A superior Court of record has the inherent jurisdiction to deal with contempt in facie curiae and punish for the offence summarily. It must once again be emphasised that the summary power of punishing for contempt should however, be used sparingly and only in serious cases, Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. King-Emperor (1945) AC 264, 270; Araka v. Attorney-General (1982) 1 SC 153; Oku v. State [1970] 1 NLR 60.
This must be for it is a power which a Court, must of necessity, possess. Its usefulness, surely depends on the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised. In cases of contempt ex facie curiae, there may be cases where the offence should be dealt with summarily, but such hearing must be conducted in accordance with cardinal principles of fair process. Above all, the case must be one the facts surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious as to be virtually incontestable, where the Judge would have to rely on evidence or testimony of witnesses to events occurring outside his view and outside of his presence in Court, he should not try the case himself.
The matter must be placed before another judge where the usual procedure for the arrest, charge and prosecution of the offender must be followed, Oku v. The State (supra) 68. In other words, in the trial of criminal contempt ex facie curiae, an offender is entitled to the benefit of a full process of a criminal trial. The reason for this is obvious. Firstly, this is to ensure that the accused person receives a fair hearing of the case against him. In the second place, the Judge no doubt would have to rely on evidence or testimony of witnesses to events which did not occur in his presence, Boyo v. Attorney-General of Mid- West (1971) 1 All NLR 353.
It is even settled that contempt or committal proceeding no doubt is quasi-criminal proceeding which has the likelihood of affecting the liberty of a citizen. Against this background therefore, the person setting up contempt proceedings must therefore ensure that every step that is necessary is taken and the entire requirements are complied with strictly, Opobiyi v. Muniru [2008] All FWLR (pt. 408) 380; Nya v Edem [2005] All FWLR (pt. 242) 576; F.C.D.A. v. Koripamo – Agary (2010) 14 NWLR (pt.1213) 377, 391-392; Aina v. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.233) 90; Ogaji v. Igonikon – Digbani [2010] 10 NWLR(pt.1202) 298, 306; and Uhunwangbo v. Okojie [1989] 5 NWLR (pt.122) 471, 487.Since contempt outside the precincts of the Court is quasi-criminal in nature, every procedural step (the vega modus prosequiandl must ex necessitate) be followed strictly and strictly complied with. Accordingly, the appellants ought to have been arrested, charged before the Court and full trial conducted and the offence proved beyond reasonable doubt and if found guilty, punished in accordance with the Law,Omoijahe v. Umoru(2000) FWLR (pt. 29) 2401, 2406; Ogboni v. Ojah (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.100) 725; Alesinloye v. Oyediran (1999) 12 NWLR (pt.63) 491; Ojeme & Ors. v. Momodu II (1995) Chief Tom Ikimi v. Godwin Omamuli (1995) 3 NWLR (pt.387) 335; Military Governor of Kwara State v. Rufus Afolabi (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.196) 212; Oyeyinka v. Osague [1994] 2 NWLR (pt.328) 612; Awobukun v. Adeyemi (1968) NWLR 299; Gloria Nya v. Madam Eme Bassey Edem (2005) 4 NWLR (pt.973) 345 at 367 -369; Deduwa and Ors v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR (pt. 1) 1; Boyo v. Attorney General Mid-West State (1971) 1 ALL NLR 342, 352.
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ANOR V. OGUEBEGO & ORS:LGC(12/7/2017)C-D
Here, I take liberty to restate that there are two broad classifications of contempt – that committed in facie curiae and that committed ex facie curiae. In the latter category, a charge and a plea are necessary and the accused is entitled to a fair hearing of the case against him. In both types of contempt, a trial is involved, Omoijahe v. Umoru and Ors (1999) LPELR – 2645 (SC) 10 – 11; Awosanya v. Board of Customs and Excise (1975) 3 SC 47. What separates one from the other is the procedure to be adopted.For words or actions used in the face of the Court, or in the course of proceedings, to be contempt, they must be such as would interfere with the course of justice.
The contempt for which the appellants are being proceeded against was committed outside the precincts of the Court. The procedure laid out for dealing with that species of contempt is rather elaborate and allows the contemnor a right to challenge the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction See: Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 225) 539. This is what the appellants have done in this appeal.
There are however a few exceptions to the general rule. The principle does not apply to applications by an alleged contemnor challenging the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the Court.
It is even settled that contempt or committal proceeding no doubt is quasi-criminal proceeding which has the likelihood of affecting the liberty of a citizen. Against this background therefore, the person setting up contempt proceedings must therefore ensure that every step that is necessary is taken and the entire requirements are complied with strictly, Opobiyi v. Muniru [2008] All FWLR (pt. 408) 380; Nya v Edem [2005] All FWLR (pt. 242) 576; F.C.D.A. v. Koripamo – Agary (2010) 14 NWLR (pt.1213) 377, 391-392; Aina v. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.233) 90; Ogaji v. Igonikon – Digbani [2010] 10 NWLR (pt.1202) 298, 306; and Uhunwangbo v. Okojie [1989] 5 NWLR (pt.122) 471, 487.
Since contempt outside the precincts of the Court is quasi-criminal in nature, every procedural step (the vega modus prosequiandl must ex necessitate) be followed strictly and strictly complied with. Accordingly, the appellants ought to have been arrested, charged before the Court and full trial conducted and the offence proved beyond reasonable doubt and if found guilty, punished in accordance with the Law,Omoijahe v. Umoru(2000) FWLR (pt. 29) 2401, 2406; Ogboni v. Ojah (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.100) 725; Alesinloye v. Oyediran (1999) 12 NWLR (pt.63) 491; Ojeme & Ors. v. Momodu II (1995) Chief Tom Ikimi v. Godwin Omamuli (1995) 3 NWLR (pt.387) 335; Military Governor of Kwara State v. Rufus Afolabi (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.196) 212; Oyeyinka v. Osague [1994] 2 NWLR (pt.328) 612; Awobukun v. Adeyemi (1968) NWLR 299; Gloria Nya v. Madam Eme Bassey Edem (2005) 4 NWLR (pt.973) 345 at 367 -369; Deduwa and Ors v. The State (1975) 1 All NLR (pt. 1) 1; Boyo v. Attorney General Mid-West State (1971) 1 ALL NLR 342, 352.
For words or actions used in the face of the Court, or in the course of proceedings, to be contempt, they must be such as would interfere with the course of justice. A superior Court of record has the inherent jurisdiction to deal with contempt in facie curiae and punish for the offence summarily. It must once again be emphasised that the summary power of punishing for contempt should however, be used sparingly and only in serious cases, Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. King-Emperor (1945) AC 264, 270; Araka v. Attorney-General (1982) 1 SC 153; Oku v. State [1970] 1 NLR 60. This must be for it is a power which a Court, must of necessity, possess. Its usefulness, surely depends on the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised. In cases of contempt ex facie curiae, there may be cases where the offence should be dealt with summarily, but such hearing must be conducted in accordance with cardinal principles of fair process. Above all, the case must be one the facts surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious as to be virtually incontestable, where the Judge would have to rely on evidence or testimony of witnesses to events occurring outside his view and outside of his presence in Court, he should not try the case himself. The matter must be placed before another judge where the usual procedure for the arrest, charge and prosecution of the offender must be followed, Oku v. The State (supra) 68. In other words, in the trial of criminal contempt ex facie curiae, an offender is entitled to the benefit of a full process of a criminal trial. The reason for this is obvious. Firstly, this is to ensure that the accused person receives a fair hearing of the case against him. In the second place, the Judge no doubt would have to rely on evidence or testimony of witnesses to events which did not occur in his presence, Boyo v. Attorney-General of Mid- West (1971) 1 All NLR 353. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION &...
Here, I take liberty to restate that there are two broad classifications of contempt – that committed in facie curiae and that committed ex facie curiae. In the latter category, a charge and a plea are necessary and the accused is entitled to a fair hearing of the case against him. In both types of contempt, a trial is involved, Omoijahe v. Umoru and Ors (1999) LPELR – 2645 (SC) 10 – 11; Awosanya v. Board of Customs and Excise (1975) 3 SC 47. What separates one from the other is the procedure to be adopted.
However, that ancient prescription is now subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, it is now tolerably settled that where a defendant, in a cause, challenges the validity of an order directed against him, either by way of an appeal or other application, he cannot be proceeded against for contempt of that order unless and until the issue of its regality is settled one way or the other, Onwochei Odogwu v. Olemeoku Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt 225) 539, 554. Gordon v. Gordon (1904) All ER 163.
This re-statement has even become necessary now having regard to the distinctive attribute of contempt as sui generis, Boyo v. The State (1970) All NLR 316; (1970) LPELR – 797 (SC) 4- 5; C-A; Oswald on Contempt Committal and Attachment, 17; John C, Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (London: Professional Books Ltd. 1972) 44 et seq; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2005) 4 WRN 1, 15; Ifekwe v. Mgbako [1990] 3 NWLR (pt. 140) 588, 593; Bonnie v. Gold (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 465) 230, 238; Okeke v. A.G. Anambra State (1997) 9 NWLR (pt. 519) 123, 140.
Now, the general common law rule is that a person in contempt cannot be heard in the cause unless he purges himself of the contempt, Group Danone and Anor v. Voltic (Nig) Ltd (2008) LPELR 1341 (SC) 21; B-D; [2008] 7 NWLR (pt. 1087) 637; (2008) 34 NSCQR (pt. 1) 40.
The law is well settled that on order of court must be obeyed regardless of the attitude of a litigant toward the validity thereof. See Nigerian Army V. Mowarin (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt 235) 345. It is not expedient that a contemnor of a court's order should be heard and obliged any favour either by the some court which he holds in contempt or any other court of law so ever. It is trite and reasonable I hold, that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. See Military Government of Lagos State V. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621.
However, generally, the common law principle which precludes persons in disobedience of the order of the court from being heard in respect of the matters in which they stand in disobedience has been settled. In Hadkinson vs. Hadikinson (1952) 2 All ER 567 at 573; DENNING, LJ; opined thus:
"I need hardly say that it is very rare for this court to refuse to hear counsel for an appellant. No matter how badly a litigant has behaved, nevertheless, generally speaking, if he has a right of appeal, he has a right to be heard, for the simple reason that, if he is not heard, his right of appeal is valueless........................the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the cause of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason in shown why it should not be removed."
There are however a few exceptions to the general rule. The principle does not apply to applications by an alleged contemnor challenging the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the court. There is a clear distinction between the right to be heard in defence of the order made and the right to enforce yet an order whilst in disobedience. The right to be heard is clearly different from the right to enforced a right whilst still in disobedience. See; First African Trust Bank Limited & Anor vs. Basil O. Ezegbu & Anor (1992) NWLR (Pt 264) 132, (1993) 6 SCNJ 122; (1992) LPELR 1278.
To this end, it may be asked, who is a contemnor?
A contemnor is a person who is guilty of contempt before a government body such as a court or legislature Contempt therefore is a conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a court or legislature. Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable by fine or imprisonment. In otherwords, a civil contempt is the failure of a party to obey a court order that was issued for another party's benefit. See; Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition page 360.
Now, the general common law rule is that a person in contempt cannot be heard in the cause unless he purges himself of the contempt, Group Danone and Anor v. Voltic (Nig) Ltd (2008) LPELR 1341 (SC) 21; B-D; [2008] 7 NWLR (pt. 1087) 637; (2008) 34 NSCQR (pt. 1) 40. However, that ancient However, that ancient prescription is now subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, it is now tolerably settled that where a defendant, in a cause, challenges the validity of an order directed against him, either by way of an appeal or other application, he cannot be proceeded against for contempt of that order unless and until the issue of its regality is settled one way or the other, Onwochei Odogwu v. Olemeoku Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (pt 225) 539, 554. Gordon v. Gordon (1904) All ER 163.
This re-statement has even become necessary now having regard to the distinctive attribute of contempt as sui generis, Boyo v. The State (1970) All NLR 316; (1970) LPELR – 797 (SC) 4- 5; C-A; Oswald on Contempt Committal and Attachment, 17; John C, Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (London: Professional Books Ltd. 1972) 44 et seq; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2005) 4 WRN 1, 15; Ifekwe v. Mgbako [1990] 3 NWLR (pt. 140) 588, 593; Bonnie v. Gold (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 465) 230, 238; Okeke v. A.G. Anambra State (1997) 9 NWLR (pt. 519) 123, 14
Now, the general common law rule is that a person in contempt cannot be heard in the cause unless he purges himself of the contempt, Group Danone and Anor v. Voltic (Nig) Ltd (2008) LPELR 1341 (SC) 21; B-D; [2008] 7 NWLR (pt. 1087) 637; (2008) 34 NSCQR (pt. 1) 40.
Contempt of Court is an affront or challenge to the authority and dignity of the Court. It can be either contempt ex facie curiae or contempt in facie curiae and the Court has different procedure for dealing with each type of contempt. See BRITTANIA-U (NIG.) LTD. V. SEPLAT PET. DEV. CO. LTD. (2016) 4 NWLR (PT. 1503) 541 (SC). Contempt of Court is any act or conduct which interferes with the course of justice, and tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect.
It is a contempt to disobey an order either to do a specified act within a specified time or to abstain from doing a specified act. It is obvious that the administration of justice can only be effective if the Court has the means to enforce its judgments or orders which the Appellants herein have made impossible for the Court by conducting the national delegate conference and electing new executives, the same acts sought to be restrained. The acts of the Appellants is such that renders the effort of the Court hopeless.
Contempt in facie curiae is contempt in the face of the Court and it is punishable summarily for the sake of maintaining the dignity and the authority of the Court. While contempt ex facie curiae being a contempt committed outside the Court is criminal in nature and may not be punished summarily. In the instant case, the Respondents’ complaint was that the Appellants violated the order of the trial Court restraining the parties from doing anything that will affect the ruling of the Court when the Appellants went and held the National Delegates Conference and conducted the election.
It is contempt ex facie curiae. Hence, it cannot be tried summarily. PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.