Limitation of Action

That conclusion calls for an insight into the second limb of sub – section 11(1), dealing with injury of a continuing nature with a view to demonstrating that in computing of period of limitation, the appellants' action does not attract any deferment of the time for instituting an action as provided by the second limb. As regards the computation of the period of limitation under the second limb, the provision of sub-section 11(1) of the State Proceedings Law is in pari materia with the provision of sub-section 2(a) of the Public Officers protection Act, Cap. 379 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 and parallel State Laws on the matter in which the phrase 'continuance of damage or injury' which has the same connotation and scope as 'continuing injury or damage' in sub-section 11(1) under review has received interpretation. In Obiefuna vs. Okoye (1961) ALL NLR. 357, 360 – 362, the import of that phrase was examined by Dickson, J., with illustration from English decisions on parallel legislation and the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Carey vs. Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough Council (1903) 20 TLR. 2, in which it was held that continuance of the injury or damage means the 'continuance of the act which caused the damage' as opposed to the consequence of the act. On the strength of that decision, buttressed by the persuasiveness of Freeborn vs. Leening (1926) 1 K.B. 160, on a similar point and editorial commentaries in the Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, page 772 of Vol. 2, the learned Judge held that 'continuance of injury or damage means continuance of the legal injury, and not merely continuance of the injurious effects of a legal injury.' One can as well explain in aid of clarity that the word 'injury' used as a synonym with the word 'damage' in sub-section 11(1) of the State proceedings Law, which is a carry-over from the early legislation in the matter, in its technical meaning does not refer to 'physical injury'.

For the purpose of determining the limitation period under sub-section 11(1), the requirements are separated into two limbs, the first is where the injury for which redress is sought was complete at the time the wrongful act was done, when the limitation period begins to run from the date of the wrongful act. This is in contrast with the second limb where the injury is of a continuing nature and the period of limitation is deferred until after the cessation of the injury when the counting of the period of limitation begins.

OKAFOR V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, ANAMBRA STATE. LGC(11/5/1999) F