Where an averment in a statement of claim is not denied in a statement of defence, same is deemed admitted. That which is admitted needs no proof. See Adesanoye V. Adewole (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 671) at 145 paragraph A.
The definitions assigned to the word/phrases confession or confessional statement by the Evidence Act and the case law, refer to an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime suggesting or stating that he committed the crime. See the case of FRN v. Iweka (2011) 12 SCM (Pt. 2) page 213 @ 218.
The law is well settled in plethora of cases that an accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where same is direct, positive and proved. Again see the case of Akpa v. State under reference supra wherein the principle is affirmatively restated that what is admitted needs no further proof. At page 74 for instance, it was held that:-
a confession is an admission made by an accused person. The duty of the Court is to decide the weight to be attached to it.
So far as the voluntariness of a confession is not in issue, the Court is bound to admit same in evidence if the confession is direct and positive. Where however the voluntariness of a Confessional Statement becomes an issue in the sense that the Statement was/is not the statement made out of the free will or volition of the accused person, the Court at the point the application is made to tender the Statement and an objection is taken thereto, is bound to conduct a trial within trial to ascertain the voluntariness or otherwise of that Statement Nwangbomu V. State (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 327) 380; Igri V. The State (2009) LPELR-4374(CA).
The facts admitted by the Appellant represent the allegation against her for which she was arraigned before the trial Court. The law is settled beyond any argument that admitted facts require no further proof. See NNPC vs Klifco (Nig) Ltd (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.125) 209: Ikare Community Bank vs Ademuwagun (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.924) 275; Ogolo v. Fubara (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.831) 231;Adeleke vs Aserifa (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt 30) 575: Nnonye vs. Anyichie (1989) 2 NLWR (Pt.101) 110.
By the provision of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime amounts to a confession. See Patrick Ikemson & Ors V. The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 455 at 476.
An admission against interest, in order to be valid in favour of the adverse party, must not only vindicate or reflect the material evidence before the court; it must also vindicate and reflect the legal position. Where an admission against interest does not vindicate or reflect the legal position, it will be regarded for all intents and purposes as superfluous. And a court of law is entitled not to assign any probative value to it.
An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily which is positive and unequivocal and amounting to admission of guilt of the person charged can be used by the Court to predicate the conviction of the accused on regardless of whether the maker resiled from it or attempted to retract it: STANLEY ADIGUN EGBOGHONOME v. THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 383. In DIN v. AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS OF NIGERIA LTD (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.139) 392; (1990) 21 NSCC (Pt.2) 313, admissions are held to be the best evidence. The old adage is no man ordinarily tells lies to incriminate himself.
Again to be said is that under Section 251 of the Evidence Act, the wrongful admission of evidence shall not of itself be a ground for the reversal of any decision in any case where it shall appear to the Court on appeal that the evidence so admitted cannot reasonably be held to have affected the decision and that such decision would have been the same if such evidence had not been admitted.
There needs be pointed out that the Evidence Act 2011 at Section 29 (2) (a) and (b) has provided for the circumstances in which a confessional statement would be rejected in evidence.
"Section 29
(2) If in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant, it is represented to the Court that his confession was or may have been obtained.
(b) by oppression of the person who made it or
(c) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely in the circumstances existing at the time to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in such consequences, the Court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the Court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (not withstanding that it may be true) was not obtained in a manner contrary to the provisions of this section.
The definition of a confession is as stated in Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011 thus:
"A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime."
It is now settled law that a confession would be relevant against the person who makes it when the statement is voluntary and thereby admissible. It follows that once a confessional statement is deemed to be positive, direct and unequivocal such a statement would be admitted since it has been voluntarily made and when that is the case such a confessional statement alone as evidence can sustain a conviction. In such a case also there is no need for corroboration. In this, I place reliance on the cases of Yesufu v State (1976) 6 SC 167 at 173; Olabode v State (2007) All FWLR (Pt.389) 1301; Nwachukwu v State (2003) FWLR (Pt.123) 312; Kanu v King (1952 14 WACA 30; R v Omokaro (1941) 7 WACA 146.
It also needs to be emphasised and it's also settled law too, that mere retraction of a voluntary confessional statement by an accused person, as in this instant case, does not render such statement inadmissible or worthless or untrue in considering his guilt. See Idowu v State (2000)7 SC (pt.ll) 50; Silas v State (1996) 1 NILR 59.
It needs be stressed here, that a confession of an accused person to the commission of an offence plays a vital role in the determination of his guilt. Therefore, a trial Court is free to convict him even on the confessional statement alone once that trial Court is convinced that the confession is voluntary as in this instant case. I said so because by his confession, the accused (now appellant) had confirmed the commission of criminal responsibility in terms of mens rea and actus rea. See Okeke vs State(2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.842) 25.
Facts emerging from any pleading, raising new matters and throwing new light on the adversary's averment must be denied. If not denied, they are taken as admitted because there is no element of surprise or embarrassment.
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Ogunleye v Oni, lawonline LGC(27/4/1990) N
The principle of pleadings has time and again been explained in law books and decided cases in this country that I shall be on the superfluous side to cite them. But suffice to restate that pleadings are meant primarily to let parties know each other's case. They can even settle issues so as to save the Court's time, by agreeing on those facts not in contest and leaving the Court to decide from received evidence based on those facts in pleadings contested, the justice of the case
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Ogunleye v Oni, LGC(27/4/1990) N
Therefore all matters not denied in the pleadings whether raised in the statement of claim or statement of defence are taken as admitted
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Ogunleye v Oni, LGC(27/4/1990) N
Being a bonafide beneficiary, the purported appellant has no reason to appeal. I wish to add further that a client is bound by his counsel's concession made on his behalf. SeeMaku v FUT, Minna (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 190 at 235 wherein this Court held that once a counsel is briefed or engaged to handle a matter, he has complete control over the case to decide in his own understanding as how best to conduct his client's case.
l begin to wonder whether one can eat one's cake and have it back again. In other words, can the law permit him to blow hot and cold at the same time? Or, can he approbate and reprobate? The answer definitely is in the negative. However, if in the event that Mr. Nwokedi, SAN is oblivious and or should I say that he has forgotten the position of the law on the fiduciary relationship existing between a legal practitioner and his client, I should respectfully remind him that a counsel representing his client in a civil cause or matter has got enormous powers of making admissions or concessions on behalf of his client which bind the client. I will only cite few decisions of this Court on the issue and I will be contented; Firstly in the case of Okesuyi v. Lawal (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt 170) 661, this Court held as follows: A counsel can, while functioning as such, make admissions of fact which could be binding on his client particularly where such admission was made for the purpose of dispensing with proof at the trial and when the client failed to retract the admission before judgment. Secondly in Okonkwo v. Kpajie (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) at 633 Nnaemeka – Agu, JSC (Rtd) had this to say: I must note that a counsel who is representing his client in a civil cause or matter in litigation has got very wide powers of making admissions on his clients behalf. He is the agent and mouth piece of his client in the litigation. So, he has implied authority to make admissions on behalf of his client during the progress of the litigation, either for purpose of dispensing with proof at the trial, when they are regarded as conclusive, or incidentally as to any of the facts in the case, when they are prima facie evidence only. See on this Langley v. Oxford 5. L.J. Ex. 166, also Holt v. Square RY & M. 282. See also Phipson on Evidence (11th Ed.) pp. 332-334, para 738-740. In the instant case, no issue has been raised to show that counsel made the concession in question without...
After all parties and the Court are bound by the admissions/pleadings – Unity Bank Plc v Bouari (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 372 AT 381, Abubakar v. Joseph (2008)13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 307. Furthermore, Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011 vividly provides as follows: “No fact need be proved in any civil proceedings which the parties to the proceedings or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings”.
PER BAYERO, J.C.A.
Admission of a claim (or part thereof) by an adversary in litigation, whether contained in pleadings or otherwise, is the best form of proof, which obviates the necessity of leading evidence to establish that very same claim. It is hornbook law that facts admitted need not be proved: S. 123 of the Evidence Act 2011, UREDI v DADA (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 69) 237, CHIEF OKPARAEKE & ORS v O. EGBUONU & ORS (1947) 7 WACA 53 and NDAYAKO v JIKANTORO & ORS (2004) 8 MJSC 163 at 185.
As Aniagolu, JSC put it in OJUKWU v ONWUDIWE& ORS 179841 NSCC 172 at 199: “Another principle deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence is that admissions made do not require proof for the simple reason, amongst others that “out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh” and that no better proof is required than that which an adversary wholly and voluntarily owns up on”.
In our adjectival law, an issue in a civil action conducted by pleadings emerges only where the Court, upon a comparison of the averments in the statement of claim and the statement of defence, identifies the matters actually in dispute between the parties and upon which it is necessary to lead evidence. There is no dispute between parties on matters which have been admitted in the pleadings and generally, evidence on such admitted matters is to be excluded.
The isolation of issues truly in dispute from those not in dispute enables the Court to save valuable time and cost, and it is by this process that the Court is enabled to receive evidence only on matters in respect of matters in controversy between the parties. See ADEDEJI v OLOSO (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 356) 670 at 634-635 -per Oguntade JSC and INDIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v THAWARDES (1978) 3 SC 143. PER AFFEN, J.C.A.
In is judgment, the Court below, wherein it was held that inter alia: “The law is that where an accused person makes an extra-judicial statement, admitting the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the statement will still be considered or taken into account in determining his guilt, irrespective of the fact that he had resiled from that evidence in his testimony at the trial, by giving testimony in Court contrary to the previous evidence.
It is a firmly settled principle of law that facts admitted need no further proof and same is deemed established. See NAS Ltd v. UBA Plc (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945)421 @435 A-B, where the Supreme Court, per Akintan JSC, held as follows: “The position of the law is that facts admitted require no further proof.” This Court in the case of Oforlete v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681)415 held that where there is unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence, the Court has a duty to act on it. “ -PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
Section 75 of the Evidence Act is clear that where facts or evidence remain uncontroverted they are deemed as admitted. This was the position in the case of IITA vs. AMARANI (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 332) AT page 303, ratio 13. Therein the Court of Appeal held that:- “…evidence not controverted or discredited or challenged ought to be accepted as proving an existing or alleged fact”. Also in the case of Osuji Vs.
Ekeocha (2009)16 NWLR Pt. 1166 AT page 94 ratio 22(c) the Supreme Court held that a decision of a Court will be held to be perverse where inter alia:- “c) The Court shuts its eyes to the obvious”. And also in the case of NWANGWU VS. FBN PLC (2009) 2 NWLR Pt. 1125 AT page 208 ratios 9, the Court of Appeal defined a perverse decision of the Court as “where a Court misconceives the issues presented before it” See also the case of Palm Beach Insurance Co Ltd vs. Bruhns (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 519) AT page 84, ratio 4.
The Court of Appeal therefore has a duty to examine the grounds, the conclusions or inference of the Court below upon which the said judgment was based and if convinced that they were erroneous, then the Court of Appeal will be justified in taking a different view on such a decision. See the case of RAMANU ATOLAGBE VS., KOREDE OLUYEMI SHORUN (1985)4 SC Prt 1 page 250 AT page 285. It is also in the same vein that the Court of Appeal in the case of NBC vs.
OLAREWAJU (2007) 5 NWLR Prt 2017 AT page 260 ratio 8 line 3 held :- “An Appellate Court may only interfere when findings are perverse or wrong because of some principles of law or procedure. …” PER AKINBAMI, J.C.A.
The law is that facts admitted need no further proof. See, MBA VS. MBA (2018) LPELR–44295 (SC) PP. 24–25, PARAS. F-E, SOLANA VS. OLUSANYA & ORS (1975) LPELR–3097 (SC) P. 10, PARAS. A–B and MOZIE & ORS VS. MBAMALU & ORS (2006) 12 SCM (PT. 1) 306 at 317. It is the law that whatever fact is admitted needs no further proof, such fact is deemed established. Any admitted facts, or fact not disputed or not specifically denied, need no further proof and will be deemed established.
I hold that Exhibits ‘B’, ‘B1’ and ‘B2” examined with the Appellants’ pleadings in their paragraphs 5 and 6 of their statement of defence established clearly that there was a loan transaction between the 1st Appellant and the late Benjamin Nwazue. PER UWA, J.CA.
In law, the failure of the 1st Respondent to make any counter submission to the challenge to the competence of the 1st Respondent’s Suit before the lower Court simply amounts, in my view, to a concession by the 1st Respondent that it is indeed true that his Suit before the lower Court was incompetent as urged upon us by the Appellant.
This is so because in law, where one party is duly served with the arguments of the other party and he fails or neglects or refuses to respond to the said arguments as proffered by the other party, it would be taken that he has conceded to the arguments of the other party. See Dr. Arthur Nwankwo & Ors V.
Alhaji Uniaru Yar’Adua & Ors (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518, where the Supreme Court per Onnoghen JSC, (as he then was but later CJN) had held inter alia thus: “It is settled law that where an opponent fails or neglects to counter any argument or issue validly raised in the brief of argument or during oral presentation, the issue is not so contested and is deemed conceded by the defaulting party.” See Elephant Group Plc V. National Security Adviser & Anor (2018) LPELR-45528(CA) AT pp. 99 – 102, per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Ahmed V. Ahmed (2013) 41 WRN 1, Dairo V.
Aderinoye (2013) 50 WRN 111. Be that as it may, I am aware that in law where an issue raised by one party is not countered by the other party, it does not automatically follow that such arguments, though conceded, are to be taken hook, line and sinker by the Court. Thus, the failure of one party to counter the arguments of the other party alone does not ipso facto, and without more, confer merit on the arguments of the party as the Court is still under a duty to consider the arguments on their own merit. See Adah V. NYSC (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639. See also Elephant Group Plc V.
National Security Adviser & Anor (2018) LPELR-45528(CA) AT pp. 99 -102, per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Tanko V. UBA Plc. (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 80, Obiuweubi V. CBN (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 80, Stowe V. Benstowe (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 450, Elelu Habeeb V. AG. Fed. (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423, Agi V. Access Bank Plc (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1411) 121.
It is therefore, only in deference to the above position of the law and the overriding need to do substantial justice that I intend to proceed to consider and resolve the challenge to the competence of the 1st Respondent’s Suit as canvassed under issue one for determination in the Appellant’s brief. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.
It is trite that uncontroverted facts contained in an affidavit are taken as true and require only minimal proof. See UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC VS. PETRO UNION OIL & GAS CO. LIMITED (2022) 7 NWLR (PT. 1829)199; DANIEL VS. AYALA (2019) 18 NWLR (PT. 1703)25; PLATEAU STATE HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT BOARD VS. GOSHWE (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1338)338; CAPPA AND D’ALBERTO LIMITED VS. AKINTILO (2003) 9 NWLR (PT. 824)49. PER AYODEJI, J.C.A.