Contradiction

In all, for contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses to affect a conviction, particularly, in a capital offence, they must raise doubts as to the guilt of the accused person

Ukpong v. State LGC(11/1/2019) I

In any event, courts have even taken the view that witnesses may not always speak of the same facts or events with equal and regimented accuracy

Ukpong v. State LGC(11/1/2019) I

This is so because it would be miraculous to find two persons who witnessed an incident giving identical accounts of it when they are called upon to do so at a future date. If that were to happen, such accounts would be treated with suspicion, as it is likely that the witnesses compared notes. In effect, minor variations in testimonies seem to be badges of truth

Ukpong v. State LGC(11/1/2019) I

This is so because it would be miraculous to find two persons who witnessed an incident giving identical accounts of it when they are called upon to do so at a future date. If that were to happen, such accounts would be treated with suspicion, as it is likely that the witnesses compared notes. In effect, minor variations in testimonies seem to be badges of truth

Ukpong v. State LGC(11/1/2019) I

The applicable principle is that only material or grave contradictions in the evidence of a party which goes to the root of the case weakens the case of the party who relies on the evidence so bedeviled.

MAMUDA v. STATE LGC(11/1/2019) I

Unfortunately, the testimonies, which he, [the appellant], adduced were so evidently contradictory and inconsistent that they could not establish that the said exhibit was the result sheet of a primary election, the conduct of which, was authorized by the National Working Committee of the second respondent as required by law. The effect is that these conflicting versions render his evidence very unreliable and untenable, C. D. C. (Nig.) Ltd v SCOA (Nig.) Ltd [2007] 6 NWLR (pt. 1030) 300. This must be so because such contradictions in the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness are disastrous; they, actually, have the effect of destroying the case of the plaintiff, Audu v Guta [2004] 4 NWLR (pt 864) 463.
As this Court held in National Investment Properties Co. Ltd v The Thompson Organization Ltd and Ors (1969) NMLR 99, 104:
A Plaintiff must call evidence in support of his pleadings and evidence which is in fact adduced, which is contrary to his pleadings, should never be admitted. It makes no difference that the other side did not object or that the Judge did not reject it. It is of course the duty of counsel to object to, in one word, inadmissible evidence; but if notwithstanding this, evidence is still, through oversight or otherwise admitted, then it is the duty of the Court when it comes to give judgment to treat the inadmissible evidence as if it had never been admitted.
The explanation for this prescription is simple: the standard of proof is on the preponderance of evidence.
Thus, where the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is contradictory, he would have failed to discharge the onus of proof on him, Yakubu v Jauroyel and Ors (2014) LPELR-22732 (SC) 69; E -G. That was the fate of the plaintiff's case at the trial Court. His case must, therefore, fail.

a piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other asserts; not necessarily when there are minor discrepancies in the details between them.
As Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, said in Ogoala V. State (supra) – "contradiction between two pieces of evidence goes rather to the essentiality of something being or not being at the same time whereas minor discrepancies depend on the person's astuteness and capacity for observing meticulous detail see Akpan v. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 182) 646 SC, Daggaya V. State (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 980) 637 SC and Ochemaje V State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. | 109) 57, where in Tobi, JSC, explained
Contradictions definitely arise in evidence of witnesses in Court. That explains the human nature and the humanity in witnesses. Although witnesses see and watch the same event, they may narrate it from different angles, in their individual peculiar focus, perspective or slant. This does not necessarily mean that the event they are narrating did not take place. It only means most of the time that the event took place, but what led to the event was given different interpretations, arising from the senses of sight and mind dictated by their impressions and idiosyncrasies. That is why the law says that contradictions, which are not material or substantial will go to no issue. The main interest of the Court is that the witnesses are in Union or Unison as to the happeninig of the event but gave different versions in respect of the peripheral surrounding the event. In our context, the event is the murder of Alhaji Bameyi and where PW1 and PW2 were on the day- The number of persons who participated in the murder and the date and manner of the arrest of the Appellant, are merely peripheral.- What has the date of arrest of the Appellant have to do with the act of murder committed by the Appellant?

The word "contradiction" comes from two Latin words – contra meaning opposite, and dicere, which means to say. So, to contradict is to speak or affirm the contrary,

The position of the law on the issue of contradictions in the evidence of witnesses that testify in Court is pretty well settled. It is not every minor contradiction that matters; for a trial Judge to disbelieve a witness, the contradiction in his evidence must be on a material point – Kalu v. State (1988) 3 NSCC

A piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what that other asserts. Put another way, evidence contradicts evidence, when it says the opposite of what the other evidence says, not on just any point, but on a material point – Odunlami V. Nigerian Army (2013) LPELR-20701(SC).

The law insists that where there are material contradictions in the evidence adduced by a Party, the Court is enjoined to reject the entire evidence as it cannot pick and choose which of the conflicting version to follow – Kayili V. Yilbuk & Ors (2015) LPELR -24323(SC).

The law is well entrenched and established that it is not all contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that are fatal. For any of such to be detrimental, it must be substantial and fundamental. Again see the case of State V. Saliu Babuga (supra).

This Court, as submitted by the Respondent's Counsel, has held in ADEKOYA v. THE STATE (2012) L.P.E.L.R – 7815 (SC) that it is trite law that it is not every discrepancy or contradiction or any form of inconsistency that affects the substance of a criminal charge which has been proved with credible and or unchallenged evidence. The contradiction or inconsistency that will upturn a decision must be of such magnitude that goes to the root of the evidence of a witness and must be total renounciation of the case of the party relying on it: ABOGEDE v. THE STATE (1996) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.448) 270; ISHOLA v. THE STATE (1978) 9 – 10 5.C 81; OGOALA v. THE STATE (1991) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.175) 509. The rationale for this principle, put forward in BOLANLE v. THE STATE (2005) 7 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 925) 431 at 454 – 455, is that the substantiality or fundamentality of the conflicts and contradiction to the main issue will necessarily create some doubt in the mind of the trial Court to enure in favour of the accused person, or Defendant, the benefit of doubt entitling him to acquittal.

It was argued for the Appellant that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution and that in the circumstance, the Court cannot pick and choose which piece of evidence to believe and which piece not to believe. This Court stated in ONUBOGU v. THE STATE (1974) 9 N.S.C.C. 378 andBOY MUKA v. THE STATE (1976) 9 – 10 S.C. 193 that when one witness for prosecution in a criminal case contradicts another witness on a material point, the prosecution ought to explain the circumstance of the inconsistency, failing which, the Court cannot pick and choose which witness to believe and which witness to disbelieve.

This Court had explained the situation with clarity in a number of judicial authorities and I shall refer to few to showcase what I am trying to put across. See the case of Isibor v. The State (2002) 2 SCNJ 162 at 167 where in Uwaifo JSC stated as follows:
"There is no doubt that the contradictions pointed out do exist in the evidence of PW4 and PW5. But in considering a case where contradictions have been recorded in the evidence of witnesses, it is important always to assess the materiality of those contradictions to the case presented. It is well established that contradictions which do not affect the substance of the issue to be decided are irrelevant. The contradiction must be shown to amount to a substantial disparagement of the witness or witnesses concerned, making it unsafe to rely on such witness or witnesses".
In Igbi v State (2000) 2 SCNJ 63 at 72, Ayoola JSC held:
"Discrepancies or contradictions in the evidence of a witness or witnesses may be said to be material where they go to an issue of fact which must be determined before a proper verdict can be arrived at in the case or where in the circumstances in which they occurred they were such as to cast a doubt on the credibility of the witness or witnesses."

The law is trite, that it is not every contradiction in evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution that may warrant interfering with the decision of a trial Judge by an appellate Court. For a contradiction to be a fatal one to a case, it must not only relate to material fact but it also must lead to a miscarriage of Justice. See Queen v. Iyanda (1960) 5 FSC 14; Omisade v. Queen (1964) 1 ALL NLR 233; Asariyu v. State (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 709; Golden Dibie & Ors v The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) 30; Olatunji v. Adisa (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.376) 167; Princent & Anor v. The State (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) 49; Isibor v. The State (2002) 2 SCNJ 162 at 167.

Where there is/are material contradiction(s) in the evidence led or adduced by the prosecution, then obviously doubt will be created in the mind of the trial Court, hence such doubt will be beneficial to the accused in which case, the Court should discharge the accused person. See Almu vs. The State (2009) 4 SCNJ 159/160.

The fact that the testimony of the accused person is full of inconsistencies or inherent contradictions did not, and should not tie the hands of the Court in relying on same where the facts therein are obvious and unassailable. Even where subsequently denied or retracted, in full or partially, as arguably done in this case, the Appellant would still have been unable to explicate his crime of robbing and killing the deceased.

As I said earlier, it is only material discrepancies, which constitute substantial disparagement of the witnesses concerned, in the sense that reliance on their testimony will likely result in miscarriage of justice that impacts negatively on the case of the Party, who relies on such evidence – see Ibrahim V. State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 399, where this Court per Belgore, JSC (as he then was), made the point very clear as follows-
If contradiction in the evidence of the Prosecution goes to the root of the case, that is to say, the substance of the case, as to raise doubt in the mind of the Court, the Court should not convict. It is clear that if there is contradiction in evidence as to material fact, that then goes to the root of the prosecution's case as to raise doubt, the benefit of which must be given to the Accused Person In the case where the contradictions are not as to material facts to the Charge against the Accused Person such contradictions should not disturb the finding of guilt, if sufficient evidence has been led on the material facts to the Charge.

Thus, the contradiction in the testimony of a witness, which will be fatal, must be substantial; minor discrepancies that do not affect the credibility of a witness may not be fatal – Uche V. State (2015) LPELR-249693 (SC).

It is settled law that it is not every minor contradiction that matters; for a trial Judge to disbelieve a witness, the contradiction in his evidence must be on a material point. In effect, the law allows room for minor discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses, which may not be fatal to the Prosecution's case Akpan V. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt 182) 646 SC.
See also Ochemaje v. Stare (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt 1109) 57 SC, wherein this Court per Tobi, JSC, explained what this means as follows:
Contradiction definitely arise in evidence of witnesses in Court. That explains the human nature and the humanity in witnesses. Although witnesses see and watch the same event, they may narrate it from different angles, in their individual peculiar focus, perspective or slant. This does not necessarily mean that the event that they are narrating did not take place. It only means most of the time that the event took place, but what led to the event was given different interpretations, arising from the senses of sight and mind dictated by their impressions and idiosyncrasies. That is why the law says that contradictions, which are not material or substantial will go to no issue.

The word "contradiction" comes from two Latin words contra meaning opposite, and dicere, which means to say. To contradict is, therefore, to speak or affirm the contrary, and a piece of evidence is contradictory to another when it asserts or affirms the opposite of what the other asserts.

Before a Court can be satisfied that there are contradictions in the case of the prosecution, the contradictions must be material. Where two or more witnesses, witness an event, in this case murder and after some time they are told to say what they saw. If their testimony is exactly the same, there would be very strong suspicion that the witnesses had been tutored. There are bound to be minor discrepancies and this is allowed.
There would be contradictions in the testimony of two witnesses where there is a clear departure on material facts from the testimony of one witness by the other. Variations, discrepancies are expected. Where there are none, it would be safe to conclude that the witnesses were tutored and that would not be reliable evidence.

Where two or more witnesses, in this case PW1 and PW2 testify at a criminal trial and their testimony is contradictory or and irreconcible it would be wrong for the Court to accept and believe the evidence of such witnesses. Where such is the case the trial judge must reconcile such testimonies before deciding to convict the accused.

A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what that other evidence has stated, and not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradicts one another when they are themselves inconsistent.
A discrepancy may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of or contains a little more than, what the other evidence says or contains some minor differences in details. See
Gabriel v State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) p.460
Idiok v State (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt.333) p.1788

In all, for contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses to affect a conviction, particularly, in a capital offence, they must raise doubts as to the guilt of the accused, Nwosisi v State [1976] 6 SC 109; Ejigbadero v State [1978] 9 – 10 SC 81; Kalu v State [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt.90) 503; Igbi v. State [2000] FWLR (Pt.3) 358; [2000] 3 NWLR (Pt.648) 169.

Hence, testimonies of witnesses can only be said to be contradictory when they give inconsistent accounts of the same event. That explains why the law takes the view that for contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses to vitiate a decision, they must be material and substantial. That is, such contradictions must be so material to the extent that they cast serious doubts on the case presented as a whole by the party on whose behalf the witnesses testify, or as to the reliability of such witnesses, Enahoro v. Queen (1965) NMLR 265, endorsed in Ogun v Akinyelu [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt.905) 362, 392; Emiator v. State [1975] 9-10 SC 112; Afolalu v. State [2009] 3 NWLR (Pt.1127) 160.
This is so because it would be miraculous to find two persons who witnessed an incident giving identical accounts of it when they are called upon to do so at a future date. If that were to happen, such accounts would be treated with suspicion, as it is likely that the witnesses compared notes. In effect, minor variations in testimonies seem to be badges of truth, Okoiziebu v. State [2003] 11 NWLR (Pt. 831) 327, 341; Nasaru v. State[1999] 6- 9 SC 153; Ikemson v State (supra). In any event, Courts have even taken the view that witnesses may not always speak of the same facts or events with equal and regimented accuracy, Ogun v Akinyelu [2004] 18 NWLR (Pt.905) 362, 392.

Now, the word "contradiction", traces its lexical roots to two Latin words, namely, contra and dictum meaning "to say the opposite', see Ikemson v State [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 455, 479.

Similarly, whether or not PW4 was at the identification parade does not affect the credible evidence given by PW3 that he identified the appellant at the Police station from a line-up of 12 men. Minor discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses would not result in a conviction being set aside. It is only substantial contradictions on material facts, which create doubt in the mind of the Court that would result in an acquittal. See: Okashetu v. The State (2016) 15 NWLR (Pt.1534) 126 @ 160; Afolabi v. The State (2010) All FWLR (Pt.538) 812 @ 820; Ikemson vs. The State (supra).

The person, as in the accused/appellant, who seek to rely on the decision in Woru V. State (supra) to discredit the evidence of a witness for the prosecution in terms of the identification of the accused person, should I think, invite the attention of that prosecution witness to his earlier statement to the Police to see whether by that statement, he had disclosed the identity or the description of the accused person to the police.
Having thus laid that foundation, the accused/appellant can thereafter seek to contradict that witness by applying to tender the witness earlier statement made to police in evidence to establish the fact that the piece of evidence which the witness now seek to put across in his oral evidence in chief is afterall an afterthought so far as that piece of evidence was not contained in his earlier statement made to the police.

The last point that I should comment on is the question posed by the learned appellant's counsel in his issue no. 1 in his brief of argument on the question of contradiction between Exhibit B, the cautionary statement of the accused/appellant and his testimony in Court when testifying for his defence. This Court in the case of Wasari Umani v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt.70) 274 or (1988) All NLR 148 or (1988) 2 SC 88 or (1988) LPELR 3357 (SC)had this to say per Nnamani JSC (of blessed memory) at page 14.
"In the recent case of Oladejo v. State (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 61) 364 at 427 this Court dealt with this matter in greater detail. There, I said as follows:-
"Contrary to the conclusion of the learned trial judge, the law is rather that where a witness (here an accused person makes a statement which is inconsistent with his testimony, such testimony is to be treated as unreliable while the statement is not regarded as evidence upon which a Court can act" See pages 427-428.

This Court also went further to say thus:-
"While I agree that the learned trial judge was clearly under a duty to consider all possible defences available to the defence even if they were not raised by the defence, I can see nothing suffered by the appellant by his failure to consider those defence (provocation and self defence. There was nothing to sustain them ...."

It is settled that where an accused person gives evidence that is inconsistent with the earlier statement he made to the police, the Court, if it chooses not to disregard the evidence as being unreliable, should take same with a pinch of the salt.

A critical view of this appeal shows that apart from the confessional statement of the Appellant (Exhibit Q), which is challenged for not being voluntary, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence by either PW.1, PW.2, PW.3 or PW.4 suggesting that the Appellant agreed or conspired with anyone to commit an unlawful purpose. More worrisome, the alleged or supposed Principal Actor who was earlier arrested was later released without any charges being brought against him. What is the effect of all these?The above, in effect, casts serious doubts on the guilt of the Appellant. And, where there is or are doubts, as in this case, the law is settled that such must be resolved in favour of the suspect, the Appellant in this case. Doubts, as in this case, must be necessarily be resolved in favour the Appellant in line with the tradition of this Court. In the case of OFORLETE VS THE STATE (2000) 7 WRN 86 at 106, (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt.681) 415 at 436.Achike, JSC., (as he then was) observed that, doubt (referring to doubt as to the possibility of the appellant committing the offence) must be resolved in favour of the appellant where the allegation of his offence has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This Court per Wali JSC, (as he then was) held in the case of CHUKWU VS THE STATE (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt.463) 686 at 701 G-H as follows:-
Where Prosecutions evidence is found to be contradictory on a material issue, the Court should give the benefit of that doubt to an accused person that stems from the non-credibility of such evidence and discharge and acquit him.

The contradiction complained about by the learned counsel for the Appellant is very insignificant. It is not any and every minor discrepancy or inaccuracy in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that amount to contradiction, especially where the witnesses are in substance saying the same thing. It is only material contradiction that is important. See The State vs Azeez & Ors 4 SC 188: Dibie & 2 Ors vs The State (2007) 3 SC (Pt. 1) 176.

contradict one another. It is true that when prosecution contradict one another on material facts, the Court cannot pick and choose which of them to believe or disbelieve. In such a situation, there has been a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt.

It is settled that Witness testimonies can only be said to be contradictory when they give inconsistent accounts of same event, and for such contradictions to vitiate a decision, they must be so material that they cast doubt on the case presented as a whole.
Thus, it is only a contradiction in respect of a material fact that would make a Court doubt the evidence, and what is material will depend on the facts of the particular case – see Eke V. State (2011) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1235) 589, Kalu V. State (1988) 4 NWLR (pt. 90) 503, and Ikemson V. The State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 110) 455 at 474/5, where this Court per Karibi-Whyte, JSC, aptly stated as follows-
I think it is right to postulate that material evidence, is such evidene, which on account of its logical nexus with the issue tends to influence decisively the establishment of the fact in issue. – – – For instance, the evidence which of the Appellants shot PW1 or PW2 or which leg PW2 was shot is not material to the issue of fact that PW1 or PW2 was shot. That PW1 or PW2 was shot at is material to the crime with which Appellants have been charged. Similarly, the sequence of pointing a gun at PW1 and PW2 and blocking of the road on a Motor Cycle. The fact was that there was credible evidence that the gun was pointed at them and the road was blocked by persons on a Motor Cycle. Thus, none of the contradictions alleged – – is material to affect the establishment of the fact that the offence of robbery with arms was committed, and that Appellants have been identified as those who committed the offence. The alleged contradictions are not material to the facts in issue, no explanation seems to me to be required.

In this case, I am unable to see any inconsistency or contradiction significantly material in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the material fact in issue required to establish the charge against the appellant. Indeed, this Court has laid it down in several cases that the contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses that will weigh on the mind of the Court must be such as are fundamental to the real question before the Court; the contradictions must be material and go to the root of the case to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court. See; Eze Ibeh Vs. The State (1997) 1 NWLR (pt.484) 632; (1997) LPELR 1389 (SC).

However, it is trite law that for inconsistency or contradiction in evidence to negatively affect its veracity, such inconsistency and contradiction must be materially significant as to affect negatively the overall case of the prosecution, otherwise such insignificant inconsistency or contradiction will be discountenanced by the Court. See; The State Vs. Azeez & Ors (2008) 8 SCM 175; (2008) 4 SC 188;Dibie & 2 Ors Vs. The State (2007) 7 SCM 101; (2007) 3 SC (Pt.1) 176; Stephen John & Anor Vs. The State (2011) 12 (Pt.2) SCM 238.

Generally, the law is settled that where there are material contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution, the accused is entitled to be given the benefit of the doubt so created as a result of the inconsistencies. See; Onubogu Vs. The State (1974)9 SC.1; Nwabueze Vs. The State (1988)4 NWLR (Pt.86) 16.

There is no doubt that where there are contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on a material fact and the said contradictions are not explained by the prosecution through any of its witnesses, it behoves the trial Court not to speculate on or profer the explanation for such contradictions and thereby pick and choose from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that which to believe. See; Boy Muka & Ors Vs. The State (1976) 9 & 10 SC 305; Christopher Arehia & Anor Vs. The State (1982) NSCC 85; (1982)4 SC 78.

The stance of Owoade, JCA, as I earlier pointed out, is consistent with the dictum of Coker, JSC, and Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in AJAO v. THE STATE (1984) NSCC. 783 at pages 785 and 789respectively to the effect that a witness, who at the trial gives details of the contents of his statement to the Police, cannot be said to have given inconsistent evidence.
The law is that when there appears to be some inconsistency between the oral evidence of the witness and his previous statement in writing, the witness is required to explain the Inconsistency in his evidence. See AGWU v. THE STATE (1965) NMLR 18 at 20.

On the alleged inconsistency in the testimony of the appellant and his confessional statement which he denied making as alluded to in the appellant's counsel brief; same in my respectful view is a recipe of retraction and not a contradiction. Even where there are contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution's witnesses, that would not cast or raise doubts in the mind of a trial Court except where they are on material point. Mere contradictions are often noticed or found in testimonies of witnesses due to human error. Thus, where the contradiction are not on material points, they cannot be fatal to the prosecution's case. See GALADIMA V. STATE (2017) 14 NWLR (Prt 1585) 187 at 207.

The law. as re-stated by Madarikan, JSC in OSENI v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL SC. 202/1968 decided on 16th July, 1969, (see Digest of Supreme Court cases, Vol. 10 at p. 166) where there is a conflict between the written statement made to the police by a witness and his oral evidence in Court, the trial Judge ought to resolve such conflict before deciding whether to accept the witness's evidence or not. To do that resolution between the extra-judicial statement and the oral evidence both have to be legal evidence before the Court. In other words by dint of Section 209 of Evidence Act, 1990 in pari materia with Section 199 Evidence Act. 2004 (now Section 232 of the Evidence Act, 2011) the said previous statement in writing has to be, or must be, produced for the trial Courts inspection, before the Court may thereupon make use of it for the purposes of the trial".
In all the cases where the previous written statement of the witness, made extra-judicially by him, was held to be a contradiction of his testimony in Court the previous statement was produced for inspection of the trial Court and was duly admitted in evidence as exhibit

It is settled law that a material contradiction must go to a material point-that is, to the root of the charge against the accused person. Therefore, where there are differences in the narration of events by prosecution witnesses, especially as to recounting or recollecting the dates of events, which are mere discrepancies that would not avail the accused person, because some of such discrepancies are expected as being natural. See Golden Dibie & Ors. V. The State (2007) 3 SCNJ 160 @ 170 & 178; John Ogbu & Anor v. The State (2007) 2 SCNJ 319 @ 334 – 335.

It is settled law that a material contradiction must go to a material point-that is, to the root of the charge against the accused person. Therefore, where there are differences in the narration of events by prosecution witnesses, especially as to recounting or recollecting the dates of events, which are mere discrepancies that would not avail the accused person, because some of such discrepancies are expected as being natural. See Golden Dibie & Ors. V. The State (2007) 3 SCNJ 160 @ 170 & 178; John Ogbu & Anor v. The State (2007) 2 SCNJ 319 @ 334 – 335.

For a contradiction to affect the case of the prosecution, it must be material and go to the root of the charge against the accused person. This court has held severally that where there are differences in the narration of events by prosecution witnesses, especially as to recounting or recollecting the date of events, which are mere discrepancies, that would not avail the accused person, because some of such discrepancies are expected as being natural. See John Ogbu & Another V. The State (2007) 2 SCNJ 319, Golden Dibie & Ors V. The State (2007) 3 SCNJ 160.

With respect, testimonies of witnesses can only be said to be contradictory when they give inconsistent accounts of the same event. That explains why the law takes the view that for contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses to vitiate a decision, they must be material and substantial, That is, such contradictions must be so material to the extent that they cast serious doubts on the case presented as a whole by the party on whose behalf the witnesses testify, or as to the reliability of such witnesses, Enahoro v Queen (1965) NMLR 265, endorsed in Ogun v Akinyelu (2004) 18 NWLR (pt 905) 362, 392; Emiator v State (1975) 9-10 SC 172; Ikemson v State (1989) 3 NWLR (pt 110) 455, 479; Afolalu v State [2009] 3 NWLR (pt 1127) 160.
This is so because it would be miraculous to find two persons who witnessed an incident giving identical accounts of it when they are called upon to do so at a future date. If that were to happen, such accounts would be treated with suspicion, as it is likely that the witnesses compared notes. In effect, minor variations in testimonies seem to be badges of truth, Okoiziebu v State (2003) 11 NWLR (pt 831) 327,341;Nasiru v. State (1999) 6- 9 SC 153; Ikemson v State (supra). In any event, Courts have even taken the view that witnesses may not always speak of the same facts or events with equal and regimented accuracy, Ogun v Akinyelu (2004) 18 NWLR (pt 905) 362, 392.
In all, for contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses to affect a conviction, particularly, in a capital offence, they must raise doubts as to the guilt of the accused person, Nwosisi v State (1976) 6 SC 109; Ejigbadero v State [1978] 9- 10 SC 81; Kalu v State [1988] 4 NWLR (pt 90) 503; Igbi v State [2000] FWLR (pt. 3) 358; [2000] 3 NWLR (pt 648) 169.

It is settled law that minor discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which do not go to the substance of the charge, cannot result in the conviction being set aside. See: Akindipe Vs The State (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1325) 94; Asuquo Vs The State (2016) LPELR 40597 (SC) 1 @ 27-28 E-A Theophilus Vs The State (1996) LPELR – 3236 (SC) 1 @ 27 – 28 E – A.

It is however trite law that for any conflict, contradiction or mix-up in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to be fatal to the case, the conflict or mix-up must be substantial and fundamental to the issues in question before the Court. See; Manshep Namsoh Vs The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt 292) 129; (1993) 6 SCNJ 55; (1993) LPELR – 1937 (SC)

It is also settled law that, it is not in all cases where there are discrepancies or contradictions in the prosecution's case, that an accused person will be entitled to an acquittal. It is only when discrepancies or contradictions, are on material point or points in the prosecution's case, which create some doubt that the accused person is entitled to benefit therefrom. See; John Agbo Vs. The State (2006) NWLR (Pt.977) 545; (2006) 1 SC (Pt.4) 73. Minor contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. But convictions in respect of material contradictions in the evidence adduced by prosecution are unsafe and will be set aside. See; Akpnenva Vs. The State (1982) 4 SC 78; (1982) 13 NSCC 85; Nicholas Wankey Vs. The State(1993) 5 NWLR (pt. 292) 542; (1993) LPELR – 3470 (SC).

It is already settled law that "two pieces of evidence contradict one another when they are by themselves inconsistent" and a discrepancy may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of or contains a little more than what the other piece of evidence says or contains, some minor difference in details. But minor discrepancies between a previous written statement and subsequent oral testimony do not destroy the credibility of witness. See; Ayo Gabriel Vs. The State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.457) 468 at 469; Jerry Ikuepenikan Vs. The State (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1229) 449 at 454.

The appellant had raised an issue on inconsistencies in the evidence of PW1 and contradictions in her evidence in Court as against her extra judicial statement and that the Court should take those as fatal to the prosecution case. It needs be said that it is not every contradiction or inconsistency in the evidence of prosecution witness as against the other or even between the testimony of a witness and the extrajudicial statement. For a fatal effect, the contradiction has to be on a material point and not just a minor discrepancy between a previous written statement and a subsequent oral testimony that would destroy or dent the credibility of a witness. Also the testimonies of witnesses cannot be expected to be the same, word for word as like a verbatim recording as that is not in keeping with normal human occurrences. In fact if the versions tallied so well as to be in a parrot like rendition then it is suspect and would lead to the conclusion that they were stories emanating from rehearsed and tutored tales. In the case at hand what the appellant is hanging onto are not minor discrepancies which the Court can safely discountenance. In this case, the discrepancies in the evidence of PW1 as against her earlier statements are material and cannot be ignored.
See; Abogede v The State (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt.448) 270; Nasiru v The State (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.589) 87; Jerry Ikuepenikan v The State (2011) 1 NWLR (Pt.1229) 449 at 454; Uwagboe v The State (2008) 163 LRCN 92 at 115 &116.

I have noted the discrepancies highlighted by learned counsel for the Appellant. It is not every contradiction in the prosecution's case that will result in upsetting a trial Court's judgment. For a contradiction to upset a judgment, it must be of such magnitude as to warrant interference with the conclusion reached by the trial Court. In other words, for a contradiction to upset the judgment of the trial Court, such contradiction must go to the root of the case and if allowed will lead to a miscarriage of justice. See Ejeka v. State[2003] 7 NWLR (Pt. 819) 408, Gidado Iyanda v.The Queen (1960) SCLR 595, Ikemson v The state (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 455 at 466. Indeed, a witness who experienced what PW1 went through will be suspected of having been tutored if he gives three different stories without some discrepancies.

Before a Court can be satisfied that there are contradictions in the case of the prosecution, the contradictions must be material. Where two or more witnesses, witness an event, in this case murder and after some time they are told to say what they saw. If their testimony is exactly the same, there would be very strong suspicion that the witnesses had been tutored. There are bound to be minor discrepancies and this is allowed.
There would be contradictions in the testimony of two witnesses where there is a clear departure on material facts from the testimony of one witness by the other. Variations, discrepancies are expected. Where there are none, it would be safe to conclude that the witnesses were tutored and that would not be reliable evidence.

Where two or more witnesses, in this case PW1 and PW2 testify at a criminal trial and their testimony is contradictory or and irreconcible it would be wrong for the Court to accept and believe the evidence of such witnesses. Where such is the case the trial judge must reconcile such testimonies before deciding to convict the accused.

A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what that other evidence has stated, and not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradicts one another when they are themselves inconsistent.
A discrepancy may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of or contains a little more than, what the other evidence says or contains some minor differences in details. See
Gabriel v State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) p.460
Idiok v State (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt.333) p.1788

The verb contradict, in its ordinary grammatical meaning, also means to assail, controvert, deny, dispute or traverse. One fact or set of facts is required to contradict, controvert, or traverse another fact or set of facts. That is why in Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, it is provided that facts not disputed or which are taken as admitted need no further proof. See also DIN v. AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS OF NIGERIA LTD. (1990) 21 NSCC (pt. 2) 313 at 320.

It is settled law, as I said supra, that for contradiction to have any effect on the case of an accused person, it must be material, substantial and must relate unequivocally to the charge against the accused person. See State V. Abdulazeez (2008).
Click the link below to read the full Judgment:
Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)H

The law is trite, that in an appeal Court, it is not enough for an appellant to show that there were contradictions in the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses, but it must be shown that the trial judge did not consider those contradictions.
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Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)H

The position of the law is that, before any contradiction can be established between the evidence of a witness and the previous statement made by the witness, the statement must be brought to the attention of the witness for his explanation in accordance with Sections 199 and 209 (now Sections 232 and 235) of the Evidence Act.

A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what that other evidence has stated not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradicts one another when they are themselves inconsistent. A discrepancy may occur when a piece of evidence stops short of, or contains a little more than what the other evidence says or contains some minor difference in details. See Gabriel v State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.122) p.460.
If a witness makes a statement before trial which is inconsistent with the evidence he gives in Court and he does not explain the inconsistency to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court should regard his evidence as unreliable. See
Onubogu & Anor v State (1974) (NSCC) p.358.

A piece of evidence contradicts another when it affirms the opposite of what that other evidence has stated, not when there is just a minor discrepancy between them. Two pieces of evidence contradicts one another when they are by themselves inconsistent. See Gabriel v. State (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) p. 457.

In all criminal cases the burden of proof squarely lies on the prosecution which always has a duty to prove all the above mentioned ingredients of the offence charged and by the provisions of Section 138 of the Evidence Act, the standard of such proof is nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, it is settled law that if there is any doubt in the evidence produced by the prosecution such doubt shall be resolved in favour of the accused person. See Adebiyi v. The State (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 397; Kola v. Poteskum (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 540) 1; David Abaje v. The State (1976) A NLR 139.

As to the alleged contradiction emphasised by the appellant's Counsel, a contradiction, if any, is fatal only when it goes to the substance of the case and there is no such contradiction in the case at hand. See Yaki v. state (2008) A FWLR (Pt. 440) 618 at 6114 SC. Minor and inconsequential contradictions which do not seriously relate to the ingredients of the offence charged cannot vitiate the prosecution's case against the appellant. See Enahoro v. Queen (1965) NMLR 265, Emiator v. State (1975) 9 – 11 SC 107, Nasiru v. State (1999) 1 SC 1.

On the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that there were serious contradictions in the evidence led by the prosecution, the law is settled that it is not every contradiction in the prosecutions case that will raise a doubt, the benefit of which ought to be resolved in favour of the accused. It is only contradictions that are substantial and fundamental to the main issue in question that would be fatal to the prosecution's case. For a contradiction to be material it must not only relate to a material fact, it must in addition lead to a miscarriage of justice. See: Dibie V. The State (2004) 14 NWLR (893) 257 at 280 A – D: Ikemson Vs The State (1989) 2 NSCC (Vol. 20) 471; Onubogu Vs The State (1974) 1 All NLR (part II) 5: Okonji Vs The State (1987) 1 NWLR (52) 659.

It is also the law that whenever doubts arise in the course of trial in the case of the prosecution, such doubts are resolved in favour of the accuse person being tried.
See NDIDI VS THE STATE (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1052) 633.

It is a general principle of criminal law that, contradictions in evidence which do not affect the substance of the issue is irrelevant. The contradiction that would make an appellate Court disbelieve the prosecution witnesses must be on a material point in the case, capable of upturning the decision of the trial Court.
Minor or miniature contradictions which do not touch on any of the ingredients of the offence charged will not be of any moment, Jimmy v The State (2013) 18 NWLR (Pt 1386) 229; Enahoro v The State (1965) NSCC (vol. 4) 98 at 113; Isibor v The State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 758) 741; Sele v The State (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 269) 276. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE Uwani Musa Abba Aji

It is settled law that Witness testimonies can only be said to be contradictory when they give inconsistent accounts of the same event, and for such contradictions to vitiate the Court’s decision, they must be so material that they cast doubt on the case presented as a whole. Thus, it is only a contradiction in respect of a material fact that would make a Court doubt the evidence, and what is material will depend on the facts of the case. See Eke V. State (2011) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1235) 589, Kalu V. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 90) 503, and Ikemson V. State (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 455 .
PER AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C

It is settled in law that where there are conflicts in the evidence given by the witnesses called by the same party to his case, their testimony will be treated as unreliable. See Mogaji v. Cadbury Nig. Ltd (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 7) 393. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.
THE LAW ON THE CLAIM OF A FAMILY PROPERTY The law is well settled that the person claiming family property as personal property cannot get a declaration of title. See ATUANYA V ONYEJEKWE (1975) NSCC, 89 at 91; OKELOLA v ADELEKE (2004) 12 NWLR PT. 891 SC, at 319-320. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

The law is settled that where the credibility of a witness is successfully impeached, his evidence loses probative value – Obri V State (1997) LPELR-2194(SC) 12, D-E. However, in this instance, based on the facts on record, PW4 was not declared a hostile witness and his credibility was not impeached. His evidence as given was merely allowed to stand and the lower Court ultimately decided on the weight to be ascribed to it, as it is entitled to. PER SANKEY, J.C.A.

It is trite law that it is not every contradiction in evidence that is fatal to a case and that a contradiction would be material if it is on the main issues in question before the Court or is on the evidence that establish any ingredient of the offence. A contradiction not on a main issue in question before the Court or not on the evidence that establish any ingredient of the offence is immaterial and go to no issue and cannot vitiate the decision of the trial Court. See Dibie & Ors. v. The State (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 363) 83, (2007) 3 SC (Pt. I) 176; Dagayya v.
State (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 308) 1212, (2006) LPELR – 912 (SC); Akpabio v State (1994) LPELR – 369 (SC) and Ndike v. State (1994) LPELR – 1971 (SC). An appeal on the ground of contradictions in the evidence elicited by a party to a case cannot succeed merely because some contradictions are shown to exist. The appeal can only succeed if it is shown that the contradictions are material . EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.

The law does not insist that there cannot be contradictions in the evidence of witnesses called by a party on any issue in contention, but the contradiction should not be material in such a way that they cast serious doubt on the case presented as a whole by that party -PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.
​It is not every contradiction in the case of the prosecution that would adversely affect the case of the prosecution. It is only material contradiction that can negatively affect or vitiate the case of the prosecution -PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

The law does not insist that there cannot be contradictions in the evidence of witnesses called by a party on any issue in contention, but the contradiction should not be material in such a way that they cast serious doubt on the case presented as a whole by that party -PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.
​It is not every contradiction in the case of the prosecution that would adversely affect the case of the prosecution. It is only material contradiction that can negatively affect or vitiate the case of the prosecution. In the instant case, the contradiction highlighted in the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 as to the date of the commission of the offence and the whereabout of the gun used in committing the armed robbery are not material.
The factor eliminating the materiality of the contradictions in the evidence of PW1 and PW2 is the established fact in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the Appellant conspired with others and committed the armed robbery – PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.

However, in law minor inaccuracies or discrepancies not going to the root of the case of the parties may not go to any issues. However, crucial inconsistencies and/or contradictions touching on the substance of the case of the Prosecution against an Accused person would raise reasonable doubt, and which must be resolved in favour of the Accused person. Thus, any reasonable doubt raised as a result of substantial inconsistencies or contradictions in the evidence led by the Prosecution must necessarily be resolved in favour of the Accused person. See Sa’adu Deriba (Driver) V.
The State (2016) LPELR – 40345 (CA) per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA. See also Saheed V. State (2018) LPELR – 46675 (CA) per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, Madu V. The State (2012) LPELR – 122009 (SC), Famakinwa V. The State (2012) LPELR 972010 (CA), Umar V. The State (1988) LPELR 171986 (SC). PER GEORGEWILL, JC.A.

The law is trite that it is not in all cases where there are discrepancies or even contradictions in the prosecution’s case that an accused person will be entitled to an acquittal. Rather, it is only where the discrepancies or contradictions are on a material point or points in the prosecution’s case which creates some doubt, that the accused person will be entitled to an acquittal. This is because, in such a circumstance, it is not possible to hold that the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.
A minor contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution which cannot vitiate the decision or which has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice, cannot affect the decision of the trial Court. Discrepancies or contradictions in the evidence of a witness or witnesses may be said to be material when they go to an issue of fact or where, in the circumstances in which they occurred, they were such as to cast a doubt on the credibility of the witness or the witnesses. For such to be fatal, they must be substantial and fundamental to the case of the prosecution.
See Udjor V State (2018) LPELR-43928(CA); Egwumi V State (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 525, 555, B-D; Egwemi V State (2010) LPELR-4080(CA); Usufu V State (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1020) 94; Agbo V State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 977) 545; Ejeka V State (2003) 4 SCNJ 16. PER SANKEY, J.C.A. THE POSITION OF LAW ON SELF DEFENCE
The defence of self-defence is a complete defence to a charge in law. See Sections 59 and 65 of the Penal Code. However, where an accused person pleads self-defence, what it connotes is that he agrees and/or accepts that he committed the act that led to the death of the deceased, but he was forced to do it because his life or limb was threatened either with death or with a grievous injury or harm. In other words, the plea of self-defence is inconsistent with an outright denial by an accused person that he inflicted the injuries which led to the death of the deceased.
Put another way, by pleading self-defence, the Appellant is saying that he was forced to kill the deceased because the deceased attacked him and, in fear for his life or serious injury to himself, he attacked him with an axe and inflicted serious injuries on him which led to his death. That therefore, for this reason, he is not culpable.
The Supreme Court in the case of Fulani V State (2018) 45195(SC) 31-36, F-B, per Eko, JSC, stated emphatically and with clarity what self-defence entails, thus: “Self-defence, as a defence, simply means that the accused person did the alleged act while in the process of defending either himself or some other person and that he had no pre-meditated intention to kill his attacker or to cause him grievous bodily harm. In the instant case, there was no evidence of premeditated intention to kill the deceased by the Appellant.
However, the concurrent findings that the Appellant deployed excessive of disproportionate force on his attacker completely takes the matter beyond what the law regards as self-defence to the brink of vengeance, which thus brings the motive for the excessive force. When self-defence is not accepted, or is dismissed, the accused loses the right to be completely absolved or exonerated. Self-defence, if successfully pleaded and affirmed is a justification or excuse for the act alleged to be a criminal offence. It is a complete defence to the charge.
It exonerates the accused person of any wrongdoing. Section 59 of the Penal Code is very explicit: nothing is an offence which is done in the lawful exercise of the right to private defence. The right operates on the principle that it is the first duty of man to defend himself. The right to self-preservation is a biological and inalienable right. Self-defence ordinarily casts reasonable doubt that the accused person intentionally committed the alleged offence.
When it was pleaded, and from the facts, it is not accepted or it is dismissed, there can be no question of reasonable doubt created thereby because the mere fact of pleading it [is] tantamount to an admission of the actus reus; … as by the plea the accused person places on himself the evidential burden of establishing that he acted without any criminal motive or intention.”(Emphasis supplied) See also Afosi V State (2013) LPELR-20751(SC); Braide V State (1997) LPELR-800(SC). PER SANKEY, J.C.A.