Burden of Proof

It is vital to the case of the prosecution to prove that death of the deceased was a direct result of the act of the accused to the exclusion of all probable causes.

Okoro v. State LGC(16/12/1988) C

The question then arises how the burden can be discharged? The burden on the prosecution is only discharged when the essential ingredients of the offence charged have been established and the accused person is unable to bring himself within the defences or exceptions allowed under the law generally or the statute creating the offence.

Okoro v. State LGC(16/12/1988) C

The established legal position is that the onus of proving negligence is on the plaintiff who alleges it and unless and until that is proved, it does not shift. In other words where a plaintiff pleads and relies on negligence by conduct or action of the defendant, he or she must prove by evidence the conduct or action and the circumstances of its occurrence, giving rise to the breach of the duty of care. It is only after this that the burden shifts to the defendant to adduce evidence to challenge negligence on his part.
And what amounts to negligence is a question of fact not law and each case must be decided in the light of its own facts and circumstances.

In an action of this nature, where the appellant, as plaintiff, seeks declaratory reliefs, he has the burden of satisfying the Court that he is entitled to those reliefs. He must rely on the strength of his own case and not the weakness of the defence, if any. He may not even rely on any lapses or inadequacies in the defence. See: Dumez Nig. Ltd. Vs Nwakhnoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt 1119) 361: Emenike vs P.D.P (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.1315) 556; Okoye vs Nwankwo (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt.1429) 93.

Whoever desires a Court of law to give him judgment as to any legal right, dependent on the existence of facts he asserts, has the burden or onus of proving that those facts exist. Failure to prove or establish positively asserted facts leads to assumption, admittedly, that those positively asserted facts do not in fact exist.

At the Court below the Appellant's counsel submitted correctly on the authority of BOZIN v. THE STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 8) 465; THE STATE v SALAWU (2011) 8 NWLR (pt.1279) 580; BELLO v THE STATE (2007) 10 NWLR (pt.1043) 564, that the following facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt for the charge of the offence of armed robbery to be sustained against the Appellant to warrant his conviction and sentence. That is
"i. there was robbery
ii. the robbery was an armed robbery: and
iii. the accused person took part in robbery."
The learned Appellant's counsel further submitted correctly that Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011 enjoins the prosecution (herein the respondent) to prove each of the 3 ingredients, aforestated, beyond reasonable doubts. See BAKARE v. THE STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.52) 579; BANJO v. THE STATE (2013) 38 WRN 1: SHOFOLAHAN v. THE STATE (2013) 49 WRN 172.

My Lords, it is the settled position of the law that the burden of proof in a criminal trial lies on the prosecution throughout and does not shift. The accused person enjoys a constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. It is the duty of the prosecution to rebut the presumption. Furthermore, it is an onerous burden, as the standard of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Igbi V. The State (2000) 3 NWLR (pt.648) 169;Amala V. The State (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt.888) 520; Amadi Vs FRN (2008) 12 SC (Pt.III) 55. The standard of proof is not proof beyond all doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt. The doubt must be reasonable. It is not sufficient to raise an improbable doubt or a slight doubt or an unlikely doubt or a doubt, which is not supported by credible evidence. See: Bakare Vs The State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.52) 579 @ 588 C E; The State V. Oladotun (2011) LPELR-3226 (SC); Salawu V. The State (2009) LPELR-8867 (CA).

The law is very clear on who the burden of proof in a criminal case reside. Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act have placed the burden of proof in criminal cases squarely on the prosecution, who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden does not shift. See Alabi v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 paras A-C; Sola v. The State (2005) 5 (Pt. 1) 135.

But that is not to say that the Prosecution is left off the hook. It is an ironclad principle that the Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and this remains so even if the accused admits in his Statement to the Police that he committed the crime: the Prosecution must still prove it beyond reasonable doubt see Adekoya v. State (2012) LPELR-7815 (SC), and Madu V State (2012) LPELR-7867 (SC), where this Court, per Adekeye, JSC, said –
The Prosecution has the burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, regardless of the plea of the accused or where he admitted the commission of the crime in his statement to the Police.
And the Prosecution must so prove each ingredient of the offence – see Chukwu v. State (2012) 12 SCNJ (Pt 1) 208. cited by the Appellant and Respondent, wherein this Court stated as follows –
In a case of culpable homicide or murder, the following conditions must be met for the Prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt-
i. That the deceased had died
ii. That the death of the deceased was caused by the Accused; and
iii. That the act or omission of the Accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.

I seek to restate the obvious and an elementary principle of law as submitted rightly by both counsel that, in criminal cases, the prosecution has a duty to prove the case against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the provision of Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), by which an accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty. Furthermore, Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 also provides that an allegation of crime even in a civil proceeding must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See the case of Udosen V. The State(2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1023) 125 and Bakare V. The State (1987) 3 SC 1.

I shall even at the peril of being repetitive state, that in a claim of declaration of title to land the claimant always has the burden to prove his claim by leading credible and reliable evidence to establish his title and should not rely on the weakness(es) of the defendant's case even though he can rely on or take advantage of the evidence adduced by the defence to support his case or claim. See also Okpala vs Iheme (1989) 3 SCNJ 153.

It is noted by me, that both Lower Courts have found that the identity of the land in dispute was not in controversy. It is equally an established law that in a claim of declaration of title to land, a plaintiff has the onus to prove his case based on the evidence he adduces at the trial and not to rely or capitalise on the weakness(es) in the defendant's case even though he can always take advantage of the evidence of the defence which supports his case. See Tukur v. Sabi (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt.913) 2 NWLR (Pt.537) 308; Ojo v. Anibire (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt.628) 630. See alsoUchendu vs Ogboni (1999) 4 SC (Pt.II) 1 and Akimola v Oluwo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352.

In order to secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove every element of the offence charged. However, it has long been settled that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. In Bakare Vs The State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.52) 579, His Lordship, Oputa, JSC opined that absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice. This Court has held that it is sufficient if the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not admit of fanciful possibilities but admits of a high degree of cogency, consistent with an equally high degree of probability. In Afolalu Vs The State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt.1220) 584 @ 609 – 610 G – A, His Lordship. Mahmud Mohammed, JSC (as he then was) stated thus:
"proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof beyond all possible or imaginary doubt. It is proof to moral certainty, such proof as satisfies the judgment and conscience of the judge as a reasonable man, and applying his reason to the evidence before him that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant and so satisfies him as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible. It therefore imposes a duty on the prosecution to prove the main ingredient of the offence charged against the accused person to the satisfaction of the trial Judge.
See also: R. Vs. Lawrence (1932) 11 NLR 6 @ 7; Oseni v. The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351 @ 388 F G; Ikpo v. The State (2016) LPELR-40114 (SC) @ 16 A E.

In discharging the burden of establishing its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, as it is enjoined to do pursuant to Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the prosecution may rely on:
a. Direct evidence of eye witnesses;
b. Circumstantial evidence; and/or
c. The confessional statement of the accused person.
See: Igabele v. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.975) 100 @ 120 121 H A; Abirifon v. The State (2013) LPELR 20807 (SC); Adio v. The State (1986) 5 (SC) 194 @ 219 220; Itu v. The State (2016) LPELR 26063 (SC) @ 26 B C.

With greatest respect to the learned justices of the Court of Appeal, to secure a conviction for armed robbery, all that the prosecution must prove are:-
(i) That there was an armed robbery;
(ii) That the accused person or persons was/were armed during the armed robbery or in company with someone amongst them who was so armed.
Once the prosecution proves the above ingredients beyond reasonable doubt, their failure to tender the offensive weapon or the arms, cannot result in acquittal of the accused person(s) because of the possibility of the accused person doing away with the offensive weapon they used, after the commission of the offence in order to exculpate himself from criminal responsibility or to escape detection. See the cases of Martin vs State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt.481)355; Okosi v. AG Bendel State (1989)1 NWLR (Pt.100) 642; Olayinka v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 561 SC.
I must also stress here, that there is no principle of law which requires the prosecution to mandatorily tender the weapons used in an alleged robbery in order to establish the guilt of the accused person. In fact, in Olayinka's case (supra), it was held that since there was no assertion from the prosecution witness that any weapon was recovered from the accused, proof of use of any weapon at the alleged robbery operation was not necessary to establish.

It is well settled principle of law, that an accused person arraigned before any Court of law is presumed innocent unless and until he is proved guilty by his accusers beyond reasonable doubt through credible and reliable evidence. See Section 138 of Evidence Act (as amended) Cap 62 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. SeeOlayinka Afolalu v The State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt.1210) 584; Okoro v State (1988) NWLR (Pt.94), (1958) 2 SC (Pt.II) 88; Bakare v. The State (1957) 3 SC 1 or (1987) LPELR -714 (SC). It needs to be added, that the burden of proof does not shift. Once there is the slightest doubt in the mind of the Court, such doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused who should subsequently be acquitted by the trial Court. See Alonge v. IGP (1959) SCNJ 5116.

The settled law is that in order to obtain conviction on the offence of armed robbery like in any other criminal matters the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt as required and provided by Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) See Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462; Uche v State (2015) 4-5 SC (Pt.11) 140 at 157; State v Oladotun(2011) 5 SC (Pt.11) 133; Sani v. State (2015) 6/7 SC (pt 11)1 at 17.

I would want to go back to the assertion of the appellant of the improper or non service of the Statutory Notices by stating that the law is now trite as backed by Section 131 of the Evidence Act 2011 that he who asserts must prove. In fact I shall quote the provision thus:-
SECTION 131-
"Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependant on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist."
That provision is supported by the fact that the burden of proof in civil cases is not static as it shifts from one party to another. Firstly the burden of proving the existence or nonexistence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the Court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may come up from the pleadings. Therefore if the party adduces evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy the Court that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies on the party against whom the judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced and so on successively until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with.

In the instant suit, the plaintiffs claimed to be "The Registered Trustees of the Anglican Diocese of Lagos". Prima facie Registered Trustees of the Anglican Diocese of Lagos appears to be a corporate and juristic personality. Once the juristic capacity is challenged, the fact of incorporation becomes a fact in issue. The onus of proving that fact lies on the party claiming to be incorporated in the name it has taken out the action as the plaintiff. The burden of proof is discharged upon the production of the Certificate of Incorporation. This is a matter of fact.

It is settled that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not the same as saying proof beyond the shadow of any doubt that the person is guilty. See Bakare V. State (1987) 3 SC, wherein Oputa. JSC, observed –
"Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of probability. As Denning J. (as he then was) observed in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All E.R 373:- The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible but not in the least probable, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.."
That is the law. It has not changed, and is the same in election cases – see Ikpeazu V. Otti & Ors (2016) LPELR-40055 (SC) wherein this Court clearly stated that where in an election petition, the Petitioner makes an allegation of crime against a Respondent, Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, imposes strict burden on the said Petitioner to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, if not his petition will fail.

It would then be the duty of the investigating Police officer to investigate it. Failure to investigate it properly may cast some doubt on the probability of the prosecutions case. The accused person is required to raise the defence of alibi and adduce evidence in support. The burden of proving an alibi is on the prosecution and not on the accused person.

It is now trite that in any criminal proceedings such as the present, the prosecution is duty bound to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and this burden does not shift through the proceedings until the duty is fully discharged. This bounden duty of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof to the hilt or proof beyond all iota of doubt. Therefore once the prosecution has established all the essential ingredients of the offence that an accused is charged with, it has carried out the duty required.

An accused person therefore has no burden placed on him by law, to prove his innocence in a Court of law. See Uche Williams vs The State (1992) 10 SCNJ 74 or (1992) NWLR (pt. 261) 515.

In criminal proceedings, the burden of proof is always on the prosecution, which is duty bound to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution can only achieve this result, by ascertaining that all the ingredients of the offence with which the accused was charged, have been duly proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 139 of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended. See also Yongo & Anor v COP (1992) NWLR (pt 257) 36 or (1992) 4 SCNJ 113. This is borne out from the fact that under our criminal system or even under our Constitution, an accused person is always presumed innocent until he is proved guilty.

The law is settled that the burden of proof in a claim for declaration of title to land lies on the plaintiff, who generally must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendants case. See Kodilinye V. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336, Udegbe V. Nwokafor (1963) 1 SCNLR 184, Woluchem V. Gudi (1981) SC 291, Piaro V. Tenalo (1976) 12 SC 31.

Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. Flowing from above therefore, the burden of proof criminal cases is on the prosecution who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden never shifts. See Alabi v The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.307) 511 at 531 paras A-C; Solola v The State (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 135. In Mufutau Bakare v The State (1987) 3SC 1 at 32 Oputa JSC, defined "proof beyond reasonable doubt" in the following words:-
"Proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of a compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of any doubt the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice."
See Bolanle v The State (2005) 1NCC 342 at 359. Where the prosecution fails to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused must be discharged and acquitted.

Even at the risk of repetition, I wish to reiterate that the Appellant was sentenced to death. lt follows therefore that before a Judge will reach such a verdict in which someone's life is at stake, he must be absolutely sure that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused person. For the law is settled that if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding, civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. See Section 135(1) (2) (3) of the Evidence Act 2011, Adamu v A.G Bendel State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 284; Akpan v The State (1990)7 NWLR {Pt. 160} 101: Ayub-Khan v The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.172) 127.

The law is trite and well settled that in a Criminal trial, the prosecution has a duty to prove its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. See the case of Abirifon v. State (2013) 9 SCM page 1 at 5.

The conviction and sentence of the appellant arises from a criminal trial. The onus of establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt lies on the respondent. The onus does not shift. If at the end of trial and on the whole evidence, the trial Court is left in a state of doubt, the respondent would have failed to discharge the burden the law puts on it thereby entitling the appellant to an acquittal. See Okputuobiode & Ors v. The State (1970) LPLER 2524 (SC) and Ogundiyan v. The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.181) 519

There is no doubt, and it is trite as well, that the Appellant has the burden of establishing his assertions. He has a duty to establish the assertions made in the complaints either in his grounds of appeal or the issues formulated from the grounds of appeal for the determination of his appeal. Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 is quite categorical on this: whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.This principle applies also in appellate Courts.

The burden of proof of the existence of terms of an agreement rests squarely on the party asserting such terms since it is a matter of evidence.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence, a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. See Osuagwu v. State (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt.1347) p.360

A reiteration is necessary here and that has to do with the prescription under Section 135 of the Evidence Act on the Standard of Proof in a criminal proceeding and it is thus:
Section 135-.
1. If the commission of a crime by party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal first must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to Section 139 of this Act, on the person who asserts it whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action.
3. If the prosecution proves the commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt the burden of proving reasonable doubt is shifted to the defendant.
This Court had interpreted that section in Chukwuma v FRN (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1264) 391 at page 408 where this Honourable Court per Muhammad JSC (as he then was) at page 408, paras D – H expounded thus:
"The burden of proof in our adversarial system of criminal justice is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the process the requirement of the Law is that the prosecution has the duty to prove all the essential elements of an offence as contained in the charge. The law places the burden on the prosecution to produce vital material evidence and witnesses to testify during the proceedings before a trial Court comes to the conclusion that an offence had been committed by an accused person. The prosecution does not require a magic wand in order to attain to its proof to be beyond reasonable doubt". All the prosecution is required to do simply is to put forward to the Court evidence which is so strong, compelling and convincing against the accused such that it leaves no reasonable man in doubt as to the probability of the accused person committing the alleged offence" (Underlining mine).

It must be said again and again that in all criminal trials the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and this burden is discharged by the prosecution calling witnesses to give compelling evidence against the accused person with relevant exhibits to lend credence to oral evidence.

In criminal cases, the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it. See Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. The assertion before the trial Court that the Appellant committed the offence for which he was charged, tried and convicted was made by the prosecution. The burden of proof was therefore on the prosecution who was required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the Appellant. This burden never shifts. See Alabi vs The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 at 531 paras A-C; Solola vs The State (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 135.

The burden of proving the existence of any circumstances which bring the case within any exception to or exemption from or qualification to the operation of any law, rests on the accused person. He also has the burden of proving any fact especially within his knowledge. See Sections 139 (1) and 140 of the Evidence Act and the proviso to Section 36 (5) of the Constitution.

By virtue of Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011, the standard of proof in any criminal proceeding is beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving the guilt of the accused person rests squarely on the prosecution and does not shift. However, where the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proving reasonable doubt shifts to the accused person. See Section 135 (3) of the Evidence Act. See also: Abokokuyanro Vs The State (2016) LPELR-40107 (SC) @ 33 – 34 E – A; Esangbedo Vs The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.113) 57 @ 69 – 70 H A; Udo Vs The State (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1001) 361; Okoh Vs The State (2014) LPELR-22589 (SC) @ 22 – 23 F – B.

It is another thing altogether in all Criminal Prosecutions where the guilt of the person accused has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, meaning that the burden of proof does not shift from the Prosecution to the accused or defence. It is not for the accused person to prove his guilt of the offence for which he was charged. It is against the law. Section 135 of Evidence Act refers but such is the effect for admitting Exhibits B and C through the appellant as the accused person at the trial Court in his evidence under cross-examination. In other words, by dint of Exhibits B and C being admitted through the appellant and acted upon at the trial Court, he (appellant) was made to acknowledge and or affirm his guilt over the offences or charges framed against him and this in my view is not proper. Exhibits B and C being Confessional Statements credited to the appellant is admissible only through that person or authority who affirm that the accused person, in this case, the appellant made it.

Section 134 of the Evidence Act states that burden of proof in civil cases shall be discharged on the balance of probabilities.
Balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence means that in civil proceedings judgment is given to the party with the greater weight or stronger evidence.

The law is well settled, that the prosecution always has the burden to prove the commission of an offence (SeeSection 138 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended). This tallies with time honored principle of law that who asserts must prove. In criminal cases the law places the burden of proof on the prosecution.

It is well settled law, that in criminal cases, the burden of proof of the offence or offences is squarely on the prosecution and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. See Asariyu v. The State (1987) 4 NWLR (pt. 67) 709; Paul Ameh v. State (1987) 6-7 SC 27 at 36. Okpulor v. State (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 164) 581 at 593; Oduneye v. The State (2001) 1 SCNJ 25.

If, as the appellant argues, that plea bargain, successfully proved, operates as autrefois convict under Section 36(9) of the 1999 Constitution, then the burden of proof falls heavily on the appellant to discharge. Section 36(9)& (10) of the Constitution provides –
36.(9) No person who shows that he has been tried any Court of competent jurisdiction or tribunal for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for a criminal offence having the same ingredients as that offence save upon the order of a superior Court.
(10) No person who shows that he has been pardoned for a criminal offence shall again be tried for that offence.

PML (NIGERIA)

In Osuagwu v. State (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1347) p.360. I said that:
"Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence, a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability."
See also
Nwaturuocha v. State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt.1242) p.170
Osetola & anor v. State (2012) 6 SC (Pt. iv) p.148
Adewunmi v. State (2016) 1-3 SC (Pt.II) p. 123.

The Appellant's counsel had called in aid THE STATE v. AZEEZ & ORS (2008) 14 (pt.1108) 451; also reported elsewhere as (2008) 4 SC. 188; (2008) 3 FWLR 4567 SC as booster to his submission that if all the vital or material witnesses are not called by the prosecution the case is doomed to fail. I am afraid this does not represent the ratio decidendi of THE STATE v. AZEEZ (supra). The decision of this Court on this point, per M.D. Muhammad, JSC in the THE STATE v. AZEEZ (supra), is that in discharge of the burden of proving a crime beyond reasonable doubt placed by Section 138 (1) of the Evidence Act 1990 (now Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, (2011):
"it is the duty of the prosecution to see that it places before the trial Court all available relevant evidence. This may not mean that a whole host of witnesses must be called upon (on) the same point, but it does mean that if there is a vital point in issue and there is one witness whose evidence would settle it one way or the other, that witness ought to be called."
The "Judge" of whose evidence establishes or proves that vital point is the prosecutor. The Court will not usurp that function of the prosecutor. All the Court, as the final arbiter, is interested in is whether the available evidence proves the vital point. – USUFU v. THE STATE (2007) 1 NWLR (pt.1020) 94 at 118 C-E Cited by the Appellant, which also held that although the prosecution need not call a host of witnesses on the same point, where there is a vital point in issue and there is a witness whose evidence will settle it one wav or the other that witness ought to be called, does no riot to the settled principle of law.

This Court had amplified the cardinal principle in criminal proceedings that the burden of proving a fact which if proved would lead to the conviction of the accused is on the prosecution who should prove such fact beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, any doubt, as to the guilt of the accused arising from the contradictions in the prosecutions evidence of vital issues must be resolved to the benefit of the accused. See AHMED VS THE STATE (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt.612), PG. 641 at PG. 673.
The law demands that, irrespective of sentimental and other subjective considerations, we must always step forward, to resolve doubt on the guilt of an accused in favour of the accused, the Appellant in this case, as established and reconfirmed in several cases, not the least the cases of KALU VS STATE (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.90) 503; IKEMSON vs STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.110) 455; NNOLIM VS THE STATE (1993) 3 NWLR (PT.283) 569.

Clearly the conviction of the appellant had nothing to do with the charge for rape wherewith the appellant was acquitted and discharged. The only issue left for this Court to determine is whether the Court was right when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court that the prosecution did prove by circumstantial evidence that the Appellant intentionally killed the deceased. Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 have squarely placed the burden of proof in criminal cases on the prosecution, who must prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused person and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused Person.
This burden does not shift. See Alabi vs The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 at 531 paras A-C; Solola vs The State (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 135 (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 939) 460; Akeem vs The State (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 311 at 350 paras D-E.

The law enuring in favour of every accused person is that he can only be convicted for an alleged offence if, and only if, the prosecution established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by legal evidence lawfully admitted in evidence against him.
Every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. SeeSection 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution. Section 137 of the then extant Evidence Act (now Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011) imposes a strict burden on the prosecution to prove crime beyond reasonable doubt. lf they fail to discharge the burden, their allegation that an offence had been committed fails. See OGUNBANJO v. THE STATE (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt.789) 76; NWOBODO v. ONOH & ORS. (1984) NSCC 1; (1984) 1 SCNLR 1.

The law is now trite that in a criminal case it is essential that proof of material facts should necessarily be beyond reasonable doubt. See for instance, OBUE v. THE STATE (1976) 2 SC. 79; ELIZABETH OGUNDIYAN v. THE STATE(1991) 4 SCNJ 44; (1991) 4 SC. 100. Where the prosecution failed to prove a material fact in a criminal proceeding beyond reasonable doubt the law imposes on the Court to resolve the benefit of doubt on favour of the accused person. It does not lie in the office of the adjudicator to resort to speculation in order to fill in the gap for the prosecutor. Speculation, being an unfortunate and undesirable frolic, the familiar admonition is that a Court of law must refrain from indulging in it. As Uwaifo, JSC had put it in ACB PLC v EMOSTRADE LTD. (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt.770) 501: It is not part of judicial exercise but a mere curious guess work.

The Appellant's counsel had called in aid THE STATE v. AZEEZ & ORS (2008) 14 (pt.1108) 451; also reported elsewhere as (2008) 4 SC. 188; (2008) 3 FWLR 4567 SC as booster to his submission that if all the vital or material witnesses are not called by the prosecution the case is doomed to fail. I am afraid this does not represent the ratio decidendi of THE STATE v. AZEEZ (supra). The decision of this Court on this point, per M.D. Muhammad, JSC in the THE STATE v. AZEEZ (supra), is that in discharge of the burden of proving a crime beyond reasonable doubt placed by Section 138 (1) of the Evidence Act 1990 (now Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, (2011):
"it is the duty of the prosecution to see that it places before the trial Court all available relevant evidence. This may not mean that a whole host of witnesses must be called upon (on) the same point, but it does mean that if there is a vital point in issue and there is one witness whose evidence would settle it one way or the other, that witness ought to be called."
The "Judge" of whose evidence establishes or proves that vital point is the prosecutor. The Court will not usurp that function of the prosecutor. All the Court, as the final arbiter, is interested in is whether the available evidence proves the vital point. – USUFU v. THE STATE (2007) 1 NWLR (pt.1020) 94 at 118 C-E Cited by the Appellant, which also held that although the prosecution need not call a host of witnesses on the same point, where there is a vital point in issue and there is a witness whose evidence will settle it one wav or the other that witness ought to be called, does no riot to the settled principle of law.

AMADI V. ATTORNEY- GENERAL OF IMO STATE LGC(10/2/2017)B

In criminal cases, the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it. See Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. The assertion before the trial Court that the appellant committed the offence for which he was charged, tried and convicted was made by the prosecution. The burden of proof was therefore on the prosecution who was required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the Appellant. This burden never shifts. See Alabi vs The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 at 531 paras A-C: Solola vs The State (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 135.

By virtue of Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the prosecution has the onerous burden of establishing the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. The onus remains on the prosecution throughout and does not shift.
In other words, an accused person has no duty to prove his innocence. There is a presumption of innocence in his favour by virtue of Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. See: Mumuni Vs The State (1975) 1 ANLR 295; Alabi v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511; Afolalu vs The State (2010)15 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 584. What is required of the prosecution is to establish the guilt of the accused with compelling and conclusive evidence. It must prove its case with a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. See: Nwaturuocha Vs The State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1242) 170; Lori & Anor vs The State (1980) 12 NSCC 259; Oseni Vs The State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 351; Miller Vs Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ER 372.

The law is trite that counsel's summation and final address in the brief of argument does not have the force of evidence, and it can not be substituted for legal evidence. A bare statement from the Bar does not have the force of legal evidence by which a burden of proving a fact in issue is discharged. See ONU OBEKPA v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (1981) 2 NCLR 420.

To go back on track, it is to be restated that the burden of proof is on the prosecution and the standard required is Proof beyond reasonable doubt pursuant to Section 138 of the Evidence Act. That would not be different herein in the two Court charge of conspiracy and armed robbery on which the appellant and his co-accused were charged at the trial Court. In proof of armed robbery, the three essential ingredients that must be proved, I dare say conjunctively are:
1. That there was a robbery or series of robberies
2. That each robbery was on armed robbery.
3. That the accused took part in the robbery or robberies.
I place reliance on the case of Onyenye v. The State (2012) NCC 304 at 310 – 311.

However, the law is very clear that, this proof which it expects to be beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond any iota or shadow of doubt. Yet, the burden of such proof which lies solely on the prosecution never shifts. lf at the conclusion of trial, on the entire evidence adduced the Court is left with no doubt that the offence was committed by the accused, then that burden is discharged. See; Bello Vs The State (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1043) 564; Amina Vs State (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt 155) 125; Nwachukwu Vs State (1985) NWLR (Pt.11) 218; Ani Vs State (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt. 83) 142: Uwagboe Vs State (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 1.

In effect, the burden of proving a Counter Claim is on the counter claimant as he is the party who would fail is no evidence is adduced to establish it, N.B.N. Ltd v. U.C. Holding Ltd (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 436, 454; Umeojiako v. Ezeanamuo (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt 126) 253, 267.

Where a party adduces sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden shifts to the person against whom judgment would be given if no further evidence were adduced. The burden of proof would then continue to shift until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with.See Section 133 of the Evidence Act. The standard of proof in civil cases is on the balance of probabilities. See: Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291; A.G. Bayelsa State v. A.G. Rivers State (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1012) 596; Agbakoba v. I.N.E.C. & Ors (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 489.

It is a settled principle of law that in a civil case, the burden of proof lies on the person who desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability which depends on facts which he asserts to prove that those facts exist. It is also settled that the burden of proof in a particular proceeding lies on the person who would fail if no further evidence is given on either side. See Sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The burden of first proving the existence or non-existence of a particular fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the Court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleadings.

It is well settled principle of law that an accused person is presumed innocent until he or she is proved guilty. The prosecution as the accuser, is always saddled with the heavy burden of proving the guilt of the accused person and the standard of such proof in criminal cases or trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Joseph Orungu & Ors vs The State (1970) All NLR 269 or (1970) LPELR – 2780 (SC). See Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) and also Section 138 of the same Evidence Act which make provision for the standard of proof. See also Olayinka Afolalu v The State (2010) 16 NWLR (pt.1220)584; Miller v Minister of Pensions 1947) 2 All ER 372. It should be noted however, that in order to displace the presumption, the evidence adduced by the prosecution must be targeted at the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt only and NOT proof beyond shadow of any doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence he is charged with.This is so because absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure inclusive of the administration of criminal justice.

The constitutional provision on the presumption of innocence of an accused person is sacrosanct and settled. The burden is always on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not his business to prove his innocence. He can decide to keep mute from beginning of the trial right through to the end.
It is for the prosecution to make out a prima facie case against the accused through credible evidence which must be laid bare before the Court. It is the proof of hard facts that would lead to the conviction of the accused.
Without any case made out against the accused, he cannot be called upon to enter his defence because in doing otherwise would undermine the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Although this Court recently decided by a majority of 3-2 in Spiess v. Oni (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt.1532) 236 that where there is lack of good faith, the bona fide claim of right will not avail a person charged with criminal trespass. The reasoning in the majority decision is that law is meant to provide peace, security, protection, concord and purposeful co-existence amongst citizens and no reasonable society will encourage resort to self-help for whatever reason. I still remain of the strong conviction that the legal position regarding the bona fide claim of right where ownership is contested, the burden of proving mens rea must be discharged by the prosecution and Nwakire v. C. O. P. remains good law.

The burden of establishing the voluntariness of the making of a confessional statement, in a criminal proceeding, is on the prosecution. It is not a matter for assumption or presumption. This is more so when Sections 29, 131, 132, 135 and 138 of the Evidence Act. The burden of proving the fact necessary to be proved to make a confession an admissible piece of evidence is on the prosecution by virtue of Sections 29 & 138 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
The law, by dint of Section 135 of the Evidence Act, is settled that if the commission of crime is directly in issue in any proceeding that fact must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since it was the appellant, as the prosecutor in this case, who desired that the accused, on his confession, should be convicted for the offence of rape charged, the burden of proving that fact beyond reasonable doubt is certainly on the appellant; because they would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. See Sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

THE STATE V. MASIGA (TSOLO):LGC(15/12/2017)G

I agree, as submitted for the appellants relying on BRONIK MOTORS v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 1 SCNLR 296, that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the Court of first instance that entertains the claim. In the appellate jurisprudence, the burden is on the appellant to show how and in what way the trial Court or the Court below erred in its decision. To corroborate this, Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 [formerly Section 134(1)] firmly places on whoever desires any Court to give him judgment as to any civil right or obligation dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.

The rule with regard to the award of special damages is that the burden of proof is on anyone claiming it to prove strictly that he did suffer such special damages claimed. What is required is that the person claiming it should plead its particulars and lead credible and admissible evidence of such character as would establish that he is indeed entitled to an award under that head. The evidence of particulars of the losses must be known exactly and accurately measured before the trial Court. See – Agunwa v. Onukwe (1962) 2 S.C.N.L.R. 275; Oladehin v. C.T.M.L. (1978) 2 S.C. 23; Imana v. Robinson (1979) 3 – 4 S.C. 1 at 23 and Kilrubo v. Zach Motison Nigeria Limited (1992) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 239), 102.
.

The trial court failed to accept the distinction which this Court in a plethora of its decisions held exists, and which the Lower Court in the foregoing clearly imbibed, between legal burden of proof and evidential burden of proof. Whereas legal burden of proof remains throughout on the claimant to establish his case otherwise he looses his claim, the evidential burden of proof in a case fought on the pleadings rests on the party who asserts in the affirmative and shifts depending on the pleadings of the parties at each turn.

In civil cases, the like of the one under consideration, on the burden of proof on the pleadings, the rule is that the burden of proof rests on the party (whether plaintiff or defendant), who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue.When it is said that onus of proof shifts from plaintiff to defendant and vice versa from time to time as the case progresses, it means no more than the burden of proof may shift depending on how the scale of evidence preponderates. However, subject to the scale of evidence preponderating, the burden of proof rests squarely on the party who would fail if no evidence at all, or no more evidence as the case may be, were given on either side. However, let me quickly say that if a plaintiff on whom always rests the onus of proving that affirmative of what he asserts, no burden shifts to the defendant unless he has counter-claimed.

It is now settled that in civil matters, a plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish his claim. It does not shift to the defendant. See Elias v. Disu (1961) All NLR (Pt. 1) 215 at 220. The onus of proof in a suit for declaration of title, as in this appeal, lies on the plaintiff and he must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defendant's case, if any. See Kodilinye v. Mbanefo Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336; Akinola v. Olumo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352 Mogaji v. Cadury Nig Ltd. (Pt.1985) 2 NMLR (Pt. 7) 393.

I had to go further to explain that proof of a case beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond any iota or shadow of doubt. The burden of such proof which lies on the Prosecution never shifts. If at the conclusion of trial, on the entire evidence the court is left with no doubt that the offence was committed by the Accused, that burden is discharged. See Bello v The State (2007) 10 NWLR (Part 1043) 564; Amina v State (1990) 6 NWLR (Part 155) 125; Nwachukwu v State
(1985) 1 NWLR (Part 11) 218; Ani v State (2002) 5 SC (Part l) 33; (2003) 11 NWLR (Part 83) 142; Uwagboe v State (2007) 6 NWLR (Part 1031) 606
The 1999 Constitution of this country as it affects our criminal legal system, in Section 36(5) stipulates that-
"Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. Provided that nothing in this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon any such person the burden of proving particular facts."
Also Section 138 (1) of the Evidence Act provides that-
"If the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceedings civil or criminal it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt."

There is no doubt that in criminal proceedings the onus of proof lies on the prosecution throughout the trial and does not shift. In other words, there is no burden on the accused person to prove his innocence.

In all criminal trials, the burden is on the prosecution to establish or prove the essential ingredients of the offence which an accused person is charged with beyond reasonable doubt, and the prosecution will readily achieve this if it can assemble credible, cogent and believable/or reliable evidence against the accused person. Thus, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. It does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt or proof to the tilt. As was stated by Lord Denning J, in Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, a case which has been severally relied upon by Courts in Nigeria, it does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The distinguished and revered jurist observed: The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with one sentence – of course it is possible but not in the least probable the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See also Nwaturuocha v. The State (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt.1242) 170, Smart v. The State (2016) 1-2 SC (Pt.11) 41, (2016) 9 NWLR, (Pt.1518) 447, Oseni v. The State (2012) LPELR-7833 (SC), (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt.1293) 351 Hassan v. The State (2016) LPELR-42554 (SC). In The State v. Onyeukwu (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt.813) 340, this Court held that the expression beyond reasonable doubt is a concept founded on reason and rational and critical examination of a state of facts and law rather than in fancied whimsical or capricious and speculative doubt. From all that has been said above, it has to be noted that there is no burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond all doubt or to the tilt. It is just to establish the guilt of the accused person by credible, cogent, reliable and believable evidence. Click on the link...

The law is settled: he who asserts must prove. That is the essence of Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. The burden of proof in every suit or proceeding lies on the party who will fail if no evidence at all were given on either side: Section 132 of the Evidence Act.

DASUKI (RTD)

The Supreme Court sitting on appeal is usually reluctant to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by Courts below. In the instant case, the decision of the High Court and the Court of Appeal have failed to meet the justice required in this case. It will not be in the interest of justice to condemn the Appellant to death on contradictory evidence presented by the prosecution. In Ukwunnenyi vs State(1989) 5 NWLR (Pt.113) 137 at 156 Oputa JSC had this to say about proof beyond reasonable doubt:-
This is the policy of our law. The policy derives from the fact that human justice has its limitations. It is not given to human justice to see and know as the great eternal knows the thoughts and actions of all men. Human justice has to depend on evidence and inference. Dealing with the irrevocable issues of life and death, she has to tread cautiously, lest she sends an innocent man to an early and ignoble death. In our system, it is therefore better that nine guilty persons escape than for an innocent man to be condemned. And that is why the Court gives the benefit of any reasonable doubt to accused person.

The fact that an accused person told lies to wriggle out of trouble would show that he is a liar, but that does not change or reduce the burden of proof squarely and constitutionally placed on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt.

The law is settled that if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. See Akpan v. The State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.160) 101; Adamu vs. A.G. Bendel State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.22) 284. Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides that every person who is charged with criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. It is therefore plain that the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden does not shift. See Alabi vs. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.307) 511 at 531 paras A C; Solola vs. The State (2005) 5 SC (Pt.1) 135; Bakare vs. The State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.53) 579.

Explaining the evidential burden of proof, Fidelis Nwadialo learned author of "Modern Nigerian Law of Evidence" second edition page 401-402 stated the legal position as follows: "Incidence of evidential burden of proof. This is the burden of adducing evidence to prove or disprove a particular fact. When a party wishes the Court to believe any fact, then the burden of proof as to that fact rests on that party. The party bearing the legal burden of proof must first make out a prima facie case in his favour. This means that he has to adduce enough evidence which, if believed, may reasonably justify a finding that the facts he seeks to prove exist. But whether this burden has been discharged cannot be known until at the end of the trial and the Court actually gives a verdict in his favour. If the Court disbelieves his evidence then the burden is not discharged. However, making out such a case he has discharged the evidential burden cast on him because he has tendered the evidence basically necessary for the establishment of this case. It then becomes necessary for his opponent to call contrary evidence to challenge the case set up by the party. By the necessity to adduce this contrary evidence, the evidential burden of proof is shifted unto the opponent. Of course he is not bound to supply any evidence at all. But by so doing, he runs a great risk of the Court finding against in denial of allegations of the allegations of the other party. The position is very well clarified by Denning J (as he then was) in Dunn v Dunn which was a petition for divorce on ground of desertion. "The legal burden" in the case, he states- "was on the petitioner to prove that his wife deserted him without cause. In order to discharge that burden the petitioner relied on that fact that he asked her to join him and she refused. That is a fact from which the Court might have inferred that she had deserted him without cause, but it is not bound to do so, once...

The stance of the appellant is that the Court below shifted the burden of proof in a criminal trial to the appellant to prove his innocence instead of what is statutorily provided for the prosecution respondent to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Of a fact is that the onus or burden of such proof in a criminal trial such as this is on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt and when the prosecution has done that and in so doing so once the prosecution having placed sufficient evidence on the guilt of the appellant either by direct or circumstantial or presumptive evidence beyond reasonable doubt required by law. At that stage the onus is on the accused appellant to attack or rebut the evidence so presented by the prosecution by a contrary to what the prosecution has laid out. That is not tantamount to shifting the burden on the appellant to prove his innocence. See Adeniji v The State (2001) 25 WRN; Uwe Idighi Esai & Ors v The State (1976) 11 SC 39; Peter Nwachuckwu Eze v State (1976) 1 SC 125.
The above position of the Court is strengthened by the provisions of Section 19(5) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 which stipulates thus:-
"In any trial for an offence under this Act, the fact that an accused person is in possession of pecuniary resources or property for which he cannot satisfactorily account and which is disproportionate to his known sources of income, of that he had at or about the time of the alleged offence obtained an accreditation to his pecuniary resources or property for which he cannot satisfactorily account, may be proved and taken into consideration by the Court as corroborating the testimony of any witness in the trial". See further (Section 19(2) of the MLA Act 2004 for similar provision).

Proving Money Laundering cases is a herculean task because it requires a prior establishment of the predicate offence before the money laundering aspect can be established. To obviate this problem a remedy was introduced by statutorily inferring money laundering from not only the conduct of the defendant but his lifestyle which is similar to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of the UK. Even though Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution provides that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty, the proviso allows for shifting the burden of proof on the defendant. The Section provides thus:-
"36(5) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty provided that nothing in this Section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon any person the burden of proving particular facts".
By Section 19(3) of the Money Laundering Act, if an accused person is in possession of pecuniary resources or property which is disproportionate to his known source of income, or he obtained an accretion to his pecuniary resources or property, the burden of giving a satisfactory account of how he made the money or obtained the accretion shifts to him. The prosecution is relieved of the burden of having to prove that the money so found in his account or in his possession is proceeds from illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or of any illegal act.
To explain the point further, where A is a fixed salary earner and suddenly his account is credited with an amount beyond his income or has property which his legitimate income cannot afford, the burden shifts to him to explain how he got the money with which he bought the property or the legitimate transaction he was engaged in for which the account was credited.

I do not think that there is any dispute, and the law is trite, that in criminal proceedings the burden of proving the guilt of the accused is always on the prosecution.

There is no doubt, and it is trite as well, that the Appellant has the burden of establishing his assertions. He has a duty to establish the assertions made in the complaints either in his grounds of appeal or the issues formulated from the grounds of appeal for the determination of his appeal. Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 is quite categorical on this: whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.This principle applies also in appellate Courts.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt, or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence. As was held by Oputa, JSC in Bakare v The State (1987) 1 NSCC Vol. 18 P.267 at 279, the burden is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt with emphasis on "reasonable"' That not all doubts are reasonable. It was further assessed that reasonable doubt will automatically exclude unreasonable doubt, fanciful doubt, imaginary doubt and speculative doubt i.e. a doubt not borne out by the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case.
Reasonable doubt does not eliminate the possibility of any doubts whatsoever, including remote possibilities as was expressed by Denning J in Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 373 as follows:-
"The law will fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with one sentence – 'of course it is possible but not in the least probable' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
See also Nwaturuocha v the State (2011) LPELR 8119 (SC), (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt.1242) 170, Akinlolu v The State (2015) LPELR – 25986 (SC).

Now the Law is settled that if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. See Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, Adamu v. A.G. Bendel State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.22) 284; Akpan v. The State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.160) 101.
Section 36 (5) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. The burden of proof is on the prosecution who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden of proof on the prosecution does not shift. See Alabi v The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 at 531 paragraph A- C, Solola v the State (2005) 5 SC (Pt.1) 135. Where the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused must be discharged and acquitted.

It is also the law that where the commission of a crime by a party to a proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding, civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See:Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011. The burden of proof is on the person who asserts it. See: Section 135 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011. See also: Abubakar v. Yar'Adua (2008) 19 NWLR (pt.1120) 1 @ 143 D 144 B: Buhari v. Obasanjo (supra): Omoboriowo v. Ajasin (1984) 1 SCNLR 108: Kakih v. P.D.P. (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt.1430) 374 @ 422-423 B-C.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence, a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability. See Osuagwu v. State (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt.1347) p.360

However, I must state here, that even though the burden of proof of the guilt of an accused person lies on the prosecution, where the prosecution had adduced adequate evidence which shows that the accused person had actually committed the offence charged, the burden of proving that he is innocent shifts to the accused in view of the provisions of Section 138 (3) of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended. See Nasiru vs State (1999)2 NWLR (pt 589) 87 at 89.
Click the link below to read full Judgment:
Terlumen Giki v. State LGC(19/1/2018)C

The burden of proving the guilt of an accused person squarely rests on the prosecution and such burden does not shift. See Section 138 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended.
Click the link below to read full Judgment:
Terlumen Giki v. State LGC(19/1/2018)C

It must be said again and again that in all criminal trials the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and this burden is discharged by the prosecution calling witnesses to give compelling evidence against the accused person with relevant exhibits to lend credence to oral evidence.

The evidential burden laid on the prosecution in our criminal justice system is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Constitutional safeguard of the presumption of innocence grounds the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in our criminal justice system. See Section 36 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.

It is now settled law that the prosecution is not under any obligation to call a host of witnesses with whom it can prove the guilt of the accused appellant. This is because the fact that PW1 was the victim does not make out a necessity or need for an independent witness as in human dealings an alleged threat can emanate in a transaction between just two persons, one the person making the threat and the other, the person to whom it is made. To put across that once there is no other witness apart from the complainant, the offence cannot be established is to negate the intendment of the law and to give free hand to a person to dish out threats irrespective of the effects, injury or damage to the person and the perpetrator go scot free. It is to be reiterated that once the sole witness has proffered credible evidence uncontradicted and sufficient to satisfy the Court that the burden of proof has been discharged, the fact that that single witness is the complainant is of no moment. I rely on Olabode v The State (2009) 38 NSCQR (Pt.1) 313 at 332; Buba v The State (1994) 7 – 8 SCNJ 472 at 478; State v Olatunji (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt.839) 138 at 167 – 168.

It is to be noted that the onus is always on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offences charged and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt in keeping with Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 as amended. That is not to say proof with absolute certainty, but what is required is that the ingredients of the offense charged are proved as expected or required by law and to the satisfaction of the Court. This onus in a criminal trial rests throughout the proceedings on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it is not akin to proof beyond the shadow of doubt. See Obiakor v The State (2002) 6 SCNJ 193 at 202 per Kalgo JSC, State v Aibangbee (1988) 7 SC (Pt. 1) 96 at 132-133; Aric v The State (2009) 16 NWLR (pt.1068) 443 at 457;Kabir Alma v The State (2009)10 NWLR (pt. 1148) 31 at 46.

The age long principle of law, is that in criminal cases an accused person is constitutionally presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. The onus of proof in criminal cases does not shift as the burden throughout lies on the prosecution in criminal trial which must prove the guilt of the accused. See Bello v State (2007) 10 NWLR (pt.1043)364;Igabele v State (2006) 6 NWLR (pt. 975)100.
However, any doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favour of the accused person
s

In order to prove the offence of murder against an accused person, the prosecution has the onus to establish beyond reasonable doubt, the following ingredients of the offence, namely: –
(i) That the death of a human being was caused
(ii) That it was caused by the act of the accused; and
(iii) That the act or acts was/were done with the intention that death was to be caused; or
(iv) The accused knew that death would be the probable consequence of his act or acts.
See Sunday Omini vs. The State (1999) 12 NWLR (pt.630) 68 or (1999) 9 SC 1 or (1999) LPELR 2638 SC.

Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)E

The prosecution also has the onus to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt through credible and reliable evidence in proof of the case against the accused person. The burden therefore, does not shift. This is borne out from the fact that our Constitutions had entrenched adequate provisions to the effect that an accused person is always presumed innocent until he was otherwise proved to have committed that offence. Therefore, once the prosecution succeeded in proving the elements or ingredients of the offence or offences, the burden thereupon, shifts to the accused person to prove that he was not responsible in committing the offence(s) charged. If he succeeds in doing so, the trial Court then must acquit the accused person promptly.

Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)E

The prosecution also has the onus to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt through credible and reliable evidence in proof of the case against the accused person. The burden therefore, does not shift. This is borne out from the fact that our Constitutions had entrenched adequate provisions to the effect that an accused person is always presumed innocent until he was otherwise proved to have committed that offence.

Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)E

The prosecution also has the onus to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt through credible and reliable evidence in proof of the case against the accused person. The burden therefore, does not shift. This is borne out from the fact that our Constitutions had entrenched adequate provisions to the effect that an accused person is always presumed innocent until he was otherwise proved to have committed that offence. Therefore, once the prosecution succeeded in proving the elements or ingredients of the offence or offences, the burden thereupon, shifts to the accused person to prove that he was not responsible in committing the offence(s) charged. If he succeeds in doing so, the trial Court then must acquit the accused person promptly.

Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)E

It is trite law that the burden of proof in criminal cases is always on the prosecution which must prove all the elements of the offence charged in order to secure conviction of the accused person. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act Cap 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended). See also the cases of Duru v. The State (1993)3 NWLR (pt.281) 290; Amadi vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 12 SC (pt. III) 55; Abdullahi Vs State (2008) 5-6 SC (pt. 1) 1.

Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)E

It is trite law that the burden of proof in criminal cases is always on the prosecution which must prove all the elements of the offence charged in order to secure conviction of the accused person. See Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act Cap 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended). See also the cases of Duru v. The State (1993)3 NWLR (pt.281) 290; Amadi vs Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 12 SC (pt. III) 55; Abdullahi Vs State (2008) 5-6 SC (pt. 1) 1.

Anyasador v. State LGC(9/2/2018)E

It is well settled principle of law that an accused person is presumed innocent until he or she is proved guilty. The prosecution as the accuser, is always saddled with the heavy burden of proving the guilt of the accused person and the standard of such proof in criminal cases or trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Joseph Orungu & Ors vs The State (1970) All NLR 269 or (1970) LPELR – 2780 (SC). See Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) and also Section 138 of the same Evidence Act which make provision for the standard of proof. See also Olayinka Afolalu v The State (2010) 16 NWLR (pt.1220)584; Miller v Minister of Pensions 1947) 2 All ER 372. It should be noted however, that in order to displace the presumption, the evidence adduced by the prosecution must be targeted at the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt only and NOT proof beyond shadow of any doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence he is charged with.This is so because absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure inclusive of the administration of criminal justice

On whether or not the prosecution proved its case against the accused appellant beyond reasonable doubts, it has to be borne in mind that the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt. It is not tantamount to proof beyond all shadow of doubt; as all that is expected is that the evidence is strong enough against the accused to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can easily be dismissed with the fact that, "it is possible but not in the least probable", then the burden of proof is discharged, I referred to Mukhtar JSC (as she then was) in the case of Jimoh Michael v. The State (2008) 3 NCC 660 at 690.

It is a well settled principle of law, that the prosecution is not bound to call every person that was linked to the offence by physical presence or otherwise to give evidence what he perceived. Once person who can testify to the actual commission of the crime and the other relevant ingredients has done so, it will suffice for the satisfaction of the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt as stipulated by Section 138 of the Evidence Act. See Obue v State (1976) 2 SC 141; Sadau v State(1968)All NLR 124; The State v John Ogunbanjo & Anor (2001)12 NWLR (pt.678) 576; Shurumo vs The State (2010)44 NSCQR 159. As a matter of fact, a single witness who gives cogent eye witness account of the incident, as in this instant case, will be sufficient. See Odili vs State (1977) 4 SC 1; Shurumo v The State (supra).

The Law is settled that in criminal cases, the burden of proof that the accused committed the offence for which he is charged lies squarely on the prosecution, who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden never shifts. See Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act, Alabi v The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt.307) 511 8t 531 paras A-C, Solola v The State (2005) 5 SC (Pt.1) 135.

Where, as in this case, the commission of a crime by a party to the proceeding is alleged, the alleged criminal offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; and the burden of proving the commission of the criminal offence beyond reasonable doubt is on that person who asserts it. See Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, see NWOBODO v. C.C. ONOH & ORS (1983) 14 NSCC 478. Allegations beyond imaginable conjectures and speculations in political times and proof beyond reasonable doubt of such allegations of criminal offences are not one and the same thing. The former may be of unacceptable political desperation. The latter is an imperative in criminal law practice and procedure.

I will not be breaching any law if I take us back to an undergraduate criminal law class to refresh our memory on the established criminal law principles. It is a settled principle of criminal law as stated by the Appellant that for an accused to be convicted for an offence, the burden to prove the guilt lies with the prosecution, in this instance, the Respondent.
The point I am trying to make is that the burden of proof in criminal cases is clearly and squarely rest on the prosecution (the Respondent in this appeal), and this burden does not shift and the standard required is beyond reasonable doubt. See Kanu vs. A.G. Imo State (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1680) 369, Almu vs. State (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) 31, Charles Egbirika vs. State NSCQR Vol. 57 2004 p. 457, Chukwuemeka Agugua vs. The State (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1573) 254, State vs. Yahaya (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1690) 397 @ 416.
I must hasten to also add that when the Appellant makes an assertion the burden to prove that assertion falls on him. This does not mean that the Appellant has a duty in law to prove his innocence. He certainly does not. That is why the fact that an accused lied cannot be leveraged by the prosecution to establish his case. See Okereke vs State (2016) 5 NWLR (pt. 1504) 107. PER TOBI, J.C.A.

​The position of the law as stated by the Appellant’s Counsel is that it is the duty of a party to plead and lead evidence on material facts to entitle him to judgment, even where the defendant has failed to rebut the case of the plaintiff, the Plaintiff is duty bound to prove his case by credible evidence and succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence. This Court in SMAB INTER-TRADE LIMITED v.
BUKAR ALI BULANGU (2013) LPELR-21414 (CA) Pages 18-19 Per MBABA, JCA stated: ‘’The law is trite that failure to defend a suit is an implied admission of the case presented by the adverse party. Efet v. INEC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 565) 203 ‘’The law is well settled that any fact which has not been categorically denied by a party is deemed admitted in law by the other party.’’ Nzeribe v. Dave Engr. Co. Ltd (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 124.
But because a plaintiff has the duty to prove his claims on the strength of his own case, the Court is enjoined to review and evaluate the evidence presented by a claimant, even if not challenged, to establish whether the same has proven the claim. Elias v. Omo-Bare (1982) LPELR-SC 41/1981; (1982) ALL NLR 75; Shittu v. Olawumi (2011) LPELR-CA/AE/38/2010; Alao v. Akano (2005) 11 ALL NWLR (Pt. 935) 160; see also Ogunyomi v. Ogundipe ​(2011) All FWLR (Pt. 594) 188, Where it was held. ‘’It is the duty of the Appellants as plaintiffs in the lower Court to prove their case….
And it is a notorious principle of law that in so doing, they must rely in order to succeed on the strength of their own case and not on the weakness of the defendants.’’ PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

A convenient and instructive starting point is the burden and standard of proof. The law is settled that the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt while the burden is on the prosecution. See the following cases: – Agugua v. The State (2017) LPELR–42021 (SC), P. 38, paras B–F, Tobi v. The State (2019) LPLR–46537 (SC) P.24, paras C–D, Edun & Anor v.
FRN (2019) LPELR–46947 (SC) P. 12. ​It has also been established in law that the guilt of an accused person can be proved in three ways, to wit: (I) By eye witness account of the Commission of the offence, (II) By confessional statement of the accused person, (III) By circumstantial evidence. The following judicial authorities are instructive: James Afolabi v. The State (2016) LPELR–40300 (SC), PP. 51–52 paras F–B, Demo Oseni v. The State (2012) LPELR–7833 (SC), P. 41, paras B–C, Darlington Eze v. FRN (2017) LPELR–42097 (SC), P. 63, paras C – E. PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

The trial Court convicted the appellant because it was convinced that the charge was proved. This calls to question the burden of proof. It is settled law that the standard of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt while the burden rests on the prosecution and never shifts, unless in cases in which the statute provides otherwise. I rely on the following cases – Agugua v. The State (2017) LPELR – 42021 (SC), p. 38, paras E – F, Tobi v. The State (2019) LPELR – 46537 (SC), P. 24, paras C – D, Edun & Anor. v. FRN (2019) LPELR – 46047 (SC) p. 12.
It is also settled law that there are three (3) ways in which the guilt of an accused person may be proved:- (i) By eye witness account of the commission of the offence, (ii) By confessional statement of the accused person, (iii) By circumstantial evidence. I refer to the following cases on the issue – James Afolabi v. The State (2016) LPELR – 40300 (SC). Pp. 51 – 52, paras F – B, Demo Oseni v. The State (2012) LPELR – 7833 (SC) p. 41. Paras B – C, Darlington Eze v. FRN (2017) LPELR – 42097 (SC) p. 63, paras C – E. PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

I will not be breaching any law if I take us back to an undergraduate criminal law class to refresh our memory on the established criminal law principles. It is a settled principle of criminal law as stated by the Appellant that for an accused to be convicted for an offence, the burden to prove the guilt lies with the prosecution, in this instance, the Respondent.
The point I am trying to make is that the burden of proof in criminal cases is clearly and squarely rest on the prosecution (the Respondent in this appeal), and this burden does not shift and the standard required is beyond reasonable doubt. See Kanu vs. A.G. Imo State (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1680) 369, Almu vs. State (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148) 31, Charles Egbirika vs. State NSCQR Vol. 57 2004 p. 457, Chukwuemeka Agugua vs. The State (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1573) 254, State vs. Yahaya (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1690) 397 @ 416.
I must hasten to also add that when the Appellant makes an assertion the burden to prove that assertion falls on him. This does not mean that the Appellant has a duty in law to prove his innocence. He certainly does not. That is why the fact that an accused lied cannot be leveraged by the prosecution to establish his case. See Okereke vs State (2016) 5 NWLR (pt. 1504) 107. PER TOBI, J.C.A.

​The position of the law as stated by the Appellant’s Counsel is that it is the duty of a party to plead and lead evidence on material facts to entitle him to judgment, even where the defendant has failed to rebut the case of the plaintiff, the Plaintiff is duty bound to prove his case by credible evidence and succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence. This Court in SMAB INTER-TRADE LIMITED v.
BUKAR ALI BULANGU (2013) LPELR-21414 (CA) Pages 18-19 Per MBABA, JCA stated: ‘’The law is trite that failure to defend a suit is an implied admission of the case presented by the adverse party. Efet v. INEC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 565) 203 ‘’The law is well settled that any fact which has not been categorically denied by a party is deemed admitted in law by the other party.’’ Nzeribe v. Dave Engr. Co. Ltd (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 124.
But because a plaintiff has the duty to prove his claims on the strength of his own case, the Court is enjoined to review and evaluate the evidence presented by a claimant, even if not challenged, to establish whether the same has proven the claim. Elias v. Omo-Bare (1982) LPELR-SC 41/1981; (1982) ALL NLR 75; Shittu v. Olawumi (2011) LPELR-CA/AE/38/2010; Alao v. Akano (2005) 11 ALL NWLR (Pt. 935) 160; see also Ogunyomi v. Ogundipe ​(2011) All FWLR (Pt. 594) 188, Where it was held. ‘’It is the duty of the Appellants as plaintiffs in the lower Court to prove their case….
And it is a notorious principle of law that in so doing, they must rely in order to succeed on the strength of their own case and not on the weakness of the defendants.’’ PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

A convenient and instructive starting point is the burden and standard of proof. The law is settled that the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt while the burden is on the prosecution. See the following cases: – Agugua v. The State (2017) LPELR–42021 (SC), P. 38, paras B–F, Tobi v. The State (2019) LPLR–46537 (SC) P.24, paras C–D, Edun & Anor v.
FRN (2019) LPELR–46947 (SC) P. 12. ​It has also been established in law that the guilt of an accused person can be proved in three ways, to wit: (I) By eye witness account of the Commission of the offence, (II) By confessional statement of the accused person, (III) By circumstantial evidence. The following judicial authorities are instructive: James Afolabi v. The State (2016) LPELR–40300 (SC), PP. 51–52 paras F–B, Demo Oseni v. The State (2012) LPELR–7833 (SC), P. 41, paras B–C, Darlington Eze v. FRN (2017) LPELR–42097 (SC), P. 63, paras C – E. PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

The trial Court convicted the appellant because it was convinced that the charge was proved. This calls to question the burden of proof. It is settled law that the standard of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt while the burden rests on the prosecution and never shifts, unless in cases in which the statute provides otherwise. I rely on the following cases – Agugua v. The State (2017) LPELR – 42021 (SC), p. 38, paras E – F, Tobi v. The State (2019) LPELR – 46537 (SC), P. 24, paras C – D, Edun & Anor. v. FRN (2019) LPELR – 46047 (SC) p. 12.
It is also settled law that there are three (3) ways in which the guilt of an accused person may be proved:- (i) By eye witness account of the commission of the offence, (ii) By confessional statement of the accused person, (iii) By circumstantial evidence. I refer to the following cases on the issue – James Afolabi v. The State (2016) LPELR – 40300 (SC). Pp. 51 – 52, paras F – B, Demo Oseni v. The State (2012) LPELR – 7833 (SC) p. 41. Paras B – C, Darlington Eze v. FRN (2017) LPELR – 42097 (SC) p. 63, paras C – E. PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

It is trite that in order to discharge the burden of proof in a criminal case the prosecution must prove the ingredients of the offence with which the accused is charged beyond reasonable doubt. This well-established principle of law was reiterated by this apex Court in NWATURUOCHA V. STATE (2011) LPELR- 8119(SC) where it was held as follows:- “In the process of establishing the guilt of an accused, the prosecution has to prove all the essential elements of an offence as contained in the charge.
While discharging the responsibility of proving all the ingredients of the offence vital witnesses must be called to testify at the proceedings- Before a trial Court comes to the conclusion that an offence had been committed by an accused person, the Court must look for the ingredients of the offence and ascertain critically that acts of the accused come within the confines of the particulars of the offence charged, Amadi v. The State (1993) 8 NWLR pt. 314 pg. 644 at pg. 668; Alor v The State (1997) 4 NWLR pt. 501 pg. 511.” Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, J.S.C.

Once the prosecution proves the ingredients of armed robbery beyond reasonable doubt, failure to tender the offensive weapon cannot result in the acquittal of the accused person. This is because of the possibility of the accused person doing away with the offensive weapon after the commission of the offence in order to exculpate himself from criminal responsibility. Nothing stops an accused person from throwing away or hiding the offensive weapon completely outside the investigative eyes of the Police.
If there is compelling evidence that the accused person committed the armed robbery, failure to tender the offensive weapon, in the circumstances, cannot therefore be basis of acquittal. Per TOBI, JSC, in FATAI OLAYINKA V. THE STATE (2007) LPELR-2580(SC) (PP. 21-22 PARAS. G). UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI J.S.C.

It is now well settled that in our criminal jurisprudence, the onus is on the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. See Josiah Orungua & Ors v. The State (1970) All NLR 266; (1970) LPELR 2780 (SC) – Olayinka Afolalu v. The State (2010) 16 NWLR (PT 1220) 584 – Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372 – Yongo v. Commissioner of Police (1992) 4 SCNJ 113; (1992) 8 NWLR (pt. 257)36 – Alonge v. IGP (1959) 4 FSC 203; (1959) SCNLR 516 – Babuga v. State (1996) LPELR-701 SC; (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 460) 279 – Sections 135 and 138 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended).
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

The prosecution is saddled with the burden of proving the guilt of the accused person and the standard of such proof is beyond reasonable doubt. UKPONG v. STATE (2019) LPELR-46427(SC); AMOS v. STATE (2018) LPELR-44694(SC); EWUGBA v. STATE (2017) LPELR-43833(SC) as well as Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. PER ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C

Where the Prosecution fails to establish all the essential ingredients of the offence charged, its case will collapse like a pack of cards,Nwachukwu v State (1985) 3 NWLR (pt.11) 218; Bozin v State (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.8) 465; Suberu v State (2010) 8 NWLR (pt. 1197) 586; Oyebola v State (2008) All FWLR (pt. 402) 1175. PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C

The position of the law is settled that in a case of murder, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that:- (a) The deceased has died; (b) It was the act of the accused that caused the death of the deceased; and (c) The accused person intended either to kill the deceased or cause him grievous bodily harm. See Iliyasu v State (2015) 11 NWLR (pt. 1469) 26; Ukpong v State (2019) 6 NWLR (pt. 1667)1. PER JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C

It is imperative for a Plaintiff claiming title against another to establish his root of time because that is the source or basis of his claim: OKOYE v. DUMEBI (2014) LPELR-24155 (CA) 20. Failure of the Plaintiff to effectively establish his root of title is very fatal to his claim: UDE v. CHIMBO (1998) 12 NWLR (pt. 577) 169; OMOTAYO v. CO-OPERATIVE SUPPLY ASSOCIATION (2010) 16 NWLR (pt. 1218) 1 (SC) 16. Therefore, when a Plaintiff fails to prove the root of the title to the land he claims, his case stands dismissed in toto: NNADOZIE & ORS. v.
MBAGWU (2018) LPELR-2055 (SC) at 40; ANYADUBA & ANOR. v. NRTC LTD (1992) LPELR-505 (SC); MOGAJI v. CADBURY NIG. LTD. (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 7) 393. Ejembi Eko J.S.C

I want to say that for the sake of emphasis that even where the police were unable or refused to investigate the alibi of the Defend, acquittal would depend on the overall circumstances of the case. Where there is doubt in the evidence adduced by the prosecution, failure to investigate the alibi to clear any doubt in the defence of the Defendant becomes the final lid in the coffin of whatever case the prosecution intended to make and the prosecution’s case would be buried. Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, J.S.C

The law is firmly settled that in criminal trial the burden of proof rest on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceedings is directly in issue in any proceeding Civil or Criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty.
However proof beyond reasonable doubt is only required to attain a high degree of probability and not the degree of absolute certainty. In other words, it is not prove beyond all doubts or shadow of doubt. See Rabiu v. State (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 925) 491 and Esene v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1568) 337. The prosecution can discharge its burden in three ways. These are through direct evidence of an eye witness, through confessional statement of the accused and through circumstantial evidence. See Akibu v. State (Supra) and F.R.N. v. Barminas (supra). PER TALBA, J.CA.

The law is beyond settled that in civil matters, the burden of proof rests on the party who asserts a fact and whose case will fail if such assertion is not proved. The standard of proof remains the preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. A party is not allowed to rely on the weakness of the defence of the other party but must establish his case with clear, cogent and credible evidence. see the cases of YAKUBU V. JAUROYEL 2005 ALL FWLR PT. 283 184, LONGE V. FBN PLC. 2006 3 NWLR PT. 967 P. 228 and OKUBULE V. OYAGBOLA 1990 4 NWLR PT. 147 P. 723. PER WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.

It is settled law that a Claimant seeking declaratory reliefs, must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the Respondent’s case – see Emenike v. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) 556 and Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt 1119) 361 at 373-374, wherein this Court held as follows: The law on the requirements of the Plaintiff to plead and prove his claims for declaratory reliefs on the evidence called by him without relying on the evidence called by the Defendant is, indeed, well settled.
The burden of proof on the Plaintiff in establishing declaratory reliefs to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission by the Defendant, where the Plaintiff fails to establish his entitlement to the declaration by his own evidence. A Claimant must prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is entitled to the declaratory relief sought. He cannot point fingers at any weakness, omission, or default on the part of the Respondent.
He stands or falls on the strength of his case; if his case is strong, he wins, and if his case is weak, then he loses. In this case, Plaintiffs claimed four declaratory reliefs; the other three are consequential reliefs, which are predicated on the success of the declaratory reliefs, particularly Relief (a), and they had to prove to the satisfaction of the trial Court that they were entitled to the said Reliefs – Emenike v. PDP (supra). AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

When the defence of insanity or diminished responsibility is raised, the burden on the defendant to establish that defence is not as heavy as that which rests on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. However, the defence shall lead evidence material to the conclusion that, on the balance of probability, he was of unsound mind at all times material to the  commission of the offence charged: R. v. DUNBAR (1958) 1 Q. B. 1. ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.
THE SETTLED LAW ON THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION IN AN APPEAL The law is settled in the appellate Courts that issues for determination in an appeal against the decision of a lower Court must inure, arise from and be distilled from the grounds of the appeal which contain the real complaints against the decision of the lower Court. Where any issue submitted to the appellate Court for determination does not arise from and is not reasonably traceable to any of the valid grounds of the appeal, such issue would be invalid and incompetent for the appellate Court to consider and determine on the merit.
See Nasiru v. State (1999) 2 NWLR (pt. 569) 87, Akpan v. FRN (2012) 1 NWLR (pt. 1281) 403, Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 6 SC (pt. 1) 66, Nwosu v. Imo State Env. Sanitation Agency (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 135) 688, Shitta-Bey v. A. G., Federation (1989) 10 NWLR (pt. 570) 392, Garba v. State (2000) 4 SCNJ. ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.

The law is settled that he who asserts a fact must prove the existence of that fact, otherwise he would not be entitled to the judgment of the Court. The burden of proof lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. See Sections 131 – 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 as well as DASUKI V. FRN & ORS (2018) LPELR-43897 (SC); JIMOH V. HON. MINISTER FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ORS (2018) LPELR – 46329 (SC).
The Appellant whose contention it is that the 1st Respondent exercised his power on behalf of the board has been unable to show that that power was exercised in his capacity as a member of the board of directors. Thus, it is erroneous and incorrect to assert the 1st Respondent lacked locus standi to appeal against the decision of the trial Court before the lower Court. ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.
AN APPEAL IS THE CONTIUATION OF HEARING OF THE SUIT AT A TRIAL COURT In the same vein, if the petitioner was competent to institute the winding-up proceedings and to file the application, then the petitioner ought to be competent to exercise a right of appeal. It is the law that the jurisdiction of an appellate Court is derived from that of the trial Court, in the sense that the originating processes at the trial Court is the jurisdictional source of the appellate Court. See AG Anambra v Okeke (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt 783) 575, 590, Lagga v Sarhuna (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt 1114) 427, 482- 483.
Also relevant is the principle that an appeal is not necessarily distinct from but is a continuation of hearing of the suit at the trial Court. See F.U.T. Minna v Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt.1617) 176, 194, Adeokin Records v MSCN (Ltd/Gte) (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt 1643) 550, 567. Hence, parties on appeal must reflect parties at the trial Court. See: Obi v Etiaba (2015) 6 NWLR Pt 1455 377 at 389-390,399, Sanusi v Modu (1994) 5 NWLR Pt 347, 732 at 739, PPA v INEC (2012) 13 NWLR Pt 1317, 215 at 236-237, 242-246, 251. HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.

The Respondent has rightly submitted, and it is well settled that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person in any criminal trial must be discharged by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. See Ogundiyan v. State [1991] 1 NSCC 448, The State v. Azeez (2008) 4 S. C. 188, Shande v. State (2005) 12 MJSC 152, John Agbo v. State (2006) 1 S.C. (PT. II) 73, Udo v. State (2006) 7 S.C. (PT. II) 83. See also Section 135 Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2011. This simply means there is credible evidence upon which the Court can safely convict; Miller v.
Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All E.R. 372 at 373, cited with approval in John Agbo v. State (supra). Therefore, where all the ingredients of an offence have been credibly and clearly established by the prosecution, the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Osetola v. State (2012) LPELR-9348(SC), Alabi v. State (1993) 7 NWLR (PT 307) 511 at 523, Ajayi v. State (2013) 2-3 MJSC (PT 1)59. PER OTISI, J.C.A.
DEFINITION OF STEALING Section 279 thereof defined stealing as: Any person who dishonestly: (a) takes the property of another person; or (b) converts the property of another person for his own use or to the use of any other person, is guilty of the offence of stealing.
Section 279(2) gave an expose of the meaning of dishonestly in this manner: A person is deemed to dishonestly take or convert the property of another if he does so with any of the following, to: (a) intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property; (b) intent to permanently deprive any person who has a special interest in the property; (c) intent to use the property as a pledge or a security; (d) intent to part with the property on a condition as to its return which he may be unable to perform; (e) intent to deal with the property in a manner that it cannot be returned in the condition it was in at the time of the taking or conversion; or (f) intent to in the case of money, an intent to use it at his will although he may intend to repay the owner afterward.
By these provisions, the offence of stealing is committed where a person fraudulently takes or converts to his own use or the use of any other person, any property capable of being stolen, in any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 279(2) reproduced above.
Simply put, ingredients of the offence of stealing which must be proved by the prosecution are: (a) that the thing stolen is capable of being stolen; (b) that the accused has the intention of permanently depriving the owner of the thing stolen; (c) that the accused was dishonest; and, (d) that the accused had unlawfully appropriated the thing stolen to his own use. See also Oshinye v. Commissioner of Police (1960) 5 SC 105, Chianugo v. State (2002) 2 NWLR (PT 750) 225, Adejobi v. State (2011) LPELR-97(SC), Ayeni v The State (2016) LPELR-40105(SC) Chyfrank Nigeria v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2019) LPELR-46401(SC), Takim v The State (2014) LPELR-22667(CA). PER OTISI, J.C.A.

The law on the burden and standard of prove to establish forgery is settled. Permit me as I take a little excursion on this venture. Forgery can be defined as the act of making a false document or altering a genuine document for same to be used. See Agi vs PDP & Ors (2016) S.C.(pt 1) 74. As to what will amount to ingredients of the offence of forgery, the Supreme Court in Ndoma- Egba vs A.C.B. Plc (2005) 14 NWLR (pt 944) 79 held thus: “In Nwobodo vs.
Onoh (1984) All NLR 1 at 77, (1984) 1 SCNLR 1 at 72, Obaseki JSC discussed the nature of the offence of forgery and the proof of it in relation to Section 137 (1) of the Evidence Act thus: “Forgery as defined under the Criminal Code reads – S. 465 A person who makes a false document or writing knowing it to be false, and with intent that it may in any way be used or acted upon as genuine, whether in Nigeria or elsewhere to the prejudice of any person, or with intent that any person may be in the belief that it is genuine be induced to do, or refrain from doing any act whether in Nigeria or elsewhere is said to forge the document or writing.
To bring an indictment for the offence of forgery under S. 465 of the Criminal Code, it must contain the important ingredient of knowledge except the word ‘forgery’ is used in the indictment.” Similarly, this Court held in Wagbatsoma vs FRN (2015) ALL FWLR (pt 812) 1430 as follows: “On the offence of forgery and uttering of a false document, what the prosecution needs to prove is as stated in ODIAWA V. FRN (2008) LPELR 4230 (CA); ALAKE vs STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.205) 567 thus: “The offences of forgery and uttering have been defined in Section 467(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.
Their ingredients are: a. That the accused utters or forges a document. b. That he knew the document to be false. c. That he presented the said document to the other party with the intention that it could be acted upon. d. That the document was acted upon by the other party to his determent (the 4th ingredient is not always necessary to prove once the other 3 have been established).” PER TOBI, J.C.A.

The established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court and this Court and as stipulated in Section 131 (1) and (2), and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011  is that, whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist. It therefore means that whoever desires the Court to give judgment in his favour has to prove his case. See JACK V. WHYTE (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 709) 226 AT 272, MADUMMA V. JAMMO (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) 461, UKAEGBU V. NWOLOLO (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1127) 194 and SAKATI V.
BAKO & ANOR. (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 531. Where the parties have adduced evidence, either oral or documentary at the trial, the duty of the trial Court is to evaluate the totality of such evidence so as to see where the scales of justice tilts. He does that by placing the evidence adduced by the claimant on one side of the imaginary scale of justice with that of the Defendant on the other side. He will then weigh them together on the imaginary scale, so that whichever side weight of evidence tilts or preponderates, will have the judgment of the Court. See MOGAJI & ORS V.
ODOFIN & ORS (1978) 4 SC AT 93, AYUYA V. YONRIN (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135, BELLO V. EWEKA (1981) 1 SC 101. PER ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.

Now turning to whether the Respondent established the identity of the land in dispute to entitle him to the declaration of title over the land. As rightly held in OGUNSINA V OGUNLEYE [1994] 5 NWLR, PT. 346, 625 AT 635, PARAS G – H: “The first duty of a plaintiff in an action for declaration of title to land is to establish with certainty the identity of the land he is claiming.
He could do this by way of a survey plan, but there have been cases which laid it down that, in establishing the identity of land in dispute in an action for declaration of title to land, a survey plan is not a sine qua non. What is important is that evidence to establish the identity of the land in dispute is given in such a detailed and clear manner with regard to the features, boundaries and size of the land as to ensure that the identity of the land is understood.” See also DANJUMA V S.C.C. (NIG.) LTD [2017] 6 NWLR, PT. 1561, 175 AT 204, PARAS E-G.
The need to properly identify the land for which a declaration of title is sought is to ensure that when a declaration of title is made, it relates to land ascertained with certainty both as to its location and boundary. See EKWEALOR V OBASI [1990] 2 NWLR, PT. 131, 231 AT 254. Where it is clear that both parties to an action for declaration of title to land are not in doubt as to the identity, location, size, or boundaries of the land in dispute, a survey plan will not be necessary to establish the identity of the land.
See OLUJINLE V ADEAGBO [1988] 2 NWLR, PT. 75, 238 AT 249, PARA E, where Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC rightly held that: “it is now perfectly settled that a plan is not a sine qua non in every land case. Where, in a case like this both parties know the quantity and quality of the land in dispute between them, a plan ceases to be an absolute necessity.” SEE ALSO OSANYINBI V SOKENU [2001] 3 NWLR, PT. 699, 170 AT 182, PARAS B-E. PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.

The law is trite that he who asserts must prove. See Section 131 of the Evidence Act and the case of AMADI V. ORJI [2016] 9 NWLR (Part 1516) 154. It is thus the duty of the Defendants to establish the customary tenancy. In the case of DASHI V. SATLONG [2009] 1-2 SC (Part II) the Supreme Court held that “Customary Tenancy involves the transfer of an interest in land from the Customary Landlord or Overlord to the Customary Tenant to exclusive possession of the land and which interest subject to good behavior, he holds in perpetuity.
Unless it is otherwise excluded the main features of a customary tenancy is the payment of tribute by the customary tenant to the Overlord. And the status of his exclusive possession is such that it is enforceable against the world at large including even the customary land lord or those claiming through him”. Again in the case of DIM V. ENEMUO [2009] 10 NWLR (Part 1149) 353 the Supreme Court held further that a Claimant alleging Customary tenancy must plead and prove the incidences of Customary tenancy.
Throughout the length and breadth of the said Amended Statement of Claim in AHC/44/84 there is no pleading on the incidences of Customary tenancy. I have also looked at the further Amended Statement of Defence in AHC/25/83 and find no such pleading. It is clear that the Defendants have not established customary tenancy.” (Bold font for emphasis). PER ADEGBEHINGBE, J.C.A.

The law both ancient and modern is that in a criminal trial the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. The burden never shifts. Even where an accused in his statement to the police admitted committing the offence the prosecution is not relieved of the burden. If an accused person gives an account which is consistent with his innocence and could be true and is not proved to be untrue he is entitled to an acquittal.
This is because in such circumstances there must be a doubt with regard to his guilt. ​Proof beyond reasonable doubt means that it is not enough to suspect a person of having committed a criminal offence. It means that there must be evidence which identifies the person accused with the offence and that it was his act which caused the offence. See the decisions of the Supreme Court in Igabele v State (2006) NWLR (Pt. 975) 100, Aigbadion v State (2000) 4 SC 1 (Pt. 1)1 and the decision of this Court in Okafor v State (2006)4 NWLR (Pt.969)1. PER ABIRIYI, J.C.A.

The position of the law as settled in plethora of authorities that the burden of proof in civil matters is generally on the claimant is well firmed. See: ADAMU V. NIGERIAN AIRFORCE & ANOR (2022) (SC). As commonly put; he who asserts must prove. However, the burden of proof in civil matters unlike in criminal proceedings is not static, it lies on that person who would fail if no evidence was given on either side. This burden of proof required is on balance of probability or on preponderance of evidence. See: INYANG V.
CCECC (2020) LPELR-49694 (CA); SECTION 132, 133 AND 136 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 2011. Therefore, the onus of proof herein lies on the Claimant who seeks a declaration of title to the disputed land to establish with certainty and precision and without inconsistency the area of land to which his claim relates and how he acquired his title. The point clearly emphasized is that a declaration of title to land can only be granted in respect of land which has definite, precise and accurate boundaries.
Thus, for the Claimant to succeed in his claim for the land, he must prove the exact location of the land and how he acquired his title. See: DADA V. DOSUNMU (2006) LPELR-909(SC); AMU & ANOR V. OKEAYA-INNEH & ANOR (2021) LPELR-55660 (CA); IBRAHIM & ANOR V. BORNO STATE GOVT & ANOR (2021) LPELR-56575(CA); TOMU V. MUAZU & ORS (2019) LPELR-47930(CA).
This is the foremost and fundamental duty of a Claimant, because where a Claimant fails to plead and establish the precise area of the land to which his claim relates, whatever evidence, whether oral or documentary he produces at the trial and even though it is cogent and credible cannot in law, ground a claim of an interest in the land in his favor. Hence, before a Court before trying a land case goes into the facts of the case, it must firstly satisfy itself with the certainty of the land in dispute and its boundaries. PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

In a criminal trial, the law is trite that the burden rests on the Respondent from beginning to the end of trial and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, see ABDULLAHI V. STATE (2008) LPELR-28 (SC) wherein the apex Court held thusly: ”It is settled law that in a criminal trial the onus remains with the prosecution to prove or establish the charge against the accused person(s) beyond reasonable doubt and that the onus or burden of proof never changes/shifts. See the case of Ahmed v. The State (2001) 12 S.C. (Pt.I) 135; (2003) 3 ACLR 145 at 177, Anekwe v.
The State (1998) ACLR 426 at 433, Obiakor v. The State (2002) 6 S.C. (Pt. II) 33; (2002) 6 SCNJ. 193.” Per ONNOGHEN, J.S.C. PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.

It is long settled that the burden of proof with respect to criminal offences is on the prosecution, that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act. By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the law insists that every ingredient of the offence with which the accused stands trial must be proved by the prosecution. Failure to prove any of the ingredients would result in the acquittal of the accused person. See OBI VS. THE STATE (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 346) 68, BABATUNDE VS. THE STATE (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 1391 298, SABASTINE VS.
THE STATE (2020) LPELR 50319 and GAWONI VS. THE STATE (2021) LPELR 55470.
The burden on the prosecution is not beyond every shadow of doubt for absolute certainty is impossible in our criminal jurisprudence except in certain exceptional situations. Once the evidence is so strong against an accused as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least probable” the case will be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This can be attained by proof of all the ingredients of an offence. See ISAH VS. THE STATE (2018) 8 NWLR (PT. 1621) 346, EZEANI V.
FRN (2019) 12 NWLR (PT 1686) 221 and PHILLIP V. STATE (2019) 13 NWLR (PT 1690) 209. The prosecution is at liberty to prove its case by calling eye witnesses to the commission of the offence or by circumstantial evidence or by confessional statement made by an accused person. The prosecution can rely on any of the three modes or all of them to prove its case. See ADIO V. STATE (1986) 5 SC 94, ABIRIFON V. STATE (2013) LPELR 20804, GARBA V. FRN (2014) LPELR 24591 and MUSA V. STATE (2014) LPELR 22912. PER LAMIDO, J.C.A.

Proof in civil cases such as herein is on preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. See the cases of DAODU V. NNPC 1998 2 NWLR PT. 538 355, KALA V. POTISKUM 1998 3 NWLR PT. 540 1 and ITAUMA V. AKPA-IME 2000 7 SC PT. II 24. The burden is first on the Plaintiff to establish his case first with cogent and credible evidence before it shifts to the Defendant and the Plaintiff cannot rely on the weakness of the Defendant’s case except where the Defendant’s case supports his case. See the case of IHEKORONYE V. HART 2000 15 NWLR PT. 692 840.
The greater weight of evidence is otherwise referred to as preponderance of evidence which is not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by the most convincing evidence with superior evidentiary weight that even though it is not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt will suffice to swing the mind impartially to one side other than the other. See the case of SUNDAT OKORIE V. IGNATIUS UNAKALAMBA 2013 LPELR-2011. One will consider these Issues along with the findings of the Court below. PER WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.

The law has crystalized in our criminal jurisprudence that an accused person is presumed innocent until he or she is proved guilty.
The prosecution is saddled with the burden of proving the guilt of the accused person and the standard of such proof in criminal cases or trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See JOSEPH ORUNGUA & ORS VS THE STATE (1970) LPELR-2780 (SC); Sections 135 & 138 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended). ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.

By virtue of the unequivocal provisions of Section 135 (3) of the Evidence Act, the Prosecution has the responsibility of proving each charge against the appellant (accused person) beyond reasonable doubt in any of the following established manners: a. By direct evidence of an eyewitness of commission of the offence by the accused person; or b. By the confessional statement of the accused person; or c. By circumstantial evidence linking the accused person, and no other, with the commission of the offence. See Ilori v. State [1980] 8-11 SC 18; Emeka v.
State [2001] 14 NWLR (pt.734) 666; Igabele v. State [2006] 6 NWLR (pt. 975) 100. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.

The rationale for this attitude was summed up by Ogundare, JSC in Olalekan v. The State (supra) thus: Without this evidence, the prosecution would not have proved that the statement sought to be tendered by the interviewing police officer was more than just hearsay. It is not for the defence to establish what went on between the accused (person) and the interpreter. The burden of proving that fact is on the prosecution and not on the defence.
It is for this reason that, in my respectful view, the interpreter must be called to testify and to elicit from him, in evidence, what the accused (person) told him that he interpreted to the interviewing police officer. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.

The law is quite well settled that while the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, it is equally trite that any doubt must be resolved in the accused person’s favour. See: F.R.N. Vs Abubakar (2019) LPELR-46533 (SC) @ 22 C-D: Okonji vs The State (1987) LPELR-2479 (SC) @ 26 E-F. KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.

Having set out in summary, the postures albeit divergent of the Appellant as against the Respondent, it is to be reiterated that in seeking to establish the guilt of a defendant, the prosecution may rely on any of the three ways set out hereunder: 1. Confessional statement of the defendant. 2. Direct eyewitness account of a witness or witnesses. 3 Circumstantial evidence.​ The above is a follow-up in our criminal justice system as an accused person is presumed innocent until the prosecution proves his guilt.
Hence an accused is not expected to prove his innocence before the Court of law, since the duty is on the prosecution to establish the charge or charges against an accused beyond reasonable doubt. See Saminu v State (2019) LPELR- 47622 (SC); Uche Williams v The State (1992) 10 SCNJ 74. PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime of wrongful act is on the person who asserts it- Sanmi Vs State (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt.1690) 551 at 557; Akpan Vs State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.160) 101; Amala Vs State(2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 520 and State Vs Musa (2020) 2 NWLR (Pt.1709) 499 at 504 – PER TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.c.a.

Extradition proceedings are sui generis. While the legal burden of proof is fixed, the evidential burden shifts as the evidence preponderates. OKOYE & ORS v. NWANKWO (2014) LPELR-23172 (SC). PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C

The law is settled that the burden of proof of insanity lies on the accused person. In NDU v THE STATE 1990 LPELR-1975 SC this Court held as follows: The law is that the burden of proving insanity rests on the accused person. Of course the burden of proof which he has to discharge is a light one. It is a proof by a preponderance of evidence or on a balance of probability. The defense of insanity is a plea which must be positively put forward by way of defence and evidence should be adduced in support.
Also in ANI V THE STATE (2002) 10 NWLR PT 776 644, this Court had this to say; The burden on the accused to prove his insanity, however is merely as in civil cases that is to say on the balance of probability or the preponderance of evidence.
In the more recent case of NWODE v THE STATE (2019) LPELR-49372 SC, this Court had a reason to interpret Section 28 of the Criminal Code Law supra, and held as follows: Section 28 of the Criminal Code Law supra provides as follows; a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him capacity to understand what he is doing or of capacity to control his actions… however by Section 27 of the same act, the onus of proving insanity is on the accused who is required to make available evidence to satisfy the Courts that he was insane at the time he committed the offence.
In order to succeed in a plea of insanity, the Appellant must before the trial Court, prove on the balance of probability that as at the time of committing the offence, he lacked the capacity to; 1. Understand what he was doing 2. Control his actions 3. Know that he ought not to act or make the omission See BABANGIDA JOHN v THE STATE (2012) 7 NWLR (PT 1299 ) 3 36. PER ABOKI, J.S.C.

Now, it is an established principle of criminal law that the burden of proving a fact, which if proved, would lead to the conviction of the Accused Person, is on the Prosecution, and the Prosecution is enjoined to prove such fact beyond reasonable doubt. What is more, any doubt as to the guilt of the Accused must be resolved in favour of the Accused -Ahmed V. State (1999) 7NWLR (Pt. 612) 641, Oforlete V. State (2000) 12 NWLR (PL 681)415, Kalu V. State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 90) 502/513. PER AUGIE, J.S.C.

Indeed, this is an offshoot of the prescription that in criminal cases, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution throughout and does not shift to the accused person, except in a few limited circumstances, such as where an accused person raises a defence of insanity, The State v. Emine [1992] 7 NWLR (pt. 256) 658; Ogundiyan v The State [1991] 3 NWLR (pt. 181) 519; [1991] 4 SCNJ 44; Alonge v IGP (1959) 4 FSC 203; [1959] SCNLR 516.
This notion of the Prosecution’s burden derives from our accusatorial criminal justice system under which, in contradistinction to the inquisitorial system, it is anathematic to expect an accused person to purge himself of guilt since the fundamental law of the country, the Constitution, avails him of the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise, Uso v C. O. P [1972] NSCC 631; Kinnami v. Bauchi Native Authority (1957) NRNLR 42, approvingly, adopted in Ani and Anor v The State (2009) LPELR -488 (SC) 14 -15, D-E; Section 36 (5) thereof.
This is, actually, a fundamental principle of most commonwealth penal laws, often couched in the ancient maxim in dubio pro reo – a principle which has been interpreted as imposing the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person on the prosecution, Obiakor v. State (2002) 10 NWLR (pt. 776) 612; Bello v State (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 1043) 564, 585 Oladele v. Nigerian Army (2004) 6 NWLR (pt. 868) 166. PER NWEZE, J.S.C.

I believe the starting point is to restate the settled position of the law that a vital element of our criminal jurisprudence is that the Prosecution has a duty to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. In OGUNDIYAN VS. STATE (1991) 1 NSCC 448, also reported in (1991) LPELR – 2333 (SC) AT PAGES 13 – 14, the Supreme Court per OBASEKI, JSC said: “The standard of proof in all criminal trials is proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Hycienth Egbe Vs. The King 13 WACA 105 at 106.
In that celebrated case, Verity, CJ (Nigeria) delivering the judgment of the Court on the standard of proof said: “As illustration of the required standard of proof and degree of certainty in criminal trials, we wish to refer to a portion of the charge to the jury of Martin B in Rex V.
White 4 F &F 383 at 384 where the learned Baron said: – “In order to enable you return a verdict against any person, you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt and as a conviction created in your minds, not merely as a matter of probability and if it is only an impression of probability, your duty is to acquit.” PER OJO, J.C.A.

It is settled law that the proof of cases in civil matter is by preponderance of evidence, as such, the evidence which has higher weight tilts the balance of probability to the party whom judgment shall be entered in his favor. See the case of Buhari v. INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 at 369 – 370 where the Apex Court Per Niki Tobi JSC, stated on the issue of whom rests the burden of proof in any given proceeding as follows: “This rests on the party whether plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue.
It is fixed at the beginning of the trial by the state of the pleadings and it is settled as a question of law, remaining unchanged throughout the trial exactly where the proceedings place it…” It is equally the law that the party who alleges must prove that those facts and circumstance which he relies on for the Court to give him judgment exist by cogent and material evidence in other for judgment to be entered in his favor. PER HASSAN, J.C.A.

Our adversarial criminal justice system is accusatorial and the prosecution has the onus of proving the commission of the crime charged. This is so on account of the provisions of Section 36 (5) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, which provides that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proven guilty. The necessary corollary of this presumption of innocence is the cardinal principle of law which requires the prosecution to prove the commission of the crime by the person charged with a criminal offence.
By Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011 the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing esoteric in the apothegm that in criminal trials the burden is on the Prosecution to prove the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and if the evidence is strong against a man, as to leave only a remote probability in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence: “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable”, then the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
See MILLER vs. MINISTER OF PENSIONS (1947) 2 ALL E.R. 372, MICHAEL vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (1987) 1 at 24 and BAKARE vs. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 1 or (1987) LPELR (714) 1 at 12-13. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean or import beyond any degree of certainty. The term strictly means that within the bounds of the evidence adduced before the Court, no Tribunal of justice would convict on it having regard to the nature of the evidence led in the case. It should be a proof that excludes all reasonable inference or assumption except that which it seeks to support.
It must have clarity of proof that is readily consistent with the guilt of the accused person. The expression does not connote any ungainly and abstract construction or understanding. A priori, it is a concept founded on reason and rational and critical examination of a given set of facts and the law rather than a fanciful, whimsical or capricious and speculative doubt. See THE STATE vs. ONYEUKWU (2004) 14 NWLR (PT 893) 340 at 379-380, ONIANWA vs. THE STATE (2015) LPELR (24517) 1 at 40-41 and TAIYE vs. THE STATE (2015) LPELR (25783) 1 at 26-27.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof of an offence with the certainty required in a criminal trial. That certainty is that the offence was committed, which is established by proving the essential ingredients of the offence, and that it is the person charged therewith that committed the offence. To captivate our attention in ascertaining whether the lower Court rightly held that the offences charged were proved beyond reasonable doubt are the set of facts established by the prosecution evidence, vis-à-vis the law under which the offences were charged. PER OGAKWU, J.C.A.

It is trite that a party seeking for declaration of title to land, who relies on traditional history as proof of his root of title, must plead same sufficiently. That is to say, he must demonstrate in his pleadings the original founder of the land, how he founded the land, the particulars of the intervening owners through whom he claims. When a party has not given sufficient information in his pleadings as regards the origin OR ownership of the land and the line of succession to himself, he has just laid foundation for the failure of his claim. See HOJACINTH ANYANWU VS.
ROBERT ACHILIKE MBARA (1992) 5 SCNJ PG. 90, IDUNDUN VS. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9-10 SC PG. 224, ATANDA VS. AJANI (1989) 3 NWLR PT. III PG 511 Per Okoko JSC in ANYAFULU VS. MADUEGBARA MEKA (2014) LPELR 22336. PER AKEJU, J.C.A.

As rightly found by the lower Court, in an action for declaration of title to land, a party claiming title to land must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the other party’s case, except where the weakness of the defendant’s case tends to strengthen the plaintiff’s case or where the defendant’s case supports the plaintiff’s case . CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C

My Lords, it is trite that the onus of proof in a criminal case is fixed on the prosecution and does not shift until the prosecution adduces cogent, credible and compelling evidence against the Defendant. The Respondent does not have any obligation to prove his innocence. To discharge the onus, the prosecution must prove all the ingredients of the offence charged. See -Yongo vs. C.O.P (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.257) 36, Alor v. The State (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt.501) 511, Idi v. State (2017) LPELR-42587 (SC); State v. Gwangwan (2015) LPELR-24837 (SC). PER OGUNWUNMIJU, J.S.C.

My Lords, it is trite that the onus of proof in a criminal case if fixed on the prosecution and does not shift until the prosecution adduces cogent, credible and compelling evidence against the Defendant. The Respondent does not have any obligation to prove his innocence. To discharge the onus, the prosecution must prove all the ingredients of the offence charged. See -Yongo vs. C.O.P (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.257) 36, Alor v. The State (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt.501) 511. Idi v. State (2017) LPELR-42587 (SC); State v. Gwangwan (2015) LPELR-24837 (SC). PER OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.