Retraction

The law is trite that mere retraction of a voluntary confessional statement by the accused person does not render it inadmissible or worthless. See Egboghonome v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 383 and Joseph Idowu v. State (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 50, also Dibie v. The State (2007) 3 SCNJ 160 at 171.

The retraction of the confessional statement by the appellant did not change the situation in the light of the statement being direct, positive and related to acts, knowledge or intention, stating or suggesting the inference that the appellant committed the offence charge. That there was no corroboration would in the circumstance not matter. However, the Court out of prudence could look for something outside of that confessional statement that would show that the confession was probable. That is to say that it is trite that an accused can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where the confession is consistent with other ascertained facts which have been proved. See Bassey v State (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.1314) 209 at 227; Akpan v State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.248) 439 at 468.

The term 'retraction' means the act of taking or drawing back; the act of recanting or withdrawing (of something e.g. statement)See Black's Law Dictionary 9th Edition 2009 at 1431.

I must say that I am satisfied with the position taken by the two Courts below. It is trite that an accused person may be convicted on his confessional statement even if retracted. However, the Court is expected to look for evidence outside the confessional statement no matter how slight tending to show that the accused committed the offence.

Different considerations and principles of law govern the admissibility of a confessional statement disowned and one objected to as involuntarily made, see lkpasa V. Bendel State (1981) NSCC 300, where Udoma, JSC, explained: A distinction is usually drawn as regards practice and procedure in relation to the admissibility of a confession in evidence between a confession objected to on the ground that it was not made at all by an Accused, in which case such a confession may be said to have been retracted, and a confession objected on the ground that it was not voluntary in that although an Accused Person agreed to have made the confession, his complaint would be that he was forced or induced to make it. In the latter case, what is attacked is the admissibility in evidence of the confession and, therefore, a trial within trial must be held, the confession having been challenged on voi dire so as to determine whether or not the confession was voluntary. lf at the end of trial, the Court comes to the conclusion that the confession was not voluntary, then it is not admissible in evidence, and the Court should so rule. In the former case, where the confession is wholly retracted, the question as to whether or not the confession is admissible in evidence does not arise for decision at all. The trial Judge is entitled to admit the confession in evidence as something, which had occurred in the course of the investigation conducted by the Police and thereafter to decide or find a matter of fact at the conclusion of the case as to whether or not, in all the circumstances, the Accused Person did make the statement as alleged by the Police. In other words, where the Accused Person contends that he did not make the confession at all, the trial Court is entitled to admit it in evidence, and thereafter, decide whether or not he had made the statement at the conclusion of the trial. A trial-within-trial is therefore, not required or called for in such circumstances.