Remedy

It is settled law that a court cannot grant to a plaintiff a remedy which has not been claimed and established by the pleading and the evidence respectively. The Court has no power to do so. Thus a Court cannot grant a relief which has not been specifically prayed for.

Declaratory claims are said to be invitations to the Court to make pronouncement on the legal position of a state of affairs and it is by itself not enforceable in law. Declaratory judgment therefore is a remedy for determination of a justifiable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights. It is granted as a judicial discretion only in circumstances in which the Court is of the opinion that the party seeking it is entitled, when all facts are taken into account. OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C

The principle of ubi jus ibi remedium as the Appellant has portrayed it in the instant appeal even as fluid as it is does not dictate to the Court the specific orders to make where a Court has the absolute discretion to act as it considers expedient. In this regard, see the case of BELLO V. A-G OYO STATE (1986) LPELR- 764(SC) where the Supreme Court in enunciating the principle of ubi jus ubi remedium stated per Karibi-Whtye thus: – “I shall before doing so dispose of a minor issue concerning the reliance on the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium.
It is common ground that the claim of the Appellants falls within the provisions of the Torts law. … The Respondent has contended that Counsel did not in fact advert his mind to the Torts law because his reliance on the maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium, (meaning where there is a right there is a remedy), suggested that he knew there was a right but that there was no remedy: and is asking the Court to provide one. That may well be the case. Even in such a situation the Court cannot in the discharge of its sacred duty to do justice be inhibited by the ignorance or carelessness of counsel.
The injustice resulting to the cause of the litigant from such demonstration of ignorance or carelessness does not adversely affect Counsel whose fees remain undiminished. I think I am speaking the mind of all engaged in the administration of justice, not only in this Court but in all Courts in this country, that the day the Courts allow the inarticulacy or ignorance of counsel to determine the result of an action before it, that day will herald the unobtrusive genesis of the unwitting enthronement of injustice aided by the Court itself by default.
I think it is erroneous to assume that the maxim ubi jus remedium is only an English Common Law principle. It is a principle of justice of universal validity couched in Latin and available to all legal systems involved in the impartial administration of justice. It enjoins the Courts to provide a remedy whenever the Plaintiff has established a right. The Court obviously cannot do otherwise. It is enjoined to eschew reliance on technicalities in the determination of disputes – see State v. Gwonto & Ors (1983) 1 SCNLR 142 at p. 160.
The substance of the action rather than the form should be the predominating consideration. Appellants have relied on the decision of this Court in Falobi v. Falobi (1976) 1 NMLR 169, 171 to argue that even if the writ of summons and statement of claim had not specified a particular law under which the action was brought, the Court will give a remedy where the facts disclosed fall within a remedy recognized in law. I think this is a correct principle deducible from Falobi v. Falobi (supra).” PER LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.