Notice to Defend

As shown above, in the opening paragraph of the Statement of Defence, the first defendant employed the mode of pleading known as general traverse. In the words of Mohammed JSC in Ugochukwu v. Unipetrol (Nig) Plc (2002) LPELR-3321 (SC) 7, a general traverse in the sense of a general denial is effective to cast on the plaintiff the burden of proving the allegations denied. According to the eminent jurist, it is not correct that, inLewis and Peat (NRL) Ltd v. Akhimien (1976) 6 SC 159, the Apex Court held that a mere traverse of material facts is not enough to deny such facts.In my humble view, the lower Court's error was that it did not consider the evidence elicited from the third plaintiff during his cross examination. According to this witness, in cross examination, "I have not seen the Certificate of the Registered Trustees of the Anglican Diocese. The Registered Trustees of the Anglican Diocese have not been registered."(page 378 of the record; italics supplied for emphasis)
The above notwithstanding, I pray in aid the views of Oputa JSC in Akintola and Anor v. Solano (1986) LPELR-360-SC; (1986) 2 NWLR (pt. 24) 598 that the Law and Rule of pleadings do allow a general traverse (such as the first defendant employed in the opening paragraph of the Statement of Defence). Its only effect is to cast on the plaintiff the burden of proving the allegations, thus, generally denied. His Lordship cited with approval ACE Jimona v. NECC Ltd (supra); Warner v. Sampson (1959) 1 QB 297, 310, Akintola and Anor v. Salano (supra) at page 40; Osafile and Anor v. Odi and Anor (1994) LPELR JSC in 2784, placing reliance on the views of Lewis JSC in Mandillas and Karaberis Ltd v. Apena (1969) NMLR 199, 392-393; per Denning MR in Warner v. Sampson (supra); ACE Jimona v. NECC Ltd. (supra).