Concurrent Findings

It is now trite law, that an appellate Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below unless there is substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings or are shown to constitute a miscarriage of justice or in any way amount to a violation of some principles of substantive law or procedure.

It has been the consistent practice of this Court not to disturb concurrent findings of fact once they are not perverse and are based on the evidence before the trial Court. See OSHO VS FOREIGN FIN. CORP (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157, IRIRI V. ERHURHOBORA (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 173) 253 and IGWEGO VS EZEUGO (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 561.

Where there are concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts, this Court is usually very reluctant to interfere. See Ogundayor vs The State (1991) 4 SC 100 @ 109 H-A; Ogoala vs The State (1991) 3 SC 80 @ 85; Nasamu vs The State (1979) 6-9 SC (Reprint) 112; Lewis vs U.B.A. Plc (2016) 1 SC (Pt.1) 96 @ 120-121.
In order to surmount this hurdle the appellant must satisfy the Court that there is an error of law or of fact on the record i.e. that the findings have been shown to be perverse or some miscarriage of justice or other violation of a principle of law or procedure has occurred.

The attitude of this Court to concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the intermediate Court is quite settled. Unless the appellant is able to show satisfactorily, that the findings of fact are perverse, not supported by evidence and unreasonable, or that have occasioned miscarriage of justice, this Court will loathe to interfere and disturb such findings of fact, particularly, where the findings of fact are supported by evidence in the printed record. See NNAJIOFOR & ORS. v. UKONU & ORS. (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.9) 686 at 705 – 706; BEN v. THE STATE (2006) 16 NWLR (pt.1006) 582 at 593 – 594.

It is settled law that the Supreme Court does not make a practice of interfering with the concurrent findings of facts by the Lower Courts except such findings have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court to be perverse, or erroneous in substantive or procedure law etc, which has not been shown to have occurred in this case by appellant.

This Court, learned respondent's counsel is right, is very hesitant at interfering with concurrent findings of the two Lower Courts and indeed lacks the jurisdiction of interfering in the instant case where their findings have not been shown to be perverse. See Isibor v. State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt.758) 741, Maiyaki v. State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1109) 173 and Itu v. The State (2016) LPELR 26063 (SC).

It has been the stance of this Court, dictated by public policy not to disturb the concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal. The policy, according to Oputa, JSC, in NWADIKE v. IBEKWE (1987) 11-12 SCNJ 72; (1987) NWLR (Pt. 67) 718:
"is dictated both by good sense and by what should be the proper role of the Supreme Court, – it should be in everybody's interest that there should be an end to litigation. It should be of concern to the State that lawsuits should not be too protracted. When two Courts have considered the facts of a case and made concurrent findings, the parties ought to be concluded on those facts. The supreme Court should really not be bothered with messy issues of fact. It should be given ample time and opportunity to concentrate on, and shape, the law of this country and interpret the Constitution. These two functions are those that rightly belong to any country's Court of lost resort. An appellant appealing to this Court and seeking to upset two concurrent findings in favour of the Respondent is thus faced with an uphill task of considerable magnitude. He has to show exceptional circumstances- either that there was some miscarriage of justice or a serious violation of some principle of law and procedure: ENANG v, ADU (1981) 11-12 SC.25 at P.42; LOKOYE v. OLOJA (1983) 8 SC 61 at PP,68 &73; OJOMU v. AJAO (1983) 9 SC.22 at P.53.

An appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with its findings of fact except where it is clear that they are perverse or not supported by evidence or not arrived at as a result of a proper exercise of judicial discretion or the trial Court has not made a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted credible evidence or has taken an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or where they were reached as a result of a wrong application of some principle of substantive law or procedure Ude & Ors V. Chimbo & Ors (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 169 SC.
So, in the absence of compelling evidence indicating erroneous appraisal of facts and erroneous conclusions, an appellate Court must show utmost restraint and reject any temptation to interfere with well-considered findings made by a trial Court – Ude V. Chimbo (supra).

In this case, the Appellant is faced with an uphill task because this Appeal is predicated on the question of facts requiring proof by evidence, and the attitude of this Court on concurrent findings of facts by the two lower Courts is that it will not interfere with the findings except he can show any of the flaws or errors afore-stated – that there was a miscarriage of justice or a serious violation of some principles of substantive law or procedure or that the findings do not flow from the evidence adduced by the parties or that the findings are perverse- See Akayepe V. Akayepe (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 217 SC.

The law is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of facts by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal unless such findings are perverse; or are not supported by the evidence; or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure." See ARABAMBI VS ADVANCE BEVERAGES IND. LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt 959) 1 Per Onnoghen. J.S.C (P. 46. C-F)
In this case, there are two concurrent findings of facts of the lower Courts on the issue, it has always been the practice of this Court in such circumstances to decline to review the evidence a third time unless there is proof of miscarriage of justice or a violation of some principle of law or procedure. or if the finding is/was perverse.
See OCHIBA VS THE STATE (2011) 12 SC (Pt IV) P. 79 Per Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C. (Pp. 51-52, paragraphs F-B). See also CAMEROON AIRLINES VS OTUTUIZU (2011) 12 SC (Pt III) P. 200, OLOWU VS NIG. NAVY (2011) 12 SC (Pt. II) P.1 AROWOLO VS OLOWOOKERE & 2 ORS. (2011) 11-12 SC (Pt. II) P. 98.

The concurrent findings of fact, as was done by the two Courts below, in the instant appeal are rarely disturbed by this Court. Seldom would this Court be compelled to interfere if the findings are perverse or cannot be supported by the evidence before the Court or there is or was a miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure.
See UGWANYI VS F.R.N. (2012) NCC 105 at 123 paragraphs G-H, 124 paragraph 'A', CAMEROON AIRLINES vs. OTUTUIZU (2011) 1-2 SC (Pt. III) 200, ALAKIJA VS ABDULLAHI (1998) 5 S.C. 1, OLOKE VS AGBODIVA (1999) 12 S.C. (Pt. II) 101 and OGBU VS WOKOMA (2005) 7 SC (Pt. II) 123.

As I had earlier alluded to the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below, the question that I must answer at this level is whether there is justification upon which I can interfere with those findings of fact. This question which must be answered advisedly bearing in mind the general principle that where there are concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court below such as in the instant case, the Supreme Court is not likely to disturb such findings which it can only do where those findings are perverse or a miscarriage of justice has taken place whereby this Court can take the stand of intervention or interference with the said findings. A reference to earlier decided cases of this Court along those lines would clear the point. See Ude v Chimbo (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 169 at 186-187 and 194; Woluchem v Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291. For effect see the case of: Adegoke v Adibi (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 410 at 427 where this Court held per Wali JSC that: "Where the trial Court has failed to properly evaluate the evidence before it as a result of which it reached a decision which is perverse, as in this case, the Court of Appeal has a duty, by way of rehearing, to evaluate as if it were the trial Court the evidence that has been adduced... The Court of Appeal should not shrink from the task of such evaluation or be inhibited therefrom just because it is an appellate Court (Emphasis Supplied) In the case of Nneji v Chukwu (1996) 10 NWLR (pt.478) 269 at 278 this Court also held: "A Court of Appeal does not easily disturb the findings of facts of a trial judge who had the singular opportunity of listening to the witnesses and watching them perform. It is settled law, however, that such findings of facts or inferences from time to time may be questioned in certain circumstances." (Emphasis supplied). In the case of Agbomeji v Bakare (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 564) 1 at 19 this Court also said the same thing when it held thus:...

More importantly, the law says that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court below, they will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of the principles of law or procedure is shown thereon – See OGOALA VS THE STATE(1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 506 SC.
In other words, the two lower Courts are concurrent in their decisions and the onus lies on the Appellant to give very good reasons why this Court should interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the two lower Courts. 'It is not a matter of course:- MUHAMMAD VS THE STATE (2017) 13 NWLR (pt. 1583) 386 SC.

I must observe that this appeal is against the concurrent findings of fact of the two Courts below. The law is long settled that the top Court would not upset concurrent findings of fact except the findings are perverse, or were not supported by credible evidence, or there was miscarriage of justice or some principle of law, or violation of procedure. See:
Gundiri & Anor v. Nyako & 6 Ors (2012) 11-12 SC p.62 Dakolo v. Dakolo (2011) 6-7 SC (Pt. III) p.104.
Egunjobi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) 12 SC (Pt. IV) p.148.

I agree with my learned brother, Augie JSC's reasoning and conclusion that this appeal essentially is concerned with the concurrent findings of fact reached by the General Court Martial and the Court below and unless the appellant is able to show that the findings made by the General Court Martial and affirmed by the Court of Appeal led to a miscarriage of justice or are perverse, there will be no justifiable reasons to reverse such finding. See: Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 360 and Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 1 at 12. This Court will hardly set aside the findings of the lower Courts which are predicated on the credibility of witnesses. It is the trial Court that sees the witnesses testify and notes their demeanor and from that assesses their credibility. See:Nwaezema v. Nwaiyeke (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.137) 230; Ishola v. U.B.N. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.922) 422; Onisaodu v. Elewuju (2006) 13 NWLR (pt.998) 517; Anyegwu v. Onuche (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1129) 659 and Agu v. State (2017) 10 NWLR (pt.1573) 171.

In other words, this Court rarely upsets findings made by the trial Court and affirmed by Court of Appeal since the findings were arrived at after cross-examination and observation of witnesses by the trial Court – Adegbite V. State (2017) LPELR-42585(SC).
It is also settled that in order that such concurrent findings of fact may stand the test and enjoy respect, "they must be such that can justifiably be defended primarily from the available evidence" -see Mojekwu V. Iwuchukwu(2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 883) 196 SC.

The two issues, as I earlier stated, turn on whether the two Courts below were right in their concurrent findings of fact. It has to be borne in mind that the policy or attitude of this Court to the concurrent judgments of the Courts below on facts is that: it will not interfere with the findings made by the trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, as the intermediate Court, unless the findings are perverse or not supported by the evidence on the record: OGIDI v. THE STATE (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 824) 1; AJIBULU v. AJAYI (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt.885) 458. The onus is on the Appellant to establish the exceptions, or the exceptional circumstances, that would warrant this Court, the apex Court, to evaluate the evidence, the third time, in order to interfere with or disturb the two concurrent judgments on fact.

As is the usual practice in this Court, this Court is always hesitant in interfering with or disturbing the concurrent findings of two Lower Courts, except of course, where there is manifest error which leads to some miscarriage of justice, or a violation of some principle of substantive or procedural law, or that the findings have been shown to be perverse or there is miscarriage of justice. I am unable to say that any of these vices are shown or manifested in this instant case, hence I will refuse to interfere with or disturb the findings. See Amadi v Nwosu [1992] NWLR (Pt. 241) 273; Eholor v Osayande (1992)7 SCNJ 217; Ogoala v The State [1991) 3 SCNJ 81 or [1981) 3 SC 80 or (1991) 2 NWLR [Pt.175] 509; Dr. Tunde Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt.622) 290 or [1999] 6 SC (Pt.II) 72; Ezeudu v Obiagwu (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.21) 218.

As a matter of practice, this Court rarely interferes with or disturbs the concurrent finding of two lower Court, except in special or exceptional circumstances. See Calaber East Cooperatives Thrift & Credit Society Limited & Ors vs Etim Emmanuel Ikot (1999) LPELR-826 (SC);Dawodu vs Danmole (1962) 1 ALL NLR to 2; Uche vs Eke (1998) 9 NWLR (pt 564) 24; Some of these exceptional or special circumstance that would warrant such interference by an appeal Court are if it is shown that there was a miscarriage of Justice, misconception of fact or serious violation of some principle of law whether substantive or procedural or that such findings were erroneous or perverse. See Chief Alhaji K.O.S. Are & Anor v Kaji Ipaye & Ors (1990) NWLR (pt 13) 298.

There are concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal, and this Court does not, in practice, disturb such concurrent findings unless they have been shown to be perverse or occasioned miscarriage of justice. This is not the case here. See Nwankwo & Anor v Ecumenical Development Co-operative Society (2007) 5 NWLR (pt 1027) 377, Kimdey & Ors v Military Governor of Gongola State (1988) 2 NWLR (pt77) 445; Ferodo Ltd & Anor v Ibeto Industries Ltd (2004) 5 NWLR (pt 866) 317.

It is settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support the concurrent findings by the two lower Courts, such findings should not be disturbed unless there is substantial error apparent on the record.
In other words, this Court will only act to the contrary where the findings of the lower Courts have been shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some material violation of some principle of law or of procedure is shown Amadi V. Nwosu (1992) 6 SCNJ 59.

This Court on very many occasions had held its ground on not disturbing concurrent findings and would only go against that principle if certain conditions are at play. The conditions being if the concurrent findings are tainted with miscarriage of justice or shown to be perverse or against the trend of evidence or based on evidence that is inadmissible in law. Failing these extenuating circumstances, this Court or any appeal Court is loath to interfere with concurrent findings. See Chukwuogor v Obuora (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 454 at 457; Igwego v Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561; Yaki v Bagudu (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt.1491) 288 per Ogunbiyi JSC; R – Benkay Nig Ltd v Cadbury Nigeria Plc (2012) All FWLR (pt. 631) 1450 at 1467.

The law is settled that assessment of oral evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal or trial Court and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial Court has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts, which those facts do not support.
In other words, an appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence by the trial Court in the absence of special circumstances. See Eki v Giwa (1977) 11 NSCC 96 where Obaseki JSC cited with approval the case of Fashanu v Adekoya (1974) 1 LL NLR (Pt. 1) 35 at 41 where this Court held:-
"The appeal before us clearly attacks the findings of facts and seriously challenges the judgment in an area which is only narrowly open to a Court of Appeal. The appraisal of oral evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal of trial and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial Court had made an imperfect or improper use of the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witness or has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts which those facts do not support or indeed has approached the determination of those facts in a manner which those facts cannot and do not in themselves support."

It is noted by me that in this instant appeal there are concurrent findings of facts by the two Courts below both confirming the guilt of the present appellant. The practice of this Court is that it is always hesitant in disturbing or interfering with concurrent findings of judgments of two lower Courts, except on special circumstances bordering on perversion, miscarriage of justice or misconception of law substantive of procedural. See Igwego & Ors Vs Ezeugo & Anor (1992) LPELR – 1458 (SC): Kenneth Ogoala vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509; (1991) 3 SCLNJ 61; Osho & Anor vs Forign Finance Corporation (1991) 5 SC 59; Adeyemi v The State (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.195) 1; Ogoala vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.175) 509.

The two lower Courts are concurrent in their judgments. The law is trite that the said decision cannot be disturbed except only if the appellant shows that the judgment was either perverse or it is shows to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Onyejekwe v. The State (1992) 3 NWLP (Pt. 230) 444: Posu v. The State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 565) 234 at 249: Salu v. Egeibon (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.348) 23: Alsthom S. A. v. Saraki (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 246) 1385 at 1399: University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 156: Ndulue v. Ibezun (2002) (pt.780) 12 NWLR P.139 and Mbadugha v. Nwosu (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt.315) P.110.

The law is well established that concurrent findings of the Courts below will not be disturbed ordinarily except where they are tainted with miscarriage of justice or shown to be perverse.
The appellant in this appeal has not shown or advances any cogent reason at all why the concurrent findings should be disturbed. Plethora of authorities are well established in support of this point. See the decision of this Court in the case of Yaki V. Bagudu (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 149) 288. See also the cases of:- Igwego V. Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561, Mago Chikwendu V. Mbamah (1980) 3 5C 31; Ojomu V. Ajao (1983) 9 SC 22, 53: Lokoyi V. Olojo (1983) 8 SC 61, 68; Onobruchere & Anor V. Esegine & Anor (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799 andKazeem V. Mosaku (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 523 at 536.

t is well settled by numerous decided cases that this Court will not disturb a concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below unless the decision is perverse or erroneous and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced by the prosecution or is a violation of some principles of law. See Olaiya V. State (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 423 at 438, where this Court held and said:-
"The appeal being one against concurrent findings of facts of two Courts below, the appellant is very far from discharging the burden the law places on him of showing that the decision of the Courts below were perverse or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced by the prosecution. In situation such as this, in the present case, I see no reason whatsoever to disturb the findings of the trial Court which were affirmed by the Court below that the appellant was indeed guilty of the charge."
Also on the same principle are the cases of Attah V. State (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 190 at P.226 and Archibong V. The State (2006) 14 NWLR (PT. 1000) 349 wherein this Court relied on its earlier decision in Olokotinti V. Sarumi (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 784) 307 at 317.

Indeed this appeal being against concurrent findings of facts and conclusion of two Lower Courts cannot be disturbed off hand being findings that did not arise from perversity and so rendering no basis for the interference by this Court. This is the law and practice and in the light of the findings stemming from solid evidence based on the law this Court cannot interfere or disturb the findings and the ensuing conclusion.
See Oguonzee v State (1998) 4 SC 110 at 121-122 per Iguh JSC and I shall for effect quote my Lord Iguh at pages 124 ofOguonzee v State (Supra) thus:-
"It is clear from the above findings of the Court of Appeal that this is a clear case of concurrent findings of facts by both the trial Court and Court of Appeal. In this regard, the law is well settled that where there are concurrent findings of fact by both the trial Court and Court of Appeal, again whether in a civil or criminal proceedings, then unless those findings are:-
(1) found to be perverse: or
(2) not supported by the evidence; or
(3) reached as a result of a wronged application of principle of substantive law or procedure:
This Court, even if disposed to come to a different conclusion upon the printed evidence, cannot do so. See Enang v Adu (1981) 11-12 SC 25 at 42; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 718; Igwego v Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 561 etc. Accordingly, this Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal unless a substantial error apparent on the face of the record of proceedings is shown or where an appellant establishes a special circumstance to warrant the reversal of such concurrent findings. See too Sobakin v The State (1981) 5 SC 75; Ige v Olunloyo (1984) 1 SCNLR 158; Eholor v. Osayande (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 524 at 548."

In view of the foregoing, it is my considered view that the judgment of the trial Court cannot be faulted at all and the lower Court was right in affirming and endorsing it. The Appellant has also failed woefully to convince us that this is a situation in which this Court should interfere. The law is settled that if there are concurrent findings of fact made by the High Court and Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court will not readily set them aside or substitute its own views unless there is no evidence to support the findings. "See Re: MOGAJI (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 759; SALAMI VS THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 85) 670; MBENU VS THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.84) 615."Per Aka'ahs, JSC" (page 18, paragraphs D-F). See also MINI LODGE LTD VS NGEI (2009) 18 NWLR (PT. 1173) 254 Per Musdapher J.S.C (Former CJN Blessed Memory) (page 33, paragraphs B-D).
The Supreme Court will only interfere with concurrent findings of facts made by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal where such findings are perverse; or are not supported by the evidence; or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure. None is the case in the instant appeal. SEE ARABAMBI VS ADVANCE BEVERAGES IND. LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 1 Per Onnoghen, JSC. (now CJN) (p. 46, C-E). See also: OCHIBA VS STATE 2011 12 SC (Pt. IV) P.79, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. (pages 51-52, paragraphs F-B). See also CAMEROON AIRLINES VS OTUTUIZU 2011 12 SC (Pt.111) page 200; OLOWU VS NIG. NAVY (2011) 12 SC (Pt. 11) Page 1; AROWOLO VS OLOWOOKERE & 2 ORS. 2011 11-12 SC (Pt. 11) Page 98.

It is settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, such findings will not be disturbed unless the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of principles of law or procedure is shown see Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt 175) 506 SC.

The lower Court did not also waste time but rightly in my view also endorsed the trial Court's conclusion. This was based on sound s in the absence of any evidence to disturb the concurrent findings. See the case of Ochibo V. State (2011) 12 SCM (Pt. 2) page 284 @ 289 where this Court in reiterating the well settled principle of law said:,
"where the two Courts below make concurrent findings of fact, as herein, this Court will not interfere unless same is perverse or runs against current of evidence adduced or occasioned miscarriage of justice

It is also pertinent to note that this appeal is against the concurrent findings of fact made by the trial and intermediate Courts. The attitude of this Court to concurrent findings of fact is that the Court would rarely interfere with such findings unless they are shown to be perverse or to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See: Yesufu Vs Adama (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt.1188) 522; Ogundiyan v. The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.181) 519; Ubani v. The State (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.851) 224.

My Lords, prefatorily, let me re-state the policy of this Court on concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the intermediate Court. That is: this Court will, ordinarily, not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the intermediate Court, unless it is shown that such concurrent findings of fact are perverse. This is the established attitude of this Court in both criminal and civil appeals, as can be seen from the decisions of this Court (just to mention a few) in DAN AWAZA BASHAYA & ORS. v. THE STATE (1998) 4 SC 199; (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.550) 351; A. OLA YESUFU v. ROBINSON OLUSEYI ADAMA (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt.1188) 522 SC; ELIZABETH OGUNDIYAN v. THE STATE (1991) 4 SCNJ 44; (1991) 3 SC 100.

The law is again firmly established that findings of fact must be based on admissible evidence (oral or documentary). Where it is however otherwise and based on inadmissible evidence, the finding will be held as perverse and the law enjoins an appellate Court to interfere there with and set it aside. See Olayinka v. State(2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 561 at 578, where it was held that a decision is perverse where:
i). It is speculative and not based on any evidence;
or
ii). the Court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account; or
iii). the Court has ignored the obvious.
See again Umah v. Akpabio (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt.1407) 472 at 488.

It has been said in a plethoria of cases that this Court would rarely disturb or upset concurrent findings of the two Courts below except there are exceptional circumstances such as the findings are perverse, there is miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure. See
Daniel Holding Ltd v UBA PLC (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt.943) P.533
Solola v State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt.937) p.460.

The law is trite and well settled that this Court cannot disturb or interfere with such findings unless they are shown to be perverse: or are not supported by the evidence, or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of evidence, or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure. See the cases of Arabambi V. Advance Beverages Ind. Ltd. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt.959) 1 at 43 and Nwadike V. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 718.

This Court does not, in practice, disturb such concurrent findings unless they have been shown to be perverse. See Sobakin v. The State (1981) 5 SC 75, Bashaya v. The State (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.550) 351.

The settled policy of this Court is that, this Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless the appellant shows special circumstances of either that there was a miscarriage justice, or that there was a serious violation of some rules of substantive law or procedure, or that the findings of fact do not flow from the evidence adduced at the trial, or that the findings are perverse:ENANG v. THE STATE (1981) 11- 12 SC 25 at 42; AKAYEPE v. AKAYEPE (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt.1152) 277 (SC).

The situation tallying with the concurrent findings of the two Courts below, I cannot see any way to say anything to the contrary in line with this Courts attitude with regard to concurrent findings of fact of Courts below. See Ogoejeofo v. Ogoejeofo (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 301) 1792 at 1802 – 1808 where this Court held thus:
"The attitude of the Supreme Court to concurrent findings of lower Courts is that it will not interfere. With such findings where the findings are reasonably justified and supported by evidence and where no special circumstances why the Supreme Court should interefere with the findings is shown why the substantial error apparent in the Record of proceedings, such as miscarriage of justice or violation of some principles of law or procedure."

The law is trite that where there is sufficient evidence to support the concurrent findings by the two Lower Courts, this Court does not disturb such findings unless there is substantial error apparent in the record. Put differently, this Court does not make it a habit of disturbing concurrent findings of two Lower Courts except it is shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice is occasioned, or some material violation of some principle of law or of procedure is shown to have occurred. See Amadi v Nwosu (1992) 6 SCNJ 59, Ezeudu v Obiagwu (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt 21) 208, Oguanuhu & Ors v Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt.1351) 588.

Where there are concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal, this Court is not likely to disturb such findings unless they are perverse or have led to a miscarriage of justice. See: Mbang v. State (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1352) 48; Ajayi v. State (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1360) 589; Aliyu v. State (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt.1368) 403.

More importantly, the law says that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court below, they will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of the principles of law or procedure is shown thereon – see Ogoala V. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 506 SC.

Furthermore, it is now well known that this Court refrains from disturbing concurrent findings of facts where there is sufficient evidence to support the findings. See: OGOEJEOFO VS. OGOEJEOFO (2006) All FWLR (Pt.301) page 1792 at 1807 where this Court held that:
"The attitude of the Supreme Court to concurrent findings of lower Courts is that it will not interfere with such findings where the findings are reasonably justified and supported by evidence and where no special circumstances why the Supreme Court should interfere with the findings is shown by the substantial error apparent in the record of proceedings, such as miscarriage of justice or violation of some principles of law or procedure."

The judgment appealed is a concurrent decision of the two lower Courts. For the appellant to have a break through, he must show sufficient evidence on record that the lower Court was perverse in its decision. In the absence of such, the appellte Court cannot interfere therewith. See Akpagbue v. Ogu (1976) 6 SC 63: Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291: Enang v. Adu (1981) 11 12 SC. 25 and Amadi v. Nwosu (1992) 5 NWLR, (Pt.241) 273 and also Tiza v. Begha (2005) 5 SC 1 at 17 where Onu, JSC had this to say:-
"It is now trite law that concurrent findings of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal cannot be set aside by this Court except such findings is not supported by evidence."

The above finding is an accurate appraisal of the evidence before the Court. Unless the appellant is able to show the Court that the concurrent findings of the two Lower Courts are perverse, this Court would be reluctant to interfere. The appellant has failed to do so in this case.

Finally, I must observe that this Court is slow to upset concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal but would be quick to upset such findings if found to be perverse, or cannot be supported from the evidence led, and accepted by the Court, or if there was miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle or law or procedure. See Ilodigwe v. State(2012) 5-7 SC (Pt. II) P. 143.

This is because it is not the practice of this Court to interfere with concurrent findings of facts by the two lower Courts, unless the appellants are able to show that the findings are perverse, that there has been a miscarriage of justice or some other violation of some principles of law or procedure. See: NICON V. Power & Industrial Engineering Co. Ltd. (1986) 1 NWLR (pt.27) 1; Afolalu V. The State (2010) LPELR SC.193/2008; Achiakpa & Anor. V. Nduka & Ors (2001) LPELR – SC.28/1996; Kalango V. Governor of Bayelsa State (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt.476) 1839 @ 1864 G-H.

The judgment on appeal now before us is concurrent at the levels of the Magistrate, High Court and Court of Appeal. The law is well settled that a concurrent decision of the Court below is not ordinarily disturbed unless there is a miscarriage of justice. See the cases of Michael v. The State (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1104) 361 at 384: Posu v. The State (2011) All FWLR (Pt.565) 234 at 249 and Onyejekwe v. The State (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 444.

The Supreme Court is slow to set aside concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal but would set aside such findings if found to be perverse, or cannot be supported from the evidence led, and accepted by the Court or if there was miscarriage of justice, or violation of some principle or law or procedure. See
Arowolo v. Olowookere & 2 ors (2011) 11-12 SC (Pt.II) p.98
Nguma v. A.G. Imo State (2014) 2 SC (pt. II) p.1
Akoma & anor v. Osenwokwu & 2 ors 2014 5-6 SC (Pt. IV) p. 1
Anekwe & anor v. Nweke (2014) 4 SC (Pt. III) p. 65.
This has been the practice and it is good. The reason being that the trial judge saw, heard and watched the demeanour of the witnesses. He is thus in the best position to make a correct assessment of the witnesses testimony.
Findings of fact after examination in chief cross examination, and re-examination should be highly regarded and not upset by an Appeal Court, but only when there are exceptional circumstances justifying intervention by an Appeal Court.

It is also settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, such findings will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of principles of law or procedure is shown – see Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 175) 506 SC.

The Supreme Court is not in the habit of interfering with concurrent findings of two lower Courts where there is no reason such as perversity leading to those findings and in that regard those findings remain untouched See Habibu Usman v The State (2014) All FWLR (Pt.713) 1929; Jimmy v The State (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 714) 119.

It is settled law that an appellate Court is duty-bound to limit its consideration to the case made out and decided by the lower Court – see Anfa V. Anyanbola & Ors (1977) NSCC (Vol. 11) 162. In this case, it is clear from the Judgment appealed against that the issue is simply whether there was a plea bargain agreement between the Parties, and convincing this Court to set aside concurrent findings of the two lower Courts that there was none is what the the Appellant is faced with.

PML (NIGERIA)

The law is trite and well established that it is open for an appellate Court to interfere with findings of a trial Court when such findings have been made on legally inadmissible evidence, or they are perverse or are indeed not based on any evidence before the Court. See the cases of SELE VS THE STATE (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt.267) P.276 at 282 and IYARO VS THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.69) P.256. In this appeal, we found facts different from the two Courts below.

The law is settled that if there are concurrent findings of fact made by the High Court and Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court will not readily set them aside or substitute its own views unless there is no evidence to support the findings. See RE: MOGAJI (1986) 1 NWLR (PT.19) 759; SALAMI v. STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.85) 670; MBENU V STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.84) 615. per AKAAHS, JSC (P.18, Paras D-F).
However, the instant appeal is one of those rare occasions that this Court would revisit, for the purpose of fairness and justice re-assess and re-align the concurrency in the findings of the two Courts below us.

When the appeal is predicated on the question of facts, concurrently found by the Courts below, the attitude of this Court is well settled. This Court will not interfere with those findings of facts except when appellant shows special or exceptional circumstances justifying the interference. Such special or exceptional circumstances include the showing either that there was miscarriage of justice; or a serious violation of some principles of substantive or procedural law; or that the findings of fact are perverse, in the sense that they do not at all flow from the totality of the evidence at the trial and or that the findings are unreasonable. See ENANG v. ADU (1981) 11-12 SC 25 at 42; LOKOYI v. OLOJO (1983) 8 SC 61 at 73; OJOMU v. AJAO (1983) 9 SC 22 at 53; IBODO v. ENAROFIA (1980) 5-7 SC 42; AKAYEPE v. AKAYEPE (2009) 11 NWLR (pt. 1152) 217 SC

Furthermore, it is trite that this Court will not set aside, except same is clearly perverse, the concurrent findings of fact of the Court of trial and the court below vide Bakare v The State (1987) 1 NWLR. (Pt.52) 579; Ajeigbe v. Odedina (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 548 (598A).

It is now well settled that this court will not disturb the findings of facts of two courts below unless there is manifest error which leads to some miscarriage of justice, or a violation of some principle of law or procedure.

What is more, where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, such findings will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of principles of law or procedure is shown – Ogoala V. State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 175) 506.

It is also settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, such findings will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of principles of law or procedure is shown – see Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 175) 506 SC.

AMADI V. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF IMO STATE LGC(10/2/2017)I

The Supreme Court is not in the habit of interfering with concurrent findings of two lower Courts where there is no reason such as perversity leading to those findings and in that regard those findings remain untouched See Habibu Usman v The State (2014) All FWLR (Pt.713) 1929; Jimmy v The State (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 714) 119.

AMADI V. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF IMO STATE LGC(10/2/2017)I

Learned Counsel submits further that when a decision is perverse, the appellate Court can intervene in the interest of justice and set it aside. That undoubtedly is the law. See Nepa v. OSOSANYA (2004) 1 SC (pt.1) 159 at 175; AGBOMEJI v. BAKARE (1998) 7 SC (pt.10) 10. It is however not enough for a party to assert that the judgment of a law Court which enjoys the presumption of regularity by dint of Section 150 Evidence Act, 1990. (now Section 168 of Evidence Act, 2011), is perverse. He must show how the decision is perverse. The basic rule is, he who asserts must prove.

AMADI V. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF IMO STATE LGC(10/2/2017)C

Where the two Courts below have made concurrent findings of fact, which has not been shown to be perverse in any respect, such findings must endure. This Court is loathe to interfere in such situation; particularly when the findings are supported by evidence in the printed record and the findings are not perverse. See OGOALA v. THE STATE (1991) 2 SCNJ 61; (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.175) 509; OGUNDIYAN v. THE STATE (1991) 4 SCNJ 44; (1991) 3 NWLR (pt.181) 519).

AMADI V. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF IMO STATE LGC(10/2/2017)B

For a fact what is before the Supreme Court is an appeal based on concurrent findings of facts of two Courts below and I shall refer to the attitude of this Court to such presentations.
In Military Governor, Lagos State v Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 291 at 334 parasF-H, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"In the instant Appeal at this juncture, there are two concurrent findings of fact of the lower Courts. The Supreme Court will not ordinary disturb concurrent finding fact made by the High Court and the Court of Appeal unless a substantial error apparent on the face of the record of proceedings is shown or when such findings are perverse. On going through the record, It is my conclusion that the Court has no duty to interfere with the decision of the two lower Courts.
Akeredolu v Akinremi (No.3) (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) pg. 164; Ibodo v Enarofia (1980) 5-7 SC Pg.42; Ige v Olunloyo(1984) 1 SCNLR Pg.158; Durosaro v Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt.927) Pg.407.
In Ucha v Elechi (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt.1317) 330 at 362 paras D-G, this Court further held as follows:-
This is a case of concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal where there is sufficient evidence in support of such findings and where no substantial error is apparent on the record such as miscarriage of justice and violation of some principle of law or procedure. See Ogunbiyi v Adewunmi (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.93) Pg.215; Shipcare Nig Ltd v The Owners of the M/V Fortunato & Anor (2011) 2-3 SC (Pt.11) p.1; (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1246) 205; Ezeonwu v Onyechi (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.438) p.499″.

The concurrent judgments of the two Courts below enjoy presumption of regularity under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act. It is also a settled principle of law that the apex Court will not lightly interfere with concurrent findings of fact: OMETA v. NUMA (1934) 11 N.L.R. 18. The Appellant' seeking to induce this Court to disturb concurrent findings of fact by the trial and intermediate Courts, bears the burden of showing the special circumstances necessitating the apex Court to disturb such concurrent findings of fact. It is on this principle that this Court, in OCHIBA v. THE STATE(2011) 12 S.C. (Pt. 4) 79, stated that it is not difficult for the Supreme Court to flow along with the concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below.

The law is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of facts made by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal unless such findings are perverse; or are not supported by the evidence; or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure. See ARABAMBI V. ADVANCE BEVERAGES IND. LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt.959) I per Onnoghen, J.S.C. (Pt. 46, C-E). See Also OCHIBA VS STATE2011 12 SC (Pt. IV) p. 79, CAMEROON AIRLINES VS OTUTUIZU 2011 12 SC (Pt. III) P. 200; OLOWU VS NIG. NAVY2011 12 SC (Pt. II) page 1; AROWOLO VS OLOWOOKERE & 2 ORS. 2011 11-12 SC (Pt. II) P. 98.

Above all, this Court does not lightly interfere with the concurrent findings of lower Courts unless such findings are shown to be perverse or not the result of a proper exercise of discretion. Counsel for the appellant, thus, had a duty to demonstrate the perversity of those concurrent findings. Having failed to do so, there is no basis for this Court's interference with them,Sokwo v Kpongbo (2008) All FWLR (pt 410) 680, 695 – 696; H – A; Braimah v Abasi (1998) LPELR – 801 (SC) 34; C – E; Okonkwo v Okagbue [1994] 9 NWLR (pt 368) 301.
Simply put, if learned counsel wanted this Court to upset those concurrent findings of lower Courts he should have shown that there were exceptional circumstances for doing do. Thus, he had a duty to show that the findings are perverse; there was a miscarriage of justice or that a principle of Law or procedure was not followed, Ogbu v. State (1992) 8 NWLR (pt. 295) 255; Igago v State [1999] 14 NWLR (pt. 637) 1; Adeyemi v The State [1991] 1 NWLR (pt. 170) 679; Adeyeye v The State (2013) LPELR – 19913 (SC) 46; Akpabio v State (1994) 7 NWLR (pt 359) 635; Ejikeme v Okonkwo [1994] 8 NWLR (pt 362) 266.

It is well settled that the evaluation of evidence is primarily the exclusive preserve of the trial Court, which has the unique opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify and of observing their demeanour. However both the trial Judge and the appellate Courts have equal right to evaluate documentary evidence. Where the trial Court failed to evaluate the evidence, or failed to evaluate it properly or where such evaluation results in a perverse conclusion, the appellate Court, has a duty to re-assess and evaluate the evidence in order to reach a just Conclusion. See: Gonzee Nig. Ltd. vs. Nigerian Educational Research and Devt. Council & Ors. (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 634; Ogunleye vs. Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 745; Iwuoha vs. NIPOST Ltd (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 822) 308; Rev. King vs The State (2016) LPELR-40046 (SC) 1 @ 49 A D.

As already identified, there is concurrent findings of facts on the custom and tradition of the parties on the right of the Diokpala, the first son, which led to the granting of reliefs (1), (2), (3), (a) and (5) of the claim. It is now trite law, that this apex Court will not disturb such concurrent findings on appeal to it except on exceptional circumstance, or unless there is a substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings. See; Chinwendu Vs. Nwanegbo Mbamali & Anor (1980) 3-4 SC 31 at 75; Kofi Vs Kofi I WACA 284 at 2851; Ganiyu Kale Vs. Madam Coker (1982) 12 SC 252 at 271. It is worthy of note that, the special or exceptional circumstances which will enable this Court interfere with concurrent findings of facts must include a demonstration of occurrence of a miscarriage of justice or a serious violation of some principles of law or procedure or where the findings are shown to be erroneous or perverse. See; Godwin Nsiegbe & Anor Vs Obinna Mgbemena (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1042) 364; (2007) 4-5 SC 1 (2007) SCM (2007) LPELR – 2065. In other words, this Court will only interfere, where not to do so, will occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice and cause perversion. See; Afolabi Coker vs. Mariamo Oguntola & Ors (1985) All NLR 319, (1985) 6 SC 132.
In this appeal, with the peculiar circumstances of the facts and the duty of the Court, to do substantial justice at all times, there is no miscarriage of justice shown by the appellant, hence this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts as stated above. See; Abiodun Famuroti Vs Madam S. Agbeke (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.189) 1; (1991) 6 SC.1; (1991) LPELR – 1240.

Before going further, I am mindful of the fact that what is before this Court is an appeal against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below and this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal as long as the said findings are supported by legally admissible evidence and they are not perverse or have led to a miscarriage of justice. In this, I am guided by the following cases:-Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006)10 NWLR (Pt.988) 382;
Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt.1202) 412,Peter Iliya Azabada v The State (2014) LPELR – 23017.
l

This Court has over the years and without equivocation shown its attitude not to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of both Courts below, the High Court and the appellate Court unless it is established by the appellant that such findings are perverse. I rely on the cases of Sobakin v. State(1981) 5 SC 375: Abirifon v. State (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 619 at 636; Egunjobi v. FRN (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1342) 534 at 555.

What we have before us are concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below. In order to persuade this Court to disturb those findings, the appellant must show that the findings are perverse, not supported by evidence or that there is some other error in law or procedure that has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, See: Omotola & Ors vs The State (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt.1139) 148; Ogundiyan V. The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.181) 519; Iyaro Vs The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.69) 256.

What is more, where there is evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts, such findings of facts will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record: that is – the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of law or procedure is shown -. see Ogoala v. State (supra). In this case, there is nothing perverse about the decision of the trial Court, including conviction and sentence, affirmed by the Court below.

It is also settled that the duty of an appellate Court to interfere with improper findings or correct any erroneous conclusions, would only come into play where a trial Court fails to properly examine and evaluate the evidence adduced by the Witnesses.
In other words, there is not much this Court can do when an Appeal turns on credibility. It is the trial Court that is in the vantage position to believe or disbelieve the witnesses, and that advantage can never ever be recaptured by an appellate Court.
The trial Court's liberty and privilege to believe one side or disbelieve the other can only be questioned on appeal if it is against the drift of the evidence when considered as a whole – see Adelumola v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 683 wherein Oputa, JSC, aptly captured the essence of this principle thus –
For example, we all know that 2 plus 2 makes 4. If a witness testifies that 2 plus 2 makes 5, and he is believed, his arithmetic does not cease to be wrong because the trial Court erroneously believed him. There, and in such a case, an appellate Court can intervene.

Indeed, there is no peg on which the Court can hang an interference with the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below which are founded on sound evaluation of the evidence before the trial Court nor was there any taint of perverseness or a wrong application of the law. This Court or any appellate Court for that matter does not disturb concurrent findings of Courts below just for the heck of it but has to do so in very rare instances of infraction in the application of the law or miscarriage of justice which are clearly absent in this matter

Both the trial Court and the Court below gave judgment to the Respondent and made concurrent findings. Where there are concurrent findings by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal, this Court does not, in practice, disturb such concurrent findings unless they have been shown to be perverse. See Nwankwo & Anor v. Ecumenical Development Co-operative Society (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 377.

The law is settled that assessment of oral evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal or trial Court and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial Court has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts, which those facts do not support.
In other words, an appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the assessment of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence by the trial Court in the absence of special circumstances. See Eki v Giwa (1977) 11 NSCC 96 where Obaseki JSC cited with approval the case of Fashanu v Adekoya (1974) 1 LL NLR (Pt. 1) 35 at 41 where this Court held:-
"The appeal before us clearly attacks the findings of facts and seriously challenges the judgment in an area which is only narrowly open to a Court of Appeal. The appraisal of oral evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a tribunal of trial and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial Court had made an imperfect or improper use of the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witness or has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts which those facts do not support or indeed has approached the determination of those facts in a manner which those facts cannot and do not in themselves support."

It is noted by me that in this instant appeal there are concurrent findings of facts by the two Courts below both confirming the guilt of the present appellant. The practice of this Court is that it is always hesitant in disturbing or interfering with concurrent findings of judgments of two lower Courts, except on special circumstances bordering on perversion, miscarriage of justice or misconception of law substantive of procedural. See Igwego & Ors Vs Ezeugo & Anor (1992) LPELR – 1458 (SC): Kenneth Ogoala vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509; (1991) 3 SCLNJ 61; Osho & Anor vs Forign Finance Corporation (1991) 5 SC 59; Adeyemi v The State (1991) 6 NWLR (pt.195) 1; Ogoala vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt.175) 509.

The two lower Courts are concurrent in their judgments. The law is trite that the said decision cannot be disturbed except only if the appellant shows that the judgment was either perverse or it is shows to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Onyejekwe v. The State (1992) 3 NWLP (Pt. 230) 444: Posu v. The State (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 565) 234 at 249: Salu v. Egeibon (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.348) 23: Alsthom S. A. v. Saraki (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 246) 1385 at 1399: University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 156: Ndulue v. Ibezun (2002) (pt.780) 12 NWLR P.139 and Mbadugha v. Nwosu (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt.315) P.110.

Indeed this appeal being against concurrent findings of facts and conclusion of two Lower Courts cannot be disturbed off hand being findings that did not arise from perversity and so rendering no basis for the interference by this Court. This is the law and practice and in the light of the findings stemming from solid evidence based on the law this Court cannot interfere or disturb the findings and the ensuing conclusion.
See Oguonzee v State (1998) 4 SC 110 at 121-122 per Iguh JSC and I shall for effect quote my Lord Iguh at pages 124 ofOguonzee v State (Supra) thus:-
"It is clear from the above findings of the Court of Appeal that this is a clear case of concurrent findings of facts by both the trial Court and Court of Appeal. In this regard, the law is well settled that where there are concurrent findings of fact by both the trial Court and Court of Appeal, again whether in a civil or criminal proceedings, then unless those findings are:-
(1) found to be perverse: or
(2) not supported by the evidence; or
(3) reached as a result of a wronged application of principle of substantive law or procedure:
This Court, even if disposed to come to a different conclusion upon the printed evidence, cannot do so. See Enang v Adu (1981) 11-12 SC 25 at 42; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 718; Igwego v Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 561 etc. Accordingly, this Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal unless a substantial error apparent on the face of the record of proceedings is shown or where an appellant establishes a special circumstance to warrant the reversal of such concurrent findings. See too Sobakin v The State (1981) 5 SC 75; Ige v Olunloyo (1984) 1 SCNLR 158; Eholor v. Osayande (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 524 at 548."

In view of the foregoing, it is my considered view that the judgment of the trial Court cannot be faulted at all and the lower Court was right in affirming and endorsing it. The Appellant has also failed woefully to convince us that this is a situation in which this Court should interfere. The law is settled that if there are concurrent findings of fact made by the High Court and Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court will not readily set them aside or substitute its own views unless there is no evidence to support the findings. "See Re: MOGAJI (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 759; SALAMI VS THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 85) 670; MBENU VS THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.84) 615."Per Aka'ahs, JSC" (page 18, paragraphs D-F). See also MINI LODGE LTD VS NGEI (2009) 18 NWLR (PT. 1173) 254 Per Musdapher J.S.C (Former CJN Blessed Memory) (page 33, paragraphs B-D).
The Supreme Court will only interfere with concurrent findings of facts made by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal where such findings are perverse; or are not supported by the evidence; or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure. None is the case in the instant appeal. SEE ARABAMBI VS ADVANCE BEVERAGES IND. LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 1 Per Onnoghen, JSC. (now CJN) (p. 46, C-E). See also: OCHIBA VS STATE 2011 12 SC (Pt. IV) P.79, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. (pages 51-52, paragraphs F-B). See also CAMEROON AIRLINES VS OTUTUIZU 2011 12 SC (Pt.111) page 200; OLOWU VS NIG. NAVY (2011) 12 SC (Pt. 11) Page 1; AROWOLO VS OLOWOOKERE & 2 ORS. 2011 11-12 SC (Pt. 11) Page 98.

For a fact what is before the Supreme Court is an appeal based on concurrent findings of facts of two Courts below and I shall refer to the attitude of this Court to such presentations.
In Military Governor, Lagos State v Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 291 at 334 parasF-H, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"In the instant Appeal at this juncture, there are two concurrent findings of fact of the lower Courts. The Supreme Court will not ordinary disturb concurrent finding fact made by the High Court and the Court of Appeal unless a substantial error apparent on the face of the record of proceedings is shown or when such findings are perverse. On going through the record, It is my conclusion that the Court has no duty to interfere with the decision of the two lower Courts.
Akeredolu v Akinremi (No.3) (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) pg. 164; Ibodo v Enarofia (1980) 5-7 SC Pg.42; Ige v Olunloyo(1984) 1 SCNLR Pg.158; Durosaro v Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt.927) Pg.407.
In Ucha v Elechi (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt.1317) 330 at 362 paras D-G, this Court further held as follows:-
This is a case of concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal where there is sufficient evidence in support of such findings and where no substantial error is apparent on the record such as miscarriage of justice and violation of some principle of law or procedure. See Ogunbiyi v Adewunmi (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.93) Pg.215; Shipcare Nig Ltd v The Owners of the M/V Fortunato & Anor (2011) 2-3 SC (Pt.11) p.1; (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1246) 205; Ezeonwu v Onyechi (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.438) p.499″.

The law is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of facts made by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal unless such findings are perverse; or are not supported by the evidence; or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure. See ARABAMBI V. ADVANCE BEVERAGES IND. LTD. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt.959) I per Onnoghen, J.S.C. (Pt. 46, C-E). See Also OCHIBA VS STATE2011 12 SC (Pt. IV) p. 79, CAMEROON AIRLINES VS OTUTUIZU 2011 12 SC (Pt. III) P. 200; OLOWU VS NIG. NAVY2011 12 SC (Pt. II) page 1; AROWOLO VS OLOWOOKERE & 2 ORS. 2011 11-12 SC (Pt. II) P. 98.

What is on ground clearly are concurrent findings of fact of the two lower Courts and it is settled that the Apex Court will not interfere with such findings of fact so long as the said findings are supported by legally admissible evidence that are not perverse or have led to a miscarriage of justice. See Agala v Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt.1202) 412; Osigwe v PSPLS Mgt. Consortium Ltd (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1128) 378; Onwudiwe v FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 988) 382.

Finally, in this instant appeal, I observe that there are concurrent findings of two lower court. It is an established practice of this Court not to interfere with or disturb the findings of two lower Courts except in an exceptional or special circumstances such as where the findings are perverse, or there is misconception of fact or misapplication of law be it substantive or procedural.
None of these special circumstances have been shown to have existed in this instant appeal.I therefore do not see any cogent or compelling reason(s) for me to depart or to disturb or interfere with the concurrent findings. See. Bamgbose vs University of Ilorin & Anor (1999) 6 SC (pt. II) 72; Eholor v Osayande (1992) 7 SCNJ 217; Mbenu & Anor v The State (1988) NWLR (pt.84) 615 or (1988)7 SC (pt.III)71.

"it is trite that where a finding or a decision rightly or wrongly is not challenged on appeal, such a decision rightly or wrongly cannot be disturbed on appeal. In other words, where an appellant has filed no ground of Appeal against any part of the judgment of the trial Court, which is adverse to him, it must be deemed that, that part of the judgment stands."
It is therefore not part of the duty of an appellate Court to disturb the findings of fact made by a trial Judge, except in exceptional circumstances where the inferences from established facts are wrong or where the findings just do not flow or follow from the given evidence; Emiowe v State (2000) 1 NWLR (pt 641) 409, (2000) LPELR-5612(CA). In effect, the finding of the lower Court that the Appellant was the maker of both Exhibit K and Exhibit A, which was not challenged on appeal, remains fact. However, having found that Exhibit A was wrongly admitted as a confessional statement, I would resolve Issue 3 in favour of the Appellant.

Another way of saying it is that, it is a policy situation of the Supreme Court not to disturb concurrent findings of the two lower courts unless special circumstances exist to warrant interference. Such special circumstances include:
(a) Perverse findings;
(b) Error in procedural or substantive law occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
Okulate v. Awosanya (2000) 2 NWLR (pt. 645) 530 at 547 – 548 per Uwaifo JSC; Chinwendu v. Mbamalu (1980) 3 – 4 SC 31; Onwuka v. Ediala (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.96) 182; Adebayo v. Ighodalo (1996) 5 NWLR (pt.450) 507; Ivienagbo v. Bazuaye (1999) 9 NWLR (pt. 620) 552.

It is now well settled that an appellate Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of two lower Courts unless the findings are perverse or erroneous in substance or procedural law. There is no basis, in my opinion for this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts in this case. See Sanyaolu v State (1976) 5 SC 37, Princent v The State (2002) 18 NWLR (pt 798) 19, Amusa v The State (2003) 4 NWLR (pt 811) 595.

The findings of the learned trial Judge in regard to the confession statement and the evaluation of that statement with the evidence proffered as affirmed by the Court below are such that there is nothing perverse and no miscarriage of justice or wrong application of law and so this Court has no business interfering with those findings. I find strength in the case of Iguh JSC in Oguonzee v. State (1998) 4 SC 110. "Before I turn to the treatment of the above findings of fact by the Court of Appeal, I think I need re-emphasize that where facts in issue, whether in a criminal or civil proceedings are accepted or believed by the trial Court, will not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact made by a trial Judge which are supported by evidence simply because there is some other evidence in contradiction of the findings or that if the same facts were before the appellant Court, it would not have come to the same decision as the trial Judge. See Ike v. Ayoola, supra; Ogbero Egri v. Uperi (1974) 1 NMLR 22; Ogundulu & Ors v. Philips & Ors (1973) NMLR 267 etc. This, as already stated, is because findings of fact made by trial Court are matters peculiarly within its exclusive jurisdiction and they are presumed to be correct unless and until an appellant satisfactorily proves that they are wrong. Such trial Courts saw the witnesses and heard them testify and unless the findings are perverse and unsupported by credible evidence, the Court of Appeal will not interfere with them. See Adelumola v The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 683. An appellate Court may however interfere with such findings in circumstances such as where the trial Court did not make a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it drew wrong conclusions from accepted credible evidence or took an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings of fact are perverse in the sense that they did not flow from the evidence accepted by it...

The lower Court had also after duly considering the trial Court's judgment, rightly arrived at the correct finding that the decision of the trial Court is faultless, flawless before finally affirming same. In view of the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts, I find no reason to interfere or disturb such concurrent findings of the two lower Courts which, to my mind, are not perverse. See Adaku Amadi v Edward N. Nwosu (1992) NWLR (pt. 241)273; or (1992)6 SCNJ 59; Kenneth Ogoala vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.176) 509 or (1991) 3 SCNJ 81; Ojo Ogbemudia Ebiolor v Felecia Osayande (1992) 7 SCNI 217 or (1991] NWLR (pt.249) 824.

It is also settled law that where a Court of trial unquestionably evaluates the evidence and justifiably appraises the facts and arrives at a conclusion on the credible evidence before it, an appellate Court will not interfere with such findings of fact. It is not the business of the appellate Court to substitute its own views of the facts for those of the trial Court. The duty of the Court is to scrutinize the evidence on record to find out whether there is evidence on which the trial Court could have acted. See: Oguonzee Vs The State (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.551) 521 @ 543 H – 544 C per Iguh, JSC, Bakare Vs The State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.52) 579; Ogundiyan vs The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.181) 519. It is also settled that once the Court is satisfied with the cogency, high quality and credibility of the evidence of a witness and accepts it, a conviction based on such evidence should not be interfered with unless such evidence, by law, requires corroboration. See: Oguonzee Vs The State (supra).

It is no longer opened to any debate that this Court can only disturb such findings if they are shown to be either perverse, Braimah v Abasi and Anor (1998) LPELR -801 (5C); Ometa v. Nuna (1935) II NLR 18; Okonkwo v. Okagbue (1994) 9 NWLR (pt. 368) 301; unsupported by the evidence before the trial Court; were reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence or a wrong application of the principles of substantive law or procedure, Enang v Adu [1981] 11-12 SC 25, 42; Nwadike v. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 718; Igwego v. Ezeugo [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561, 576; Lamal v. Orbih [1980] 5-7 SC 28; Woluchen v. Gudi (1981) SC 291, 326; lke v. Ugboaja (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 301) 539, 569; Chinwendu v. Mbamali (1980) 3-4 SC 31 etc. These, the appellant, woefully, failed to demonstrate,

This Court will not ordinarily disturb concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts or even with findings based on evidence believed by the trial Court, unless in very exceptional circumstances, for example where the findings or judgment appealed against are perverse: KARIMU v. STATE (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt.633) 1 at 4.

It is no longer open to any debate that this Court can only disturb such findings if they are shown to be either perverse, Braimah v Abasi and Anor (1998) LPELR -801 (SC); Oneta v. Nuna (1935) II NLR 18; Okonkwo v. Okagbue(1994) 9 NWLR (pt. 368) 301; unsupported by the evidence before the trial Court; were reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence or a wrong application of the principles of substantive law or procedure, Enang v Adu [1981) 11-12 SC 25, 42; Nwadike v. Ibekwe [1987] 4 NWLR (pt. 67) 718; Igwego v. Ezeugo [1992] 6 NWLR (pt. 249) 561, 576; Lamai v. Orbih [1980] 5 7 SC 28 Woluchen v. Gudi [1981] 5 SC 297, 326; lke v. Ugboaja (1993) 6 NWLR (pt. 301) 539, 569; Chinwendu v. Mbanali (1980) 3-4 SC 31 etc. These, the appellant, woefully, failed to demonstrate.

The Courts below have found as a fact that Exhibit A is the confessional statement of the appellant. It is now well settled that the Supreme Court will not disturb the concurrent findings of fact of two Courts below unless there is manifest error which leads to some miscarriage of justice, or a violation of some principle of law or procedure. See Amadi V. Nwosu (1992) 6 SCNJ 59, Onwujuba V. Obienu (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt.188) 16, Ogundipe V. Awe (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 88) 188. In this case, the appellant has failed to show why the concurrent findings of the two Lower Courts on the issue of Exhibit A, the confessional statement should be tampered with.

In the same vein, it is trite law that this Court will not ordinarily disturb concurrent findings of fact in favour of a party by two lower courts, unless there is miscarriage of justice or violation of some principles of law or procedure. See; Mogo Chinwendu V. Nwanegbo Mbamali (1980) 3 SC 31, Enang V. Adu (1981) 11 – 12 SC 25; Okagbue V. Romaine (1982) 5 SC 133. Olomu v. Ajao (1983) 9 SC 53; Ogundipe V. Awe (1988) 1 NWLR (pt 68) 118; (1988) 1 SC 216. The situation in this case is very clear and was properly handled by the courts.

The appellants in the case at hand have fallen far short of their expectation by calling upon this court to upset the judgment of the lower court. They have not justified any reason warranting the cause or reason for interference.
In the case of Nsirim V. Nsirim (2001) FWLR Pt 96 P. 433 at page 445 the learned jurist Iguh, JSC also had the following to say on issue of concurrent findings of court:
"I think both courts are perfectly right in the above findings. In the first place, it is trite law that a trial judge having had the opportunity of hearing witnesses and watching their demeanour in the witness box is entitled to select witnesses to believe or facts he finds proved and the Court of Appeal should not interfere with such facts unless they are perverse. So to this court will not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal on essentially issues of fact where there is sufficient evidence on record to support them and where there is no substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings unless special circumstances are shown such as violation of some principle of law or procedure or where such findings are shown to be perverse or patently erroneous and a miscarriage of justice will result if they are allowed to stand."

The law is well settled and has often been pronounced time without number that this court will not ordinarily disturb the concurrent findings of two lower courts except it is shown to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice or to have been perversely reached. See Onyejekwe V. The State (1992) 3 NWLR (pt. 230) 444, Ogundule V. Chief Olabode (1973) 2 SC 71; Balogun V. Akani (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 70) 301; and Posu V. The State (2011) All FWLR (pt. 565) 234 at 249 where it was held by this court that:-
"The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts unless compelling reasons are shown. In the instant case the concurrent findings of the lower courts were not perverse, therefore the Supreme Court will not interfere with it."
A related further authority is the earlier case of Tiza V. Begha (2005) 5 SC 1 at 17 wherein Onu, JSC held and said thus:-
"It is now trite law that concurrent findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal cannot be set aside by this court except such finding is not supported by evidence. See Emeagwara V. Stan PPL (2000) 78 Ircan 1701 at 1720. The trial court found that the plaintiff is the owner of the land in dispute and that Orasoho is the natural boundary between the plaintiff and the defendants. The Court of Appeal confirmed this finding."

Generally, an appellate court does not make a practice of interfering with the award made by the trial court unless it is convinced that:-
(a) the trial court acted upon some wrong principle of law or;
(b) the amount of damages awarded was so extremely high or ridiculously small as to make it, in the judgment of the court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled. See: Agbu v Otubusin (1961) 1 All NLR 299 and Eze v. Lawal (supra).

In essence, the doctrine is well settled, that where there is sufficient evidence to back up concurrent findings of facts by both lower Courts, such unassailable findings ought not to be disturbed. Of course, the exception to the general rule is where it is so apparent there is a substantial error on the record, thus rendering the entirety of the findings perverse, thereby occasioning some miscarriage of justice or material breach of some fundamental principle of law or procedure.
See OGOALA VS THE STATE (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509; (1991) 3 SCNJ 61; (1991) 3 SC 80; (1991) LPELR-2307 (SC) @ 25-26 paragraphs G-B; NASAMU VS. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 153. PER IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.

The facts as now reviewed definitely justify the intervention of the Supreme Court to interfere with the concurrent finding of the Courts below on the question of who between appellant and respondent proved better title. Their lordships in the lower Court came to a perverse conclusion in the face of all that has now been exposed on the printed record. See AKINPELU V. ADEGBORE (2008) 10 NWLR PT. 1096 SC 531 AT 559 – 560. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

Indeed, the law is well settled, beyond per adventure, that findings of Court that are borne out of credible evidence must not be disturbed by an appellate Court, unless such findings are shown to be perverse. See ENANG VS. ADU (1981) 11-12 SC 25; IGBI VS. THE STATE (2000) 3 NWLR (pt. 648) 169; IBIKUNLE VS. THE STATE (2007) LPELR-8068(SC) per Muktar, JSC @ 25 paragraphs C-E.
It is equally settled, that if a Court came to a decision which no reasonable Court of justice applying its mind to proper considerations and directions can come, then an appellate Court having jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from such a decision only on a point of law, would reverse such a decision. The reason being, that the position then is exactly the same as if the trial Court has come to a decision of fact which no evidence whatsoever supports, and the decision in question ought to be considered erroneous in law, and equally perverse. See NAFIU RABIU VS.
KANO STATE (1980)1 per Idigbe, JSC @ 57 paragraphs A-E; BRACEGIRDLE VS. OXLEY (1947) 1 ALL ER 126 (a decision of the Court of five Justices), where in Lord Goddard, CJ remarkably observed: It is of course, said that we are bound by the findings of facts set out in the case by the justices, and it is perfectly true that this Court does not sit as a general Court of Appeal against justices’ decisions in the same way as quarter sessions, for instance, sit as a Court of Appeal against the decisions of Courts of summary jurisdiction.
In this Court, we only sit to review the justices’ decisions on points of law, being bound by the fact which they find, provided always that there is evidence on which the justices can come to the conclusions of fact, at which they arrive. -PER IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.

It is an established practice of this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of two lower Courts, unless in exceptional circumstances.
The only recognized exceptional circumstances, in line with precedent, include: (a) when the findings are perverse; (b) when the findings are not supported by the available evidence; and (c) when the concurrent findings have occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the appellant, Lanre v State [2019] 3 NWLR (pt. 1660) 506; Samaila v State [2021] 5 NWLR (pt. 1770) 562; Lawali v State [2019] 4 NWLR (pt. 1663) 457; Mbang v The State [2013]7 NWLR (pt. 1352) 48; Ike v Ugboaja [1993] 6 NWLR (pt. 301) 569; Ejinima v State [1991] 6 NWLR (pt.200) 627; Mbenu v State [1988] 3 NWLR (pt.84) 615; Kale v Coker [1982] 12 SC 252; Woluchem v Gudi [1981]5 SC 291, 326.
In the instant appeal, the concurrent findings were backed by available evidence that were credible. There was evidence on record, particularly, the testimonies of PW2 and PW3, which the trial Court believed, that the appellant was found to be in possession of a locally- made pistol and a cartridge. The appellant did not raise any objection when he was identified as the owner of the firearm, at the scene where he was apprehended. -PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.

The established judicial policy of this Court is that it will not undertake further evaluation of the evidence the third time; and that it will only interfere and disturb the concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below only when the appellant established that the concurrent findings of fact on which his conviction was sustained were perverse and/or that the concurrent findings fact had occasioned a miscarriage of justice against him: UKAEGBU & ORS v. UGOJI & ORS. (1991) 7 SC (pt. II) 24; (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 196) 127; OLAYODE v. THE STATE (2020) LPELR-52519 (SC) at 18.
EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.:

Concurrent findings of fact are reasonable, credible and justified when they are supported by available evidence on the printed record: OLAGUNYI v. OYENIRAN & ORS. (1996) 6 NWLR (pt. 453) 127 (SC); WOLUCHEM & ORS v. GUDI & ORS. (1981) 5 SC 291; FOLORUNSHO v. ADEYEMI (1975) NMLR 128. EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.
WHETHER AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN BE CONVICT ON CREDIBLE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT? The law is settled that the trial Court, in a criminal proceeding, can convict on credible confessional statement of an accused person, even without more. The criminal Court is empowered by law to convict on evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused person. A confession being an admission by the accused person suggesting or stating that he committed the alleged offence is the best evidence on which to predicate his conviction: FRN v. FAITH IWEKA (2013) 3 NWLR (pt. 1341) 285 (SC); SAIDU v.
THE STATE (1982) 4 SC.41 at 56-57; IKEMSON & ORS. v. THE STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 110) 46. EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.:

Situations in which the Court may interfere with the concurrent judgments of the lower Courts include:- (a) Where the findings are perverse, (b) Where the findings are unreasonable and against the evidence adduced, (c) Where the findings are in violation of some principles of law and procedure, (d) When the findings occasion a miscarriage of justice. See Lokoyi v. Olojo (1983) 8 SC, 61 at 68, Bankole v. Pelu (1991) 8 NWLR (pt. 21 1) 23, Ajayi v. Adebiyi (2012) 14 NWLR (pt. 1310) 137, Bayol v. Ahemba (1999) 10 NWLR (pt. 623) 381, Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (2011) 4 NWLR (pt. 1238) 512.
Mohammed Lawal Garba, J.S.C

Clearly, what is evident is that the exceptional circumstances that would make the Supreme Court disregard its policy of not intervening in concurrent findings have made themselves available here, leaving the Court no option than to resolve the doubts that are present in favour of the appellant in line with the decision in Yav v State (2005) 2 NWLR (pt. 917) 1 at 25; Shekete v The Nigerian Airforce (2000) 15 NWLR (pt. 692) 868 at 880-881. PER PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.