Fundamental Human Right

Before then, I intend to emphasize the special character of this right; a right which is known to most, if not, all legal systems. The right to fair hearing in Section 36 (1) (supra), and indeed all the other fundamental rights, guaranteed in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution (supra) were greatly influenced by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which in turn, was influenced by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, see, per Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher (1980) AC 319,329; also, Chima Centus Nweze, "The New Regime of Human Rights Litigation in Nigeria: Old Rights; New Enforcement Strategies," in Chima Centus Nweze et al (eds.), Beyond Bar Advocacy (Umuahia, Nigeria: Impact Global Publishers Ltd, 2011) 394 G. Ezejiofor, Protection of human Rights Under The Law (London: Butterworths, 1964) 182. This background to these guaranteed rights was the proximate impulsion to the formidable prescription that their provisions should not be subjected to "the austerity of tabulated legalism." On the contrary, they [their provisions] ...call for a generous interpretation ... suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher (supra) Instructively, this Court in cases too numerous to be cited here, has endeavoured to "give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to." In particular, its attitude to the fair hearing provisions has been to seek after the highest possible ideal of justice and fairness. Only a handful of cases will be cited here to illustrate this attitude. Ogboh and Anor v FRN (2002) LPELR -2285 (SC) 15; A-C; Igboha, Irepa LGC and Anor v T. B. S. C and Anor (1988) LPELR -1449 (SC) 16; D-E; The State, Ex Parte Joseph Ajidasile Olakunrin and Ors v. Oba Alaiyeluwa Ogunoye.

The right in this section [that is, Section 36 (6) (b)] and, indeed, the other fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, (as amended), were greatly influenced by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR, for short] which, in turn, was influenced by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. See, per Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher (1980) AC 319, 329; also, Chima Centus Nweze, "The New Regime of Human Rights Litigation in Nigeria: Old Rights; New Enforcement Strategies," in Chima Centus Nweze et al (eds.), Beyond Bar Advocacy (Umuahia, Nigeria: Impact Global Publishers Ltd, 2011) 394; G. Ezejiofor, Protection of Human Rights Under The Law (London: Butterworth's, 1964) 182. This background to these guaranteed rights was the proximate impulsion to the formidable prescription that their provisions should not be subjected to "the austerity of tabulated legalism." On the contrary, they [their provisions] ...call for a generous interpretation ... suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to...," Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher (supra). This Court, subsequently, explained the rationale for this interpretive approach in Kim v State (1992) LPELR -1691 (SC) 11-12; F-E. Listen to this eloquent reasoning: Human rights in our written Constitution mark a standard of behavior which we share with all civilized countries of the world. Since the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, though it is still left for various member nations to determine which rights from the plethora of rights then declared they would wish to incorporate into their domestic laws, once incorporated, their application lose the character of insular isolationism. Rather they assume a universal character in their standard of interpretation and...