Defamation

In the instant appeal, the respondents successfully made out their defence of fair comment or qualified privilege hence, rebutting the presumption of technical malice or malice in law. In the circumstance, the appellants were left with one option; they had the onus of proving express malice or malice in fact against the respondents. As this Court explained in S. B. Bakare v. Alhaji A. Ibrahim (1973) All NLR 653; (1973) 6 SC 147: We think it is necessary to stress here that the word 'maliciously,' as usually pleaded in defamation actions, has a technical meaning. We think that in pleadings, sufficient care should be taken to draw a clear distinction between this 'technical malice,' if we may say so, and actual malice. In our view, each has a definite place in the pleadings, and each also has a distinct role to play at the trial. It should always be borne in mind that, once the plea of fair comment or qualified privilege is made out, the inference of malice is rebutted, and the burden is thrown upon the plaintiff of showing and proving 'express malice' against the defendants. This is generally known as 'malice in fact,' and to be able to discharge this onus at the trial, it is important that the plaintiff should deliver a reply, alleging express malice and giving particulars of the facts from which such malice is to be inferred 'technical malice' otherwise known as malice in law is always presumed in the plaintiffs favour. While 'express malice,' otherwise known as malice in fact, is never presumed, it must be proved by evidence. In our view, therefore, it is equitable to expect that just as the defendants (as in this case) are required to give particulars of the facts on which the plea of fair comment is based, so also is the plaintiff (where he intends to defeat such defence of fair comment) obliged to deliver a reply alleging malice against the defendants, and setting out particulars of the...

The plaintiff/appellant is a juristic persona, or an artificial person, being an entity created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being. Such an artificial entity or person is distinct from the human beings who are its promoters or officers. Both, though, can be defamed or libelled. An artificial person, as EDEM v. ORPHEO NIG LTD (2003) 13 NWLR (pt. 838) 537 at 558 demonstrates, can be "defamed in the estimation of right thinking members of the society generally-". It can be libelled.
The cause of action vesting in either the natural person or the artificial person (the legal entity) cannot be lawfully subrogated by one for the other.
Thus, where the cause of action vests in the natural person, the human being; the artificial person, the corporate entity, cannot usurp it to maintain an action to lay claim to any legal remedy or reliefs. Similarly, the cause of action vesting in the corporate entity cannot be usurped by the natural person to predicate an action thereon for any relief or redress against another.