The important thing is whether such order for forfeiture made was grantable in accordance with any law. This is so because a Court order can not be vitiated or does not become null and void simply because the Court relied on a wrong law in making. Such order is valid provided that there is any law that backs the grant of such order. As the appellant was tried at the trial Court for committing an offence or offences under the Penal Code and the same penal code by its Section 78 and also by Section 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code, gives a trial Court power to make order of forfeiture or compensation to any party after convicting an accused person such forfeiture order remains valid. In Martins v COP (2013) 4 NWLR (pt.1343) 25 Mahmud Mohammed JSC [as he then was) had this to say on Page 47:-
"what is significant is that under either Section 78 of the Penal Code which Provides specifically for compensation arising from the conviction for offences and the Penal Code and so applicable to the instant case, or under Section 365 (1) (b) which is general provision in respect of all convictions under any law no limit has been set as to the amount the Court, on convicting the offender can award the victim of the offence by way of compensation.
See also Mafa v State (2013) 3 NWLR (pt.1342) 607 at 622/623.
It is therefore my considered view, that the lower Court was correct in endorsing or affirming the trial Court's order of forfeiture/compensation as it had such power both under Section 78 of the Penal Code and Section 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code, notwithstanding that it stated that it granted such order under Sections 19 and 20 of EFCC Act 2004. That will not vitiate the order or render the order null and void. This issue is also resolved against the appellant herein.
What obtains when there is a subsisting order of a Court of competent jurisdiction is well stated in the case ofAkinyemi v Soyanwo (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt.998) 496 per Tabai JSC at page 514.
"it is a settled principle of law that every party to a suit, and indeed every citizen, has an obligation to obey the subsisting Court decision or order in the suit unless and until it is set aside. And the party's obligation to obey the decision is without regard to his perception about the irregularity or illegality of the decision as long as it subsists. See Odogwu v Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.225) 539; Nigerian Army v Gloria Mowarin (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.235) 345. The appellant as a party in the case cannot claim ignorance of this decision of the Court of Appeal on the 15th July, 1999. He became aware or deemed to have become aware on the 15th July, 1999 that the Court decided to keep the running of the 45 days in abeyance during the pendency of the motion for variation from the 17th March, 1999 to 15th July, 1999″.
Outside the above which is not yet tenable, there is no other reason why the lower Court refused the ex-parte application. In an application of this nature, the discretion of the trial judge normally comes into play. With all the documents exhibited in support of the ex-parte application without any reference made in their favour or against in the ruling of the learned trial judge, I am of the strong view that it is a discretion made in vaco and therefore can not pass the litmus test of judicious and judicial exercise of discretion and judicial exercise of discretion. In such a case, the Court of Appeal is justified to interfere. And I so do by holding that the Appellants exhibited sufficient documents to sponsor and support their application. As a result, it was wrong for the Court below to rule on the application without reference to the documents placed before it by the applicant. See ENEKEBE V. ENEKEBE (1964) NMLR 42 at 45, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS V. AIGORO (1985) 1 NSCC 88, BABATUNDE V. PAN ATLANTIC SHIPPING & TRANSPORT AGENCY LTD. & ORS (2007) 4 SCNJ 140 and ODUBA V. SCLLP Aartonderneming Houtmangracht & Anors (1997) SCNJ 216.
It is trite that, a Court order is not binding on a person who is not a party to the process that gave rise to the order. See Akinsanya v. A.G. Federation and Minister of justice (2013) ALL FWLR (part 688) 941 ratio 2 pp951-952 paras H-B). The Respondent can therefore not be bond by the order of the Magistrate Court to which he is not a party.
Second, it is now trite that where there is an Appeal before the Supreme Court, as in the present case, a decision by the High Court which will render the result of the Appeal nugatory should be avoided.
See MOHAMMED VS. OLAWUNMI (1993) 4 NWLR (PT. 287) 254 AT 278 – 279. Relatedly, the learned trial Judge was right by his conditional orders to avoid the ugly situation whereby his own judgment granting injunctive reliefs to the Appellant would be rendered impossible and or incapable of being obeyed if the Supreme Court found against the declaratory reliefs which the Court of Appeal earlier granted to the Appellant. The legal maxim is Lex non cogit ad impossibilia meaning The law does not compel to impossible ends. Thus in the case of BULUNKUTU VS. ZANGINA (1997) 11 NWLR (PT. 529) 526 AT 539 – 540, the Court held that Courts should desist from making Orders in vain and not make Orders that are impossible to be obeyed or implemented.
See also: C. C. B. (NIGERIA) PLC VS. OKPALA (1997) 8 NWLR (PT 518) 673 AT 694;
OLADIPO VS. OYELAMI (1989)5 NWLR (PT. 120) 210 AT 221.
The Law is settled beyond any argument that a judgment or ruling of a Court of Law, no matter how incorrectly arrived at is valid, binding and subsisting until it is set aside by the same Court through a judicial review or by appellate proceedings.
See Obineche v. Akusobi (2010)12 NWLR (Pt.1208) 383 at 405 paragraphs D.
I think the learned Counsel for the Respondent was not right to say that inclusion of the grounds of appeal originated from the interlocutory Ruling of the trial Court in the Notice of Appeal against the final judgment of the Court polluted the appeal, by reason of non obtaining of leave to appeal against the interlocutory ruling. Even if the Appellant did not obtain leave to appeal against the interlocutory ruling, that failure or error would only operate against the grounds of appeal relating to the interlocutory ruling, not the entire appeal. And such grounds only would be struck out, leaving the other grounds, developed on the final judgment to sustain the appeal. See SPDC Nig. Ltd Vs Onyiriuka & Ors (2016) LPELR 41309 (CA); Nwaolisah Vs Nwabufoh (2011)14 NWLR (Pt.1268) 600. See also the case of Bauchi State House of Assembly & Ors Vs Guyaba (2017) LPELR 43295 CA.