Confessional Statement

A confessional statement of a co-accused is no evidence against the other accused person, unless he adopted the confession by word or conduct:

Ozaki & Anor v. State LGC(12/1/1990)O

It is trite law that where a person makes a free and voluntary confessional statement which is direct and positive and is properly proved, a trial Court can comfortably convict him even on such confessional statement alone, without necessarily looking for any corroborative evidence.

UMARU SUNDAY v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA LGC(14/12/2018)N

It is also trite that confession remains the best form of evidence against the accused for no rational being, all things being equal, says anything against his interest.

MUSA v. THE STATE LGC(11/01/2019) F

It is a trite law that an accused person can be convicted on his Confession alone. A voluntary Confession of guilt by an accused is sufficient to warrant conviction without corroborative evidence if it is direct, positive, duly made and satisfactorily proved. See Sule VS The State (2009) 4 NCC 456, Amanchukwu VS. FRN (2009) 4 NCC 58 Amoshima VS. The State (2009) 4 NCC 280.

Where an accused person denies making a Statement to the Police, such denial does not affect its admissibility. The Court is entitled to admit the statement in evidence and consider the weight to attach to it in light of all the evidence before it. The approach is different where the accused person challenges the statement on the ground that it was not made voluntarily. In that circumstance, the learned trial Judge is obliged to conduct a trial within trial to determine its voluntariness, See: The State Vs Salawu (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt.1279) 883 @ 905 – 906 G – A; Dawa & Anor. Vs The State (1980) N.S,C.C, 334 @ 345; Ogunye Vs The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.604) 548 @ 570.

On the issue of endorsement of the said statement by an SPO, it needs to be emphasised here, that the practice of having an SPO to verify and confirm that a confessional statement of an accused was voluntarily given, does not have the force of law. It is merely a desirable practice, therefore any confessional statement which was not so verified should not of necessary without more, be viewed with any air of suspicion. In other words, the fact that an SPO was not called to testify as in this instant case [which even the reason for her absence was given) will not affect the admissibility or credibility of the endorsement of Exhibits P5 and P21. See the case of Dibie v State(2007) 2 NSCQR 1431.

The law is trite that mere retraction of a voluntary confessional statement by the accused person does not render it inadmissible or worthless. See Egboghonome v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 383 and Joseph Idowu v. State (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 50, also Dibie v. The State (2007) 3 SCNJ 160 at 171.

I agree with learned appellant's counsel that by virtue of a chain of decisions of this Court, see R V Sykes (supra) Dawa v. State (supra) and Ikpasa v. State (supra), it is desirable to base the appellant's conviction on further evidence outside his confession, the requirement for such corroborative evidence is however not mandatory. The principle still is that the Court, where the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal and is properly proved, may convict an accused solely on such a confession. As learned respondent's counsel rightly submitted, there is no evidence stronger than a person's admission of the state of affairs: See Stephen V. State (supra), Oguonze v. State (supra) and Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 523.

A confession is an admission by an accused stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime, and I did say earlier, inference means a conclusion reached by considering other facts, and deducing a logical consequence from them.

This Court has repeatedly stated that the appropriate time to object to the admissibility of a statement said to be a confession is when the statement is sought to be tendered – see Oseni V State (2012) LPELR-7833(SC). Wherein I.T Muhammad JSC observed-
There was no objection to the admissibility of the Appellants confessional statement. It is rather too late to raise such an issue on appeal. It {is} regrettable that Appellants counsel at the trial stage did not object to the admissibility of [this] confessional statement, yet he went on to blame the trial Court in not treating Appellants confessional statement with utmost caution. It will appear to be too late in the day to seek to supply a remedy to a dented or a crucified matter, which can hardly be revived... It is too late to seek to retract such confessional statement after its admission without objection from the defence. It is always taken as an afterthought, which Courts are not ready to accommodate.

The position of the law as regards confessional statements is not without its peculiarities. Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011, says a confession is an admission made by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed it. In my view, the key word there is inference" which simply means, "A conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them"– Blacks Law Dictionary 9th Ed.

In a criminal trial the guilt of the accused person for the commission of any crime can be proved by any or all the following methods;
1. The confessional statement of the accused person or
2. Circumstantial evidence,
3. Evidence of an eye witness.

The retraction of the confessional statement by the appellant did not change the situation in the light of the statement being direct, positive and related to acts, knowledge or intention, stating or suggesting the inference that the appellant committed the offence charge. That there was no corroboration would in the circumstance not matter. However, the Court out of prudence could look for something outside of that confessional statement that would show that the confession was probable. That is to say that it is trite that an accused can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where the confession is consistent with other ascertained facts which have been proved. See Bassey v State (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.1314) 209 at 227; Akpan v State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.248) 439 at 468.

In fact, it is the law that in appropriate cases, an accused person can properly be convicted on his or her confessional statement alone. Ojegele v. The State (1988) 1 NSCC 276. Although it is always preferable to have some evidence outside the confession in further proof of the offence, the absence of such additional proof would not necessarily prevent a Court from convicting on the confessional statement alone provided the statement satisfies other conditions such as being positive, direct and unequivocal. Queen v. Obiasa (1962) 1 All NLR 651.

I must say that I am satisfied with the position taken by the two Courts below. It is trite that an accused person may be convicted on his confessional statement even if retracted. However, the Court is expected to look for evidence outside the confessional statement no matter how slight tending to show that the accused committed the offence.

Different considerations and principles of law govern the admissibility of a confessional statement disowned and one objected to as involuntarily made, see lkpasa V. Bendel State (1981) NSCC 300, where Udoma, JSC, explained: A distinction is usually drawn as regards practice and procedure in relation to the admissibility of a confession in evidence between a confession objected to on the ground that it was not made at all by an Accused, in which case such a confession may be said to have been retracted, and a confession objected on the ground that it was not voluntary in that although an Accused Person agreed to have made the confession, his complaint would be that he was forced or induced to make it. In the latter case, what is attacked is the admissibility in evidence of the confession and, therefore, a trial within trial must be held, the confession having been challenged on voi dire so as to determine whether or not the confession was voluntary. lf at the end of trial, the Court comes to the conclusion that the confession was not voluntary, then it is not admissible in evidence, and the Court should so rule. In the former case, where the confession is wholly retracted, the question as to whether or not the confession is admissible in evidence does not arise for decision at all. The trial Judge is entitled to admit the confession in evidence as something, which had occurred in the course of the investigation conducted by the Police and thereafter to decide or find a matter of fact at the conclusion of the case as to whether or not, in all the circumstances, the Accused Person did make the statement as alleged by the Police. In other words, where the Accused Person contends that he did not make the confession at all, the trial Court is entitled to admit it in evidence, and thereafter, decide whether or not he had made the statement at the conclusion of the trial. A trial-within-trial is therefore, not required or called for in such circumstances. On the other...

As I stated earlier the fact that the accused denied at the earliest opportunity of making the statement, that does not stop the statement being admitted in evidence but the timing of the retraction lends weight in considering what use it would be put. In this I am guided by the words of my learned brother Ngwuta JSC in Demo Oseni v The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351 at 372-373 where he stated as follows:
"The Appellant took the earliest opportunity when the statement was offered in evidence to deny having made it. A mere denial without more, even at the earliest opportunity, cannot on the facts of this case, lend weight to be denial. The denial is bare statement bereft of any supporting fact and standing only on the ipse dixit of the Appellant. As stated earlier, the statement was not challenged on ground of voluntariness and the trial Court rightly declined the invitation to conduct trial within trial".

In that consideration of weight in the resiled confessional statement the following questions are asked of himself by the trial judge, viz:
1. Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true?
2. Is it corroborated?
3. Are the relevant statements made in it of facts, true as far as they can be tested?
4. Was the accused the one who held the opportunity of committing the offence alleged?
5. Is his confession possible?
6. Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved? See the case of Dibie v The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 30.

The law is that confessional statement, which is voluntarily made, positive and unequivocal stating or suggesting the inference that the accused person committed the crime for which he is charged, is capable, without more, of grounding a conviction. See: Nwaebonyi Vs The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.343) 138; Odeh Vs The State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt.1103) 1; Mohammed Vs The State (2007) Vol.37 WRN 1: Ikpo Vs The State (supra). It has however been the practice of the Courts, over the years, to consider other facts established by evidence outside the confessional statement to determine whether the confession is probable. This is sometimes referred to as the rule in R Vs Sykes (1913) 8 C.A.R. 233. The factors to be considered, as laid down in that case are:
1. Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true?
2. Is it corroborated?
3. Are the relevant statements made in it true as far as they can be tested?
4. Was the accused person one who had the opportunity of committing the crime?
5. Is the confession possible?
6. Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved?
See also: Egboghonome Vs The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.306) 383; Ojegele Vs The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.71) 414; Akpa Vs The State (2007) 2 NWLR (1019) 500.

Exhibit A1 is the appellant's extra-judicial confessional statement. Interestingly, he, subsequently, resiled from it, perhaps, in the vain hope that its admission as a voluntary statement could be vitiated. It is proper, therefore, to remind him now that a retraction or denial of a confessional statement (as he did) does not affect its admissibility. This has long been settled in the very old cases of R v Sapele and Anor (1952) 2 FSC 74; R v. Itule(1961) All NLR 462; the relatively old decisions of Ikpasa v. The State (1981) 9 SC 7; Akpan v. State(1992) LPELR-381 (SC) 36; Osakwe v State (1994)2 SCNJ 57; Nwangbomu v. The State (1994) 2 NWLR (pt327)380; Bature v State(1994) 1 NWLR (pt 320) 267; Eragna & Ors . The AG, Bendel (1994) LPELR-(SC) 30; Idowu v. State (1998) 11 NWLR (pt 574) 354; as well as the more recent decisions of Silas Sule v. State(2009) LPELR-3125 (SC) 28-30, G-B; FRN v Iweka (2011) LPELR-9350(SC 53; Oseni v The State (2012) LPELR -7833 (SC) 22- 23. In such a situation, the only thing the Court has to do is to consider the principles outlined in Case Law in determining whether or not to believe and act on such a confession which the accused person resiled from as enunciated in R. v. Sykes (1913) B C. A. R.233, 236; Kanu v The King (1952) 14 WACA 30; The Queen v. Obiasa(1962) 1 All NLR 651; lL962l 1 SCNLR L37; Obosi v The State (1965) NMLR 129. Others include: Onochie and Ors v The Republic (1966) NMLR 307; Jafiya Kopa v. The State(1971) 1 All NLR L50 Dawa v The State (1980) 8 -11 SC 236;Ejinima v The State (1991) 5 LRCN 1640, 1671; Arthur Onyejekwe v The State (1992) 4 SCNJ 1,9; (1992)3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 444; Aiguoreghian & Anor. v. The State (2004)3 NWLR (pt 860) 367; (2004)1 SCNJ 65;(2004)1 SC (pt.1) 65. These are: whether there is anything outside the confession which may vindicate its veracity; whether it is corroborated in any way; whether its contents, if tested, could be true; whether the defendant had the opportunity of committing...

Exhibit A1 is the appellant's extra-judicial confessional statement. Interestingly, he, subsequently, resiled from it, perhaps, in the vain hope that its admission as a voluntary statement could be vitiated. It is proper, therefore, to remind him now that a retraction or denial of a confessional statement (as he did) does not affect its admissibility. This has long been settled in the very old cases of R v Sapele and Anor (1952) 2 FSC 74; R v. Itule(1961) All NLR 462; the relatively old decisions of Ikpasa v. The State (1981) 9 SC 7; Akpan v. State(1992) LPELR-381 (SC) 36; Osakwe v State (1994)2 SCNJ 57; Nwangbomu v. The State (1994) 2 NWLR (pt327)380; Bature v State(1994) 1 NWLR (pt 320) 267; Eragna & Ors . The AG, Bendel (1994) LPELR-(SC) 30; Idowu v. State (1998) 11 NWLR (pt 574) 354; as well as the more recent decisions of Silas Sule v. State(2009) LPELR-3125 (SC) 28-30, G-B; FRN v Iweka (2011) LPELR-9350(SC 53; Oseni v The State (2012) LPELR -7833 (SC) 22- 23.

In addition, the appellant made a confessional statement, Exhibit A1, although he resiled from it at the trial. It is settled law that as long as the confessional statement was voluntarily made and properly admitted in evidence, its subsequent retraction by the accused person will not vitiate its admission as a voluntary statement. In such circumstance, the Court would usually look for some independent corroboration, no matter how slight outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession is true. See: Salawu Vs The State (1971) NMLR 249 @252; Aremu Vs The State(1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.201) 1; Ikemson Vs The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 455; Oseni Vs The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351.

It is not the law that by resiling from his extra judicial confessional statement the appellant is automatically entitled to an acquittal. It is long settled that he can be convicted solely on his free confessional statement that is direct, positive and unequivocal. See Nwachukwu V. State (2002) LPELR-2084 (SC)and Rabi lsma'il v. The State(2011) LPELR-9352 (SC).
Over the years, however, the practice has evolved where, beyond the confessional statement of the accused, Courts ensure that other available evidence further establish the fact that the accused person indeed perpetrated the criminal act. See R V Sykes {1913) C.A.R. 233, Akpan v. The State (1992) LPELR-381 (SC) and Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Faith Iweka (2011) LPELR-9350 (SC).

In discharging the burden of establishing its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, as it is enjoined to do pursuant to Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the prosecution may rely on:
a. Direct evidence of eye witnesses;
b. Circumstantial evidence; and/or
c. The confessional statement of the accused person.
See: Igabele v. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.975) 100 @ 120 121 H A; Abirifon v. The State (2013) LPELR 20807 (SC); Adio v. The State (1986) 5 (SC) 194 @ 219 220; Itu v. The State (2016) LPELR 26063 (SC) @ 26 B C.

My Lords, may I state that the law is well settled that an accused person can be safely convicted on his retracted confessional statement if the trial Court is satisfied that the accused made that statement, and as to the circumstances which gave credibility to the contents of the confession. Be that as it may, it is desirable that before a conviction can be properly based on such retracted confessional statement, there should be some corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See Ikechukwu Okoh v. The State (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt.1410) 502, Uluebeka v. The State (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt.665) 404, Adamu Saliu v. The State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt.1420) 65, Galadima v. The State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt.1333) 610.

Proof of the guilt of an accused person by the prosecution must be done through any of the underlisted methods, namely:-
(a) The voluntary confession of the accused person.
(b) Through direct credible and reliable eye witness(s) or victim of the offence account depending on the circumstance of the offence, and
(c) Through circumstantial evidence pointing or focusing on the guilt of the accused person that he was the one or one of the persons who committed the offence(s) charged and by no other person(s) but him. See Adio v The State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.24); Emeka v The State (2001) 6 SC 227; Egboghonome v The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.306) 383.

Nevertheless the Supreme Court in DAWA V. THE STATE (1980) 8 11 SC 238 in reliance on the English decision in R v. SKYES (1913) 18 CR APP Reports and cited KANU V. R. 14 WACA 30, highlighted six test for the verification of confessional statement before any weight can be attached to them. The six tests are as follows:-
1. Is there anything outside it to show that it is true?
2. Is it corroborated?
3. Are the statements made in it of fact true as they can be tested?
4. Was the Prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the offence?
5. Is his confession possible?
6. Is it consistent with facts which have been ascertained and which have been proved going through each of these six tests it will be seen that the prosecution has satisfied each of these requirement. Not only is the confession of the appellants possible, facts contained in them are in complete harmony with the evidence of PW1, PW2, and PW3. The statements in Exhibits A and B are true, having been found to be so by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

In this instant case, I am not unmindful of the fact that the present appellant had while testifying for his defence retracted his confessional statement, (Exhibit A). In the case of Edet Offiong Ekpe v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt.363) 3 263, the question arose as to whether the Court would consider a voluntary statement made by an accused person but later retracted as in this instant case. This Court had this to say:-
This Court considered other decisions which were apparently inconsistent in their approach to the issue of confession voluntarily made but later retracted during the trial. The matter was put to rest in a full Court decision in the case of Stanley Egboghonome v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.306) 363. In over ruling its earlier decision in Oladejo v The State (supra), this Court held that once a confessional statement is admitted in evidence it becomes part of the case for the prosecution having formed part of the case for the prosecution, the Judge is bound to consider its probative value when considering the retraction made subsequently.
This decision has been followed in the case of Nwangbomu v. The State (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt 327) 380.
Therefore, despite the fact that the appellant had, at the trial, retracted his confessional statement, the trial Court was correct to have acted on it in convicting the appellant and the Court below also had rightly affirmed or endorsed such the trial Court's reliance on the voluntary statement of the appellant (Exhibit A) in convicting him.

A voluntary confession of guilt of an accused person if fully consistent and probable and also if there is a clear proof that a crime had been committed by some person or persons, is regarded or accepted as satisfactory evidence on which a Court can convict. See Kenneth Ogoala vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 or (1991) 3 SCNJ 61 or (1991) 3 CC 80. It is however trite law, that a confessional statement is only admissible, if it is direct, free, clear unambiguous and positive and if the maker relates his acts, knowledge or intention stating or suggesting the inference that he had actually committed the crime charged. See Akpan vs The State (1992) 7 SCNJ 22; or (1992) LPELR – 381 SC. Similarly, I must add, that a confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground a conviction, if such confession is consistent with other ascertained facts which have been proved. See also Akpan v State (supra). In fact, a confession alone is sufficient to ground a conviction even where such confession is retracted at the trial (as in this instant case) provided the truth of the matter in the statement is established by some other evidence no matter how slight. See Wahab Onasanya Mumuni & Ors vs The State (1975) 1 ALL NLR 294 or (1976) 6 SC 66 or (1975) LPELR 1926 SC.

On the effect of the failure in taking the accused before a superior police officer after his statement was obtained, the practice and procedure, although desirous is not however a legal requirement. See Solola v. The State (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 937) P.460 at 484 where this Court held and said:-
"... It is not a rule of law that the confessional statement of the accused person should be taken to a superior police officer in order that the accused may deny or admit making the statement: See R v. Omerewure & Sapele (1957) 2 FSC 24."

On the confessional statement of the appellant which was resiled by him, the Court having admitted it after trial within trial was conducted, can convict the appellant on that. The law is that a free and voluntary confession of guilty by an accused person if it is direct and positive and satisfactorily proved should occupy the high place of authenticity when it comes to proof beyond reasonable doubt. That is why such a confession by itself alone is sufficient without corroboration to warrant a conviction and there cannot be such a conviction unless the trial Court is satisfied that the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This Court again in SHUAIBU ABDU VS THE STATE (2006) 12 SC (Pt. Vl) at page 103 held that – ".......The prosecution heavily relied on the confession of the accused/appellant in proof of its case. I am mindful of the fact a free and voluntary confession of guilty whether judicial or extra-judicial which is direct, positive and properly proved is enough to establish a conviction, so long as the Court is satisfied with its truth. See:- THOMAS AKPAN EKONG VS THE STATE (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 685) 353; ODEY VS F.R.N. (2008) 3-4 SC 142." However, in EGBOGHONOME VS THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 383 it was held that:- "Where an extra-judicial confession has been proved to have been made voluntarily and it is positive and unequivocal and amount to an admission of guilt, as in the instant case, it will suffice to ground a finding of guilt regardless of the fact that the maker resiled there-from or retracted it altogether at the trial, since such u-turn does not necessary make the confession inadmissible." See also QUEEN VS ITULE (1961) 2 SCNLR 183; AREMU VS THE STATE (1984) 6 SC 85; EJINIMA VS THE STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 200) 62; AKPAN VS THE STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 439 and AKINFE VS STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.85) 729. In SULE VS THE STATE(2009) 4 NCC 456, this Court decided that:- "A Court can...

I shall refer to the findings and conclusion of the learned justices of the Court of Appeal with respect to Exhibit B for further clarity leaving nothing to speculation and it is hereunder, viz: –
"The test for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is whether there is any evidence outside the confession to show that the confession is true, whether it is corroborated no matter how slightly, whether the facts contained therein as far as can be tested are true whether the accused person had the opportunity to commit the offence whether the confession of the accused person was possible and whether the confession is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved. See Ubierho v. State (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt. 219) 1028 at 1047 and Ubierho v. State (2005) 2 SC (Pt. 1) SC.
The above principles were adopted in Nsofor & Anor v. State (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 244) as at the six way test to be applied in determining the weight to be attached to a confessional statement retracted or not."

In view of the foregoing, no one is left in doubt that the lower Court relied on Exhibit B with caution and scepticism by seeking other corroborative or independent available evidence to determine whether Exhibit B can be said to have passed the six-way test of a true confession which are: –
"vi) Whether the confession is the truth;
vii) Whether the confession was corroborated;
viii) Whether the confession was free as can be tested;
ix) Whether the Appellant had opportunity to commit the crime;
x) Whether the confession was possible; and
xi) Whether the confession was consistent with other proved or ascertained facts."See: KANU VS THE STATE (1952) 14 WACA 30; MBENU VS THE STATE (1988) 3 NWLR (pt. 84) 615; STEPHEN VS THE STATE (1986) (pt. 46) 978; and UDO VS THE STATE (1972) 8-9 S.C. 234; GRACE AKINFE VS THE STATE (1988) 7 SCNJ (pt. 11) 226 at 237 – 238.

This Court, in PETER ILIYA AZABADA VS THE STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (Pt.751) 1620, Paragraph B had made it abundantly clear that the confessional statement of an accused, where it is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the commission of the crime charged, is the best evidence and can be relied upon solely for conviction of the accused person. Confession in criminal procedure is the strongest evidence of guilt on the part of an accused person. It is even stronger than evidence of an eye witness because the evidence comes from the horse's mouth who is the accused person. There is no better evidence and there is no further proof. Therefore where an accused person confesses to a crime in the absence of an eye witness to the killing, he can be convicted on his confession alone once the confession is positive, direct and properly proved.
The law, however warns that, like in the circumstance of the present case, where a confessional statement is retracted (in full or partially at the trial), the Court can convict on a confessional statement retracted at the trial if satisfied that the accused person made the statement and as to the circumstances which give credibility to the contents of the confession. But it is desirable that; before a conviction can properly be based on such a retracted confession, there should be some corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See: MUFUTAU AREMU VS THE STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.201) 1 at 15; BASSEY VS THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 469 at 479, OTUFALO VS THE STATE (1968) NMLR 261 at 265-266, NSOFOR VS. THE STATE (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 775) 274 at 293.

Confessional statement is the best evidence to ground conviction and, as held in a number of cases, it can be relied upon solely where voluntary. The criminal guilt of an accused person could be established by confessional statement, circumstantial evidence and evidence of an eye witness. A confessional statement does not become inadmissible even if the accused person denied having made it. This has been the settled position in our jurisprudence of criminal justice. See for example PARTICK IKEMSON & 2 ORS VS. THE STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (PT.110) 455 at 416 Paragraph D; JOSEPH IDOWU VS. THE STATE (2000) 7 SC 50 at 62: (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 680), at 48 NKWUDA EDAMINE VS THE STATE (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 438) 530 at 537 Paragraphs D-E; SAMUEL THEOPHILOUS VS THE STATE (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 423) page 139 at 155 paragraphs A-B; and AWOPEJU VS THE STATE (2002) 3 MJSC 141 at 151.

By virtue of the provision of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, confessional statement is tenable and admissible. The section describes a confessional statement thus: –
"A confession is an admission made at any time by a person, charged with a crime tending to show or suggest the inference that he committed the crime."

The test of determining the veracity or otherwise of a confession is whether there is any evidence outside the confession to show that the confession was or is true; that is whether it is corroborated. See UBIERHO VS. THE STATE (2005) 2 SC, part 1. See also NSOFOR & ANOR VS THE STATE (2005) All FWLR (pt. 244) on the six-way test to be applied in determining the weight to be attached to a confessional statement.

For the law is settled that an accused person can be convicted solely on his confessional statement if same is made voluntarily. See Ntaha v State (1972) 4SC1; lkemson v State(1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110)455; Saidu v State (1982) 3 SC 41.

An accused person can resile from his statement to police in one of two ways,that is:-
1. He can say that he never made the statement at all; or
2. That he made the statement or signed it, but not voluntarily. See Nwangbomu v State (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt 327) 380, where this Court held that the mere denial by an accused of having made a statement confessing to the crime charged is a question of fact that the trial Court must decide. It does not make the statement inadmissible. It must however, be considered along with the entire evidence and circumstance of the case for the weight to be attached to it.

As rightly submitted also by the respondents counsel, the retraction of the statement made by the appellant will not affect same adversely once the Court is satisfied as to its truth. See again the case of Nwachukwu v. State supra.
It follows from the foregoing that a confessional statement properly made by an accused person as in the case at hand is the best guide to the truth of the part played by him – see the case of Salawu v State (2011) 10 SCM 76. Once such statement is admitted therefore, it becomes part of the prosecutions case which the Court must consider as done in the present case. Again, see the case of Nwachukwu v. State (supra) @ 455.

The definitions assigned to the word/phrases confession or confessional statement by the Evidence Act and the case law, refer to an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime suggesting or stating that he committed the crime. See the case of FRN v. Iweka (2011) 12 SCM (Pt. 2) page 213 @ 218.
The law is well settled in plethora of cases that an accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where same is direct, positive and proved. Again see the case of Akpa v. State under reference supra wherein the principle is affirmatively restated that what is admitted needs no further proof. At page 74 for instance, it was held that:-
a confession is an admission made by an accused person. The duty of the Court is to decide the weight to be attached to it.

The saying is well established and also true that even the devil does not know the state of a mans heart. Rather he alone is the best person fully possessed of his own intention.
This restatement has confirmed the adage why a confessional statement made by an accused person is always rated as the best form of evidence. It is no wonder therefore that the law lays down the three ways to prove the guilt of an accused as follows:-
1) through d confessional statement made by the accused.
2) by circumstantial evidence.
3) by evidence of an eye witness.

It is also a settled principle of law that the guilt of an accused person may be proved by any or all of the following ways:-
a). confessional statement of the accused;
b). circumstantial evidence and
c). evidence of an eye witness

However, the question of its value and what weight to attach to the confessional statement admitted in evidence after a trial-within-trial is a different matter altogether, as admissibility and weight are not the same. In other words, the fact that a document has been admitted in evidence, with or without objection, does not necessarily mean that the document has established or made out the evidence contained therein, and must be accepted by the trial Court As Tobi, JSC, pointed out in Abubakar v. Chuks (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 386 at 403, it is not automatic".
Thus, the admissibility of a document is one thing and the weight a Court will attach to it is another; and it is settled that the weight a Court will attach to the document will depend on the circumstances of the case as contained or portrayed in the evidence Abubakar V. Chuks (supra).

Most importantly, it is also settled that trial-within-trial is only used to test the voluntariness of a confessional statement; not what value or weight to attach to evidence. In essence, the issue of voluntariness is kept distinct from the issue of guilt, and this is done by insulating the enquiry into voluntariness in a compartment that is separate from the main trial.
In other words, the Accused has the right to have the question of the admissibility of his confession tried as a separate and distinct issue. "At such a trial, the Accused can go into the witness-box on the issue of voluntariness without being exposed to general cross-examination on the issue of his guilt"- Ifaramoye V. The State (2017) LPELR-42031(SC)

The law is settled that where a confessional statement has admitted all the essential ingredients or elements of the offence and shows unequivocally direct and positive involvement of the accused in the crime for which he is charged, the Court can rely on it alone to convict him. See Odua vs FRN (2002) 5 NWLR (pt.761) 615; Ogudo vs State (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt.1278) 1, Ntaha vs State (1972) 4 SC 1: Ikemson vs State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 455; Saidu vs State (1982) 3 SC 41.

May I reiterate the point that a confessional statement constitutes a clear and cogent proof of an act of the accused person who made it. There is no evidence stronger than a person's own confession. This is so, since no rational being will say a negative thing against his own interest, all things being equal. See Otoha v The State (1975) 1 SC 5J, Tajudeen Fabiyi v The State (2015) LPELR – 24834 (SC).

A confessional statement is admissible in evidence and can be acted upon if it is direct, positive and relates to the maker's acts, knowledge or intention, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime charged. See: Adisa v The State (2014) LPELR-24221 (SC), Yusuf v. The State (1976) 6 SC 167, Obasi v. The State (1965) NMLR 129, Akpan v State (1992) 7 SCNJ 22, Ogoala v. State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt 175) 509.

There are innumerable authorities which support the view that the Court may convict an accused person on his extra judicial confession which is voluntary and true but inconsistent with his evidence in Court. See Queen v. Itule (1961) 2 SCNLR p.183, Queen v.Obasa (1962) 2 SCNLR p.402
Akpan v. State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.248) p.439.
Before the Court convicts on extra judicial statements that are confessional such statements must be subjected to the tests laid down in R v. Walter Sykes (1913) 8 CAC p.233, explained in the leading judgment of my learned brother Eko JSC.
It is desirable to have outside the confession some evidence, however slight of circumstances which make it probable that the confession was true.

Courts in Nigeria apply the rule in R v. SKYES 8 CAR 233 at 236 to test the veracity of the making of the confession as well as the correctness of the contents of the confessional statement. The six-way test is run on the following pertinent questions. That is –
a. Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true?
b. Is it corroborated?
c. Are the relevant statement of fact made in it true as far as can be tested?
d. Was the accused one who had the opportunity to commit the offence?
e. Is the confession possible?
f. Is it consistent with other facts which has been proved?
The 6-way test has been consistently applied in our Courts, as can be seen from NWAEBONYI v. THE STATE (1994) 5 NWLR (pt.343) 138; KAREEM v. F.R.N. (NO.2) (2002) 8 NWLR (pt.770) 664.

When an accused person retracts his confession and resiles from it, it is his function to explain to Court in his evidence the reason for his inconsistency: ONWEMERE v. THE STATE (1991) LRCN 984 at 999.

It is trite law, that there are three methods of proof of criminal cases which are in either of the under mentioned methods namely:-
(a) Through eye witness account of the commission of the offence by the accused person or Persons; or
(b) Through a direct and voluntary confessional statement; or
(c) Through circumstantial evidence pointing positively to the guilty of the accused person and to no other person.
See Adekoya v State (2012)9 NWLR (pt.1305)539; Akpa v State (2009)39 WRN 27; Haruna v AG Federation (2012)9 NWLR ( pt. 1306)419.

The Court of Appeal condemned the procedure adopted by the trial Court for the trial within trial. It is very well settled practice in this country that where on the production of a confessional statement it is challenged on the ground that the accused person did not make it at all, the question of whether he made it or not is a matter to be decided by the learned trial judge in the course of preparing the judgment. In such circumstances objection made by counsel should be disregarded by the judge as such objection does not affect the admissibility of the statement and so the statement should be admitted as the issue of voluntariness of the statement does not arise for a decision. But where the admissibility of the statement in evidence is objected to on the ground that it was not voluntary in that the confession was beaten out of the accused person, what is attacked is the admissibility in evidence of the confessional statement and a trial within trial or mini trial must be held. See
Queen v Igwe (1960) 5 FSC p. 55
Ikpasa v Bendel State (1981) 12 NSCCP p. 300

A conviction can be based upon a confessional statement alone where it is found to be voluntarily made, direct and positive and relates to the accused person's own acts, knowledge or intention, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the offence charged. See: Akpan vs. The State (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 248) 439 @ 467 E-F. It is however the practice of the Courts, in order to safeguard the accused person's right to fair hearing, to consider evidence outside the statement, no matter how slight, which makes the confession probable. See: Adeyemi vs. The State (2014) 13 NWLR (pt. 1423) 133; Okashetu vs. The State (2016) LPELR- 40611 (SC).

The law is quite settled that a confessional statement is relevant and admissible in evidence once it satisfies the conditions laid down in Sections 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The sections provide as follows: "28. A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. 29. (1) In any proceeding, a confession made by a defendant may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the Court in pursuance of this section. (2) If, in any proceeding where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant, it is represented to the Court that the confession was or may have been obtained- (a) by oppression of the person who made it; or (b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in such consequence, the Court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the Court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained in a manner contrary to the provisions of this section). (3) In any proceeding where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant the Court may of its own motion require the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do so, to prove that the confession was not obtained as mentioned in either Subsection (2)(a) or (b) of this section). (4) Where more persons than one are charged jointly with an offence and a confession made by one of such persons in the presence of one or more of the other persons so charged is given in evidence, the Court shall not take such statement into consideration as against any of such other persons in whose presence it was made unless he adopted the said...

On the other hand, where the appellant say she did not make the statement sought to be tendered at all, there is no need for a trial within trial to be conducted. The statement would be admitted in evidence and its evidential value would be considered at the conclusion of the trial along with all the other evidence adduced in the case. See: Jimoh v. The State (2014) LPELR 22464 (SC); Gbadamosi & Anor v. The State (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt.266) 465; Effiong v. The State (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt.562) 362; Owie v. The State (1985) NWLR (Pt.3) 470; Isong v. The State (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt.1531) 96.

Where an accused person objects to the admissibility of his extra judicial statement, there are different courses open to the Court depending on the nature of the objection. Where it is contended that the statement was not voluntarily made, the Court must conduct a trial within trial (or mini trial) solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it was made voluntarily. Where the Court finds that the statement was made under duress or as a result of an inducement of any kind, it would be rejected. Where the Court finds that it was freely made, it would be admitted in evidence and considered along with all the other evidence in the case.

For a confession to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must satisfy the Court beyond reasonable doubt that it was made voluntarily. If it is shown that it was obtained under duress or in consequence of any form of inducement, the statement will not be admitted by the Court (Section 29 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act). Of all the methods of proving the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, a confessional statement, which is voluntarily made and which is direct, positive and satisfactorily proved, is the most potent of all, coming as it were, "from the horse's mouth", It was stated in Adio Vs The State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 24) 581 @ 593 594 H-A thus:
"A free and voluntary confession of by an accused person, if it is direct and positive and satisfactorily proved, should occupy the highest place of authenticity when it comes to proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is why such a confession by itself is sufficient without further corroboration to warrant a conviction unless the trial Court is satisfied that the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt."
See also: Abirifon Vs The State (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt.1372) 587 @ 596 B – H & 600 A C; Ubierho Vs The State(2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.919) 644; Kopa Vs The State (1971) 1 All NLR 150; Demo Oseni Vs The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293)-351 @ 393 – 394 F – C.

A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime (Section 28 Evidence Act).

The law has it that only voluntary direct and positive confessional statement of the accused person and proved to be so, that relates to his own acts, knowledge or intention, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime charged is admissible. The accused can be convicted on it. See Ayo V. State (2007) LPELR 8817 (CA) Demo Oseni Vs. State (2012) LPELR – 7833 (SC).

Where however the rejection or objection taken is on account of the statement not having been made or signed by the accused, the trial Court is on good authority to admit that statement in evidence as the retraction of a Confessional Statement does not make it inadmissible. See Akpan Vs. State (1992) NWLR (Pt. 248) Ubierho Vs. State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) 644. The Court can admit such statement and act on it. The only rider is that the Court in the Judgment, in evaluating that evidence, must subject the Confessional Statement (retracted) to the test outlined in the case of R Vs. Sykes (1913) CR App. Rep. 224, 230 to come to the conclusion whether or not the appellant did make the Statement as alleged by Police authorities. See: Hassan V. State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 735) 184, 199.
The test laid down in the English case referred to above include:-
(i) Is there anything outside the confession (in this case, Exhibit B and C) to show that it is true.
(ii) Is it corroborated no matter how slight?
(iii) Are the facts made in it true as far as they can be tested?
(iv) Was the prisoner or accused one who had the opportunity of committing the offence
(v) Is the confession possible, and
(vi) Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertain and proved in the matter.

The proper time to raise objection against a confessional statement on account of the involuntariness of the statement, must be at the time the statement is tendered. See: Alarape V. State (2001) FWLR (Pt. 41) 1872, 89; Amina Musa Vs. State (2014) LPELR 22912 (CA); Edet Ekpo Vs. State (2008) LPELR -4370 (CA).

So far as the voluntariness of a confession is not in issue, the Court is bound to admit same in evidence if the confession is direct and positive. Where however the voluntariness of a Confessional Statement becomes an issue in the sense that the Statement was/is not the statement made out of the free will or volition of the accused person, the Court at the point the application is made to tender the Statement and an objection is taken thereto, is bound to conduct a trial within trial to ascertain the voluntariness or otherwise of that Statement Nwangbomu V. State (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 327) 380; Igri V. The State (2009) LPELR-4374(CA).

A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. Confessions if voluntary are deemed to be relevant facts as against the person who made it. See, Sections 28 and 29(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and decision in Olalekan V. the State (2001) LPELR-2561 (SC).

For a confessional statement to be used against an accused person, it must be shown to have been voluntarily made positive, direct, pungent and consistent with other facts as proved in the case. See Jimoh vs The State (2014) 10 NWLR (pt 1414) 105, Nkie vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2014) 13 NWLR (pt 1424) 305. Exhibit C, relied upon to link the appellant with the robbery was not direct and positive enough. It needed some measure of corroboration before it could be relied upon to convict the appellant.

For a confessional statement to ground a conviction, it must be voluntarily made, positive and unequivocal. It must state or suggest the inference that he committed the crime. See: Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011; Ikemson Vs The State (supra); Agboola vs The State (2013) LPELR- 20652 (SC) @ 50 E-F; Nwachukwu Vs The State(2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 31 @ 70.

Court ought to have closely looked at, examined and evaluated Exhibit C before later concluding whether it was safe for the trial Court to convict the appellant based on the alleged confessional statement alone as was done by it. This Court had in plethora of its decided authorities held that a Court of trial should always examine confessional statements in the light of other evidence in order to determine whether:-
(a) there is anything outside the confessional statement showing that the confession is true
(b)that the facts contained in the confessional statement are true as far as they can be tested.
(c) that the accused had opportunity of committing the offence
(d) that the confession is possible
(e)that the confession is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved.
See Amadi vs State (1993) 8 NWLR (pt 314) 644; Musa vs State (Supra); Yesufu v State (1976) 6 SC 167. Obosi v State (1965) NWLR 119. In other words, it is always desirable for a trial Court to look for any independent evidence outside the confession which will ascertain the truth of that confessional statement or which will make it probable that the confession is true. See Onuoha v State (1987) 1 All NLR 150, Obosi v State (1985) NMLR 119.

It is well settled law that a free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused person, if it is direct and positive and was duly made voluntarily, is sufficient to ground a conviction, since a confession always remains the best proof of what he had done. See Alabi v State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt 307)5; Fabiyi vs State (2015) 6 -7 SC (pt I) 83; Osetola & Ano vs The State (2012)6 SCNJ 3291; Nwachukwu v The State (2002) 7 SCNJ 230;Dogo v The State (2013) 3 SCNJ 144; Musa v State (2013) 2 – 3 SC (pt II) 75 at 92-94.A dispassionate and close scrutiny of that purported confessional statement of the appellant i.e Exhibit C, one can say that neither the trial Court nor the lower Court had duly examined and evaluated Exhibit C since it is settled law that before a Court convicts an accused on his confessional statement alone, it must ascertain whether such confessional statement is voluntary, direct, positive, pungent and consistent with other facts as proved. See Jimoh v State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt 1414) 105.

A confessional statement can simply be defined as an admission by a person charged/accused of committing a crime at any where stating or suggesting the inference that he committed such crime. See Section 28 of Evidence Act 2011, as amended.

I have stated the position of this Court earlier in the course of this judgment wherein it holds that confession is the best form of evidence and an accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone. Again see the case of Nwachukwu vs. State (supra).

This Court had in plethora of cases held that confession is the best form of evidence and an accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone. In the case of Nwachukwu v. State (2007) 17 NWLR. (Pt. 1062) 31 at 70 for instance, it was held that:-
a confessional statement . .. is the best evidence in criminal procedure. It is a statement of admission of guilt by the accused person and the trial Court must admit it in evidence unless it is contested at the trial."

The last point that I should comment on is the question posed by the learned appellant's counsel in his issue no. 1 in his brief of argument on the question of contradiction between Exhibit B, the cautionary statement of the accused/appellant and his testimony in Court when testifying for his defence. This Court in the case of Wasari Umani v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt.70) 274 or (1988) All NLR 148 or (1988) 2 SC 88 or (1988) LPELR 3357 (SC)had this to say per Nnamani JSC (of blessed memory) at page 14.
"In the recent case of Oladejo v. State (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 61) 364 at 427 this Court dealt with this matter in greater detail. There, I said as follows:-
"Contrary to the conclusion of the learned trial judge, the law is rather that where a witness (here an accused person makes a statement which is inconsistent with his testimony, such testimony is to be treated as unreliable while the statement is not regarded as evidence upon which a Court can act" See pages 427-428.

This Court also went further to say thus:-
"While I agree that the learned trial judge was clearly under a duty to consider all possible defences available to the defence even if they were not raised by the defence, I can see nothing suffered by the appellant by his failure to consider those defence (provocation and self defence. There was nothing to sustain them ...."

It needs to be restated here too that the fact that an accused person's evidence in Court contradicts his extra judicial confessional statement does not deprive the Court from convicting the accused on the basis of the confessional statement alone once the confession has been found to be voluntary and true. It is only desirable but not mandatory for the trial Court to identify such corroborative evidence outside the confessional statement before convicting the accused. See Eghoghonome V. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 306) 383, Kim v. State (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt 233) 17, Charles Kingsley Joe Isong V. The State (2016) LPELR-40509 (SC), Nanmdi Osuagwu V. The State (2013 LPELR-19823 (SC).

The learned Counsel to the Applicant planked his submission on Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Sections 28and 29 of the Evidence Act, 2011, become relevant in the context of this appeal. Section 28 defines confession as: A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. Section 29 states conditions for making confession relevant. (1) In any proceedings a confession made by a defendant may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the Court in pursuance of this section. (2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant, it is represented to the Court that the confession was or may have been obtained:- (a) by oppression of the person who made it: or (b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in such consequence, the Court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the Court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained in a manner contrary to the provisions of this section. (3) In any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant, the Court may of its own motion require the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do so, to prove that the confession was not obtained as mentioned in either Paragraph (a) or (b) of Subsection (2) of this section. (4) In this section oppression includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence whether or not amounting to torture. What is the essence of the above provisions? There is no ambiguity in the law. Clearly, the law intends that any confessional statement...

From what I can see the points of anchor against the confessional statements of the appellant cannot sustain a rejection of the statements as involuntarily obtained, Firstly, it is not the law or practice that an accused person's legal representation must be present before a statement from him can be accepted as voluntarily obtained nor is it also mandatory that the superior officer who before the attestation was made must be called in evidence. In effect from the proceedings of the trial within trial, not only was the procedure followed, the learned trial judge was right in his conclusion that the statement was voluntarily made and had to be admitted. See Edoho v State (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt.865) 17 at 51.

Taking a cue from the case of: Kim v The State (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.233) 17 at 25 para.14, the Supreme Court enumerated the formal requirements of extra-judicial statement which are that:
a) It must carry the usual forms of caution.
b) Each of the words of caution must be in the language understood by the maker.
c) It must be followed by the maker's thumbprint or signature as the case may be.
d) It must be recorded in the language understood by the maker.
e) It must be read over and interpreted to the maker in language in which it is made.
I shall also refer to the case of Dibie v State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) 30 at 64 per Ogbuagu JSC along similar lines, thus:
It need be stressed by me and this is also settled, that there is no requirement of law in Nigeria, but that the practice of taking an accused person along with his confessional statement, to a superior officer who reads over and interprets the statement to him and he confirms it has his voluntary statement has been highly commended and a wise one as giving extra assurance of fairness to the accused person and the voluntariness of his confession. See the cases of the Queen v Omerewure Sapele & Anor – in Re: German Awip (1957) 2 FSC 24; Nwiboko Obodo & 5 Ors v The Queen(1958) 4 FSC 1; R v Igwe (1961) ANLR 330 at 333 and Kim v The State (1992) 4 SCNL 81; (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.233) 17. Also, confessional statements not so treated, should not necessarily be viewed with suspicion. See the case of Nwigboke & 6 Ors v The Queen (1959) 4 FSC 101 at 102 – Per Mbanefo, F. J., see also Akpan v State (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.248) 439 at 472 paragraphs B-C.

In DELE v. THE STATE (2011)1 NWLR (Pt.1229) 508 the law was re-stated, emphatically, that a confessional statement that was not voluntarily made by the accused person is not admissible in evidence, and where it is wrongly admitted in evidence, without the Court conducting the necessary trial-within-trial to determine if it was voluntarily made, it ought to be expunged from the evidence before the Court.

On what should happen where an accused person gave an extra-judicial confessional statement, recorded by a police officer or third party and translated. This Court inOlalekan v. State (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 793 at 818, held that the statement is inadmissible unless the person who interpreted it is called as a witness as well as the person who wrote it down.

On the issue of endorsement of the said statement by an SPO, it needs to be emphasised here, that the practice of having an SPO to verify and confirm that a confessional statement of an accused was voluntarily given, does not have the force of law. It is merely a desirable practice, therefore any confessional statement which was not so verified should not of necessary without more, be viewed with any air of suspicion. In other words, the fact that an SPO was not called to testify as in this instant case [which even the reason for her absence was given) will not affect the admissibility or credibility of the endorsement of Exhibits P5 and P21. See the case of Dibie v State(2007) 2 NSCQR 1431.

It is settled that trial within trial is only used to test the voluntariness of a confessional statement not what value or weight to attach to evidence I came across a South African case – S v De Vires 1989 (1) SA 228 (A) where Nicholas AJA summarised its purpose brilliantly as follows- It is essential that the issue of voluntariness should be kept clearly distinct from the issue of guilt. This is achieved by insulating the enquiry into voluntariness in a compartment separate from the main trial- – Where, therefore, the question of admissibility of a confession is clearly raised: an accused person has the right to have that question tried as a separate and distinct issue. At such trial, the accused can go into the witness-box on the issue of voluntariness without being exposed to general cross-examination on the issue of his guilt. See also Onyenye V. State (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt 1324) 586 where this Court per Adekeye JSC expounded as follows – It has now become a matter of routine for an accused person to retract a confessional statement in the course of trial. The Court has adopted two reactions in circumstances as follows: (a)Where the accused has clearly expressed his ordeal in the process of obtaining the statement accredited to him in effect that it was obtained by force, tricks or undue influence or any other non-recognizable legal ways, there would be need for a trial within trial. (b) Where the accused retracted the confessional statement on the ground that it was not read to him before he signed it or that he never made it all, the requirement of the trial within trial is not applicable. In Ogudu V. State (2011) LPELR-860 (SC) this Court held – Where the accused person says that he did not voluntarily make the statement credited to him, such a stand by the accused person calls for the holding of a trial within trial. Where, on the other hand the accused person says he did not sign the statement, the statement should be admitted in...

The burden is always on the prosecution to prove that a statement was made voluntarily. In this instant case, the trial Court after the trial within trial found that the statement was voluntarily made by the accused/appellant.

It needs to be restated here, that the law is well settled that a free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused be it judicial or extra judicial if direct, and positive and properly proved, is sufficient to ground a conviction once the trial Court is satisfied with its truth. See Odeh v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 3-4 SC 147; Silas Ikpo vs The State (1995)33 LRCN 587; Akinmoju v The State (2000) NSCQR vol.2 (pt.1) 90 at 93.

However, in relation to this case the point being made is that where a conviction is based solely on a confessional statement and the person, who acted as interpreter when it was obtained did not testify, the confessional statement is hearsay evidence and the accused person is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

Confession is stronger than evidence of an eye – witness because it came from the accused's mouth.

The appellant's confessional statement, EXHIBIT B which is stronger than the evidence of an eye-witness as it came from the accused/appellant himself can secure the conviction of the appellant as in this instance the confession is positive, direct and has been proved properly.
I place reliance on Amoshima v. State (2009) Vol. 32 WRN 47, Mbang v. State(2010) Vol. 22 WRN page iii.

The appellant had also the grouse that the trial Court ought not to have convicted the accused/appellant on his confessional statement. On this, it is necessary to say that an accused can be convicted solely on his confessional statement and that corroborative evidence is only desirable and not necessary.
A free and voluntary confession which is direct, positive and properly proved is sufficient to sustain a conviction and it is now well settled that the nature of the corroborative evidence required does not need to be direct evidence that the accused person committed the offence. It is enough even if it is only circumstantial evidence connecting or tending to connect him with its commission and that is the case here. See Nguma v. A.G. Imo State (2014) 16 WRN 1; Olalekan v. State (2001) 18 NWLR (pt. 746) 793 at 824; Nwachukwu v. State (2004) 17 NWLR (pt. 902) 262; Durugo v. The State (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 255) 525; Achabua v. The State (1976) 12 SC 63; Olabode v. State (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 389) 1301.

On the confessional statement, EXHIBIT B which the appellant retracted, it has to be said that the appellant denying making the statement does not translate to the statement being inadmissible rather what would be the resultant effect is the weight the Court would attach to it or its contents. See Ikemson v. State (1989) 6 SCNJ 54, Shande v. The State (2005) 22 NSCQR 756.

There is no doubt that the appellant had confessed to the commission of the offences charged and I cannot agree more. It was held in plethora of judicial decisions including the case of OLALEKAN V. STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (Prt 746) 793 that where a confessional statement is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the admission of guilt by an accused person, the statement is enough to ground the conviction of the accused. Thus, even without those corroborative act, the appellant could perfectly be convicted solely on his voluntary confessional statement.

By virtue of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011 a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. If made voluntary; a confession is deemed to be a relevant fact against the maker. See SAIDU V. STATE (1982) 4 SC 41 and NWACHUKWU V. STATE (Supra). In HASSAN V. STATE (2017) 5 NWLR (Prt 1557) 1 at 36, the Supreme Court has held that once the Court is satisfied that a confessional statement was free, voluntary and true it is safe to convict on it.

By virtue of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011 a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.

However, a man's confession is only evidence against him and not against his accomplices. R, v. Ajani and Ors (1936) 3 WACA 3.
In effect, the confessional statement of an accused person is not binding on a co-accused person, except the statement was adopted by the co-accused person. This must be so for where an accused person makes a confessional statement to the Police as to his participation or culpability in the crime charged, he is not confessing for his co-accused person. Thus, his confession is only evidence against him and not against the co-accused person. Aikhadueki v. State (2013) LPELR-20806 (SC); Ozaki v. State(1990) 1 NWLR (pt.124) 92; Kasa v: State [1994] 5 NWLR (pt. 344) 269, 288; The State v. James Gwangwan (2015) LPELR – 24837 (SC).
The law therefore is that the confessional statement of an accused person cannot be used against a co-accused person unless it is adopted by the said co-accused person, Ozaki v The State (supra); Suberu v The State [2010] 8 NWLR (pt. 1197) 586. For this purpose, the adoption of the statement of an accused person which would qualify the statement to be used against a co-accused person can be by words or conduct, Alarape v. State [2001] 2 SC 114; Wakala v. The State (1991) 8 NWLR (pt. 211) 552; Evbuomwan v. Commissioner of Police (1961) WNLR 257.
The appellant, from the records, neither adopted the said entries by word nor by his conduct. Thus, Innocent Ekeanyanwu's confession could not have been used against the appellant, as the lower Courts wrongly held Ozaki v The State (supra); Suberu v The State [2010] 8 NWLR (pt. 1197) 586.

Unfortunately, the lower Court perpetuated the same error.
This cannot be so. A free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused person, whether under examination before a Magistrate or otherwise, if it is direct and positive and is duly made and satisfactorily proved, is sufficient to warrant convictions without any corroborative evidence so long as the Court is satisfied of the truth of the confession, Edet Obasa v. The State (1965) NMLR 119; Dare Jimoh v The State (2014) LPELR – 22464 (SC); Yesufu v. State [1976] 6 SC 109.

The law is quite settled that a free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused person, if it is direct and positive and its making is satisfactorily proved, is sufficient to warrant a conviction without any corroborative evidence: IN RE: OSAKWE {1994} 2 NWLR {pt. 326} 273 at 293 – 294.

I am aware of the argument forcefully canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant that a confessional statement of the co-accused cannot be used against the Appellant, and that where an interpreter is used in receiving confessional statement, the statement is inadmissible if the interpreter is not called as a witness. Learned counsel is correct on this score.

Also relied upon was the appellant's confessional statement, Exhibit P4. Although retracted at the trial, the Court was at liberty to consider it along with other evidence led at the trial. Once the Court was satisfied as to its truth, it could safely convict on it. See: Mumuni & Ors. Vs The State (1975) LPELR 1926 (SC); Okoh Vs The State(2014) LPELR – 22589 (SC); (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 502; Akpa Vs The State (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1106) 72; Asuquo Vs The State (2016) LPELR – 40597 (SC).

The law is that a voluntary confession of guilt that is consistent and probable may ground conviction for an offence that is clearly established to have been committed. Once a confession of guilt is properly established to have been made freely and voluntarily and is direct and positive, it constitutes proof of guilt to sustain a conviction. All it takes is for the Court to believe in its truth. See Dibie & Ors V. The State (2007) LPELR-941 (SC), Akpan V. The State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt 737) 745 and Kolawole V. State (2015) LPELR-24400 (SC).

Thereafter, His Lordship reproduced the portion of Exhibit 36 reproduced earlier in this judgment. The law is quite well settled that a statement amounting to a confession may be used against the maker alone. It cannot be used against any of his co-accused unless it was made in his presence and he adopted it by words or conduct. See: Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act. Also: Ozaki & Anor V. The State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92; State V. Gwangwan (2015) LPELR – 24837 (SC) @ 28-29 E-C; Suberu V. The State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 586.

His Lordship then, turned to the legal effect of the appellant's resiling from exhibit p4. The Court correctly stated the position of the law thus:
Having resiled from this statement, the position of the law is that the said statement, exhibit p4, will be considered and evaluated alongside other available evidence in reaching a decision notwithstanding that the defendant has resiled therefrom in his testimony in open Court, Egbohonome v State [1993] 7 NWLR (Pt 306) 383; Ibina v State [1989] 5 NWLR (pt 120) 238, 148 and Nwosu v State (1998) 8 NWLR (pt 562) 433, 442.

However, outside the confession, it is desirable to have some corroborative evidence, no matter how slight, of circumstances which make it probable that the said confession is true and correct. The reason for this prescription is simple: Courts are not generally disposed to act on a confession without testing the truth thereof, Onochie and Ors v The Republic (1966) NMLR 307; R v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR 233,236.
For the purpose of the test, the Court would be expected to consider the question: whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence charged and whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved at the trial?
There are actually several cases on this point. However, only a handful will be cited here, Queen v. Obiasa(1962) 1 ANLR 65; [1962] 2 SCNLR 402; Ikpasa v. Attorney-General of Bendel State [1981] 9 SC 7; Akpan v The State (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 248) 439, 460; [1992] 7 SCNJ 22; Kanu v The King (1952) 14 WACA 30; The Queen v. Obiasa (1962) 1 All NLR 651; [1962] 1 SCNLR 137; Obosi v The State (1965) NMLR 129; Jafiya Kopa v. The State (1971) 1 All NLR 750, Dawa v The State [1980] B -11 SC 236; Ejinima v The State [1991] 5 LRCN 1640, 1677; Arthur Onyejekwe v The State (1992) 4 SCNJ 1, 9; [1992] 3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 444; Aiguoreghian and Anor. v. The State (2004) 3 NWLR (pt 860) 367; (2004) 1 SCNJ 65; [2004] 1Sc (pt.1) 65.

It is no longer open to conjecture that a free and voluntary confession of guilt, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if it is direct and positive and, properly, established, is sufficient proof of guilt. As such, it is enough to sustain a conviction so long as the Court is satisfied with the truth thereof, Yesufu v The State [1976] 6 SC 167, 173; Okegbu v The State [1984] 8 SC 65; Kim v The State [1992] 4 SCNJ 81, 110; (1992) 4 NWLR (pt. 233) 17; Ikpo and Anor v. The State [1995] 2 SCNJ 64, 75; [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 540.
Other cases include:Igago v The State [1999] 12 SCNJ 140; [1999] 6 NWLR (pt. 608) 568; Hassan v The State [2001] 7 SCNJ 643; [2001] 7 NSCQR 107, 109; [2001] 15 NWLR (pt.735) 184; Olalekan v State [2002] 4 WRN 146; [2001] 18 NWLR (pt.746) 793, 824; Salawu v. State (1971) NMLR 249; Nwachukwu v The State (2007) LPELR -8075 (SC) 34, 36.

​ However, in law, the statement, whether retracted or not did not bind the appellant because she did not adopt it or admit it as true. See the following cases which lucidly established that when two or three persons are tried together, a confession by one of them which incriminates one or the others binds him alone, unless the confessional statement is made in the presence of the others and they decide to adopt it:- Tirimisiyu Adebayo v. The State (2014) 8 SCM 34 at 65 para. 6, The State v. James Gwangwan (2015) 9 SCM 253 at 271 paras. D – G.
See also Section 29 (4) of the Evidence Act, 2011 which provides: “Where more persons than one are charged jointly with an offence and confession made by one of such persons in the presence of one or more of the other persons so charged is given in evidence, the Court shall not take such statement into consideration as against any such other persons in whose presence it was made unless he adopted the said statement by words as conducted.” PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

​ However, in law, the statement, whether retracted or not did not bind the appellant because she did not adopt it or admit it as true. See the following cases which lucidly established that when two or three persons are tried together, a confession by one of them which incriminates one or the others binds him alone, unless the confessional statement is made in the presence of the others and they decide to adopt it:- Tirimisiyu Adebayo v. The State (2014) 8 SCM 34 at 65 para. 6, The State v. James Gwangwan (2015) 9 SCM 253 at 271 paras. D – G.
See also Section 29 (4) of the Evidence Act, 2011 which provides: “Where more persons than one are charged jointly with an offence and confession made by one of such persons in the presence of one or more of the other persons so charged is given in evidence, the Court shall not take such statement into consideration as against any such other persons in whose presence it was made unless he adopted the said statement by words as conducted.” PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

It has been an established practice that a Defendant in a criminal trial can easily be convicted solely on his confessional statement if the prosecution can show that the confessional statement was made freely and voluntarily by the accused person to the satisfaction of the trial Court. However, where the Defendant retracts his confessional statement during trial, that alone cannot render the statement inadmissible.
This is because retraction of or resiling from a confessional statement or denial by an accused person/Defendant of his having made such a statement does not ipso facto render it inadmissible in evidence. See: Alarape v. The State (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt.205) 79. Thus, a confessional statement, so long as it is free and voluntary and it is direct, positive and properly proved, is enough to sustain a conviction. The trial Court should not, however, act on the confession without first testing the truth thereof.
But so long as the Court is satisfied with its truth a confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support a conviction without corroboration. ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C

The test, however, for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is to look for any other evidence be it slight, or circumstances which make it probable that the confession is true. In R. v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR 233 at 236, Ridly, J, suggested the tests to be applied on an accused person’s confessional statement in the determination of its veracity to include: 1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true. 2. Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight. 3.
Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true. 4. Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence. 5. Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter. 6. Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. The above tests have been accepted and consistently applied by this Court over a long period of time in a number of cases, including: Dawa v. The State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 236; Akindipe v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1536) 470. ABDU ABOKI, J.S.
THE DUTY ON THE PROSECUTION IN A CRIMINAL CHARGE The duty on the prosecution in a criminal charge as prescribed by Section 139 of the Evidence Act, 2011, is to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This is in line with Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, which presumes him innocent until his guilt is proved. The onus remains on the prosecution throughout the trial and does not shift. In other words, there is no duty on the accused to prove his innocence. Furthermore, in the event of any doubt, it must be resolved in favour of the accused.
See Aiguoreghian & Anor Vs The State (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 367 @ 396 F – H; 407-408 H – A, F.R.N. Vs Abubakar (2004) LPELR – 270 (SC) @ 22 C – D, Okashetu Vs The State (2016) NWLR (Pt.1534) 126, Nweze Vs The State (2017) LPELR -42344 (SC) @ 29 D- F.
The prosecution, in order to secure a conviction, must prove all the elements of the offence as contained in the charge beyond reasonable doubt. Although not required to call a host of witnesses, the prosecution must call such witnesses as would be necessary to discharge the burden of proof. See Nwaturuocha Vs The State (2011) LPELR-8119 (SC) @ 15-16 F – C, People of Lagos State Vs Umaru (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt.1407) 584, Obiakor Vs The State (2002) LPELR – 2168 (SC) @ 11-12 F- A. KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C

There are two ways of retracting an extra judicial statement in a criminal trial whether confessional or not. The first is by the Defendant and/or his Counsel admitting at the point of the statement being tendered by the prosecution that indeed the Defendant made the statement BUT was forced by threats, violence to his person, inducement etc. to make same by the Police. At that point, Defence Counsel must state categorically according to his brief whether it was by threats, violence or inducement of any gain etc. that the Defendant was made to confess.
The onus being on the Prosecution at all times to prove the guilt of the Defendant, the prosecution must discharge the onus of proof that indeed the Defendant volunteered the statement since an involuntary statement extracted by threats, inducement etc. from a Defendant contravenes Section 29 of the Evidence Act, and would be inadmissible for all purposes in evidence. To prove the voluntariness of the statement, the Court calls for and conducts a trial within trial to determine whether or not the statement sought to be admitted by the Prosecution was voluntarily made.
The second instance of retraction of a confessional statement is where the confession is wholly retracted, that is where the Defendant denies making the statement at all, denies the signature on the statement, claims he was forced to sign a statement he never made at all, or as in this case agreed he made a statement but says the statement sought to be tendered is not the one he made at all, etc. The possibilities of a full retraction are endless. In such an instance, there is no question whether or not the statement/confession is admissible.
The law is that it is admissible as evidence of an event which had occurred in the course of Police investigation into the charge and the Court is entitled to decide as a matter of fact whether in the circumstances, the Defendant actually made the statement or not. HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

The law is trite and well established that the Court can admit and safely rely on a retracted confessional statement to convict an accused person once the Court is satisfied that such statement is voluntary, direct, positive, unequivocal and a truthful account of what transpired. The law has however made it desirable for the Court to look for some corroboration outside the confessional statement, to determine if the circumstances made it probable that the confession was true. See Haruna v. A-G, Federation (2012) 9 NWLR (pt. 1306) 419 – Alarape v. State (2001) 5 NWLR (pt. 705) 79 – Osuagwu v.
The state. (2013) 5 NWLR (pt. 1347) 360. JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C

In otherwords, a confessional statement remains the best form of evidence against an accused person once it is proved to be voluntary, direct and positive. The Court can rely solely on it to ground conviction. See Edhigere v. The State (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 464) at P. 1; – Oseni v. State (2012) 5 NWLR (pt 1293) 351 – Egboghonome v State (1993) 7 NWLR (pt. 306) 383. JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C

At this juncture, I consider it pertinent to make a distinction between a situation where an accused person completely denies making a confessional statement and where an accused contends that he made or endorsed the confessional statement under duress. In the first situation, the Court is at liberty to admit the statement without having to conduct a mini-trial to determine its veracity.
Only that the weight to be attached to the statement would be determined after subjecting it to the six-way tests prescribed by the law as follows: (i) Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true? (ii) Is it corroborated? (iii) Are the statements made in it true as far as can be tested? (iv) Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the offence? (v) Is the confession possible? (vi) Is the confessional statement consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved? ​Once the statement has been subjected to these tests and it is ascertained that there are other facts outside the confession to corroborate it, the law decrees that same can be relied upon to ground conviction.
See R v. Sykes (1913)8 LR APP R-233 approved and applied in Dawa v. State (1980) 8-11 SC 236; Musa v. State (1995) 9 NWLR (pt. 421) 540 at 554. JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C

The question of whether an extra statement is confessional or not depends on the facts surrounding a given case since the test of voluntariness of a confession must be carried out before its admissibility. That is what informs the necessity of a trial within trial once the voluntariness of the statement is challenged by the accused that makes the word ‘may’ in Section 17(2) of the ACJA permission and not a mandatory word. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

Admissibility of a confessional statement is not dependent on the presence of counsel or relation at the time of making the confession, Section 29 (1) of the Evidence Act must be satisfied. The said Section 17 (2) of the ACJCA cannot override the clear provision of the Evidence Act”. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

Where an accused person denies making the statement sought to be tendered, the proper procedure the Court should adopt is to admit the statements as exhibits and determine their evidential value at the judgment stage after all the evidence would have been before the Court. The determination of whether the accused did in fact make the statement is an issue of fact to be established after consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.
See Abu Mohammed vs The State (2020) LPELR – 52451 (SC) @ 14 – 16 F- F, Dairo vs The State (2017) 9- 12 SC 119; (2017) LPELR – 43724 (SC) @ 13 – 14 D-A and Owie vs State (1985) NWLR (Pt. 3) 470. KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C

“The position of the law is that the statement of a co-accused person to the police is binding on him only – See Suberu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 586. However, where the evidence incriminating an accused person comes from a co-accused person, the Court is at liberty to rely on it as long as the co-accused person, who gave such incriminating evidence, was tried along with that accused person – See Dairo v. The State (2017) LPELR-43724(SC); (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 399 and Michael v. State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 361.” PER SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.S.C

It is trite that there are three methods through which the prosecution can establish the guilt of an accused person to wit: (i) Through the testimony of an eyewitness; or (ii) By a confessional statement voluntarily made by the accused person; or (iii) By circumstantial evidence which is positive, compelling and points irresistibly to the conclusion that the accused person committed the offence. See OJO v. STATE (2018) LPELR-44699 (SC); KOLADE v. STATE (2017) LPELR-42362 (SC); AKWUOBI v. STATE (2016) LPELR-41389 (SC). PER ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C

It is now settled that the appropriate time to object to the admissibility of a confessional statement is at the point when the Prosecution seeks to tender same. Any objection raised to the admissibility of an extrajudicial confessional statement subsequent to its tendering and admission in evidence will be considered an afterthought. See BASSEY V. STATE (2019) LPELR – 46910 (SC); MUHAMMAD V. STATE (2017) LPELR – 42098 (SC); ODEH V. FRN (2008) LPELR – 2205(SC). PER ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C

When found to have been voluntarily made, a confessional statement is enough to ground the conviction of an accused person. See FULANI M. V. STATE (2018) LPELR – 45195 (SC); KAMILA V. STATE (2018) LPELR – 43603 (SC); JOHN V. STATE (2017) LPELR - 48039 (SC). PER ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C

It is now settled that criminal guilt of an accused person could be established either by confessional statement of the accused person, circumstantial evidence or evidence of an eyewitness otherwise known as direct evidence. See Ikemson v. State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 455; Edamine v. The State (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 438) 350. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

The guides as provided in a large number of decided cases that in all criminal trials, the guilt of an accused person for the commission of an offence can be established by any one or more of the following methods or ways:- 1. By eye witness evidence. 2. By a free and voluntary confessional statement of the accused person; and 3. By circumstantial evidence. Reference is made to the following cases: 1. SUNDAY UDOR vs. STATE (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt.1422) 548 at 561 para B 2. AKEEM AGBOOLA vs THE STATE (2013) 11 NWLR (Pti366) 619 at 648 paras A-C 3.
EMEKA vs STATE (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.734) 666 at 683 pars G-H. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

In the Court’s duty of resolving the question of whether an accused is guilty of the offence charged, it has been guided by certain parametres which are the following: a. The confession of the accused b. Circumstantial evidence; and c. Evidence of eye witness of the crime. See Lori v. State (1980) 8 – 11 SC 81; Maigari v. State (2010) All FWLR (pt. 546). Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili J.S.C.

In other words, the retraction of a confessional statement does not render the said statement inadmissible in evidence. The trial Court has a duty to admit the said confessional statement in evidence and then decide on the weight to attach to it at the end of the trial. In determining the weight to be attached to a retracted confessional statement the Court is expected to test its truthfulness and veracity by examining the said statement in the light of other credible available evidence. This is done by considering the following: 1.
Whether there is anything outside it to show that it is true 2. Whether it is corroborated 3. Whether the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence 4. Whether the facts stated in it are true as far as can be tested 5. Whether the accused persons confession is possible 6. Whether the confession is consisted with the other facts ascertained and proved at the trial. See Osetola v. State (2012)17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 251, Akpan v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 682) 607 and Kareem v. FRN (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt. 770) 664. PER TALBA, J.CA.

l think the position of the law is settled and that is that an Accused person can be convicted solely on the basis of his confession if it admits the guilt of the offence and not given to different interpretations.” I cannot fault the above view. The trial Court also, rightly held that the proof of the offence of criminal conspiracy could be inferred and indeed inferred proof of the offence from the acts of the appellant. Further, on the armed robbery charge, Exhibit P6 connected. the Appellant with the money recovered and released on Bond, Exhibit P4.
The Appellant stated clearly that the parcel was opened in his presence and the sum of 24,000 Cefas was part of the money he robbed with his colleagues. He also identified the dane gun recovered by the vigilante group from Orii’s house, as the one he (the Appellant) used during the operation. The Appellant did not give an alternative place from where the Exhibits could have been obtained from and did not make out that he had nothing to do with the Exhibits in Exhibit P6.
On the other hand, the defence did not give any explanation in respect of the Exhibits and how they came about if not as explained in Exhibit P6, the Appellant’s confession, coming from the horse’s mouth so to say. I hold that the trial Court was right to have held that the prosecution proved both counts of the charge preferred against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.” HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

In is judgment, the Court below, wherein it was held that inter alia: “The law is that where an accused person makes an extra-judicial statement, admitting the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the statement will still be considered or taken into account in determining his guilt, irrespective of the fact that he had resiled from that evidence in his testimony at the trial, by giving testimony in Court contrary to the previous evidence.

My Lords, there is no doubt that the law is that failure to call the interpreter of a confessional Statement as well as the person who recorded the statement as witnesses renders the confessional Statement inadmissible in Court. In the absence of the interpreter in Court, the document is regarded as documentary hearsay. See OLALEKAN v. THE STATE (2001) 12 SCNJ 94 Pg. 109 at 110, ODEKUNLE v. THE STATE (2015) LPELR-25766, IFARAMOYE v. THE STATE (2017) LPELR-42031 (SC).
Where the prosecution’s case is basely solely on a confessional Statement and the police officer who recorded it in the native language and the person or officer who interpreted it into English or vice versa were not called to give evidence on oath during the trial, the conviction has been held erroneous and liable to be set aside. HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

The mere fact that the appellant retracted his confessional statement which was massively self-incriminating does not amount to special circumstance warranting this Court to interfere with the adverse concurrent findings of fact.
A retracted confession is not ipso facto an inadmissible piece of evidence. It is still a legal piece of evidence available to the trial Court for purposes of evaluation of the totality of the evidence. The trial Court could act on it, if it was satisfied that the appellant made the statement voluntarily, or when other pieces of evidence outside the disputed confession corroborated the confession in materia paticular, as in the instant case.
Exhibits B & C, C2 were the extra judicial statements of the appellant, They were recorded by the PW.4. They were confessional. At the effort made by the appellant to retract and indict them, on grounds of their involuntary making, the trial Court subjected them to trial-within-trial, and found them to have been voluntarily made by the appellant. That finding affirmed by the intermediate Court had thus resolved the issue – whether the appellant infact made the confessions. It was an appealable decision (by dint of Section 318 of the Constitution). It was not appealed.
It therefore persists and subsists against the appellant, and/or between the parties. PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
Although the Appellant has contended the reliance of the Court to convict him on his retracted confessional statement, where an accused person resiles/retracts from a confessional statement made by him, his conviction upon the said statement will depend on the following conditions: 1. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that the statement is true. 2. Whether it is corroborated. 3. Whether the statement made in it of fact are true as far as they can be tested. 4. Whether the accused had the opportunity to commit the offence. 5.
Whether it is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved. See Per OKORO, JSC in STATE V. SA’IDU (2019) LPELR-47397(SC) (PP. 11-17, PARAS. -PER EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.
On the question whether the Court below was right to have affirmed the decision of the learned trial judge admitting the appellant’s statements, Exhibits B, C & C2 as evidence and treating same as confessional statements despite the appellant retracting them. In answer to that poser, I would humbly state that it is now beyond debate as to whether a retracted confessional statement can be used to convict an accused as happened in this instance if there exist other independent corroborative evidence giving credence to the truth of the resiled confessional statement as in this case.
See Ejinima v State (1991) LPELR – 1067 (SC) per Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. The mere assertion by the appellant that he did not make the confessional statements did not render them inadmissible nor reduce the weight the trial Court would attach to such evidence. This is because the issue of admissibility or not of extra-judicial statements comes up when the voluntary status of the making is questioned, which is not the case here. See Sunday v State (2017) LPELR – 42259 (SC) per Bage JSC.
Clearly, the circumstances prevailing at the trial Court did not hamper the learned trial judge admitting the retracted or denied confessional statements and going on to rely on them in convicting the appellant on the charges of conspiracy to convict armed robbery and armed robbery itself . -PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

A retraction of a confessional statement by an accused person does not render such statement void.
Rather, it is settled principle as laid down by this Honourable Court that the weight to be attached to a Confessional Statement, whether or not retracted, be applied as in Nwaebonyi v The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Part 343) 138, held thus; “In R. v. SYKES (1913) 8 CR App Rep.233 the leading authority on the weight to be attached to a confessional statement whether or not retracted, followed by the West African Court of Appeal in KANU v. THE KING(1952) 14 WACA 30 and thereafter by this Court in several of its decisions such as DAWA v. THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 235; THE QUEEN V.
OBIASA(1962) 1 ALL NLR 651; (1962) 1 SCNLR 137; OBOSI V. THE STATE (1965) NMLR 129 and ONOCHIE V. THE REPUBLIC (1966) NMLR 307 to mention but a few, the following rules were stated in order to decide the weight to be attached to it- 1. Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true? 2. Is it corroborated? 3. Are there relevant statements made in it of facts true as far as they can be tested? 4. Was the prisoner one who had the opportunity of committing the murder? (where it is a case of murder) 5. Is his confession possible? 6.
Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved? See also NSOFOR V. THE STATE (2004) 18 NWLR (PART 905) 292; OJEGELE V. THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (PART 71) 414; NWACHUKWU v. THE STATE (2007) 17 NWLR (PART 1062) 31 – PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.:
A confessional statement, once it’s duly established to be free, voluntary, direct and positive, is quite sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, the Court is required to, first and foremost, test the veracity (truth) of the confession before acting thereupon, thus, once the Court comes to the inevitable conclusion that the confession is true, the confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support a conviction without corroboration.
Albeit the veritable test for determining the veracity of confessional statement, is to seek any other extraneous evidence, no matter how slight, of circumstances which render it probable that the confession is indeed true. See ALARAPE VS. THE STATE (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt. 705) 79 @ 98 Paragraphs F-G; ACHABUA VS. THE STATE (1976) 12 SC. (Pt. 63) 68-69. – PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.:

A party who did not object to the tendering of a confessional statement, when it was put in evidence, cannot protest against the statement, on appeal, or seek to deny making the statement, voluntarily. A confessional statement can only be challenged, when it is tendered (and at that time possibly call for trial-within-trial on its voluntaries), not on Appeal. See Sunday Vs FRN (2018) LPELR – 46357 (SC), where it was held: “…The appellant, as an accused thereat, admitted committing the offence he was charged with in tandem with his voluntary confessional statement (Exhibit A).
The challenges or attacks on the confessional statement arose only at the Court below. It is therefore not an issue or case of “retracted confession” since the appellant had never testified in the case. All the challenges posed by the learned counsel for the appellant did not relate to want of voluntariness of this confession due to either duress, promise, torture or inducement applied by the investigator(s) of the case or the non-calling of either any interpreter or the recorder of such statement which would have obviously rendered the statement inadmissible.
It is trite law, that where a person makes a free and voluntary confessional statement which is direct and positive and is properly proved, a trial Court can comfortably convict him even on such confessional statement alone, without necessarily looking for any corroborative evidence. See Kim v State (1992)4 NWLR (pt.233)17; Queen v Itule (1961)2 SC NLR 183; Ejinima vs State (1991)6 NWLR (pt.200) 627; Smart v State (2016) EJSC Vol.36)145; Egboghonome V The State (1993)7 NWLR (pt.306) 383; Oseni Vs The State (2012) 5 NWLR (pt.1293) 351.
It is in fact a well-settled law that a Court can convict an accused person based on his confession alone in as much as it is satisfied with the truth of such confession. See Yahaya V The State (1986)12 SC 282; Stephen vs The State (1986)5 NWLR (pt.46)978. In other words, once a Court is fully convinced of the truth of a confession, such confession or extra-judicial statement alone can ground a conviction. See also Edhigere v State (1996) 8 NWLR (pt.464); Aremu v State (1991)7 NWLR (pt.201)1.
It is apt to state here that in the case at hand, the trial Court did not only rely on the voluntary confessional statement of the appellant (Exhibit A), but also it relied on the unequivocal and clear admission by him of the commission of the offence he was charged with when he unhesitatingly and clearly admitted his guilt at the Court in the presence of counsel of his choice when the charge was duly and properly read and explained to him.” See also the case of Ichita & Anor Vs Ichita (2017) LPELR – 42074 (CA), where this Court held: “Can Appellants, therefore, raise appeal against the admission of those documents, which they never challenged their admissibility at the Court below?
I think not. See the case of John & Anor Vs The State (2011) LPELR – 8152 (SC): “The contention that Exhibit 3 was inadmissible because it was not tendered by the maker is in the circumstance of no moment. Besides, when the said Exhibit 3 was about to be tendered, there was no objection by the learned Counsel for the defence… Having not objected to the admissibility of the confessional statement (Exhibit 3), this omissions translates to the fact that the 1st Appellant was comfortable with the admission and saw no reason to challenge its admissibility.
In a situation like this, the Court is at liberty to ascribe probative value to the document as succinctly put in the case of Alade Vs Olukade (1976) 2 SC 183…” PER MBABA, J.C.A.

It is settled law that a confessional statement of an accused person is only evidence against him. It cannot be evidence against other accused person(s). In other words, the confessional statement of an accused person implicating another accused person is only deemed to be relevant for the person who made it. It cannot be used as evidence against that other accused person unless he adopts it. See: Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the cases of GBADAMOSI & ANOR v STATE (1992) LPELR-1313(SC), per Ogundare, JSC at page 29, para.
D; IBRAHIM v STATE (2014) LPELR-23291(CA), per Galinje, JCA at pages 26–27, para. D; EMMANUEL v STATE (2015) LPELR-41676(CA), per Gumel, JCA at page 33 para. C; and AHMED v KANO STATE (2017) LPELR-43224(CA), per Daniel-Kalio, JCA at pages 14–15, para. C. PER MOHAMMED, J.C.A.

It is trite that an accused person could be convicted on his Confessional Statement alone. In IBRAHIM KAMILA V. THE STATE (2018) LPELR – 43603 (SC) P. 14, PARAGRAPH A-E. His Lordship Sanusi, JSC clearly stated the position of the law thus: “A Confessional Statement simply be defined as an admission by a person charged (or an accused person accused) of committing a crime at anywhere or anytime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed such crime. See Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended.
It is well settled law that free and voluntary confession of guilt alone by an accused person, provided it is direct and positive and was duly made voluntarily, is sufficient to ground a conviction, since a confession always remains the best proof of what he had done. See ALABI V. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 307) 5, FABIYI V. STATE (2015) 6 – 7 SC (PT. 1) 83, OSETOLA AND ANOR VS. STATE (2012) 6 SCNJ 321, NWACHUKWU VS. THE STATE (2002) SCNJ 230, DOGO V. THE STATE (2013)2-3 SC (PT. III) 75 at 92 – 94.” PER UWA, J.C.A.

In IMEPURUNGU VS. THE STATE (2019) LPELR -47047 (CA), I restated the position of the law briefly as follows: “In law, can the Appellant be convicted on Exhibit A alone? When an accused person confesses to a crime in his extra-judicial statement but in Court retracts or takes back what he had said, the practice is that before such an accused person is convicted on the confessional statement, the Court looks for some evidence outside the confession which would make the confession probable. Nowadays, the need is compelling, I dare say.” See also AZABADA VS.
STATE (2014) LPELR – 23017 (SC), STATE VS. MUHAMMED MASIGA (TSOLO) 2017 LPELR – 43474 (SC).” The testimony of the PW1 and PW2 was sufficient corroboration of the Exhibits “A1 and A2”. In UDO VS. THE STATE (2018) LPELR – 43707 (SC) at P. 22, PARAS. A – B, his Lordship Rhodes – Vivour, JSC held that: “Eyewitness evidence is always reliable evidence provided the witness is telling the truth. Such evidence is on what the witness saw.
It is almost impossible to dislodge such evidence.” The law is that the evidence of an eye witness is one of the best evidence to sustain a conviction of an accused person, an on the spot account of what an eye witness (PW1 & PW2) saw at the scene of the alleged offence, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See SHURUMO VS. STATE (2010) 19 NWLR (PT. 1226) 73, AKINMOJU VS STATE (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 662) 608 and AGU VS. STATE (2017) 10 NWLR (PT. 1573) 171. The PW1 and PW2 gave a clear and detailed account of what they saw at the scene. PER UWA, J.C.A.

In the case of SULE VS. STATE (2018) 10 NWLR (PT. 1628) PAGE 564 PARAS D – G, it was held that: “Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that a confession is an admission made at anytime by a person, charged with a crime tending to show or suggest the inference that he committed the crime. Confessional statement is tenable and admissible. Confessional statement is the best evidence to ground conviction and it can be relied upon solely where voluntary.
The criminal guilt of an accused person can be established by confessional statement, circumstantial evidence and evidence of an eyewitness. A confessional statement of the accused person that is free and voluntary regardless of the fact that he subsequently resiled from his voluntary confession at trial is good evidence to ground conviction.
A confessional statement does not become inadmissible simply because the accused person denied having made it.” When a sane right-thinking person freely and voluntarily confesses that indeed he was the one responsible for the crime for which he is being accused of, it is a gold mine for the prosecution as the Accused has willing offered himself to be slaughtered. A direct, voluntary and unequivocal confessional statement is solid evidence that can be used to convict an accused person. In the instant case, the Appellant was convicted solely and only on the strength of the confessional statement.
The question that must be answered is: was the confessional statement strong, direct, positive, unequivocal and free from doubt, capable of securing a conviction against the Appellant? In the case of SULE VS. STATE (SUPRA), it was held that: “The confessional statement of an accused, where it is direct, positive and unequivocal as to the commission of the crime charged, is the best evidence and can be relied upon solely for conviction of the accused person.
An accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone, where the confession is consistent with other ascertained facts, which have been proved. Confession in criminal procedure is the strongest evidence of guilt on the act of an accused person. It is stronger than evidence of an eyewitness because the evidence comes from the accused person. There is no better evidence and there is no further proof.
Therefore, where an accused person confesses to a crime in the absence of an eyewitness to the crime, he can be convicted on his confession alone once the confession is positive, direct and properly proved. In otherwords, a free and voluntary confession of guilt, direct and positive and if duly made and satisfactorily proved is sufficient without corroborative evidence so long as the Court is satisfied as to the truth of the confession.” PER IDRIS, J.C.A.
THE DEFINITION OF A VITAL WITNESS In the case of UZIM VS. STATE (2019) 14 NWLR (PT. 1693) PAGE 419 AT 441 PARA D – E, the Supreme Court per Augie, JSC described who a vital witness is: “A vital witness is a witness whose evidence may determine the case one way or the other and it is settled that the failure to call such a witness is fatal to the prosecution’s case. ONAH V STATE (1985) 3 NWLR PART 12 PAGE 236 SC. It is well settled that the prosecution is entitled to call only the witnesses that it considers relevant to its case.
In effect, it is for the prosecution to determine the direction of its case and which witness to call to prove its case and once it discharges that burden on it to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt it does not matter.” Furthermore, it was held in the case of UZIM VS. STATE (SUPRA), that: “The prosecution has a duty to prosecute the accused within the ambit of the law.
To that end, the law grants it the discretion to call any number of witnesses or adduce any particular evidence to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.” Simply put, no one can dictate the specific witnesses the prosecution must call in proof of its case. It is totally within their discretion. However, where the prosecution claims to have gathered information from a source or a person and they lazily dump the information before the Court without trying to prove same at all, then it can be safe to say that they have failed to call a vital witness. PER IDRIS, J.C.A.

It is also trite law that before a confessional statement could result to conviction of an accused person, it must be unequivocal in the sense that it leads to the guilt of the accused. Where the alleged confessional statement is capable of dual or more interpretations in the realm of guilt and non-guilt, a trial Court will be hesitant to convict the accused but it should instead give him the benefit of doubt. See NWEZE V. STATE (2017) LPELR-42344(SC) AT 32-33(A-E). PER BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.

The law is trite that a Court can still convict an accused person even on the basis of his confessional statement, alone, though the statement is denied or retracted at the trial, once the Court adjudges same to have been given, voluntarily. Also, where there are other pieces of evidence at the trial to corroborate the confessional statement, the Court can convict on the same. The authorities on this are replete.
See the case of Sani Vs State (2020) LPELR – 53905 (SC), where it was held: “It is certainly not the law that a Court cannot convict an accused solely on his confessional statement if found to be a clear, positive and direct admission of the commission of the offence with which the accused is charged. This Court has endlessly held that where, as in the case at hand, an accused resiles from his extra-judicial statement, he may still be convicted on the basis of the very voluntary statement if same is corroborated and shown to have indeed been made freely by the accused.
The Court has, over the years, imbibed the tests laid in R v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR. 233 at 238 and admonished trial Courts to obey the rules outlined therein before convicting and accused. See Afolabi v. State (2016) 4 SC 86 at 90, (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1524) 497, Sahalatu Shazali v. State (1988) LPELR – 3040 (SC) (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 93) 164 and Rasheed Lasisi v. The State (2013) LPELR – 20183 (SC); (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 74.” Per MUHAMMAD, JSC. PER MBABA, J.C.A.

In the recent decision of this Court in the case of Gambo Sule Vs Kano State (2022) LPELR – 57542 CA, we held as follows: By law, a confessional statement is sufficient to lie a conviction, even if retracted by Appellant, once the Court find substance in it, and same is corroborated by other pieces of evidence. The evidence of the eye witness account (PW1 and PW6) were strong to corroborate the confession of Appellant to robbery against the Appellant and were even alone, capable of establishing the offence, in my opinion.
See the case of Hussein Vs The State (2022) LPELR-57021 (CA), where we held: “Only recently, we had course to restate the law in the case Kabiru Bala v The State (2022) LPELR-56737, on confessional statement as the best evidence to work with and to convict on, once the statement is adjudged credible and made voluntarily by the accused person. We held, thus: “By law, a confessional statement is enough evidence, and, in fact the best evidence, to establish commission of offence, coming from the accused person himself where the confession is adjudged voluntarily made.
See the case of Uhara Vs The State (2021) LPELR- 55512 (CA): “We have held several times that a confessional statement alone is a conclusive and sufficient evidence to establish conviction, and, in fact, the best evidence of the commission of the offence, coming directly from the accused person himself, and closing every door of defence against him, except where the issue/defence of provocation can be invoked.
See FRN Vs Iweka (2011) LPELR-9350 SC, where it was held that confessional statement is the best evidence of proof of crime and can be accepted as satisfactory evidence, upon which alone the accused can be convicted. See also Ogoala Vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 at 534.” PER MBABA, J.C.A.

Of course, the evidence of the co-accused, naming the Appellant as one of them must be taken with caution, as the law warns against relying on such evidence. See the case of Hassan Vs The State (2016) LPELR – 42554 (SC): “It is elementary that in a criminal trial, where an accused person incriminates a co-accused in his statement to the police, the statement is evidence only against the maker and not against the co-accused.
But if the prosecution, police decides to use the statement against a co-accused, then the prosecution is bound to make the incriminating statement available to the co-accused. See R v.
Afose (1934) 2 WACA p. 115.” Per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC See also the case of Awo Vs The State (2020) LPELR – 50619 CA, Ajomayan Vs The State (2020) LPELR – 49598 CA and Obinna Vs The State (2021) LPELR – 55847 CA, which states that: A confessional statement of an accused person, implicating or seeking to implicate a co-accused should always be taken with suspicion, as such confessional statement of a co-accused is no evidence against an accused (Appellant) who has not adopted the statement. See OZAKI & ANOR VS STATE (1990) LPELR-2888 SC, YUSUF & ANOR VS STATE (2019) LPELR 46945 (SC).
And such evidence remains against the person who made the confessional statement. See MBANG VS THE STATE (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 157, ALARAPE VS STATE (2001) 2 SC 114; 2001 5 NWLR (Pt. 705).” PER MBABA, J.C.A.

See the recent case of Sule Vs Kano State (2022) LPELR-57542 (CA), where we held: “By law, a confessional statement is sufficient to lie a conviction, even if retracted by Appellant, once the Court find substance in it, and same is corroborated by other pieces of evidence. The evidence of the eye witness account (PW1 and PW6) were strong to corroborate the confession of Appellant to robbery against the Appellant and were even alone, capable of establishing the offence, in my opinion.
See the case of Husseini Vs The State (2022) LPELR-57021 (CA), where we held: “Only recently, we had course to restate the law in the case Kabiru Bala v The State (2022) LPELR-56737, on confessional statement as the best evidence to work with and to convict on, once the statement is adjudged credible and made voluntarily by the accused person. We held, thus: “By law, a confessional statement is enough evidence, and, in fact the best evidence, to establish commission of offence, coming from the accused person himself where the confession is adjudged voluntarily made.
See the case of Uhara Vs The State (2021) LPELR- 55512 (CA): “We have held several times that a confessional statement alone is a conclusive and sufficient evidence to establish conviction, and, in fact, the best evidence of the commission of the offence, coming directly from the accused person himself, and closing every door of defence against him, except where the issue/defence of provocation can be invoked.
See FRN Vs Iweka (2011) LPELR-9350 SC, where it was held that confessional statement is the best evidence of proof of crime and can be accepted as satisfactory evidence, upon which alone the accused can be convicted. See also Ogoala Vs The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 509 at 534.” PER MBABA, JC.A.

PRINCIPLE IN determining the truthfulness of the confessional statement
……the settled guidelines in determining the truthfulness of the confessional statement, to wit: (i) Whether there is anything outside the confession which shows that it may be true; (ii) Whether the confessional statement is in fact corroborated. (iii) Whether the relevant statement of fact made in it are most likely true as far as they can be tested; (iv) Whether the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence; (v) Whether the confession is possible, and; (vi) Whether the alleged confession is consistent with other facts that have been ascertained and established. See: Ubierho v.
The State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.919) 644. The above guidelines are also known as the test in R v. Sykes (1913) 8 Cr. App. Reports 233. ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C.

It is settled that a confessional statement is the most effective compass of navigating culpability of an Accused on the part he played in the commission of the offence – see Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460, wherein Tobi, JSC, said: “A confessional statement is the best evidence… It is a statement of admission of guilt by the accused and the Court must admit it in evidence, unless it is contested.
If a confessional statement is contested at the trial, our procedural law requires that the trial Court should conduct a trial within a trial for purposes of determining the admissibility or otherwise of the statement once a confessional statement is admitted, the prosecution need not prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as the confessional statement ends the need to prove the guilt of the accused.
Thus, it is well settled that a confessional statement, which is made voluntarily, even if subsequently retracted, is sufficient to sustain a conviction – see Solola v. State (supra) and Nwaeze v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 428) 1. AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.:

A confession is an admission made by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime, and it is settled that a confessional statement, which is sufficient to ground a conviction, is the most effective compass of navigating culpability of an Accused on the part he played in the commission of the offence. See Obidiozo & Ors V. State (1987) LPELR-2170(SC), and Solola V.
State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460, wherein Tobi, JSC, aptly stated that: “A confessional statement is the best evidence – – It is a statement of admission of guilt by the Accused and the Court must admit it in evidence, unless it is contested – – If a confessional statement is contested at the trial, our procedural law requires that the trial Court should conduct a trial within a trial for purposes of determining the admissibility or otherwise of the statement.
Once a confessional statement is admitted, the Prosecution need not prove the case against the Accused beyond reasonable doubt, as the confessional statement ends the need to prove the guilt of the Accused.” In this case, the trial Court did not need to conduct a trial-within-trial, as the Appellant did not challenge the admissibility of Exhibits E & E1, on the ground of involuntariness. He merely retracted his confession, and it is well settled that a confessional statement, if made voluntarily, even if subsequently retracted, is sufficient to sustain a conviction - see Solola V.
State (supra), Nwaeze V. State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 428) AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

This Court had in several decided cases reiterated that the time to object to the voluntariness of a confessional statement is at the time of tendering same by the prosecution but not when the accused person opens his defence or during that defence. It will amount to an afterthought. See; Ogudo Vs. The State (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt.1278). OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.

There is no doubt and the law is trite that an accused person can be convicted on his own confession alone and there is no law whatsoever against it. The law is clear on this point, that if a suspect makes a free and voluntary confession, as earlier stated, in his extra-judicial statement to the police, which confession is direct and positive and the Court is satisfied with its truth, such confessional statement alone is sufficient to ground and support conviction without corroboration. See; Asimiyu Alarape & Ors Vs.
The State (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt.1705) 791 (2001) 2 SC 114 (2001) LPELR 412 (SC); Ozana Ubierho Vs. The State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.919) 644; (2005) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 18. Indeed, there is no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession. See; Akeem Agboola Vs. The State (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt.1366) 619; (2013) 8 SCM 157. OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.

A man may be convicted on his own confession alone; there is no law against it. The law is that, if a man makes a free and voluntary confession which is direct and positive, and is properly proved, a jury may, if they think fit, convict him of any crime upon it. But seldom, if ever, the necessity arises, because confessions can always be tested and examined, first by the police and then by you and us in Court, and the first question you ask when you are examining the confession of a man is, is there anything outside it to show it was true? Is it corroborated?
Are the statements made in it of fact so far as we can test them true? Was the prisoner a man who had the opportunity of committing the murder? Is his confession possible? Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and which have been, as in this case, proved before us? See Per Adetokunbo Adegboyega Ademola, JSC, in KOPA V. STATE (1971) LPELR-1702(SC) (PP. 3-4, PARA. E-E) UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.:

The law is indeed trite that a confessional statement which is voluntary, properly proved, direct and unequivocal, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even where it is subsequently retracted at the trial. As a mater of practice, the Courts look for some other evidence outside the statement, no matter how slight to establish the truth of the matters admitted therein. The six-way test laid down in R.Vs  Sykes (Supra) requires the Court to satisfy itself of the following: 1. Is there anything outside the statement to show that it is true? 2. Is it corroborated? 3.
Are the facts stated therein true as far as can be tested? 4. Did the accused have the opportunity of committing the offence? 5. Is the confession possible? 6. Is it consistent with other facts that have been ascertained and proved? See Akpa vs The State (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1019) 500; Okoh Vs The State (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 502. PER KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C

Moreover, the position of the law is trite that out of the three modes of establishing the guilt of an accused person available to the prosecution, to wit: direct evidence of an eye witness, circumstantial evidence and confessional statement of the accused person, the confessional statement of the accused is the best pointer to the truth of the role played by such accused person in the commission of the offence and the Court can safely rely on it to convict once the Court is satisfied that it is direct and unequivocal. See FRN vs. Iweka (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt 1341) 285; Ikemson vs.
State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 110) 455 . JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C

The law is settled that once a confessional statement has been made voluntarily, and it is direct, positive, and unequivocal and clearly amounts to an admission of guilt, it can still ground a conviction regardless of the fact that the maker resiled there-from or retracted same completely at the trial. PER ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C.
In the instant appeal, there was ample evidence to support the Appellant’s confessional statement and the Court below was right to so hold. The concurrent findings of facts by the two Courts below, are factually and legally sound and do not merit any interference by this Court. Without any clear evidence of errors in law or fact leading to or occasioning miscarriage of justice, this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings.
It is trite law that there must be clear proof of error either of law or of fact on the record which has occasioned miscarriage of justice before the Supreme Court can upset or reverse concurrent findings of fact .

Where a confessional statement is direct, positive and admits all or some of the elements of the offence charged, and the Court is satisfied that it was made voluntarily, the Court can rely on it to convict, even if retracted at the trial -PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

The law is settled beyond peradventure that a Court may convict an accused person solely on the basis of his confession even when he retracted or resiled from the confession. It is also the law that where an accused person outrightly denies making a confessional statement, the trial Court should admit the statement in evidence as an exhibit and decide later whether or not such denial avails the accused. See Ikemson Vs State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110)455 – PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.
The Court should evaluate the confessional statement, the testimony of the accused and the other pieces of evidence adduced at trial to decide if there is any independent or corroborative evidence no matter how slight showing that the offence was committed and it was the accused who committed it – PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT A confessional statement made by an accused person, just like an admission in civil procedure is the strongest evidence of guilt on the part of the accused person. It is even stronger than the evidence of an eye witness because it came from “the horse’s mouth” who is the accused person himself stating that he actually committed the offence charged. SAMUEL CHUKWUDUMEBI OSEJI, J.S.C

I am of the view that the plea of guilt in open Court, amounts to a voluntary oral confession and this oral confession, has more evidential value than any other evidence that may be adduced against an accused person by the prosecution. In the case of OMOJU V.
FRN (2008) LPELR – 2647(SC), Tobi JSC (of blessed memory), considered the effect of an accused person’s plea of guilt on the burden placed on the prosecution where my noble Lord held thus: “The law is elementary that if an accused person pleads guilty, the burden of proof placed on the prosecution becomes light, like a feather of an ostrich. It no longer remains the superlative and compelling burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
After all, the guilty plea has considerably shortened the distance and brought in some proximity the offence and mens rea or actus reus of the accused as the case may be. That makes it easier to locate causation or causa sine qua non.” In the case of F.R.N. v. KAYODE (2019) 6 SC (Pt.1) 165 at 188, this Court, per Galumje, JSC held as follows: “The law is settled that an Accused person who pleads guilty to a criminal charge can be convicted summarily if the Court is satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence.” PER JAURO, J.S.C.

The tests for determining the voluntariness of a confessional statement have been consistently applied by this Court in a plethora of cases as follows: (1) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true. (2) Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight (3) Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true. (4) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence. (5) Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. (6) Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.
See R v. Sykes (1913) 8 CAR 233 at 236, Ikpasa v. Attorney General of Bendel State (1981) 9 SC 7; Akpan v. State (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 248) 439 at 460; Alarape v State (2001) 5 NWLR (pt 705) 28 at 98 – 99. PER PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

Invariably, the extant provisions of Sections 28, 29 and 31 of the Evidence Act (Supra) are to the following effect: 28.
A confession is an admission made at time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. 29. (1) In any proceeding, a confession made by a defendant may be given in evidence against him in so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the Court in pursuance of this Section (2) If, in any proceeding where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by a defendant, it is represented to the Court that the confession was or may have been obtained – (a) by oppression of the person who made it; or (b) In consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in such consequence. (5) In this section “oppression” includes; torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use of threat of violence whether or not amounting to torture. 31.
If the confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in a consequence of a deception practiced on the defendant for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may have been the form of these questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such statement and that evidence of it might be given. PER SAULAWA, J.S.C.

It is trite that in any given trial, where a confessional statement is sought to be tendered by the prosecution, the accused person (Defendant) has the right to object to the admissibility of the confession in either of two distinct ways. First, the accused may retract the confession or deny ever making same, at all. Second, the accused may opt to admit having made or signed the statement but claim however, that he did not do so voluntarily.
Where the accused person denies ever writing, or making the confessional statement at all, the confession is still admissible in evidence, albeit the trial Court must at the conclusion of the trial determine the veracity and probative value of the said confession. See IKPASA VS.
THE STATE (1981) NSCC 300, where in this Court aptly held: It is a well established practice in this country that where on the production of a confession, it is challenged on the ground that an accused did not make it at all, the question of whether he made it or not is a matter to be decided at the conclusion of the trial by the learned trial Judge himself.
Whatever objection be made by counsel in such circumstances does not affect the admissibility of the statement and therefore it should be admitted in evidence as the issue of voluntariness or otherwise of the statement does not arise for consideration. See also OGUNYE VS. THE STATE (1999) NWLR (Pt. 604) 548 @ 570; EHOT VS. THE STATE (1993) NWLR (Pt. 290) 6440. PER SAULAWA, J.S.C.

It is trite law that a confessional statement made by an accused person, which is properly admitted in evidence is, in law, the best pointer to the truth of the role played by such accused person in the commission of the offence. See OSENI V STATE (2012) 5 NWLR (PT 1293) 351; FRN V IWEKA (2013) 3 NWLR (PT 1341) 285. There is however a duty on the Court to test the truth of a confession by examining it in the light of the other credible evidence before the Court. See ADEKOYA V. STATE (2012) LPELR – 7815 (SC). PER JAURO, J.S.C.

My Lords, the confessional statement of the Appellant was retracted by him in the course of the trial and the position of the law as reiterated by this Court in several cases is that the statement must meet the probability test set out in R. v.
Sykes (1913) 18 CR All Pg. 233: a) Whether there is anything outside it to show the statement is true, b) Whether it is corroborated, c) Whether the statement made in it of fact so far as they can be tested are true, d) Whether the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence, e) Whether it is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved See… PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

The law is that there is no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession… Confession made in judicial proceedings is of greater force or value than other proofs, Oche vs. The State (2007) 5 NWLR (PT. 1027) 214; Nwosu vs. The State (2004) 15 NWLR (PT.897) 446. (Underlined for emphasis). PER AMADI, J.CA. WHETHER OR NOT A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT NEUTRALIZES ALL OTHER STATEMENTS INCONSISTENT WITH IT
In Kolade vs the State (2015) LPELR 41662 where the Court held: “Indeed, I would say that once properly admitted and is believed, a Confessional Statement nullifies or neutralizes all other statements inconsistent with it.” Per Okoronkwo, JCA. Also in Oseni vs The State (2012) LPELR 7833 where the Court held “There is no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession. Such a confession is admissible. A confession made in judicial proceedings is of greater force or value than all other proofs. A confession is more often denied or retracted.
The denial or retraction is a matter to be taken into consideration to decide what weight could be attached to it. Dibie v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (pt.1038) pg.30 Ukpong v. Queen (No.1) (1961) 1 SCNLR 23 Idowu v. The State (2000) SC (pt.11) Pg.50.” Per Adekeye, JSC. Again Tobi, JSC held in Magaji vs Nigerian Army (2008) LPELR 1814. “A confessional statement unequivocally confesses to the commission of the offence charged.” PER  NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.

The essence of recording and tendering the statement of an accused person in the language he understands is to ensure the correctness or accuracy of the said statement. See HAMZA VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 47 858 (SC) 28. A – D, OLANIPEKUN VS. STATE (2016) LPELR – 4044 (SC) 8, B – D, ASUQUO VS. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40597 (SC) 15 – 16, E – D and OLALEKAN VS. STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (PT. 746) 793. In ADAMU VS. STATE (2019) LPELR – 46902 (SC) 12 – 13, PARA.
A, his Lordship Kekere – Ekun, JSC stated the position of the law thus: “In the instant case, it is argued on behalf of the Appellant, that being illiterate in English Language, for his confessional statement to have been properly before the Court for consideration, both the English and Hausa versions ought to have been tendered.
In order to ensure the correctness and accuracy of a statement made by an accused person and to protect his right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, where he volunteers a statement in a language other than English Language, which is the language of the Court, the statement in the original language in which it was recorded as well as its translation into English Language must be tendered in Court. It affords the accused person the opportunity to challenge in Court if the need arises, his statement as originally recorded or its translation.
It enables the Court to be satisfied that it is his true statement. For this reason, it was held by this Court that the recorder of the statement as well as the interpreter must be produced in Court as witnesses; otherwise the statement remains hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. See FRN VS. USMAN (2012) 8 NWLR (PT. 1301) 141 at 159 – 160 D –B, 161 C-D; 163 C-H; NWAEZE VS. THE STATE (1996) 2 NWLR (PT. 428) 1 at 20, QUEEN VS. ZAKWAKWA (1960) VOL. 1 NSCC 8 at 9.” PER UWA, J.C.A.