Probative Value

Evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value is the primary duty of the trial Court that saw and assessed the credibility of the witnesses. The appellate Court that does not enjoy this much advantage cannot, on the basis of the cold facts on record, interfere with the trial Court's findings of fact unless it finds the findings to be perverse.

MUSA v. THE STATE LGC(11/01/2019) H

It must be restated that the evaluation of evidence and assumption of probative value to such evidence are the preserve of the trial Court that had the opportunity of hearing the evidence and the demeanour of the witnesses. The lower Court and indeed this Court interferes only where an appellant shows clearly that the trial Court did not, in the discharge of its primary duty of evaluating the evidence it received, bring to bear the advantage it had of seeing and assessing the witnesses. Having not done that in the instant case, appellant's complaints against the inference of the two Courts on this particular issue accordingly fails. See Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 1, Eseme Eyibo V. Mr. Dan Abia & Ors (2012) LPELR-20607 (SC) and Dakat V. Dashe (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt 531) 46.

It is trite that evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to same is essentially within the province of the trial Court. It is undoubtedly the duty of that Court to assess witnesses, form impression about them and evaluate their evidence having regard to the impression it formed of the witnesses.

The law is settled that assessment of oral evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal or trial Court and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial Court has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts, which those facts do not support.
In other words, an appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence by the trial Court in the absence of special circumstances. See Eki v Giwa (1977) 11 NSCC 96 where Obaseki JSC cited with approval the case of Fashanu v Adekoya (1974) 1 LL NLR (Pt. 1) 35 at 41 where this Court held:-
"The appeal before us clearly attacks the findings of facts and seriously challenges the judgment in an area which is only narrowly open to a Court of Appeal. The appraisal of oral evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal of trial and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial Court had made an imperfect or improper use of the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witness or has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts which those facts do not support or indeed has approached the determination of those facts in a manner which those facts cannot and do not in themselves support."