Court

...I agree with the Appellants that construing the said Rule literally again, as rightly urged by the Appellants and even so as the said provision is not ambiguous, the meaning of "the court of first instance," that is, the court that first heard the matter in the hierarchy of the court...

JIMOH & ORS. V. AKANDE & ANOR LGC(20/1/2009) F

It must be stated at this point that it is not every error or mistake by a Court that will lead to a reversal of its judgment on appeal. Only a mistake that occasions miscarriage of justice does. See John Owhonde V. Alphonso Ekpechi (2003) 9 SCNJ 1, and Ukiri V. Geco Prakla Nigeria Ltd (2010) LPELR-3341 (SC). In the instant case where the mistake of the Court below does not occasion miscarriage of justice, the mistake is accordingly discountenanced.

It is long settled that the appellate Court, particularly this one, is not under any duty to determine the appeal before it on the basis of the issue(s) formulated by the appellant or any of the parties thereto. The Court may prefer any issue(s) formulated by any of the parties or, still, suo motu formulate issue(s) it considers germane for the just and effectual determination of the matter in controversy between the parties. The preferred issue(s) must however evolve from the grounds in the notice of appeal. See Latunde & Anor V. Bella Lajinfin (1989) 5 SC 59, Diokpa Francis Onochie V. Feguson Odogwu (2006) 2 SCNJ 96, Edem V. Cankon Balls Ltd & Anor (2005) LPELR-1007 (SC) (2005) 6 SC (Pt 11) 16.

It is now trite law, that an appellate Court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below unless there is substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings or are shown to constitute a miscarriage of justice or in any way amount to a violation of some principles of substantive law or procedure.

It must be restated that the evaluation of evidence and assumption of probative value to such evidence are the preserve of the trial Court that had the opportunity of hearing the evidence and the demeanour of the witnesses. The lower Court and indeed this Court interferes only where an appellant shows clearly that the trial Court did not, in the discharge of its primary duty of evaluating the evidence it received, bring to bear the advantage it had of seeing and assessing the witnesses. Having not done that in the instant case, appellant's complaints against the inference of the two Courts on this particular issue accordingly fails. See Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 1, Eseme Eyibo V. Mr. Dan Abia & Ors (2012) LPELR-20607 (SC) and Dakat V. Dashe (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt 531) 46.

It has been the consistent practice of this Court not to disturb concurrent findings of fact once they are not perverse and are based on the evidence before the trial Court. See OSHO VS FOREIGN FIN. CORP (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157, IRIRI V. ERHURHOBORA (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 173) 253 and IGWEGO VS EZEUGO (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 561.

BULET INTERNATIONAL NIGERIA LIMITED & ANOR v. OLANIYI &

Where there are concurrent findings of fact by the two lower Courts, this Court is usually very reluctant to interfere. See Ogundayor vs The State (1991) 4 SC 100 @ 109 H-A; Ogoala vs The State (1991) 3 SC 80 @ 85; Nasamu vs The State (1979) 6-9 SC (Reprint) 112; Lewis vs U.B.A. Plc (2016) 1 SC (Pt.1) 96 @ 120-121.
In order to surmount this hurdle the appellant must satisfy the Court that there is an error of law or of fact on the record i.e. that the findings have been shown to be perverse or some miscarriage of justice or other violation of a principle of law or procedure has occurred.

The attitude of this Court to concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the intermediate Court is quite settled. Unless the appellant is able to show satisfactorily, that the findings of fact are perverse, not supported by evidence and unreasonable, or that have occasioned miscarriage of justice, this Court will loathe to interfere and disturb such findings of fact, particularly, where the findings of fact are supported by evidence in the printed record. See NNAJIOFOR & ORS. v. UKONU & ORS. (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.9) 686 at 705 – 706; BEN v. THE STATE (2006) 16 NWLR (pt.1006) 582 at 593 – 594.
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It is settled law that the Supreme Court does not make a practice of interfering with the concurrent findings of facts by the Lower Courts except such findings have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court to be perverse, or erroneous in substantive or procedure law etc, which has not been shown to have occurred in this case by appellant.

This Court, learned respondent's counsel is right, is very hesitant at interfering with concurrent findings of the two Lower Courts and indeed lacks the jurisdiction of interfering in the instant case where their findings have not been shown to be perverse. See Isibor v. State (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt.758) 741, Maiyaki v. State (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1109) 173 and Itu v. The State (2016) LPELR 26063 (SC).

This is an embellishment that is unbecoming in a Judgment. But it is not every error or wrong inference made by a Court that will lead to the reversal of its Judgment. An Appellant must show that the error or wrong inference, as in this case, has occasioned a miscarriage of justice and/or substantially affected its decision – see Ajuwon V. Akanni & Ors (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 316) 182 SC.
In other words, an error that has not occasioned miscarriage of justice is immaterial and may not affect the result of a decision. This is because an appellate Court only has to decide whether the decision of a lower Court was right; not whether its reasons were – A.G., Ekiti State V. Adewumi (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 751) 474 SC.

Even so, he brought in another argument that he is allowed to rely on new line of argument on appeal", citing Ogunbadejo V. Owoyemi (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.271) 517, wherein this Court held –
I do not accept the argument – – that because the law was not cited or relied upon in the Court below to support the view of that Court on this issue and no leave has been given here, it cannot be relied upon by this Court, I believe that such line of argument is the product of conclusion between an issue and an argument or an authority in support thereof. I believe the true position of the law is that whereas a party – – cannot in this Court, without leave, raise an issue which was not canvassed in the Court below such a party can rely upon any new line of argument or new authorities, judicial or statutory to support his argument in an issue, which is properly before the Court
The decision of this Court in Ogunbadejo V. Owoyemi (supra), may appear helpful to the Appellant however, it cannot avail him.
The issue therein was whether the Appellant was right in relying on a Section of a Law not relied upon in the lower Courts but was in support of the argument he proffered there. This Court held that it was not a fresh point because the law cited was in support of his argument on an issue that was properly before the Court.

A fresh point is a matter that was not canvassed at the trial nor in the Court of Appeal, and it is settled law that it is too late to raise such matter here unless new evidence emerged that was not available at trial and no human ingenuity could have foreseen it – SeeMohammed V. State (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 438 at 453 SC.
See also Akpabio v. State (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.359) 635 SC, where this Court, per Iguh, JSC, explained the position, as follows –
The question as to exclusion of the statement in issue was neither raised before nor pronounced by the Court below. It was, in fact, neither made a ground of appeal in that Court nor before us. It is well to bear in mind – -that an appellate Court will not generally allow a fresh point to be taken before it if such a point was not raised and pronounced upon by the Court below unless of course, the question involves substantial points of law and no further evidence needs be adduced to determine the matter and such a course of action is necessary to prevent an obvious miscarriage of justice.

After all, the test for measuring the fairness of the proceedings in a Court of first instance is the impression of any reasonable person who was present at the trial. Otapo v Sunmonu and Ors [1987] NWLR (Pt. 58) 587; Obaro v Hassan (2013) LPELR- 20089 (SC) 32-33; E-B; Tunbi v Opawole [2000] 2 NWLR (pt 644) 275.

My Lords, the power of this Court to reframe the appellant's issue (s) for the purpose of accentuating the principal question in controversy in the interest of clarity and brevity has never been in doubt, Musaconi Ltd v Aspinal (2013) LPELR – 20745 (SC) 6-7; I.T.I. V. Ltd and Anor v Onyesom Community Bank Ltd (2015) LPELR – 24819 (SC) 20; B-D; Unity Bank Plc. and Anor v Bouari (2008) LPELR -3411 (SC) 21,-22; A-B; Okoro v The State [1988] 12 SC 191; [1988] 12 SCNJ 191.

It has been the stance of this Court, dictated by public policy not to disturb the concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal. The policy, according to Oputa, JSC, in NWADIKE v. IBEKWE (1987) 11-12 SCNJ 72; (1987) NWLR (Pt. 67) 718:
"is dictated both by good sense and by what should be the proper role of the Supreme Court, – it should be in everybody's interest that there should be an end to litigation. It should be of concern to the State that lawsuits should not be too protracted. When two Courts have considered the facts of a case and made concurrent findings, the parties ought to be concluded on those facts. The supreme Court should really not be bothered with messy issues of fact. It should be given ample time and opportunity to concentrate on, and shape, the law of this country and interpret the Constitution. These two functions are those that rightly belong to any country's Court of lost resort. An appellant appealing to this Court and seeking to upset two concurrent findings in favour of the Respondent is thus faced with an uphill task of considerable magnitude. He has to show exceptional circumstances- either that there was some miscarriage of justice or a serious violation of some principle of law and procedure: ENANG v, ADU (1981) 11-12 SC.25 at P.42; LOKOYE v. OLOJA (1983) 8 SC 61 at PP,68 &73; OJOMU v. AJAO (1983) 9 SC.22 at P.53.

An appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with its findings of fact except where it is clear that they are perverse or not supported by evidence or not arrived at as a result of a proper exercise of judicial discretion or the trial Court has not made a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted credible evidence or has taken an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or where they were reached as a result of a wrong application of some principle of substantive law or procedure Ude & Ors V. Chimbo & Ors (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 169 SC.
So, in the absence of compelling evidence indicating erroneous appraisal of facts and erroneous conclusions, an appellate Court must show utmost restraint and reject any temptation to interfere with well-considered findings made by a trial Court – Ude V. Chimbo (supra).

In this case, the Appellant is faced with an uphill task because this Appeal is predicated on the question of facts requiring proof by evidence, and the attitude of this Court on concurrent findings of facts by the two lower Courts is that it will not interfere with the findings except he can show any of the flaws or errors afore-stated – that there was a miscarriage of justice or a serious violation of some principles of substantive law or procedure or that the findings do not flow from the evidence adduced by the parties or that the findings are perverse- See Akayepe V. Akayepe (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 217 SC.

It is the law that if a party (a counsel in this case) is embarking deliberately on dilatory or delay tactics. the Court can lawfully stop him in his tracks and take action against his interest without flouting the provisions of Section 36(1) of the Constitution. Also, any person who unduly and deliberately delays the proceedings of the Court will have himself to blame if the Court takes any adverse decision against him based on such unnecessary delay. See Chidoka v First City Finance Ltd (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 659) 1024.

The concurrent findings of fact, as was done by the two Courts below, in the instant appeal are rarely disturbed by this Court. Seldom would this Court be compelled to interfere if the findings are perverse or cannot be supported by the evidence before the Court or there is or was a miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure.
See UGWANYI VS F.R.N. (2012) NCC 105 at 123 paragraphs G-H, 124 paragraph 'A', CAMEROON AIRLINES vs. OTUTUIZU (2011) 1-2 SC (Pt. III) 200, ALAKIJA VS ABDULLAHI (1998) 5 S.C. 1, OLOKE VS AGBODIVA (1999) 12 S.C. (Pt. II) 101 and OGBU VS WOKOMA (2005) 7 SC (Pt. II) 123.

There is no connection between this Court and the trial Court; not directly anyway. The findings of a trial Court must be affirmed or reversed by the Court below before its decision gets to this Court. It is settled that before a pronouncement on its correctness can be made by this Court, it must be shown that the views expressed by that Court are wrong. It is only on such consideration that this Court can examine whether its Judgment is right or wrong – see Uor V. Loko (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.77) 430, where Karibi-Whyte, JSC, added – The appellate Court is entitled to have the benefit of the opinions of the judges in the judgments of the Court below. It is the opinion appealed against, which is affirmed or reversed. Hence, without the benefit of such opinion, an appellate Court will be extremely reluctant to interfere. Any Judgment - founded on grounds not canvassed in the Court below and not adverted to and pronounced upon in the judgment appealed against ideally is not an appeal against such a judgment. Since an Appellants right of appeal is circumscribed within the parameters of the judgment appealed against, this Court will not lightly permit impugning the judgment on grounds of error other than are contained therein. See also Djukpan V. Orovuyovbe (1967) 1 All NLR 134 and Ajuwon V. Adeoti (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 271 SC, wherein Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, advised counsel to adhere to what Lord Birkenhead, L.C., had said in North Staffordshire Railway Co. v. Edge (1920) A.C. 254; as follows The efficiency and authority of a Court of Appeal, and especially of a final Court of Appeal are increased and strengthened by the opinions of learned judges, who have considered these matters below. To acquiesce in such an attempt as the Appellants have made in this case, is in effect to undertake decisions, which may be of the highest importance, without having received any assistance at all from the judges of the Court below. ...

The use of the phrase "a person" in Section 31(5) of the Electoral Act is clear and unambiguous and does not admit of two meanings. It does not restrict the action to be taken only to members of other Political parties. Furthermore the application to be made to the commission in Section 31(4) of the same Act for the copy of the nomination form, affidavit and any other document submitted by a candidate is opened to everybody. It follows that the decision to go to Court to prove that a candidate who has been nominated to contest in the general election can be undertaken by anybody and not just the members of an opposing political party. And it is only the Court that can issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election.

OZEGBE LAWRENCE V. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP) &

As I had earlier alluded to the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below, the question that I must answer at this level is whether there is justification upon which I can interfere with those findings of fact. This question which must be answered advisedly bearing in mind the general principle that where there are concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court below such as in the instant case, the Supreme Court is not likely to disturb such findings which it can only do where those findings are perverse or a miscarriage of justice has taken place whereby this Court can take the stand of intervention or interference with the said findings. A reference to earlier decided cases of this Court along those lines would clear the point. See Ude v Chimbo (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 577) 169 at 186-187 and 194; Woluchem v Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291. For effect see the case of: Adegoke v Adibi (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 410 at 427 where this Court held per Wali JSC that: "Where the trial Court has failed to properly evaluate the evidence before it as a result of which it reached a decision which is perverse, as in this case, the Court of Appeal has a duty, by way of rehearing, to evaluate as if it were the trial Court the evidence that has been adduced... The Court of Appeal should not shrink from the task of such evaluation or be inhibited therefrom just because it is an appellate Court (Emphasis Supplied) In the case of Nneji v Chukwu (1996) 10 NWLR (pt.478) 269 at 278 this Court also held: "A Court of Appeal does not easily disturb the findings of facts of a trial judge who had the singular opportunity of listening to the witnesses and watching them perform. It is settled law, however, that such findings of facts or inferences from time to time may be questioned in certain circumstances." (Emphasis supplied). In the case of Agbomeji v Bakare (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 564) 1 at 19 this Court also said the same thing when it held thus:...

More importantly, the law says that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court below, they will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of the principles of law or procedure is shown thereon – See OGOALA VS THE STATE(1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 506 SC.
In other words, the two lower Courts are concurrent in their decisions and the onus lies on the Appellant to give very good reasons why this Court should interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the two lower Courts. 'It is not a matter of course:- MUHAMMAD VS THE STATE (2017) 13 NWLR (pt. 1583) 386 SC.

The limitations placed on the Court in the application of Section 87 of the Electoral Act are in a long line of cases and I shall refer to what my learned brothers faced with similar situation had to say. In Tukur v UBA (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt.1343) 90 at 162E-163E, this Honourable Court followed Onuoha v Okafor(supra) and held that: No aspirant is entitled to approach the Court to force the political party to nominate him or her as candidate on the pretext that a breach of the partys guidelines had occurred However the Court has been empowered by the introduction of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act to see that the guidelines of a political party are not breached albeit with impunity thereby ensuring that no excesses and arbitrariness of political parties are foisted on a member of the party. The above does not detract from the right of the political party in its sponsorship of a candidate of its choice the Court has NO business whatsoever in entering into the process rightly or wrongly done by a political party in its selection of a candidate of its liking. The BEST the Court can do WHERE A BREACH HAS TAKEN PLACE lay in DAMAGES to assuage the candidates grievance. (Emphasis added). The appellant in paragraph 3.83 of his brief predicated his claims on Section 87 (4) (c) (ii) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended. However, in Adebayo v PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt.1382) 1 at 59 60 H-B; your Lordships held that:- "...the question of jurisdiction as raised hereunder Section 87(4) (c) (ii), C(ii) and 9 in this matter is statutory and that the Courts have limited jurisdiction when invoked under Section 87 (9) (supra) by an aspirant who has participated in the primaries; and which has given him the necessary locus standi The provision of the subsection has conferred on the Courts that limited jurisdiction which in my view HAS NOT derogated from the non-justiciability of a partys wide discretionary powers of choosing one of its members for the elective office (Emphasis...

I agree and again state the law that where the Lower Court declines jurisdiction on an appeal before it, it is better for the Lower Court, not being the final Court, to hand down a decision on the substance of the case to enable the Supreme Court give consideration to the substance where it overrules the Lower Court's decision to decline jurisdiction.
Contrary to what has been urged on this Court in this appeal, let me state clearly that the mere consideration of the substance of a case by a Court despite its lack of jurisdiction does not automatically confer jurisdiction on the appellate Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction on the decision of the Lower Court on the substance of the matter which it decided abundanti cautelu. Where the Court of Appeal, as in this case, declines jurisdiction on an appeal but proceeds to hand down a decision on the substance abundanti cautela, no jurisdiction will be conferred on the Supreme Court to consider the merit of that decision if the Supreme Court finds that the Court of Appeal rightly declined jurisdiction on the appeal. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to consider the correctness or otherwise of the decision handed down abundanti cautela by the Court below will only be activated if the Supreme Court overrules the Court of Appeal's decision declining jurisdiction on the appeal.

In seeking reliefs from a Court of law, a plaintiff ought to seek appropriate reliefs in order not to render academic a subject matter that hitherto would have been life and within the jurisdiction of the Court, when a plaintiff, as in the instant case, omits to seek appropriate reliefs, he ties the hands of the Court and snuffs the life out of the case before the Court. It is trite that Courts do not exercise jurisdiction over academic issues as it would be an exercise in futility. The Court is also not a Father Christmas and cannot grant reliefs not sought before it. See UBN LTD vs OGBU (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 380) 647; KATE ENTERPRISES LTD vs. DAEWOO NIG. LTD.(1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) page 116.; OWOADE vs OMITOLA (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) page 413.

The challenge however, is that the injunctive reliefs sought by the Appellant are with respect to completed acts. It is the law that Courts do not restrain a completed act. This Court in IDEOZU VS OCHOMA (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 970) 364 at 395, at C-E Per Tobi, JSC held thus:
"In AJEWOLE VS ADETIMO (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 431) 391, this Court held that when a Court is asked to restrain a party from doing an act pending the decision in a matter before it, but the act has been done, no order to restrain will be made. This is so because, what is sought to be prevented had happened. In other words, an interlocutory injunction is not a remedy for an act, which has already been carried out."

As is the usual practice in this Court, this Court is always hesitant in interfering with or disturbing the concurrent findings of two Lower Courts, except of course, where there is manifest error which leads to some miscarriage of justice, or a violation of some principle of substantive or procedural law, or that the findings have been shown to be perverse or there is miscarriage of justice. I am unable to say that any of these vices are shown or manifested in this instant case, hence I will refuse to interfere with or disturb the findings. See Amadi v Nwosu [1992] NWLR (Pt. 241) 273; Eholor v Osayande (1992)7 SCNJ 217; Ogoala v The State [1991) 3 SCNJ 81 or [1981) 3 SC 80 or (1991) 2 NWLR [Pt.175] 509; Dr. Tunde Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt.622) 290 or [1999] 6 SC (Pt.II) 72; Ezeudu v Obiagwu (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt.21) 218.

It is trite law, that a Court has inherent power to make consequential order. A consequential order is simply one which flows directly and naturally from the decision or order made on issues litigated upon and inevitably consequent upon it. See Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb [1992] 2 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266 or (1992) 7 SCNJ 119 or (1992) LPELR 325 (SC).
A consequential order is one which gives effect to a judgment or order to which it is consequential. See Funduk Engineering Ltd Vs Mcarthur & Ors (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459) 153; Obayagbona Vs Obazee (1972) SC 247; Odofin & Anor Vs Agu & Anor (1992) NWLR (Pt.229) 350. Every Court, be it of first instant or appellate has the power and in fact has the duty and obligation to make any consequential order in the interest of justice and it is irrelevant and of no moment that the particular order was not specifically asked for by either party to the proceedings or appeal. See Prince Yahaya Adigun & Ors Vs Attorney General of Oyo State & Ors (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.53) 678 at 710; Chief Ebenezer & Ors Vs S.K. Owodunni & Anor (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 57) 367.

As a matter of practice, this Court rarely interferes with or disturbs the concurrent finding of two lower Court, except in special or exceptional circumstances. See Calaber East Cooperatives Thrift & Credit Society Limited & Ors vs Etim Emmanuel Ikot (1999) LPELR-826 (SC);Dawodu vs Danmole (1962) 1 ALL NLR to 2; Uche vs Eke (1998) 9 NWLR (pt 564) 24; Some of these exceptional or special circumstance that would warrant such interference by an appeal Court are if it is shown that there was a miscarriage of Justice, misconception of fact or serious violation of some principle of law whether substantive or procedural or that such findings were erroneous or perverse. See Chief Alhaji K.O.S. Are & Anor v Kaji Ipaye & Ors (1990) NWLR (pt 13) 298.

This Court has done a marvelous work on the Court's duty when faced with construction of a statutory provision to ascertained fact. See ADEWUMI & ANOR VS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF EKITI STATE (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt.751) 474 at 511. Per Wali JSC (as he then was). He stated as follows:-
"When a Judge is faced with construction, interpretation and application of a statutory provision to the facts ascertain by him in a case, he must:-
(a) Read the statute to ascertain whether and how its meaning relates to the case in controversy;
(b) If the language i.e. the words or meaning ascertained from that language resolves the controversy, the injury terminates there;
(c) But if the language or meaning does not resolve the controversy then the judge must adjust and apply an appropriate Judicial Rule to decide and resolve the case or the issue in controversy.

The law is settled that a Court can only exercise its jurisdiction or power over parties before it and strictly in respect of the case between them upon issues raised and reliefs sought. It cannot do so concerning, and to the extent it may affect persons who are not parties before it and must resist the temptation to make pronouncement to that end. The Court must confine its decision to the parties and their claims. See Ojogbue v Nnubia (1972) 1 ALL NLR (Pt.2) 226; Ochonma v Unosi (1965) NMLR 321; Labide v Regd. Trustee Cherubim & Seraphim (2003) FWLR (Pt. 142) 89 at 105 Paragraphs G-H; Intercontractors (Nig) Ltd v UAC of (Nig) Ltd (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 303; Green v Green (1987) NWLR (Pt 61) 481.

It is settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support the concurrent findings by the two lower Courts, such findings should not be disturbed unless there is substantial error apparent on the record.
In other words, this Court will only act to the contrary where the findings of the lower Courts have been shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some material violation of some principle of law or of procedure is shown Amadi V. Nwosu (1992) 6 SCNJ 59.

This Court on very many occasions had held its ground on not disturbing concurrent findings and would only go against that principle if certain conditions are at play. The conditions being if the concurrent findings are tainted with miscarriage of justice or shown to be perverse or against the trend of evidence or based on evidence that is inadmissible in law. Failing these extenuating circumstances, this Court or any appeal Court is loath to interfere with concurrent findings. See Chukwuogor v Obuora (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 454 at 457; Igwego v Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561; Yaki v Bagudu (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt.1491) 288 per Ogunbiyi JSC; R – Benkay Nig Ltd v Cadbury Nigeria Plc (2012) All FWLR (pt. 631) 1450 at 1467.

The law is well established that concurrent findings of the Courts below will not be disturbed ordinarily except where they are tainted with miscarriage of justice or shown to be perverse.
The appellant in this appeal has not shown or advances any cogent reason at all why the concurrent findings should be disturbed. Plethora of authorities are well established in support of this point. See the decision of this Court in the case of Yaki V. Bagudu (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 149) 288. See also the cases of:- Igwego V. Ezeugo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 561, Mago Chikwendu V. Mbamah (1980) 3 5C 31; Ojomu V. Ajao (1983) 9 SC 22, 53: Lokoyi V. Olojo (1983) 8 SC 61, 68; Onobruchere & Anor V. Esegine & Anor (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799 andKazeem V. Mosaku (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 523 at 536.

t is well settled by numerous decided cases that this Court will not disturb a concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below unless the decision is perverse or erroneous and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced by the prosecution or is a violation of some principles of law. See Olaiya V. State (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 423 at 438, where this Court held and said:-
"The appeal being one against concurrent findings of facts of two Courts below, the appellant is very far from discharging the burden the law places on him of showing that the decision of the Courts below were perverse or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence adduced by the prosecution. In situation such as this, in the present case, I see no reason whatsoever to disturb the findings of the trial Court which were affirmed by the Court below that the appellant was indeed guilty of the charge."
Also on the same principle are the cases of Attah V. State (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 190 at P.226 and Archibong V. The State (2006) 14 NWLR (PT. 1000) 349 wherein this Court relied on its earlier decision in Olokotinti V. Sarumi (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 784) 307 at 317.

It needs be said as first shot that before this Court can invoke Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act to entertain any matter like the Court of first instance or Court below there must be a proper appeal before the Court. The provision is not devised to revive dead issues. Also where the Court below lacks jurisdiction then the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to do anything else and the invocation of Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act does not arise. SeePPA v INEC (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 215 at 245 per Adekeye JSC; Hassan v Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547.

Counsel re-iterated the settled position that, where the provisions of the Constitution are amenable to two meanings, the Court has a duty to opt the meaning that would give force and effect to the Constitution read together as a whole and promote its object and purpose, Kalu v. State (1998) LPELR -1655 (SC); hence, a Court would never lean in favour of an interpretation that would defeat the very essence of the Constitution, Ansaldo Nig Ltd v NPFMB (1991) LPELR -498 (SC).

When proper parties are not before the Court, such that those who may be affected by the orders of the Court are not before it, the proper course a Court must follow is to direct that all persons interested or likely to be affected by the results are brought before it See: Mozie v. Mbamalu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1003) 466.

OYEYEMI(RTD) &

We are not judicial technicians in the workshop of technical Justice. The jurisprudence or logic of our reasoning is and as humanly possible, would be devoid of technicalities. The need to do substantial justice and avoid delving into the error of technicalities is well settled. The principle has been rehashed in a long line of authorities, for example: NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION (N.R.M.A.F.C) V. JOHNSON(2007 49 W.R.N. pages 169-170 where Per Odili JCA (as he then was) opined as follows:
"....The Courts have deliberately shifted away from narrow technical approach to justice which characterized some earlier decisions to non pursue the course of substantial justice. See MAKERI SMELTING CO. LTD. V. ACCESS BANK (NIG.) PLC (2002) 7 NWLR (PT. 766) 411 at 476-417.
The attitude of the Court has since changed against deciding cases on mere technicalities. The attitude of the Courts now is that cases should always be decided, wherever possible on merit. Blunders must take place from time to time, and it is unjust to hold that because, blunder has been committed, the party blundering is to incur the penalty of not having the dispute between him and his adversary determined upon the merits."
See also AJAKAIYE V. IDEHIA (1991) 8 NWLR (PT. 364) 504, ARTRA IND. LTD. V. NBC (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 483) 574, DAKAT V. DASHE (1997) 12 NWLR (PT. 531) 46, BENSON V. NIGERIA AGIP CO. LTD (1982) 5 S.C.1.

OYEYEMI(RTD) &

I feel for the 3rd Respondent, as the trial Court said, she is the one most affected in this "unfortunate and ill-fated transaction". But this is a Court of law, not sentiments or morality of emotion – Att-Gen., Lagos State V. Eko Hotels(2006) NWLR (pt. 1011) 378. In other words, sentiments have no place in judicial deliberations –Kalu V. F.RN. (2016) LPELR-40108 (SC). See also Suleiman V. C.O.P. (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 298, where Tobi, JSC, observed-
The Court cannot exercise its whims indiscriminately. Similarly there is no room for the Court to express its sentiments. It is a hard matter of law; facts and circumstances which the Court considers without being emotional, sensitive or sentimental.

The law is trite that an appellate Court is only concerned with matters that are properly placed before it. It has no jurisdiction over a matter that was not raised and adjudicated upon at the trial Court.

I wish to state clearly that assessment and/or appraisal of oral evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of the trial Court. An Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with that duty unless there are special circumstances that warrant such interference. Learned counsel for the Appellant has accused the lower Court of failing to evaluate the evidence of the prosecution and the defence by the trial Court. Has he shown any special circumstances that would warrant such interference? In Eyo v Onuoha (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1257) 1 at 38 – 39 Paragraphs G – A, this Court per Tabai JSC said:-
"It is settled principle of law that the duty of evaluation of evidence is pre-eminently that of the trial Court which alone has the benefit of seeing and hearing witness in the course of the testimonies; it is the trial Court that has the singular benefit of watching the demeanour of witnesses in the course of their testimonies. . As a general rule therefore, an Appellate Court would not disturb the findings of a trial Court unless it is proved that the findings are not supported by the evidence on record and therefore Perverse. This is because of the Appellate Court's disadvantage of not having seen or heard the witnesses".
See A. G Oyo State v Fairlakes Hotel (N0. 2) (1989) 5NWLR (Pt. 121) 255. Are v Spaye (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 132) 298; Onwuka v Ediala (1959) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 182; Anaeze v Anyaso (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.291) 1; Abbi v Ekwealor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 643.

It is settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, such findings will not be disturbed unless the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of principles of law or procedure is shown see Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt 175) 506 SC.

The lower Court did not also waste time but rightly in my view also endorsed the trial Court's conclusion. This was based on sound s in the absence of any evidence to disturb the concurrent findings. See the case of Ochibo V. State (2011) 12 SCM (Pt. 2) page 284 @ 289 where this Court in reiterating the well settled principle of law said:,
"where the two Courts below make concurrent findings of fact, as herein, this Court will not interfere unless same is perverse or runs against current of evidence adduced or occasioned miscarriage of justice

I agree, in principle and on the authority of AHMED v. THE STATE (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt.612) 641 at 681 and AKPABIO v. THE STATE (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.359) 635 at 671, cited by the Appellant's counsel, that the trial Court had a duty to consider every defence open to the accused on the evidence, whether or not the accused person specifically puts up such a defence. The appellate Court, like the trial Court, has a duty of its own to consider all such possible defences open to the accused/appellant.
Available facts, particularly the unchallenged or undiscredited evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, clearly negative the plea of any claim of the appellant to self-defence or private defence provided by Section 59 of the Penal Code.

It has been said in a plethoria of cases that this Court would rarely disturb or upset concurrent findings of the two Courts below except there are exceptional circumstances such as the findings are perverse, there is miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle of law or procedure. See
Daniel Holding Ltd v UBA PLC (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt.943) P.533
Solola v State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt.937) p.460.

I agree with learned appellant counsel that on the authorities a Court's decision which does not arise from the evidence on record constitutes such miscarriage of justice that imposes on the appellate Court the duty to set same aside. If indeed the Lower Court has failed to set aside the trial Courts conviction and sentence of the appellant which does not arise from any credible evidence, then this Court is entitled to step in and do the needful. See Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8 11 SC 85; Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 360; (1985) LPELR 592 (SC) and Williams v. The State (1992) 10 SCNJ 74.

Where in a provision of law, a mandatory sentence of a term of imprisonment is provided, a trial Court upon conviction of the offender, must hand down such mandatory sentence as no discretion is allowed to be exercised in passing a sentence lower than the mandatory minimum sentence as provided by the law.

The law is trite and well settled that this Court cannot disturb or interfere with such findings unless they are shown to be perverse: or are not supported by the evidence, or are reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence; or as a result of a wrong application of evidence, or as a result of a wrong application of any principle of substantive law or procedure. See the cases of Arabambi V. Advance Beverages Ind. Ltd. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt.959) 1 at 43 and Nwadike V. Ibekwe (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 718.

I seek to relate again to the case of Cardoso v. Daniel (supra) wherein it was held that the Court owes it the duty to consider the case and claim of parties on its merit and not allow the coverings and clouds of technicality to dim its vision on the road to justice.
The Court in other words is enjoined to resolve dispute between the parties as presented by them and not make a case for either or both, different from the initial case set out before the Court. See the case of Adebanjo Housing Dev. Society Ltd v. Mumini (1977) SC 57: and G.S. Pascutto v. Adecentro Nig. Ltd. (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt.529) 467.

It is trite that the issue of credibility of witnesses is the pre-eminent duty of a trial Court, and there is a presumption that its findings are right and correct until the contrary is shown. Thus, this Court is usually very slow in interfering with such primary findings.

What is more, when evaluation of evidence involves credibility of witnesses, an appellate Court is hamstrung because it is the trial Court that saw them, heard them and watched their demeanour that is in the position to believe or disbelieve witnesses, and this can never be captured by an appellate Court that only has "cold printed record to contend with" – Sogunro & Ors V. Yeku & Ors (2017) LPELR-41905(SC). It is only when a question of evaluation of evidence does not involve the credibility of witnesses but is against non-evaluation or improper evaluation of the evidence that an appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to do its own evaluation – Fatai V. State (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1361) 1.

Is the Appellant counting on this Court to assess the evidence, including to ascertain if he was threatened, mercilessly beaten and had a stick of broom gruesomely inserted into his penis and torturously twisted to cause him excruciating pain until he yielded and signed the confessional statement? I think not as this Court only entertains appeals against decisions of the Court below; and not directly against that of a trial Court – Akibu & Ors V. Oduntan (2000) LPELR-336(SC). The 1999 Constitution did not make provision for appeals to go directly from the High Court to the Supreme Court – A-G., Oyo State & Anor V. Fairlakes Hotel (1988) LPELR–24926(SC).

Permit me, my lords, to draw attention from the out set in this issue that it is not the business of the Court below (unless in exceptional circumstances) to evaluate and thus, ascribe probative value to evidence. That is the whole mark of the trial Court that heard, saw, observed and ascribed probative value to evidence through witnesses. The only assignment expected of an Appeal Court (in an appeal) is to review, among other things, the evidence and the whole proceedings of the trial Court.

This Court does not, in practice, disturb such concurrent findings unless they have been shown to be perverse. See Sobakin v. The State (1981) 5 SC 75, Bashaya v. The State (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.550) 351.

The settled policy of this Court is that, this Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless the appellant shows special circumstances of either that there was a miscarriage justice, or that there was a serious violation of some rules of substantive law or procedure, or that the findings of fact do not flow from the evidence adduced at the trial, or that the findings are perverse:ENANG v. THE STATE (1981) 11- 12 SC 25 at 42; AKAYEPE v. AKAYEPE (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt.1152) 277 (SC).

The law is trite that where there is sufficient evidence to support the concurrent findings by the two Lower Courts, this Court does not disturb such findings unless there is substantial error apparent in the record. Put differently, this Court does not make it a habit of disturbing concurrent findings of two Lower Courts except it is shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice is occasioned, or some material violation of some principle of law or of procedure is shown to have occurred. See Amadi v Nwosu (1992) 6 SCNJ 59, Ezeudu v Obiagwu (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt 21) 208, Oguanuhu & Ors v Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt.1351) 588.

Where an appellant complains about the non – evaluation or proper evaluation of evidence and does not involve the credibility of witnesses, the appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to evaluate such evidence. See: Fatai v. State (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.1361) 1.

Where there are concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court of Appeal, this Court is not likely to disturb such findings unless they are perverse or have led to a miscarriage of justice. See: Mbang v. State (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1352) 48; Ajayi v. State (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1360) 589; Aliyu v. State (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt.1368) 403.

More importantly, the law says that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by the trial Court and the Court below, they will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of the principles of law or procedure is shown thereon – see Ogoala V. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.175) 506 SC.

This Court is also not in a position to intervene because as Ademola, CJN, observed in the case of Omisade V. The Queen (1964) NSCC (Vol.3) 170, it is not the function of this Court to retry a criminal case on appeal. He further stated as follows –
If there was evidence before the trial Judge from which he could reasonably have come to the conclusion to which he did, the verdict must stand. The law was aptly put by Lord Tucker in the case of R. v. Aladesuru & Ors 39 C.A.R. 184, which was an appeal from Nigeria.
The learned Lord at p. 185 of the Report said:
It will be observed that the language of the WACA Ordinance follows the English Criminal Act, 1907, under which it has long been established that the appeal is not by way of re-hearing as in civil appeals from a Judge sitting alone, but is a limited appeal, which precludes the Court from reviewing the evidence and making its own valuation.

So, when the question of evaluation of evidence involves credibility of witnesses, an appellate Court cannot do much since it is the trial Court that saw them, heard them and watched their demeanour that is in the vantage position to believe or disbelieve witnesses, and this can never be captured by an appellate Court, which only has the "cold printed record to contend with see Sogunro & Ors V. Yeku & Ors (2017) LPELR-41905(SC).
"Credibility" is the quality of being convincing or believable, and since the trial Court has the liberty and privilege to believe one witness or disbelieve another witness, its findings predicated on the belief or the disbelief of witnesses, is almost sacrosanct, as this can only be questioned on appeal if it is against the drift of the evidence before a trial Court, when considered as a whole – see Adelumola V. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 683 SC.

As a general rule, therefore, when the question of evaluation of evidence does not involve credibility of witnesses but against the non-evaluation or improper evaluation of the evidence, the appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to do its own evaluation see Fatai V. State (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.1361) 1 at 21 SC.

As I pointed out earlier, the Issue in this Appeal boils down to whether the Court below should have re-evaluated evidence. The law is that it is only where and when a Court fails to evaluate evidence at all or properly that a Court of Appeal can intervene, and evaluate or re-evaluate such evidence.

To lay down some ground rules for determining this Appeal, I must point out that it is an elementary principle that this Court does not entertain appeals directly from the trial Court. Its role is limited to seeing whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeal that affirmed the judgment of the trial Court is correct – Ibator V. Barakuro & Ors (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 475 SC.
See also Ibori V. Agbi (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.868) 78 at 143, wherein this Court per Uwaifo, JSC, also observed as follows-
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to usurp the function of the Court of Appeal either by hearing an appeal directly from a High Court or by hearing an appeal, which though lying before the Court of Appeal is yet to be decided by that Court because to do so will amount to a violation of the Constitution and will be null and void –
– The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear a Suit or an issue in a Suit fit for the High Court.

It is now trite that a Court has the authority to reframe issues for determination before it in a bid to better appreciate and address the issues of the parties. Please see: BIARIKO VS. EDEH-OGWUILE (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt.726) 235 at 265; OBIUWEUBI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465; (2011) LPELR-2185 (SC).

The judgment appealed is a concurrent decision of the two lower Courts. For the appellant to have a break through, he must show sufficient evidence on record that the lower Court was perverse in its decision. In the absence of such, the appellte Court cannot interfere therewith. See Akpagbue v. Ogu (1976) 6 SC 63: Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291: Enang v. Adu (1981) 11 12 SC. 25 and Amadi v. Nwosu (1992) 5 NWLR, (Pt.241) 273 and also Tiza v. Begha (2005) 5 SC 1 at 17 where Onu, JSC had this to say:-
"It is now trite law that concurrent findings of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal cannot be set aside by this Court except such findings is not supported by evidence."

It is also the law that an appellate Court should not and would not interfere with the verdict of the trial Court unless such verdict is shown to be perverse or is not the result of a proper appraisal of the evidence. See Ahmed V State (1999) LPELR-263(SC) 76 per Achike, JSC; & Otumbere V State (2013) LPELR-22875(CA) 17. A verdict of a Court is only perverse when it runs counter to the evidence and the pleadings before it or where a Court takes into account matters it ought not to take into consideration, or where a Court shuts its eyes to the evidence, or where it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Unilorin V Abegunde (2013) LPELR-21375(CA) 40; Momoh V Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 217; Onyekwelu V Elfpet(2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1133) 181; Lagga V Sarhuna (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427.

The law is trite, that an appellate Court has the right or duty where appropriate, to formulate, re-formulate or reframe issue or issues for determination of an appeal especially in a situation where it is of the opinion that the issue(s) as formulated by learned counsel to any of the parties did not encompass the actual points in controversy in the appeal. In doing so however, the issue (s) to be re-formulated by the appellate Court must be consistent with the ground (s) of appeal.

Clearly what was of the focus of the Court below was substantial justice which that Court was not prepared to sacrifice for technical justice. Also within sight was the fact that an infraction which obviously was due to mistake of counsel cannot have its repercussion visited on a hapless client who is fighting for his liberty and life. Stated another way is that the Court of all cadres should be mindful of the paramount interest of justice and the right of a litigant to be protected even in the face of an improperly crafted process presented in a clumsy inarticulate way. Therefore the Court has to bring out with clarity what it is dealing even if it means reformulating the issues so long as they are not outside the presented in a clumsy inarticulate way. Therefore the Court has to bring out with clarity even if it means reformulating the issues so long as they are not outside the grounds of appeal or the Court can use the issues crafted by one side if it fits the bill. The important thing is that the issues utilized arise from valid grounds of appeal and the dispute is brought to light for consideration whereby the substantial justice is carried out. See Akinpelu v Adegbore (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1096) 531 at 557: Saleh v Monguno (2006) ALL FWLR (pt. 332) 1411 at 1439 – 1440; Jev v Iyortom & Ors.(2015) LPELR -24420 SC: Okere v State (2016) LPELR – 26057 (SC).

The issue is whether suit No. FHC/PH/CS/524/2016 amounts to an abuse of process of the Court since at the time it was filed suits Nos. FHC/L/CS/637/2016, FHC/L/CS/613/2016 and FCT/HC/CV/1443/2016 were pending or proceedings had commenced.
The Rule is that where matters involving the same parties and the same claims are raised contemporaneously in two or more Courts, it is desirable and clearly in the interest of justice that these matters should be heard in only one of these Courts. It is designed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings on the same issues.
The basis of the Rule is the real possibility of two conflicting decisions in respect of one and the same subject matter. So it is desirable that the issues common to both matters are heard and determined in only one Court. See:
Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) p.156
F.B.N. Plc v. T.S.A. Industries Ltd (2012) 5-7 SC (Pt. ii) p.1
Barigha v. P.D.P. & 2 Ors (2012) 12 SC (Pt. v) p.84
R-Benkav Nig. Ltd v. Cadbury Nig. Plc (2012) 3 SC (Pt. iii) p.169
Dingyadi v. I.N.E.C. (No.2) (2010) 4-7 SC (Pt. i) p.76
Lokpobiri Ogola & 2 Ors (2015) 10-11 SC (Pt. ii) p.102

Finally, I must observe that this Court is slow to upset concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal but would be quick to upset such findings if found to be perverse, or cannot be supported from the evidence led, and accepted by the Court, or if there was miscarriage of justice or violation of some principle or law or procedure. See Ilodigwe v. State(2012) 5-7 SC (Pt. II) P. 143.

This is because it is not the practice of this Court to interfere with concurrent findings of facts by the two lower Courts, unless the appellants are able to show that the findings are perverse, that there has been a miscarriage of justice or some other violation of some principles of law or procedure. See: NICON V. Power & Industrial Engineering Co. Ltd. (1986) 1 NWLR (pt.27) 1; Afolalu V. The State (2010) LPELR SC.193/2008; Achiakpa & Anor. V. Nduka & Ors (2001) LPELR – SC.28/1996; Kalango V. Governor of Bayelsa State (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt.476) 1839 @ 1864 G-H.

Instructively, the lower Court, prior to its affirming of the position of the trial Court, gave a careful consideration of the findings of facts. It found the findings of facts not to be perverse as they were borne out from the evidence." (page 183 of the record). It rightly, concluded that:
"Evaluation, assessment of evidence and ascription of probative value to evidence is primarily the function of the learned trial Judge and when based on credibility of witnesses, an appellate Court is handicapped for lack of opportunity of seeing, hearing and watching the demeanours (sic) of the witnesses as the Appeal Court deals with printed record. The only way open to the Appeal Court to interfere is where it was established that the learned trial Judge failed to take advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses then an Appeal Court may interfere, Elendu v. Ekwoaba (1998) 12 NWLR (pt. 573) 320; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291.
(page 183 of the record; italics supplied)

After a diligent examination of the issues formulated by both sides in an appeal, it is the duty of an Appeal Court, and especially the top Court to adopt or frame issue that would be decisive in determining the real grievance in the appeal and not waste time on peripheral issues.

This is the basic premise that yielded the logic in the reasoning of the decisions of this Court that where the issue is that of credibility of witnesses, the appellate Court has a very limited, if any, scope to interfere. Thus, it (the appellate Court) can only do so when the trial Court decided to believe a witness quite contrary to the trend of accepted evidence or where oral testimony is contrary to the contents of a written document, Ndukwe v. Acha and Ors (1998) LPELR -1977 (SC) 14, A-B; Agbonifo v. Aiwereoba and Anor (1988) 1 NSCC 237, 245; (1988) 1 NWLR (pt.70) 325.
In effect, therefore, unless the trial Court adduces a wrong reason for believing or disbelieving a witness, an appellate Court would seldom, interfere with its ascription of credibility to witnesses. Put differently, it is only where the appellate Court, either because the reasons given by the trial Judge are not satisfactory or because it unmistakably, so appears from the evidence, is satisfied that the trial judge has not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses, that it could properly interfere. In such a case, the matter would then become at large in the appellate Court. This is as much a settled principle of English Law, Watts (or Thomas) v. Thomas (1947) 1 All ER 582 as it is a settled position in this country, Nwankpu and Ors v. Ewulu and Ors (1995) LPELR – 2107 (SC) 32, C- E.

My Lords, since trial Court's ascription of probative value was based on the credibility of witnesses, I have an obligation to remind Your Lordships that every trial Judge is in a better position than the appellate Court to decide the issue of credibility of the witnesses. The reason is not farfetched. He (the trial Judge) has the singular advantage of seeing and observing the witnesses. He watches their demeanour; candour or partisanship; their integrity and manners. These advantages are not normally enjoyed by an appellate Court which only has the cold printed evidence to contend with, Nwankpu and Ors v. Ewulu and Ors (1995) LPELR -2107 (SC) 32, A- B.
What is more, as a vital area of credibility, it is only the trial Court which saw and watched the demeanour of the witness that has the exclusive role of watching the mannerism, habits and idiosyncrasies of the witness and attach probative value to the evidence presented before it, Kaydee Ventures Ltd v. The Hon. Minister, FCT and Ors (2010) LPELR – 1681 (SC) 60, C- E; Makanjuola v. Balogun (1989) 3 NWLR (pt. 108) 192, 218; Atolagbe v. Shorun[1985] 1 NWLR (pt 2) 60; Duru v. Nwosu [1989] 4 NWLR (pt 113) 24, 39; Lagga v. Sarhuna (2008) LPELR 1740 (SC) 66, A- E.

As this Court has often admonished, cases are only authorities for what they actually decided in the context of the prevailing facts. That explains why in Savannah Bank Ltd v P. A. S. T. A. Ltd (1987) 1 SC 198, 278, 279, Karibi-Whyte JSC enjoined Courts to "consider the claim before the Court and the issue which the Court was called upon to decide."

Where the denial of fair hearing is not charged against a Court or tribunal established by law but is against a domestic or standing ad hoc committee of a non-judicial body, the infringement of Section 36(1) of the Constitution cannot lie. See: Borno Radio Television Corporation v. Eqbuonu (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 171) 81.

Section 36 (1) of the Constitution provides: "36. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other Tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. (Emphasis supplied) All administrative bodies, even though they are not Courts, are bound to observe the rules of natural justice and fairness in their decisions, which affect the rights and obligations of citizens. See: Bakare Vs L.S.C.S.C. (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.262) 641 @ 699 H. However, in order to seek to enforce his fundamental right to fair hearing provided for under Chapter IV of the Constitution, the alleged violation must be in respect of proceedings before a Court or Tribunal established by law and not before domestic or standing ad-hoc Tribunals. See: Ekunola Vs C.B.N.{2013) 15 NWLR (1377} 224 @ 262 – 263 H – A. In Bakare Vs L.S.C.S.C. (supra) @ 700 A – B, this Court, per Nnaemeka Agu, JSC had this to say: "The Courts in exercise of their power of judicial review are constantly called upon to scrutinize the validity of instruments, laws, acts, decisions and transactions. In the exercise of the jurisdiction, the Courts can declare them invalid or ultra vires and void, not because they are unconstitutional in terms of Section 33 of the Constitution [now Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution], but because they offend against the rules of natural Justice of audi alteram partem or nemo judex in causa sua, or offends against the rules of fairness, or otherwise offends the rule of natural justice. All these are in the realm of administrative and not constitutional law. The great divide is that Section 33 deals with judicial bodies and does not necessarily extend to all bodies not judicial but all the same deciding on rights and obligations." Click...

It was held in: Madukolu Vs Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; (1962) 1 All NLR 587 at 594 that a Court is competent when:
a. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or the other;
b. the subject matter of the case is within jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and
c. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction".
See also: Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd. Vs. Ukey (1981) 1 S.C. 6 at 62; Inakoju vs Adeleke (supra) @ 588 F.

It is settled law that it is the plaintiff or claimant's claim that determines the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a cause or matter. See: Inakoju Vs Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1025) 427 @ 588 – 589 H – C: Elabanjo Vs Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1001) 76: Adeyemi Vs Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31; Tukur vs Governor Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.117) 517.

An appellate Court would ordinarily not interfere with the findings of a trial Court where that Court has carried out its duty of evaluating the evidence before it and ascribing probative value thereto. However, where the evidence is documentary, an appellate Court is in as good a position as a trial Court to evaluate same, where there is a complaint that the finding of the Court is not supported by the evidence before lt. See: Afolayan vs. Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.127) 369 @ 385 C; Obineche Vs Akujobi (2010) 12 NWLR (pt.1205) 383 416 H.

By the provisions of Section 36 (6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, reproduced supra, any person charged with a criminal offence must be informed promptly and in detail, the nature of the offence he is charged with or accused of committing in the language he understands. It seems to me that by the provisions of Section 36 (6) (a), the Constitution has decreed that a formal charge has to be framed which also must be read to the accused person in the language he understands, as well as the details of the nature of the offence. The trial Court must also be certain that the accused has not been misled in his defence.

The judgment on appeal now before us is concurrent at the levels of the Magistrate, High Court and Court of Appeal. The law is well settled that a concurrent decision of the Court below is not ordinarily disturbed unless there is a miscarriage of justice. See the cases of Michael v. The State (2008) 3 NWLR (pt.1104) 361 at 384: Posu v. The State (2011) All FWLR (Pt.565) 234 at 249 and Onyejekwe v. The State (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 230) 444.

The Supreme Court is slow to set aside concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal but would set aside such findings if found to be perverse, or cannot be supported from the evidence led, and accepted by the Court or if there was miscarriage of justice, or violation of some principle or law or procedure. See
Arowolo v. Olowookere & 2 ors (2011) 11-12 SC (Pt.II) p.98
Nguma v. A.G. Imo State (2014) 2 SC (pt. II) p.1
Akoma & anor v. Osenwokwu & 2 ors 2014 5-6 SC (Pt. IV) p. 1
Anekwe & anor v. Nweke (2014) 4 SC (Pt. III) p. 65.
This has been the practice and it is good. The reason being that the trial judge saw, heard and watched the demeanour of the witnesses. He is thus in the best position to make a correct assessment of the witnesses testimony.
Findings of fact after examination in chief cross examination, and re-examination should be highly regarded and not upset by an Appeal Court, but only when there are exceptional circumstances justifying intervention by an Appeal Court.

As this Court held in Iliyasu v. State (supra) at page 34, paragraphs B-F, true indeed, Case Law and scholastic treatises are unanimous on the point that if a dangerous weapon was used (in the instant case, a machete was employed in hacking at the neck of the deceased person), the Courts will infer that death was a probable and not just a likely consequence of the accused person's act, Adamu Garba v. The State (1997) 3 SCNJ 68; Bakuri v. The State (1965) NMLR 163; Silas Sule v. The State (2009) LPELR – 3125 (SC) 24, F-G; Ejeka v. State (2003) 7 NWLR (pt. 819) 408; Garos Bwashi v. State (1972) 6 SC (Reprint) 55; (1972) LPELR-SC.104/1972; P. Ocheme. The Nigerian Criminal Law (Kaduna: Liberty Publications Ltd. 2006) 203; also, C. O. Okonkwo, Okonkwo and Naish: Criminal Law in Nigeria (Second Edition) (supra) 221."

It is also settled that where there is sufficient evidence to support concurrent findings of fact by two lower Courts, such findings will not be disturbed unless there is significant error apparent on the Record; that is, the findings are shown to be perverse, or some miscarriage of justice or some violation of principles of law or procedure is shown – see Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 175) 506 SC.

As he pointed out, there is not much this Court can do when an Appeal turns on the issue of credibility. It is the trial Court that saw the witnesses, heard them and watched their demeanour in Court that is in the vantage position to believe or disbelieve the witnesses and that advantage can never be recaptured by an appellate Court.
Thus, the trial Court has the liberty and privilege to believe one side or disbelieve the other, and that belief can only be questioned on appeal if it is against the drift of the evidence when considered as a whole see Adelumola v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 73) 683.
As Oputa, JSC, so aptly put in Adelumola v. The State (supra) for example, we all know that 2 plus 2 makes 4. If a witness testifies that 2 plus 2 makes 5 and he is believed, his arithmetic does not cease to be wrong because the trial Court erroneously believed him. There, and in such a case, an appellate Court can intervene.

The Supreme Court is not in the habit of interfering with concurrent findings of two lower Courts where there is no reason such as perversity leading to those findings and in that regard those findings remain untouched See Habibu Usman v The State (2014) All FWLR (Pt.713) 1929; Jimmy v The State (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 714) 119.

What the Court below did tallied with the findings and conclusion of the learned trial judge. And on concurrent findings of the two Courts below and with the pride of place of the trial Court in its unique position, this Court had this to say in Isreal Aruu & Anor v Okechukwu Nwobodo 54 NSCQR (Pt.11) 894 895.
"The trial Court has the best opportunity of seeing the witness and hearing them give evidence; the Court was best placed to assess such evidence based on the demeanour of each witness. The appellate Court has not got these opportunities. It only sees written records and counsel who are not legal witnesses And so, when the Court of Appeal agreed with the findings of fact made by the High Court and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant, the attitude of this Court is clear. The concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below will never be disturbed so far as the findings are not tainted with miscarriage of justice."

This Court has stated in UDOFIA v. DPP – SC. 64/1984 of 7th December, 1984 (see Digest of Supreme Court Cases Vol. 10 Pp.566-567) that issues of credibility should be left to the Judge who saw, heard and believed the witness and that generally an appellate Court is bound by the findings of the trial Court especially when the findings relate to credibility of witnesses.

Learned Counsel submits further that when a decision is perverse, the appellate Court can intervene in the interest of justice and set it aside. That undoubtedly is the law. See Nepa v. OSOSANYA (2004) 1 SC (pt.1) 159 at 175; AGBOMEJI v. BAKARE (1998) 7 SC (pt.10) 10. It is however not enough for a party to assert that the judgment of a law Court which enjoys the presumption of regularity by dint of Section 150 Evidence Act, 1990. (now Section 168 of Evidence Act, 2011), is perverse. He must show how the decision is perverse. The basic rule is, he who asserts must prove.

It is trite that the decision of a Court of law on any disputed point or fact must be on evidence legally before it. Accordingly, a fact neither in the body of the legal evidence nor forming part of the legally admitted evidence cannot be used to contradict any evidence validly before the Court. See THE STATE v. OGBUBUNJO (2001) FWLR (pt.37) 1097 at 1115 – 1116; (2001) 2 NWLR (pt.698) 576 at 598 – 599. It is not permissible for Courts of law to act on facts extraneous to the proceedings, which though may be relevant.

It settled that no judge can or is entitled to reverse vary or alter the order or decision by another judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
See Amanabu v. Okafor (1966) ANLR 205.

There is no controversy on the fact that the Court is empowered to, in an appropriate circumstances, grant an order of injunction to protect the existing right of a person from unlawful invasion by another. Generally, the claim for an injunction is won and lost on the basis of the existence of competing legal rights. Therefore, where the applicant for an injunction has no legal right recognisable by the Court, there is no power to grant the applicant an injunction. But injunction being an equitable remedy, he who comes to equity, must come with clean hands. See; Chief T.A.L Akapo (Ojora of Lagos) Vs. Alhaji H.A. Hakeem-Habeeb & Ors (1992) 7 SCNJ 119; (1992) NWLR (Pt. 247) 266; (1992) LPELR 325 (SC) Engineer S. D. Yalaju Amaye Vs. Associated Registry Engineering Contractors Ltd & Ors (1990) 6 SC 157; (1990) NWLR (Pt. 145) 22; (1990) LPELR- 3511 (SC).

Furthermore, it is trite that this Court will not set aside, except same is clearly perverse, the concurrent findings of fact of the Court of trial and the court below vide Bakare v The State (1987) 1 NWLR. (Pt.52) 579; Ajeigbe v. Odedina (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 548 (598A).

The case above cited Obasanjo & 2 Ors v Yusuf & Anor (supra) is in line with the rock solid principle that jurisdiction cannot be donated nor assumed at will by a Court because the particular Court is confronted by some infractions criminal in content. It is not a matter for sentiments. See Jikantoro & 6 Ors v Dantoro & 5 Ors (2004) 5 SC (Pt. 2) 1 at 21.

None of the motions had come up for hearing at the lower Court as at the time that it heard and ruled on the preliminary objections of the 1st and 2nd respondents. The law is well established that a Court has a duty to hear and determine all applications pending before it before making a final pronouncement by way of delivery of judgment. See Cookey v. Fombo (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 182, 201, United Parcel Service Ltd v. Ufot (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 314) 337, 356, BCE Consulting Engineering v. NNPC (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1691) 136, 175 and Newswatch Communication Ltd v.
Atta (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144, 168 – 169. PER EKANEM, J.C.A.

None of the motions had come up for hearing at the lower Court as at the time that it heard and ruled on the preliminary objections of the 1st and 2nd respondents. The law is well established that a Court has a duty to hear and determine all applications pending before it before making a final pronouncement by way of delivery of judgment. See Cookey v. Fombo (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 182, 201, United Parcel Service Ltd v. Ufot (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 314) 337, 356, BCE Consulting Engineering v. NNPC (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1691) 136, 175 and Newswatch Communication Ltd v.
Atta (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144, 168 – 169. PER EKANEM, J.C.A.

Where however, the issue of jurisdiction is raised, it should be examined in all ramifications. It should not be compartmentalized and subjected to piecemeal examination and treatment, Oloba v Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (pt. 84) 508. The very many faces of jurisdiction should come under the searchlight and be pronounced upon, notwithstanding that it might not have been brought to the attention of the Court. CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C .

Once the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the matter before it, it has a duty to put an end to the proceedings, Sken-consult (Nig.) Ltd v Ukey [1981] 1 SC 6, 25; Adesokan and Ors. v. Adetunji and Ors. [1994] LPELR-152 (SC); Metilelu v. Olowo-Opejo and Anor [2006] LPELR-11598 (SC). CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C .

It is trite that a Court has power to raise an issue suo motu in respect of any matter before it, however the power of the Court must be exercised judicially in respect of matters relevant and necessary for the determination of the dispute before it. See Sunday Gbagbarigha v. Mr. Adekumo Toruemi & Anor. (2012) 12 SCNJ Pg. 140; Blessing Toyin Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) 3 SCNJ Pg. 384 ACB Ltd v. Crestline Services Ltd (1991) 6 NWLR Pt. 197, Pg. 301. PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.

The Court is under a duty not to give over and above what a party has claimed. Whilst a Court may have jurisdiction to make monetary award less than what a party claims, the Court lacks competence to award more than what is in the claim. See Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Southport Corporation (1956) AC 218; Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR Pg. 372; BIMT Ventures Ltd v. Linpark Nig. Ltd (2009) LPELR-8731 (CA); Bellview Airlines Ltd. v. Aluminium City (2007) LPELR- 8465 (CA). PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.

It is of fundamental importance that reasons be given for conclusions and decision. This is because it is the reasons that show that the conclusion and decisions are derived from a consideration of the case before the Court and show the reasoning process that resulted in the conclusion and decisions. Without the reasons, the conclusions and decisions would clearly be baseless and perverse. The lack of reasons render the conclusions and decisions products of intuitiveness, irrationality and arbitrariness. See Agbanelo v. UBN Ltd (2000) LPELR – 234 (SC), Doma & Anor v.
INEC & Ors (2012) LPELR- 78 22 (SC). In Obmiami Brick & Stone (Nig) Ltd ACB Ltd (1992) LPELR 21 77 (SC) this Court held concerning the absence of reasons for a dismissal of a claim thusly – “If that dismissal is meant to be, and in fact should be, a Judgment of the Court, reasons must be given. It is not for the appellate Court to speculate why a case was dismissed, non-suited or struck out- The reason for doing so must appear on the record of the lower Court.
It is not a case of decision as canvassed by the appellant, it is in the interest of justice that any party should know why he has lost or won the case” This Court in Ogboru v. Uduaghan & Ors (2012) LPELR – 8267 (SC) held thusly that “It has been stated in Abacha V Fawehinmi (2002) FWLR (Pt.4) 568 that the substance of a judgment of a Court is embodied in its ratio decidendi or ration(s) in the case, that is the reason or reasons for the decision(s) as against mere passing remarks” . Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili J.S.C.

Jurisdiction simply means a Court’s power to decide a case or issue. It also refers to the authority that a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. See amongst a myriad of precedents the cases of: (1) Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unlimited v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) P.1 and (2) Audu v. APC & Ors. (2019) LPELR-48134 (SC). The issue of jurisdiction is threshold as it is very fundamental and goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine a suit.
Where a Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a matter but goes to adjudicate over the matter, the entire proceedings, no matter how well conducted and decided, would amount to a nullity. It is therefore very crucial that a Court decides first the issue of its jurisdiction at the commencement of a trial particularly where there is a challenge to the same, before looking into the extent of judicial power exercisable under that jurisdiction.
The law is quite trite that jurisdiction is vested in Courts only by the legislations that created them, such as, the Constitution, Decrees, Laws, Acts and Edicts. This is so sacrosanct that outside of the enabling legislations, the Court cannot by itself or by the agreement of the parties cloak it with jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a Court is thus confined, limited and circumscribed by the statute that created the Court. See the cases of: (1) Galadima v. Tambai (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 677) p.1; (2) Onuorah v. KRPL & Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) p.393; (3) Afribank (Nig.) PLC v.
Akwara (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) p.619; (4) Dangana & Anor v. Usman & Ors. (2012) LPELR-25012 (SC) and (5) Nweke v. FRN (2019) LPELR -46946 (SC). PER OMOLEYE, J.C.A.

The law is trite, that while considering an interlocutory application, the trial Court must restrain itself from commenting on the substance of the main case, ahead of time, or from delving into the substantive matter. See Abdullahi Vs Nigerian Army & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45202 (SC), where it was held: “The law frowns seriously on a Court taking on substantive issues fit only for the appeal, when hearing interlocutory applications.
In other words, care must be taken to avoid making observations in its ruling on that application, which might appear to pre-judge the main issue in the proceedings relative to the said application – see Mortune V. Gambo (1979) LPELR-1913(SC) and Buremoh V. Akande (2017) LPELR-41565(SC), wherein M. D. Muhammad, JSC, aptly observe – A Court must avoid the determination of a substantive issue at the interlocutory stage. It is never proper for a Court to make pronouncement in the course of interlocutory proceedings on issues before the Court.
Interlocutory applications – – must remain the handmaid and aid that enable the Court reach the ultimate goal of doing substantial justice between the parties in the real issues in litigation between Parties.” Per AUGIE, JSC. PER MBABA, J.C.A.

Issue of locus standi of the Respondents, raised in the preliminary objection, was fatal. The Court had a duty to consider and resolve every genuine issue properly raised before it, for determination. See News Watch Communication Vs Atta (2006) 4 SCNJ 282 at 297. See also Obionwu & Ors Vs INEC (2013) LPELR – 22573 (CA) and Honey Well Flour Mills Plc Vs Eco Bank (2018) LPELR – 45127 (SC), where it was held: “It is now well-settled that, except in clearest of terms, it is the duty of all lower Courts to consider all issues placed before them, A. G.
Leventis Plc v Akpu (2007) LPELR – 5 (SC); Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of Celestial Church of Christ and Ors ​(2000) 6 SC (pt.II) 60; [2006] 6 SCNJ (pt. 299) 426, 422, Ikpeazu v. Otti and Ors (2016) LPELR- 40055 (SC) 19; A – C, Katto v. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (pt. 240) 126, 149, Okonji v. Njokanma [1991] 7 NWLR (pt. 202) 131, 150, Chukwu v. Soleh Boneh (2000) 2 SCNJ 18, 38, Brawal Shipping (Nig) Ltd v. F.I. Onwadike Co. Ltd (2000) 6 SCNJ 508, 522, Ojogbue v. Nnubia [1972] 6 SC 227; Yakassai v. Incar Motors Ltd. (1975) 5 SC 107, Citec International Estate Limited & Ors v.
Josiah Oluwole Francis & Ors (2014) LPELR – 22314 (SC), C.N. Okpala and Sons Ltd v. Nigerian Breweries Plc (2017) LPELR-43826(SC) 17; A-F.” Per NWEZE, JSC. PER MBABA, J.C.A.

It is settled that jurisdiction of Courts is donated and limited by the Constitution and/or statutes. Where the Constitution or statute does not clothe a Court with jurisdiction over a matter, neither the Court itself nor parties before it can confer jurisdiction on the Court to adjudicate over such a matter, whatever the nature, be it an application, a suit or an appeal. No Court or Tribunal has the power to widen the extent of jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution and/or statute. See DICKSON OGUNSEINDE VIRYA FARMS LTD V.
SOCIETE GENERALE BANK LTD & ORS (2018) LPELR-43710 (SC); KAWAWU & ANOR V. PDP & ORS (2016) LPELR-41387 (SC); PDP vs OKOROCHA & ORS (2012) LPELR-7832 (SC). PER ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C

It is an established and known principle of law that being creatures of the Constitution or statute, as the case may be, the Courts only exercise judicial powers specifically vested by the Constitution or relevant statute which they cannot validly expand or extend. They are legally bound by the defined and specified boundaries of the jurisdiction prescribed by the Constitution or relevant statute and lack the competence to venture outside or beyond the jurisdiction vested therein. Nigeria Re-insurance Corp. v. Cudjoe (2008) All FWLR (pt. 414)1455, Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra), Obaro v.
Hassan (2013) LPELR – 20089 (SC), Egbue v. Araka (1988) 7 SC (pt. 111) 98, (1988) 1 NWLR (pt. 82) 598, SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR  317, (2011) 5 SCM, 187, Adesina v. Kola (1993) 7 SCNJ, 79 (1993) 1 NWLR (pt. 298) 182, Egharevba v. Eribo (2010) 9 NWLR (pt. 1199) 411, Adetayo v. Ademola (2010) 15 NWLR (pt. 1215) 169, Ndaeyo v. Ogunaya (1977) 1 SC, 7, (1977) All NLR, 169. MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C.

It is also settled law that Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act can be involved in order to facilitate the speedy administration of justice, as it is designed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and hearings. Instead of sending the case back to the trial Judge for; trial, Section 16, in an appropriate case.
Empowers the Court of Appeal to assume jurisdiction of the trial Court and determine the real question in controversy between the parties so as to save much needed time in the administration of justice in this country.” His Lordship, however, cautioned that:- “…Section 16 is not an all-purpose or limitless power of the Court of Appeal to divest the High Court of the original jurisdiction conferred on it by law. It is settled law that the Court of Appeal cannot hide under Section 16 to expand its jurisdiction.
The powers conferred on the Court of Appeal by Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act are exercisable by that Court where certain fundamental conditionalities are met, such as:- (a) Availability of the necessary materials to consider and adjudicate in the matter; (b) The length of time between the disposal of the action at the trial Court and the hearing of the appeal; (c) The interest of justice by eliminating further delay that would arise in the event of remitting the case back to the trial Court for rehearing and the hardship such an order would cause on either or both parties to the case.” From this position of the law, in dealing with an appeal before it, the Court below, by dint of the provisions in Section 15 (or 16) of the Court of Appeal Act, possesses the full and all judicial powers and jurisdiction of first instance or trial Court to take appropriate steps, make necessary orders and give directives as if the appeal was a proceeding brought before it as a first instance or trial Court.
It was in line with the provision in Section 15 (or 16) of the Court of Appeal Act, that the Court of Appeal Rules, 2007 (applicable at the time the order complained of was made) in Order 6, Rule 2 (1) provided, inter alia, that:- “All appeals shall be by way of rehearing … “ ​In simple terms, by these provisions, all appeals brought before the Court below were to be dealt with or treated by way of re-hearing of the real issues or questions in controversy or dispute between the parties as presented in the case before the Court of first instance or trial Court and in respect of which that Court rendered its decision against which the appeal was filed.
Unlike the Court of first instance or trial Court, though, the re-hearing of an appeal by the Court below is done and conducted on the printed Record of Proceedings of the actual trial or hearing at the first instance or trial Court transmitted from that Court to the Court below as the Record of the Appeal. The re-hearing of an appeal before the Court below is therefore, primarily, based on the printed record of what transpired, happened or occurred in the proceedings conducted by the first instance or trial Court forwarded for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal, to the Court below.
Re-hearing by the Court below involves a review and consideration of the facts and all the material evidence produced by the parties before the first instance or trial Court, along with the evaluation of the evidence, inferences drawn from and findings made by that Court on the evidence as well as the decision/s reached in the case in line with the complaints made against the decision/s in the grounds of appeal, as contained in the pointed Record of Appeal.
Therefore, except where necessary, the re-hearing in an appeal before the Court below does not mean or involve the hearing of witnesses or taking/receiving evidence . -PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C.

The law is settled by a long line of decisions of this Court that the Court of appeal lacks the jurisdiction to revisit or vary its decision dismissing an appeal before it for want of prosecution consequent upon failure to file appellant’s brief except where the decision was made without the Court being made aware that a brief had been filed or that an application for extension of time to file appellant’s brief had been filed before the date the appeal was dismissed.
An application for extension of time to file brief filed in the morning of the day the appeal was dismissed, that was not brought to the attention of that Court cannot operate to enable that Court revisit or vary its dismissal of the appeal or relist the appeal after dismissal. In Asalu V Dakan and Ors (2006) SC (Pt.111) 120 this Court restated thusly “This Court has in a number of cases held that an appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal for failure to file appellant’s brief is final and that such an appeal cannot be revived by the Court of Appeal.
See Olowu V Abolore (1993) 5 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (Pt.293) 255, Babayagi V Bida (1998) 1-2 SC 108 (1998) 7 Nigeria Weekly Law Report (Pt.538) 367” see also Ekpeto V Wanogho (2004)20 NSCQR 333 at 344 . – PER EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.

The procedure which the Appellant is complaining of under this issue, that is the hearing of a matter during vacation upon an affidavit of urgency is governed by the rules of the lower Court in Order 8 thereof. For purposes of clarity, the whole of Order 8 Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Adamawa State High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2013 under which the matter was heard is herein reproduced thus: ‘’3.
The several offices of the Court shall be open at such times as the Chief Judge shall direct. 4. (1) The sitting of the Court for the dispatch of causes shall be held on every week-day except that the Court shall not sit: (a) on any public holiday; (b) during the week beginning with Easter Monday; (c) during the period beginning on Christmas Eve and ending on 2nd January next following. (2) There shall be an annual vacation of the Court to commence on such date in August and of such duration, not exceeding six weeks, as the Chief Judge may by notification in the Gazette appoint. 5. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4, any action may be heard by a Judge in Court during any of the periods mentioned in Sub-rule (1) (b) or (c) of Rule 4 or Sub-rule (2) where the action is urgent. (2) An application for an urgent hearing shall be made by motion ex-parte and the decision of the judge on the application shall be final.’ ’ PER TUKUR, J.C.A.

​ Even in civil matters which we do not view as serious as the criminal matters since civil matters do not attract jail term, the Supreme Court was still of the firm view that it must be conducted in open Court. The decision of the trial judge on his own to hear the matter in chambers occasioned a fundamental irregularity. The Supreme Court stated as follows: “The hearing of this matrimonial case took place in judge’s chambers. Neither the counsel nor the parties requested for the hearing of the divorce proceedings in camera.
A judge’s chambers is not a Court Hall to which the public will normally have any right to access. The petition and answers did not contain such matters, which by law, ought to be heard in camera in a Courtroom.” Again in Edibo v. The State (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) at 306, Tabai JSC, captured it succinctly, thus: “The arraignment and taking of plea of an accused person is the very commencement of a criminal trial. It is the stage when the accused person appears in Court, the charge explained to his understanding and pleads thereto in person and not even through his counsel.
It is a very fundamental aspect of any criminal proceedings and that underscores the need for the strict and mandatory compliance in matters relating thereto. Thus, any criminal trial no matter how well conducted, without the plea of the accused first and properly taken is a nullity. In the instant case, the proceedings of the 19th January, 1998 wherein the plea of the appellant and others were taken in the judge’s chambers was not only irregular, it was fundamentally defective and rendered the entire proceedings null and void.” PER NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.

​ Remarkably, evaluation of evidence connotes the appraisal/assessment of evidence, both viva voce and documentary before a Court, and ascription of probative value to them which results in finding of facts. This primary evidentiary duty falls squarely within the exclusive preserve of a trial Court. It enjoys this prerogative in that it has the singular advantage, which cannot be recaptured by an appellate Court, to watch the witnesses, form impression on their demeanour and evaluate the credibility or otherwise of their evidence, see Okpa v. State (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1587) 1; Kekong v.
State (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1596) 108; Ezeani v. FRN (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1686) 221. An appellate Court is disrobed of the vires to interfere with a finding of a trial Court anchored on demeanour and credibility of witnesses, see Adegbite v. State (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1612) 183, Adebanjo v. State (2019) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1688) 121; Tope v. State (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 289.
Where a trial Court has justifiably performed this primary duty, an appellate Court does not form the habit of imposing and/or substituting its views for its own save in exceptional circumstances: where the findings are against the drift of evidence, perverse and smell of miscarriage of justice, see Idoko v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1614) 117; Ikpa v. State (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1609) 175; Enukora v. FRN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 355; Sunday v. State (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1600) 251; Ewugba v. State (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 262; Kamila v. State (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1621) 252; Abbas v.
The People of Lagos State (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 213. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

From the foregoing therefore, I am of the opinion that the refusal and dismissal of the application of the Appellants by the trial Court was not right just because of mere irregularity. See P.H.M.B vs. Edosa (2001) FWLR (Pt. 41) 1799 AT 1809, Para F. For the avoidance of doubt, below are the words of the Supreme Court on this issue: “…this Court is replete with multiplicity of decided authorities to the effect that a Court is entitled to grant an application brought under a wrong rule of Court or statute provided there is legal basis for it.” See Maja vs.
Samouris (2002) FWLR (Pt. 98) 818 (2002) 9 NSQR 546 AT 567. In fact, this Court had this to say in Uchendu vs. Ogboni (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 603) 337 AT 351 (1999) SCNJ 64 thus: “It is trite that a particular rule of Court or law under which a motion is brought is generally stated in the motion paper but failure to do this will not make the motion incompetent nor the order upon which the motion is granted invalid, so long as there exist a rule of law which can back up the motion.” Per Okoro JSC (Pp. 21-25, Para. F) in the case of Bode Thomas vs.
Federal Judicial Service Commission (2016) LPELR-48124 (SC) has this to say: “…where a Court has jurisdiction to make an order, the fact the power of the Court is involved under a wrong law or rule of Court is no reason for not making the order or where it is made, it is no reason for setting it aside. See also the cases of Salawu Oke & Ors. vs. Musilim Aiyedun & Anor (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 548, Dr. Maja vs. Mr. Costa Samouris (Supra) and Witt & Busch Ltd. vs. Dale Power Systems Plc. (2007) LPELR-3499 (SC).” PER ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.

It is important to draw here, that both the Court Martial and the Civil Court have jurisdiction to try a person subject to service law on matters of civil offences. What is left to resolve is whether there are circumstances surrounding the assumption of such jurisdiction. I am not unmindful of the nature of the special arrangement made for the persons subject to judicial service law as expounded in Nganjiwa’s Case (supra) cited by the Appellant’s counsel.
Like in the case of the jurisdiction of the Courts, the powers to investigate a person subject to service law is not exclusive to the 1st Respondent. One may query, other than the person’s employer, who is more positioned to investigate an army officer who is alleged to be living above his lawful earning? Neither Section 7 nor 19 of the EFCC Act could be construed to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the 1st Respondent or the civil Courts in this respect. In this regard, decision of the Supreme Court recommended by the 2nd Respondent in Attorney General Lagos State v.
Dosunmu is apt, where it was held that: “It is the duty of the Courts to expound their jurisdiction but it is not part of our duty to expand our jurisdiction. That will require legislation. The best advice here is that given by Rigby, LJ in Re Watkins [1896] LR 2 CD p. 339 that we ought not to overstep our jurisdiction because we think it might be advantageous so to do .” PER TSAMMANI, J.C.A.

Decidedly there are conditions before a Court can refer a case to the Court of Appeal for determination.
These conditions are that: (a) The question must involve an interpretation or application of the constitution. (b) The question for reference must involve a substantive question of law, and it is the duty of the Court making the reference to be satisfied that the questions are indeed substantial. (c) The Court making the reference to the High Court must refrain from giving its opinion. (d) The question as to the interpretation or application of the constitution, must arise in the proceedings in the High Court in connection with an issue before the Court making the reference. AUDU V. A.G.
FEDERATION AND ANOR. (2012) LPELR–15527 (SC). From the above, it is clear that the discretionary power of the Court comes to play, if the Court is of the opinion that there is no substantial issue of law, there is no need stating a case to the Court of Appeal for determination. PER PEMU, JC.A.

It is now firmly established in our jurisprudence, or administrative law, that where a Court or judicial body is differently consisted during the hearing or on the various occasions when it met, or where one member who did not hear evidence (either the whole or part of the total evidence) took part in arriving at the decision; the effect on the proceedings is to render them null and void: Adeigbe & Anor v. Kusimo & Ors (1965) LPELR-25226(SC); Taiwah III v. Egwudzi 2 WACA 52.
This Court has been adopting and following this principle: that it amounts to denial of fair hearing for the judex or a member of a panel of quasi-judicial body to participate in rendering a decision without hearing either the whole evidence or part thereof, as can be seen from Nwalutu v. LPDC (2019) All FWLR (Pt. 997) 68 at 95, Reported as Nwalutu v. NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 174; Ubwa v. Tiv Traditional Council Ors. (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 884) 427; Sokoto State Government v. Kamdex (Nig.) Ltd. (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1034) 466. EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.

It is our humble submission that the Committee’s proceeding and Direction in issue being quasi-criminal in nature, same members of the Committee that took the plea of the appellant ought to adjudicate over the matter to its conclusion. See the case of Gwarzo v. C.O.P. (2014) LPELR-23470(SC). In the case of Kalejaiye v. L.P.D.C. (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1674) page 365 at 378, 385, this Court held: “The issue of composition of a Tribunal is intrinsic to the fulfillment of the fair hearing requirements of Section 36(1) of the Constitution.
A Court or Tribunal’s constitution must be such that guarantees its independence and impartiality and guarantees fair hearing to the accused. Where the panel is constituted in such a way that it affects a person’s right to fair hearing, whatever decision is reached by such a panel will result in a nullity. Where some members of a Tribunal who gave judgment were not present throughout the proceedings, and did not hear all the evidence, this vitiates the whole trial, and an appellate Court has no option but to declare the whole proceedings before the tribunal a nullity.
In the instant case, the membership of the Committee which found the appellant guilty of infamous conduct and directed that his name be struck out from the Roll of legal practitioners in Nigeria was not consistent.” This Court further held: “Though variations in the bench do no make a judgment a nullity, however such variatiuon makes the judgment unsatisfactory and liable to be struck out.” EJEMBI EKO, JSC.

A fortiori, a Court of competent jurisdiction denotes a Court that is duly cloaked with the power or authority to adjudicate upon a particular act (matter). That is to say, a Court duly recognized by law as possessing the right, power or authority to adjudicate a dispute or controversy. Also termed competent Court (Tribunal). See Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th edition (2019) @ 445 & 1017. IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.:

Contradistinctively, a Court devoid of jurisdictional competence may be likened to a ‘Kangaroo Court’ properly so-called.
Most interestingly, it is trite that a Kangaroo Court is a caricature, self appointed tribunal or mock Court in which the rules of law and justice are wantonly disregarded, perverted, or parodied: Kangaroo Courts may be assembled by various groups, such as prisoners in a jail (to settle disputes between inmates) and players on a baseball team (to “punish” team mates who commit fielding errors). … A Court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, especially so as to render a fair possible proceeding impossible … A sham legal proceeding.
See Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition 2019 (opcit) @ 448. IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.:

The settled principle of law is that evaluation of evidence and ascription of weight thereto remains the province of the trial Court which heard and observed the demeanor of the witnesses and is consequently in a better position to form an opinion as to the credibility of the said witnesses. See: EMMANUEL EGHAREVBA V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS (2016) LPELR-40045 (SC). PER ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

The settled position of the law is that when an issue is not placed before the Court for discourse, the Court has no business whatsoever delving into it and dealing with it.
A Court of law has no business whatsoever delving into issues that are not properly placed before it for resolution, a Court of law has no business being over-generous and open-handed, dishing out unsolicited reliefs, a Court of law is neither father Christmas granting unsolicited reliefs, nor Knight errant looking for skirmishes all about the place, a Court of law as an impartial arbiter must confine itself to the reliefs sought and the issues before it submitted for resolution. See: EJOWHOMU V. EDOK-ETER LTD (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 39) 1 at 21, OSSAI V.
WAKWAH (2006) 2 SCNJ 19 at 36 and CHIEF FRANK EBBA V. WASHI OGODO & ANOR ​ (1984) 4 SCNLR 372. TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

A Court is said to have jurisdiction and competence to determine a suit when:- (a) It is properly constituted as regards the number and qualification of its members; (b) The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and (c) The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law. Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Akeem v Unibadan (2001) 15 NWLR (pt 736) 352. JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

In IKPEAZU V. OTTI & ORS (2016) LPELR-40055 (SC), this Court came across similar situation, and my Lord GALADIMA, JSC did not hesitate in holding as follows: “This point is fairly settled in a number of decisions of this Court to the effect that arguments or submissions on incompetent issues and/or grounds of appeal cannot be lumped together with those of competent grounds of appeal and issues for determination.
If this is done it will not be the business of the Court to “sift the chaff from the grains” an exercise that would clearly involve arguments in respect of the valid grounds from the invalid ones. It is true that such an exercise may involve the Court in descending into the arena of dispute which will often becloud the judgment of the Court.
See KOREDE v ADEDOKUN (2001) 1 NWLR (pt. 736) 483 at 499.” It is the law that where a concoction of issues is presented to the Court by Counsel, and the issues are constituted by valid and invalid issues for determination and grounds of appeal, the Court has no business investing precious judicial time filtering arguments of Counsel or guessing which submissions are competent or incompetent, or sifting the chaff from the grain, this is not the business of the Court, the only duty on the Court is to order that the issues be struck out for want of competence. TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

A Court is said to be competent to adjudicate on a matter when: (1) It is properly constituted as regards members and qualification of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another: (2) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and (3) the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See Madukolu Vs. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

The law is also known that where a Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate over a matter, it cannot make other valid pronouncement or order in the case than one striking out the matter on ground of wants or lack of jurisdiction. Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in the case of Akinbinu v. Oseni (1992) I NWLR (pt. 215) 97, (1992) 23 N.S.C.C, (pt. 1) 22 stated that:- “The Court of Appeal is only entitled to make pronouncements in respect of an appeal in which it has jurisdiction. See Tukur v. Govt. of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 117) 517.
Where the Court has no jurisdiction, any observations it makes in respect of the matter is made without jurisdiction. Its pronouncements do not even enjoy the status of an obiter dicta. If there was no jurisdiction, quees ito cadit.” See also Akinbobola v. Plisson Fisko Nig. Ltd. (1991) 1 SC (pt. II) 1, (1991) 1 SCNJ, 129, Obi v. INEC (2007) 7 SC, 268, Gombe v. P.W.Nig. Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (pt. 402) 402, Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) SCNLR. 390, Adesokan v. Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (pt. 346) 540. MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C.

The law is established that in determining if the proposed grounds of appeal prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard, the Court is not to decide if the appeal will succeed or fail on the proposed grounds and should only decide if the grounds are substantial, arguable or triable. Experience has shown that it is difficult to draw a dividing line between the two types of decisions. In Imegwu v.
Okolocha & Ors (supra), this Court highlighted this challenge thusly – “He is however not expected to show that the appeal will succeed, yet he is expected to exhibit good grounds showing reasonable prospect of success in the appeal.” In most cases, not much is left to be determined after a Court has decided that a proposed ground of appeal is substantial or arguable or not. This is because such a decision results from the analysis of the grounds, the judgment sought to be appealed against and other proceedings.
To avoid the risk of deciding the success or failure of the grounds of appeal at this stage, the judicial practice of a cursory glance at the proposed grounds of appeal alone and pronouncing them as arguable without reasons for the conclusion, has developed and become prevalent . PER EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.

In Sokoto State Govt. v. Kamdex (Nig.) Ltd. (2007) 7 NWLR (P. 1034) 466 at 489 paras. C. D; 503, paras F, the Supreme Court held that:
“Where a Court is differently constituted during the hearing of a case, or an various occasion when it met, or where one member did not hear the whole evidence the effect on the proceedings is to render it null and void. In the instant case, the appellant’s appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal on 5-11-2003 by a panel of Justices of that Court made up of Ogebe, Aderemi and Chukwuma-Eneh, JJCA whereas the judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by the panel of Justices comprising of Galadima, Aderemi and Chukwuma-Eneh; JJCA. Consequently, the judgment was a nullity. See Ubwa v.
Tiv Area Traditional Council (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 884) 427; Adeigbe v. Kusimo (1965) 1 All NLR (Reprint) 260.” Indeed the principle of law is especially pertinent where the reconstitution of the panel occurred in the course of hearing oral evidence which involves evaluation of credibility of witnesses rather than a hearing on printed records. Thus in Arum v. Nwobodo (2013) LPELR-20390(SC), (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt.1362) 374, the Supreme Court reiterated the position of the law as enunciated in Adeigbe & Anor. v. Kusimo & Ors; (1965) 4 NSCC 188, as follows:
“In that judgment Sir Adetokunbo Ademola CJN observed at page 191 supra that – “We are in no doubt about the correctness of what the learned appeal judge said in his judgment that there are abundant decisions in the High Court and in the West African Court of Appeal on the point that where a Court is differently constituted during the hearing of a case, or on various occasions when it met or where one member did not hear the whole evidence, the effect on the proceedings is to render them null and void. The learned judge had in mind among others the following cases- Egba N.A. v.
Adeyanju (1936) 13 NLR 77; Tawiah III v. Ekwudzi (1936) 3 WACA 52: Otwiwa v. Kwaseko (1937) 3 WACA 230; Damoah v. Tarbil (1947) 12 WACA 167; Runka v. Katsina N. A. (1950) 13 WACA 98”. Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Invariably, the term ‘Court of competent jurisdiction’ denotes a Court of law that has the power and authority to adjudicate upon an action, matter or controversy. Also termed ‘competent Court’. Contradistinctively, a Court devoid of competent jurisdiction could be likened to what is notoriously known in legal parlance as a ‘Kangaroo Court’. Jurisprudentially, a Kangaroo Court denotes: 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock Court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted or parodied.
Kangaroo Courts may be assembled by various groups, such as prisoners in a jail (to settle disputes between inmates) and players on a baseball team (to punish teammates who commit fielding errors). 2. A Court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding. See Black’s Law Dictionary 11th edition (2019) @ 445 and 448. IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C

The delivery of the ruling during the Court’s annual vacation, in my considered view is at best, an irregularity, which cannot vitiate the proceedings. Order 5 Rule 1 (2) provides that failure to comply with the rules as to time place, manner or form, shall be treated as an irregularity and may not nullify such steps taken in the proceedings.
I agree with learned counsel for the 1st respondent, relying on the dictum of Tobi, JCA (as he then was) in Veritas Vs Citi Trust Investment Ltd. (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt.281) 349 @ 369 to the effect that the appellants have not shown that they suffered any injustice by the delivery of the ruling during the Court’s annual vacation . Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C

In this circumstance, I will answer this question in the negative. As addressed above, the entire proceeding before the Court of Appeal was a nullity. This is because all the members who heard the appeal and those who wrote the appeal were not the same. That is to say, that the members who wrote the appeal were not present throughout the hearing of appeal which includes delivery. PER NWEZE, J.S.C.

Generally, a Court is competent when, among other things, it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the Bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another. Any defect in competence is fatal and the proceedings are a nullity, no matter how well conducted and decided. The defect is extrinsic to the adjudication.
Section 294(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, which is relevant to issue 1 in this appeal, provides as follows: “294. (1) Every Court established under this Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter determined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery thereof. (2) Each Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeal shall express and deliver his opinion in writing or may state in writing that he adopts the opinion of any other Justice, who delivers a written opinion: Provided that it shall not be necessary for all the Justices who heard a cause or matter to be present when judgment is to be delivered and the opinion of a Justice may be pronounced or read by any other Justice whether or not he was present at the hearing. (3) A decision of a Court consisting of more than one judge shall be determined by the opinion of the majority of its members. (4) For the purpose of delivering its decision under this section, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal or the National Industrial Court shall be deemed to be duly constituted if at least one member of that Court sits for the purpose.
Subsection (2), in my humble opinion, is the most germane. It provides that every Justice of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal must express and deliver his opinion in writing. Where he intends to merely adopt the opinion of another Justice, the opinion of that other Justice must be in writing and the Justice adopting it must also state that he does so in writing. By Subsection (4), for the purpose of delivering judgment, any Justice of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal can read the opinion of any Justice that has already been reduced into writing.
It cannot be gainsaid that only a Justice who participated in the hearing of an appeal could reduce his opinion into writing. If he did not participate in the hearing of the appeal and is therefore not seised of the matter, on what basis could he express an opinion thereon? In Ubwa Vs Tiv Area Council (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 884) 427 @ 437 A – F, His Lordship Kalgo, JSC, clarified the position as follows: “By Section 247 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 9 of Court of Appeal Act.
Cap. 75 (Laws of Federation, 1990) the Court of Appeal is duly constituted for purpose of hearing and determining any Appeal, if it consists of at least three Justices of that Court and although a Justice of the Court who did not take part in hearing an appeal may lawfully deliver a judgment or opinion of another Justices who took part in hearing the appeal but is unavoidably absent, any judgment delivered by the three Justices in any appeal must be by those Justices who actually heard the appeal. Failure to do so, will render the judgment a nullity. See: Adeigbe & Anor. V.
Kusimo & Ors. (1965) 1 All NLR (reprint) 260 (1965) NMLR 284 at 287; Okolie Chime & Anor. V. Ofili Elikwu & Anor. (1965) 2 All NLR (Reprint) 16. PER KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.

In its equity jurisdiction the trial Court is expected to closely monitor the conduct of the parties and in doing so, must ensure that the applicant who seeks an equitable intervention of the Court must come with clean hand making full and frank disclosure of all facts within his knowledge. An applicant who deposed to facts that are not true to his knowledge to gain advantage over his adversary ought not to have the sympathy of the Court. See ADEYEMI WORKS CONSTRUCTION (NIG) LTD. VS. OMOLEHIN (2003) LPELR 7185. PER LAMIDO, J.C.A.

​Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Untltd. v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodagbe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; A.-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017)1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175; Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1; Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548.
A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: “1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”, seeMadukolu v.
Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 2081961) NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387; Nworika v. Ononeze-Madu (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422; Adeleke v.
Oyetola (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 440. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction into a Court. PER OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

A cardinal principle of our jurisprudence is that Courts of law exist to decide the rights of parties before it and not to punish them for errors or mistakes they may make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. The necessary corollary of the above principle is that a party may at any stage of the proceedings before judgment alter or amend his pleadings or endorsements as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question(s) in controversy in a case.
There is no kind of mistake or error which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Courts cannot correct if this can be done without injustice to the other party; and even though blunders occur nowadays with disturbing regularity, a Court of law (which is also a Court of equity) imbued with a sense of justice should not suffer itself to be stampeded into chasing the shadows of these blunders rather than facing the substance of the justice of the case. See ADEKEYE v AKIN-OLUGBADE [1987] 3 NWLR (PT. 60) 214. PER AFFEN, J.C.A.

The jurisdiction vested in the Court shall, so far as practice and procedure are concerned, be exercised in the manner provided by this Act or any other enactment or by such rules and orders of Court as may be made pursuant to this Act or, in the absence of any such provisions, in substantial conformity with the practice and procedure for the time being in force in the High Court of Lagos State.” See Laibru Ltd. v. Building and Civil Engineering Contractors (1962) 2 SCNLR 118 in which a similar provision made it possible to resort to the English Rules of Court.
There is the provision in Order 13, Rule 42 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1972, then applicable when this suit was filed and the trial Court gave its ruling (but now Order 14, Rule 42 of the High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1994 and in pari materia) which states: “Any person carrying on business within the jurisdiction in a name or style other than his own name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm’s name and so far as the nature of the case will permit, all rules relating to proceedings against firms shall apply.” The first point to note is that such a person coming within the said Rule 42 may be sued, but cannot sue in his trade name.
See Mason v. Mogridge (1892) 8 TLR 805. The rule is similar to the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1965 of England (as amended), Order 81 Rule 9. That rule was taken from RSC (Rev.) 1962, Ord. 81 R. 9, formerly Ord. 48A R. 11 which itself is in fact in pari materia with our Rule 42, Order 14. As far as applicable, says Ord. 81 R.9, the rules relating to partnership shall apply to business name as if it were a firm.
That is why I said it was important to note, in the case of partnership, that there is no necessity of ascertaining the names of the individual partners for the purpose of suing the firm. The same applies to business name. I therefore agree with Mr.
Ogunkeye, learned Counsel for the respondents, when in the respondents’ brief of argument, he submits: “If Order 4 Rule 6 (FHC) enables a firm which is a partnership to be sued eo nomine and Order 13 Rule 42 (LHC) enables an individual doing business in a name other than his own to be sued in that name, then the general proposition can be asserted that an unincorporated business enterprise, regardless of the nature of its ownership can be sued eo nomine, because the ownership can only be either sole or plural, which is covered by both rules.
If that proposition is valid, then it means that there is no need to first ascertain the nature of ownership of an unincorporated business enterprise before determining whether it can be sued eo nomine. The reality is that whether it is a partnership or solely owned it can be so sued.” PER OHO, J.CA.

While it is inherent in the power of a Court to put an end to an action which is an abuse of process, the Court must exercise its power judicially and judiciously and with great circumspection: FASAKIN FOODS NIG CO. LTD vs. SHOSANYA (2003) 17 NWLR (PT 849) 237 at 247-248. The Appellant’s contention that the Respondents’ action is an abuse of process is based on multiplicity of actions. Let me restate that evidence was not adduced before the lower Court so the previous actions from which the parties, issues and subject matter could be gleaned are not in evidence.
I am not in oblivescence of the averments in the Respondents’ Statement of Claim which the Appellant referred to. It is rudimentary law that pleaded facts do not constitute evidence: AJUWON vs. AKANNI (1993) LPELR (311) 1 at 20, ELEGUSHI vs. OSENI (2005) LPELR (1111) 1 at 28 and EYIGEBE vs. IYAJI (2013) LPELR (20522) 1 at 16. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence establishing the multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues, conventional wisdom dictates circumspection in holding that this matter is an abuse of process.
I am therefore unable to agree with the Appellant, in the absence of relevant and appropriate evidence, that the Respondents’ action is an abuse of Court process. PER OGAKWU, J.C.A.

A Court of record has the inherent jurisdiction to set aside its judgment in the following circumstances, i.e., where the judgment was obtained by fraud or deceit either in the Court or of one of the parties, when the judgment is a nullity, in which case a person affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, when the Court was obviously misled into giving the judgment under the belief that the parties consented to it, where the judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction and whereby the procedure adopted, the judgment is deprived of any legitimate adjudication.
See Chime & Anor vs. Ude & Ors (1996) LPELR-848 (SC); Alao vs. A.C.B. Ltd (2000) LPELR- 408(SC); Dingyadi vs. INEC (supra); Ugba vs. Suswam (2014) LPELR-22882 (SC). PER SIRAJO, J.C.A.

In a decision (judgment or ruling) reason or reasons must be given as opposed to a general passing remark. Moreso, where the decision is appealable to a higher Court. It is important to make clear the reasons why the Court exercised its discretion in a particular way, because such discretion is subject to review by a superior Court.
Where no reason is given in a decision, it leaves room for doubt as to how the Court arrived at its decision, questions raised and decided upon with the parties wondering in the dark as to how the Court arrived at its decision apart from the fact that it makes for the statement of the law where the decision is not upturned or set aside by a superior or final Court at its final destination. From the decision of the trial Court, there is nothing on record to show how and why the trial Court arrived at its decision.
It is not clear which aspect of Order 46 of the Rules of the trial Court that was violated. The trial Court ought to have given reasons for its decision. PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.

It is settled principle of law that Courts are bound by their records. This Court in OGOLO V. FUBARA (2003) 11 NWLR (pt. 831) held as follows and I quote; “an appellate Court is always bound by the record and the record only. It has no jurisdiction to go outside the record to draw conclusions which are not supported by record. Accordingly, where the conclusion of the Court of appeal is not borne out of the record, the Supreme Court is competent to interfere as such conclusion is perverse…” TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

An appellate Court is enjoined to examine the Record in relation to the grounds of appeal filed and issues for determination; and “thereafter determine whether such issues were properly decided having regard to the evidence adduced by the Parties and the applicable laws”- see Ndike V. State - AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C