definition of the word "facilities" as contained in Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed. at page 531, this Court held at page 296 – The facilities that must be afforded the accused person are the resources or anything which would aid the accused person in preparing his defence to the crime for which he is charged. These no doubt include the statements of witnesses interviewed by the police in the course of their investigation which might have absolved the accused of any blame or which may assist the accused to subpoena such favourable witnesses that the prosecuting counsel may not want to put forward to testify". It was decided in Udo v. State (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.82) 316 that Section 33(6)(d) of the 1979 Constitution (which is in pari materia with Section 36(6)(b) and (d) of the 1999 Constitution) is a provision of "equal opportunities for both the prosecution and the defence" Thus the prosecutor will not be allowed to have sole access to evidence. It was explained in Udo v. State supra that in a situation where the accused person does not know the case he will meet, while the prosecution knows everything concerning the case against the accused ahead of time would amount to nothing less than procedural inequality which is a gross violation of...
This Court in a recent case involving the appellant Marwa v. Nyako (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt.1296) 199 at 387 stated that Section 180 (1) and (2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has prescribed a single term of 4 years and if a second term, another period of 4 years and not a day long. Therefore no Court in the land has the power to extend that period of either the 4 years single term or the second term of another 4 years and so if peradventure something such as an illegal impeachment eroded into that 4 year term, it is too bad as that period of infraction cannot be brought back or an extension of time to add up to what was lost. The reason is simple and that is that it is not for the Supreme Court or any other Court in the land to add to or subtract from what the Constitution has provided. The Courts are enjoined to give effect to the clear, plain and unambiguous stipulations in the Constitution. See FRN v. Doriye (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1265). One is constantly reminded that Courts do not give orders in vain and so since the Constitution has decreed a four year tenure for the appellant which was to end on 29th May, 2015 which date had long passed, what the appellant now seeks is akin to a pipe dream which is unreachable in the circumstance on ground and so assuming the argument that learned counsel at the Court below has made a mistake, it is unfortunate but there is nothing the Court can do in relation to that relief No.6 asking for reinstatement as it has been overtaken by events. The spirit of the Constitution is to provide certainty in the polity and to avert instability and so the provision for 4 years tenure which cannot be extended even for one day. See Marwa v. Nyako (supra); Oke v. Mimiko (No.1) (2014) 13880 225 AT 254-255. I cannot resist quoting Onnoghen JSC (as he then was) in All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) v. Alhaji Mohammed Goni & 4 Ors (2012) 7 NWLR (Pt.1298) 147 at 182 where he stated and I quote:- "It has been held...
A visit to the several authorities in respect to what a Court faced with an act of counsel which had compromised the interest of his client or litigant would be helpful. See Doherty v. Doherty (1964) NSCC 213. In that case, there was an application by the defendants/appellants for the restoration of their appeal pursuant to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 17 (4) FSC Rules. It appears by the affidavit in support of the motion that although the applicant's solicitors were served with summons in accordance with Order 7 Rule 7 (1) to attend and settle the records of appeal, they were neither present nor represented before the Registrar who thereafter proceeded to settle the records and to fix the conditions of appeal as provided by Order 7 Rule 7(2). It was held by the Supreme Court per Coker JSC:- "It occurs to us that the failure to comply with the conditions of appeal is entirely due in this case to the fault of the appellants' solicitors and to shut them out from the hearing of the appeal on the merits is to hold them personally responsible for the negligence of their solicitors." This Court has in the case of:- Akinpelu v. Adegbore (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt.1096) 531 at 555 per Tobi JSC, stated thus:- "A special circumstance is of a particular kind which is unique, beyond ordinary, regular and/or usual circumstance. A special circumstance stands out on its own, punctuated with some amount of specialism. Mistake of counsel qualifies as a special circumstance. In other words, the Court would readily exercise its discretion to extend the period prescribed for doing an act if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the failure by a party to do the act within the period prescribed was caused by the negligence or inadvertence of his counsel. See Doherty v. Doherty (1964) 1 All NLR 299; Ahmadu v. Salawu (1974) 11 SC 43; Bowaje v. Adediwura(1976) 6 SC 143 at 147." In Dangote General Textile Products Ltd v. H.A. (Nig.) Ltd (2013) 16...
It was the submission of the distinguished senior counsel for the third respondent that, since the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial Federal High Court is circumscribed to the matters listed in Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), it is impermissible for the said Court to venture beyond them and deal with matters allunde (that is, from elsewhere). With respect, this submission is only partially correct. Incidentally, this Court has had occasion to deal with this question in recent times. Thus, in Wema Securities and Finance Plc v NAIC (2015) 6-7 SC (Pt IV) 163, 204-205, this Court (per Nwexe, JSC) held that: Section 251 (1) (supra) now delineates the jurisdiction of the Court, INEC v Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (pt 806) 72; NNPC v Orhiowesele and Ors (2013) LPELR 2034 (SC) 14-19, E-G; Ladoja v INEC (2007) 40 WRN 1; and circumscribes it (the said jurisdiction) to only eighteen items, Adetona and Ors v Igele Gen Ent Ltd (2011) LPELR 159 (SC) 47-53, G-B; Onuorah v KRPC Co. Ltd (supra); Gafar v Govt of Kwara (2007) 4 NWLR (pt 1024) 375; Ports and Cargo Handling and CHS Ltd v Migfo Nig Ltd (2012) LPELR 9725 (SC); Olutola v Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (pt 905) 416, 462. Such matters are exclusively reserved for the Federal High Court, Adetona and Ors v Igele Gen Ent (supra). In effect, the drafts person deliberately itemized the matters which are intended to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of that Court, Onuorah v KPMC Ltd (supra) at 1364. Simply put, therefore, that Court is a Court of enumerated jurisdiction and a fortiori its exclusive jurisdiction is expressly tied to those items enumerated there-under, NNPC and Ors v Orhiowasele and Ors (supra) 14-19, E-G, Onuorah v KPRC Ltd (supra). As such, in the exercise of its said exclusive jurisdiction, that Court (the Federal High Court) can only orbit within the universe of those enumerated issues and to others as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National...
This Court was opportuned to expatiate on a provision similar to Section 246(3) of the 1999 Constitution on the case of REV. HYDE ONWUAGULUCHI v. MR BEN COWNS NDU (2001)7 NWLR(pt. 712)309 where this Court states thus:- " Where an appeal is actually in respect of National Assembly election or other relevant election as this case, the State House of Assembly Election whatever errors of procedural nature or of procedural vice as to jurisdiction or competency can not be corrected by this Court they can only be corrected by the Court of Appeal itself or since it has no appellate or supervisory Jurisdiction over the Court of Appeal in such circumstances. This Court will not permit or encourage any subterfuge under which it may assume Jurisdiction to hear an appeal in respect of which the Constitution has in clear and unambiguous terms made the Court of Appeal the final Court. lt follows that an appeal in respect of a decision by the Court of Appeal can be taken on appeal to the Supreme Court, but is final for all purposes" This Court in the same case also stated as below per Uwai for JSC: " lt must be emphasized that such finality applies to every interlocutory decision or decision taken in respect of a matter or on issues concerning or arising from the decision reached in the appeal. No appeal shall lie from it to any other Court. The word trial" in this regard means that the journey of the case is concluded, terminated, completed and is without further appeal. The intention of the said decree is to make the Court of Appeal the Court of last resort in matters pertaining to election to the National Assembly. A proper address to the Court of Appeal in such matter to set aside its decision when refused is treated exactly like the decision in the appeal it is not appealable, it is final." I must add here that the wordings of the provisions of Section 246 (3) of the 1999 Constitution as amended are plain, clear and unambiguous which also must be...
This brings me to the second leg of the preliminary objection filed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents in their joint brief of Argument also the second leg of the third respondent's sole issue for determination. There is no gainsaying that Courts are donated or conferred with jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters by either the Constitution or statute with regard to some subject matters or suits including appeals. See AG of LAGOS STATE vs. AG FEDERATION (supra).
It must be emphasized also that where a statute or Constitution confers jurisdiction on Court, such serves as a mandate given to it to adjudicate on the matter(s) in question and once a Court is not so conferred with such jurisdiction, it then becomes incapacitated and cannot therefore adjudicate or determine the matter.
"Coming back to the case on hand, it is my respectful view that sitting in chambers to deliver judgment is not, on the facts before us, sitting in public or in open court. A Judges Chambers is not one of the regular courtrooms nor is it a place to which the public have right to ingress and egress as of right except on invitation by or with permission of the Judge ... There is in this case a clear breach of the mandatory provisions of section 33(3) and (13) of the 1979 Constitution and Order 36 rule 1 of the High Court Rules of Lagos State ... The delivery of judgment is, in my respectful view part of the hearing of a cause or matter. A breach of a mandatory constitutional provisions is more than a mere technicality it is fundamental ... The breach vitiates the entire proceedings before him." Like Oviasu this Court ordered a retrial. Court delivered judgment in chambers, this Court, relying on the above two cases, held that the procedure adopted was a fundamental breach of the Constitution which rendered the judgment delivered null and void.
Now, fundamental rights have been defined as basic moral guarantees that people in all countries and cultures allegedly have simply because they are people. In Ransome-Kuti Vs Attorney General of the Federation (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 6) 211 at 230, Eso, JSC stated that a fundamental right “is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which are in fact antecedent to the political society itself” and “it is a primary condition to civilized existence”. Fundamental rights are rights derived from natural or fundamental law.
They are rights that attach to particular individuals who can invoke them, they are of high priority, and compliance with them is mandatory rather than discretionary. Human rights are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is a man and are frequently held to be universal in the sense that all people have and should enjoy them, and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are available as standards of justification and criticism whether or not they are recognized and implemented by the legal system or officials of a country.
The moral doctrine of human rights aims at identifying the fundamental prerequisites for each human being leading a minimally good life – Hassan Vs Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt 1389) 607. The human rights law of Nigeria is contained, inter alia, in two major documents. These are the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, domesticated as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
The 1999 Constitution guarantees what are called Fundamental Rights in its Chapter IV and the rights it enshrines are largely the traditional civil and political (libertarian) rights and freedoms. It is the duty of the Court to protect these rights. PER ABIRU, J.C.A.
Now, fundamental rights have been defined as basic moral guarantees that people in all countries and cultures allegedly have simply because they are people. In Ransome-Kuti Vs Attorney General of the Federation (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt 6) 211 at 230, Eso, JSC stated that a fundamental right “is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which are in fact antecedent to the political society itself” and “it is a primary condition to civilized existence”. Fundamental rights are rights derived from natural or fundamental law.
They are rights that attach to particular individuals who can invoke them, they are of high priority, and compliance with them is mandatory rather than discretionary. Human rights are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is a man and are frequently held to be universal in the sense that all people have and should enjoy them, and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are available as standards of justification and criticism whether or not they are recognized and implemented by the legal system or officials of a country.
The moral doctrine of human rights aims at identifying the fundamental prerequisites for each human being leading a minimally good life – Hassan Vs Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt 1389) 607. The human rights law of Nigeria is contained, inter alia, in two major documents. These are the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, domesticated as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
The 1999 Constitution guarantees what are called Fundamental Rights in its Chapter IV and the rights it enshrines are largely the traditional civil and political (libertarian) rights and freedoms. It is the duty of the Court to protect these rights. PER ABIRU, J.C.A.
Now Section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended makes the following provision: “Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of the chapter has been is being or likely to be contravened in any state in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that state for redress.” What calls for resolution is the definition of the word “any” as contemplated in Section 46(1) of the Constitution. This Court while giving an expansive interpretation to the word “any”, Nweze JCA as he then was greatly influenced by the decision of the Apex Court in Skye Bank vs.
Iwu (2017) LPELR – 42595, per Kekere – Ekun JSC, having stated that in the interpretation of the constitution, the Court must bear in mind as stated in Agbaje vs. Fashola (2008) ALL FWLR (pt. 443) 1302 AT 1337, a liberal approach to the interpretation of the Constitution or statute be adopted, see also AG Bendel State vs. AGF of the Federation & Ors (1981) LPELR – 605 (SC), held that: “Now the adjective “any” is a word of enormous amplitude which admits of no limitation or qualification., Duck vs. Batey 1QBD 79 and indeed has been construed to mean as wide as possible., Beckett vs.
Sutton 51 LJ CH. “some out of many”, an indefinite number, one indiscriminately of whatever kind or Guantity Federal deposit Ins. Corporation vs. Winton CCA Tenn 131, F2 780, 782, Texaco Panama Inc vs. SPDC (Nig) Ltd (2002) LPELR – 3146 (SC). Put differently the word any has a diversity of meanings and may be employed to indicate “all” or “every” as well as “some” or “one” and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute. “ PER BARKA, J.C.A.